Russian-Turkish economic relations. Dossier. Russian-Turkish political relations Gradual normalization of relations

TASS DOSSIER. On March 10, 2017, negotiations between Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan and Russian President Vladimir Putin are held in Moscow. As reported on the Kremlin website, the meeting plans to discuss “the entire range of issues in Russian-Turkish relations.” The TASS-DOSSIER editors have prepared material on trade and economic cooperation between the two countries.

The legal framework for economic cooperation between both countries includes about 20 agreements, including an agreement on trade and economic cooperation (1991), a long-term program for the development of trade, economic, industrial and scientific-technical cooperation (1997), agreements on cooperation in the field of energy (1997), on the promotion and mutual protection of capital investments (1997), on maritime transport (2010).

Since the beginning of the 2000s. Bilateral economic relations developed quite dynamically. From 2002 to 2014 Trade turnover between the countries increased more than sixfold: from $5 billion to $31 billion (the peak of trade turnover occurred in 2012 - $3.3 billion). In 2015, a serious decline was recorded to $23.4 billion, which is 25% less than the previous year. According to the Federal Customs Service, exports from the Russian Federation to Turkey in 2015 were $19.4 billion, and imports were $4 billion. The decrease in mutual trade volumes was due to both the fall in world prices for hydrocarbons and a significant depreciation of the Russian national currency.

The dynamics of trade and economic relations between the two countries were negatively affected by the outbreak of the political crisis. It began after the Turkish Air Force shot down a Russian Su-24M bomber in Syria on November 24, 2015. In accordance with the decree of the President of the Russian Federation dated November 28, 2015, from January 1, 2016, a temporary ban was introduced on the import of certain types of Turkish goods (17 items, including fruits, vegetables, flowers), the employment of Turkish citizens, the performance of from Turkey for individual works and services (primarily in construction, tourism and hotel business).

Charter air flights between the Russian Federation and Turkey were stopped and a ban was introduced on the sale of tourist tours, and joint projects were frozen, in particular in the energy sector. In fact, cooperation in all areas was suspended.

In this regard, in 2016, Russian-Turkish trade turnover decreased, according to the Federal Customs Service, by 32.1% compared to 2015 and amounted to $15.84 billion, including exports decreased by 29% - to $13.69 billion imports - by 47%, to $2.14 billion. At the same time, the structure of exports and imports remained the same. Russia supplied mineral products to Turkey (in 2016 - 57%), gas, oil and other mineral fuels (56.2%), metals and products made from them (24.5%). Türkiye exported machinery, equipment and vehicles(33.2%), food products and agricultural raw materials (29.1%), textiles and footwear (9.3%), chemical products (15%). Turkey's share in Russia's total foreign trade turnover decreased in 2016 to 3.4% (in 2015 this figure was 4.4%).

According to the findings of the Turkish Research Foundation economic policy(TEPAV), Turkey’s losses due to the deterioration of relations with Russia in 2016 amounted to about $8 billion. Russia also felt the consequences of the crisis. First of all, it affected the tourism industry. Thus, according to the Association of Tour Operators of Russia, the damage to travel companies from the ban on the sale of tour packages and forced compensation to paying tourists for damages for a failed vacation amounted to at least 1.7 billion rubles.

In the summer of 2016, Erdogan apologized to Putin for the downing of the plane. During telephone conversation On June 29, 2016, the leaders of the two countries decided to normalize relations. On June 30, 2016, Putin signed a decree lifting the ban on the sale of tours to Turkey, and also providing for the lifting of restrictions on charter flights between countries.

In October 2016, the import of Turkish fruits into the country was allowed (the share of the listed types of fruits in Russian imports of this group of goods was: tangerines - 29.4%; oranges - 22.7%; peaches and nectarines - 28.3%; apricots - 80%; plums - 13%). In January 2017, Turkey's exports to Russia amounted to $150 million (in January 2016, a month after the start of sanctions restrictions, Turkey's exports to Russia amounted to $109.8 million). On March 9, 2017, the Russian government lifted the ban on the supply of onions (14.6% of total imports of this type of goods on the Russian market), cauliflower and broccoli (0.1%), salt (4.3%), chewing gum ( 44.7%) and carnations (13.5%) from Turkey.

Political normalization between Moscow and Ankara contributed to the gradual resumption of not only bilateral trade, but also the unfreezing of cooperation in such areas as energy, gas industry, nuclear projects, and tourism.

Energy

The largest Russian investment project in Turkey is the construction of the first Turkish nuclear power plant, Akkuyu (in Mersin province in southeastern Turkey). An intergovernmental agreement on its construction was signed in May 2010 (ratified by the parties in 2010). The document provides for the construction of four power units with VVER-1200 reactors with a total capacity of 4,800 megawatts. This is the world's first nuclear power plant project implemented according to the BOO (build-own-operate) model. The customer of the work on the creation of a nuclear power plant, as well as the owner of the nuclear power plant, including the generated electricity, becomes the Russian project company Akkuyu Nuclear. It was registered in December 2010.

Now its shareholders are companies authorized by the Russian government (in particular, the state corporation Rosatom holds 95% of the shares). In October 2016, the company assumed responsibility for the design, construction, maintenance, operation and decommissioning of the plant. In February 2017, the Turkish Atomic Energy Agency (TAEK, the regulatory agency) approved the design parameters of the nuclear power plant site. Preparatory work will begin in 2017. The first concrete is planned to be poured here in 2018. The first power unit is expected to be put into operation by 2023.

The total cost of the project is estimated at $22 billion. It is planned that Turkish specialists will service the station. For this purpose, students from Turkey were given the opportunity to receive specialized education at Russian universities, in particular at the National Research Nuclear University MEPhI.

Cooperation in the gas sector

Currently, Russia transports gas to Turkey via the Blue Stream gas pipeline, laid under the Black Sea, as well as via the Trans-Balkan gas pipeline (the “western corridor” through Ukraine, Moldova, Romania and Bulgaria). Russia provides about 60% of Turkey's natural gas needs, supplying about 27 billion cubic meters. m of gas per year. The gas buyers are the state oil and gas company Botas and a number of private companies.

The implementation of the Turkish Stream project continues, which involves laying a gas pipeline from the Anapa region of the Krasnodar Territory of Russia along the bottom of the Black Sea to the western part of Turkey. The length of the underwater part is 910 km. It will land on land near the village of Kiyikoy in Kirklareli province. The total length of the land part in Turkey is 180 km.

The project involves laying two pipeline strings with a capacity of 15.75 billion cubic meters per year each (total capacity 31.5 billion cubic meters). One line is intended to supply gas to Turkish consumers, the other to supply the countries of Southern and South-Eastern Europe (delivery point near the city of Ipsala on the Turkish-Greek border). An agreement on the construction of this gas pipeline was reached during Putin’s visit to Turkey on December 1, 2014. An intergovernmental agreement was signed on October 10, 2016 (ratified by Turkey in December 2016, by Russia in January-February 2017). In August 2016, the presidents of the Russian Federation and Turkey confirmed plans for the construction of the Turkish Stream.

Tourism

In the 2010s. Turkey was one of the most attractive holiday destinations for Russians along with Egypt. According to Federal agency on tourism, in 2012, Turkish resorts were visited by 2.5 million Russian tourists, in 2013 - 3.1 million, in 2014 their number was 3.3 million. In 2015, 3 came to Turkey on vacation, 5 million Russians, which became the peak of the Russian tourist flow to this country (Egypt has maintained second position all these years). In total, Turkey accounted for 10.1% of the total number of Russian tourists traveling abroad in 2015.

After the introduction of bans on charter air travel between Russia and Turkey and on the sale of tours, the flow of Russians to this country almost disappeared. According to Rostourism, from January to September 2016, 483.5 thousand Russian citizens visited Turkey, which was only 15% of the same figure for the previous year (3.1 million).

The first regular flight after the ban on the sale of tours was lifted, with 189 tourists from Russia, operated by Rossiya Airlines, landed in the Turkish resort city of Antalya on July 9, 2016. On August 28, 2016, Prime Minister of the Russian Federation Dmitry Medvedev signed a decree lifting the ban on charter air transportation between the Russian Federation and Turkey.

Other areas

In addition to these industries, cooperation is actively developing in banking sector, construction, automotive and light industry. Thus, in 2012, the Russian Sberbank acquired the Turkish Denizbank, which ranked sixth among the ten largest banks in Turkey (the transaction amount was $3.5 billion). The agreement also included subsidiary branches of Denizbank in Russia, Austria, as well as financial, leasing and other financial companies.

There are about 100 Turkish construction companies operating in the Russian Federation, in particular Renaissance Construction, Enka Holding, and IC Ictas insaat. Since 2013, the Russian GAZ group of companies and the Turkish Mersa Otomativ have been implementing a project to assemble Gazelle cars in Turkey. There are a number of joint shoe and textile enterprises operating on the Russian market: the shoe factory Bris-Bosphorus LLC, the textile factory Touch Textile LLC. Turkish clothing brands ADL (until 2011 Adilisik), LC Waikiki, Colin's are widely represented in Russia.

Russian-Turkish relations have cracked under Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan. According to political scientists, the steps taken by the leader pursued two main goals:

• Achieve maximum strengthening of Turkey's influence in the Arab world. This was expressed in tense relations with Israel and support for Sunni Islamic religious movements.
• Using political and economic levers, bring Kurdish separatism under strict control.

What was the main cause of the political conflict?

The crisis in Russian-Turkish relations has been brewing for several days. A big irritating factor for Turkey, which claims to be the heir to the great Ottoman Empire, was the emergence of a new strategic alliance, which included Iran, Syria and Russia.

Iran, which was under the yoke of European sanctions for 30 years, began to gradually emerge from isolation, maintaining a progressive economic development and independence. At the same time, Syria, led by Bashar al-Assad, becomes a key ally of the state. It seemed that the end had come for the Syrian leader, but our country’s intervention in the conflict caused a different development in the scenario. It is not surprising that with this turn of affairs, Russian-Turkish relations have worsened.

Incident with Russian military aircraft

Russian-Turkish relations soured after a Su-24 bomber was destroyed by the Turkish military in northern Latakia. This happened on November 24, 2015.

Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov made a statement saying that the Turkish move was regarded as nothing more than a provocation. After the incident, Russian President Vladimir Putin refused to meet with Erdogan at the summit in Paris.

The Turkish leadership did not want to make an official apology for what they had done, and saw the reason for the incident in the inattention of those who violated the air zone of a foreign state.

Russia's response

The Russian-Turkish agreements were revised by the government of our country. An official resolution was approved introducing a number of bans in the field of trade relations with Turkey. Investments were stopped, charter flights and the sale of tours to Turkish resorts by tour operators were prohibited. Restrictions on the quota for attracting Turkish citizens to Russian territory as labor force were also lifted.

In addition, Turkish companies were prohibited from conducting business in the field of construction, woodworking and hotel business. The exception was contracts concluded before the introduction of sanctions. Since the beginning of 2016, an embargo has been imposed on the import of flowers, poultry meat, fruits and vegetables.

Indirect losses consisted of lost funds from construction projects carried out by Turkish companies in Russia, as well as the implementation of large-scale joint projects.

Türkiye did not take retaliatory steps. True, in February Ankara banned Russian journalists from entering without a visa. It was also prohibited for citizens of the Russian Federation to enter Turkey using official passports. This law was adopted in April 2016. However, Ankara collected documents to appeal Moscow’s economic bans.

Relations between states today

Russian-Turkish relations after the conflict cannot be called a crisis. Trade between the countries was not completely stopped. Based on general principles, states continue to maintain trade relations in some areas.

What goods does Russia sell to Turkey?

Russia supplies to Turkey:

• oil and its distillation products;
• mineral fuel;
• agricultural products (wheat, barley, corn, sunflower oil);
• metals;
• iron ore;
• colored brooms (copper and aluminum);
• mineral-based fertilizers;
• wax;
• oils;
• animal and vegetable fats.

What does Türkiye continue to supply to Russia?

The embargo did not affect:

• electrical equipment;
• automobile spare parts;
• textiles;
• shoes;
• costume jewelry;
• medicines;
• chemical industry products;
• some food products.

Türkiye remains a major supplier of parts for automobile factories, including KAMAZ and AvtoVAZ. Drive shafts, seat glass, etc. are purchased.

Economic situation in Turkey today

Like any political player, Turkey pursues its own specific interests, but the course that has been charted by the government is gradually dragging the country into a prolonged crisis. An attempt to improve relations with the Kurdish minority and the ongoing conflict in Syria have already caused serious disagreements with the US leadership, and the tragic incident with a Russian military aircraft has sharply strained relations with Moscow.

Fall in income levels from the cessation of Turkish exports

Turkish goods, the sale of which was prohibited in Russia, are represented by seventeen items.

These are products from the food segment:

• salt;
• carnation;
• grape;
• some vegetables and fruits;
• citruses;
• poultry meat.

In addition, Turkish exporters increased the volume of salt supplies after Russia banned the import of this product from Ukraine. Now the country has lost a huge Russian market.

Withering tourism business

For representatives of the tourism business, a dark period has come. And this despite the fact that by decree of Russian President Vladimir Putin a number of amendments were made to the list of sanctions. From July 1, 2016, tour operators were allowed to start selling tours to this country. However, there is a very low flow of tourists from Russia. Citizens from European countries are also afraid to come on vacation. According to the forecast, the loss in the tourism sector will be approximately $12 billion. This figure is $4 billion higher than previously expected.

Many hotels did not open during the summer. The number of unemployed has increased. Fierce competition for each client flared up between the hotels that remained afloat. sectors were also reflected in related sectors of the economy.

The coup attempt further aggravated the already difficult situation in the country. A state in which there is no stability has ceased to be attractive for recreation.

Turkish Stream project

What is the latest news on Russian-Turkish relations? On July 26, 2016, an official meeting took place between Russian Deputy Prime Minister Arkady Dvorkovich and his Turkish counterpart Mehmet Şimşek. One of the key issues was the resumption of the Turkish Stream project. Additional discussion on this topic will be continued at a separate meeting.

An agreement on the construction of the gas pipeline was reached back in December 2014. The plan assumed that the capacity of the four branches of the system would be 63 billion cubic meters of gas per year. Of these, 16 billion were to be supplied to Turkey. After complications in relations between the two countries, the project was suspended.

At the beginning of the operation of the first branch of the gas flow, Turkey was more interested, which currently receives Russian gas through the Trans-Balkan gas pipeline passing through Romania and Ukraine. Considering the fact that the transit agreement concluded between Russia and Ukraine ends in 2019, the Turkish side could receive gas on more favorable terms.

In June 2016, Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan apologized for what happened in Latakia. Russian President Vladimir Putin instructed the government to hold negotiations with the Turkish leadership.

Russian-Turkish relations today are an attempt to find compromises and solve many accumulated problems.

The Turkish President will visit the Russian Federation

Recep Tayyip Erdogan intends to visit our country in August 2016. The official meeting between the head of Turkey and Russian President Vladimir Putin will take place on August 9. The prospects for Russian-Turkish relations will be discussed there. According to Mehmet Şimşek, the Turkish leadership is making every effort to quickly normalize cooperation with Russia, which was interrupted due to the incident with a Russian military aircraft.

Officially, Ankara claimed that the bomber violated the Turkish air border, but the Russian Ministry of Defense made a statement that it flew over Syrian territory. As it turned out later, the Turkish military took such a step on their own, and the country’s leadership knew nothing about it.

According to Şimşek, Turkish-Russian relations have always been friendly. Russia was a reliable partner.

In turn, Deputy Prime Minister Dvorkovich noted that the meeting with Mehmet Şimşek took place with the consent of both presidents. The purpose of the event was to prepare the main aspects of the future meeting of leaders.

Time will tell how the history of Russian-Turkish relations will develop in the future.

The friendship between Russia and Turkey is based on a solid foundation of comprehensively developing dynamic cooperation, which in many areas, both in economics and politics, has already reached the level of an advanced, multifaceted partnership. Türkiye is one of our close partners in regional and world affairs. Therefore, Russian-Turkish relations are invariably among Russia’s foreign policy priorities. Their sometimes difficult, rapidly developing history with an unprecedented intertwining of people’s destinies and a huge mutual influence of cultures goes back centuries. Not all of Russia's neighbors have developed such close, albeit contradictory, ties. The natural factor that determined Russian-Turkish interaction is the unique geopolitical position of the two states at the junction of Europe and Asia. It is believed that the eastern principle encourages people to create and introspect, while the western principle encourages openness to the world and active self-expression. The combination of these principles largely determined the similarity of interests and national characters, and worked to bring the Russian and Turkish peoples closer together. As a result, the once wary attitude towards the neighbor was replaced by curiosity, and then by goodwill, and a desire to get to know each other better. Despite the clashes of interests that arose from time to time, trade, economic and cultural ties between Russia and Turkey, in fact, were never interrupted, and short-lived military conflicts by historical standards were replaced by long periods of peace and alliance. Napoleon's campaign in Egypt in 1798 prompted the Ottoman Empire to seek help from Russia. According to the Russian-Turkish alliance treaties of 1798 and 1805, Russia for the first time received the right of passage through the Bosporus and Dardanelles for its military ships. Thirty years later, during the uprising of the Egyptian Pasha Muhammad Ali (1831-1833) against his overlord, the Turkish Sultan, which threatened the very foundations of the state, Russia promptly provided assistance to Turkey by landing troops on the Asian shore of the Bosphorus. In July 1833, the Russian-Turkish defensive Unkar-Iskelesi Treaty was signed, which provided for Russia's obligation to provide military assistance to Turkey if necessary.

And subsequently, at critical stages of development, our countries found effective support from each other. They were connected by many close threads at the turn of the 20s of the last century. Perhaps never in the entire previous history of relations have two nations been so interested in each other as during that difficult time. In poverty and devastation - as if from the ashes - our states were reborn, destined to take their rightful place in the community of nations. It is symbolic that the first foreign policy act of the new Turkey was an appeal to the Soviet Government on April 26, 1920 with a proposal to establish diplomatic relations and a request for support. In the same year, relations were established, considerable military-technical and financial aid. In March 1921, an indefinite Treaty of Friendship and Brotherhood was concluded between the two countries. Its fundamental principles have not lost their meaning to this day. On the bas-relief of the Republic Monument in the center of Istanbul on Taksim Square, next to the leader of the Turkish national liberation movement K. Ataturk, on his instructions, the first Soviet ambassador to Turkey S.I. is depicted. Aralov. This rarely happens in diplomatic practice. We appreciate this, just as we appreciate the choice of K. Ataturk, who commissioned the famous Soviet director S.I. Yutkevich to film in 1934 documentary“Ankara - the heart of Turkey,” tells the story of the formation of a new Turkish state and its capital. Cooperation between our countries, despite certain difficulties, continued during the Cold War. Russia provided technical, economic and financial assistance in the creation of a number of important industrial facilities in Turkey. These enterprises continue to operate effectively to this day. Large-scale contracts implemented in the 60s and 70s of the last century for the construction of the Iskenderun Metallurgical Plant, the Seydisehir Aluminum Plant, the Aliaga Oil Refinery and a number of other industrial facilities largely laid the foundations of Turkish heavy industry.

Bilateral relations moved to a qualitatively new stage in the 90s of the twentieth century with the end of the bloc confrontation. Their fundamental principles were enshrined in the agreement, the 15th anniversary of the signing of which we will celebrate in May of this year.

Representatives of the business community became the pioneers of restoring cooperation. Agreements on the supply of Russian natural gas to Turkey, concluded back in the mid-80s for a period of 25 years, created serious preconditions for a significant increase in trade and economic ties. Compared to 1992, the volume of trade turnover increased 13 times - up to 20 billion dollars. The task set by the leaders of the two countries to bring it to 25 billion dollars in 2008 is being solved. The key area of ​​our interaction is cooperation in the fuel and energy sector, which provides a solid basis for deepening trade and economic relations between the two countries. We are sincerely glad that with the launch of the Blue Stream trans-Black Sea gas pipeline, Turkey is turning into one of the main consumers of Russian gas - up to 30 billion m3 by 2010. Prospects are opening up for the transit of Russian energy resources through Turkish territory to world markets in the western and southern directions. Such cooperation between our countries would contribute to strengthening the regional and European energy security system.

Investment cooperation is also on the rise now. The volume of direct Turkish investment in Russian economy reached 4 billion dollars. More and more Turkish entrepreneurs prefer to establish the production of goods and services directly in Russia. Well known in our country Appliances leading companies in Turkey. Many Muscovites, St. Petersburg residents, and residents of other Russian cities shop at famous Turkish supermarkets. More than 150 Turkish construction companies are active throughout Russia - from Kaliningrad to Anadyr. Over the past 20 years alone, they have built over 800 facilities, and the volume of concluded contracts has reached $17 billion. Turkish builders deservedly enjoy a reputation as qualified, reliable partners. The Turkish Mediterranean coast has become a favorite holiday destination for Russians. Last year alone, about 2 million of our citizens spent their holidays in Turkey - every fourth of Russian tourists traveling abroad. It is clear that foreign policy must keep pace with such a dynamic development of relations. A powerful impetus for intensifying the political dialogue between our countries was given by the official visit to Turkey of Russian President V.V. in December 2004 for the first time in the history of bilateral relations. Putin. The Joint Political Declaration, signed then in Ankara, set the goal, which is now being realized, of bringing bilateral relations to the level of an advanced, multifaceted partnership. This new quality of our relations became possible, among other things, because Turkish partners have always been free from the latent desire inherent in some European and other countries to follow the inertia of confrontation that determined the development of the world during the Cold War era. Apparently, this is reflected in our common history, rich in joint lessons, which does not allow us to remain captive to well-known stereotypes. We are glad for the wisdom of our Turkish friends, because such a mentality belonging to the past plays a very bad role, first of all, for its bearers themselves.

Truly unprecedented, according to both sides, is the intensity of interaction between the foreign policy services; contacts between other ministries, departments and organizations are actively developing. To a large extent, this is facilitated by the coincidence or significant convergence of the approaches of both countries to a number of pressing regional and international problems. We are united in our understanding of the need to jointly counter the new challenges and threats facing all humanity and to promote the establishment of interfaith dialogue, which is so in demand today. We support the active position taken in this regard by Turkey, which jointly with Spain launched the Alliance of Civilizations initiative. We are ready for close cooperation with our Turkish partners within the framework of the Strategic Vision Group “Russia - Islamic World”, the third meeting of which was recently successfully held in Istanbul. We are brought together by belonging to a single Eurasian space. The Action Plan for the Development of Cooperation in Eurasia, signed on November 16, 2001 in New York by the foreign ministers of Russia and Turkey, undoubtedly expanded the possibilities of bilateral political interaction. The special consultation mechanism created in accordance with the plan - the Joint High-Level Working Group - has proven itself well. At its regular meetings, chaired by deputy ministers of foreign affairs, the state and prospects for the development of bilateral cooperation are examined in detail, and “synchronization of watches” is carried out on key regional and international issues. We are united in the fact that ensuring security and increasing the level of well-being of the states and peoples of the Black Sea region is, first of all, a matter of their own efforts and responsibility. Hence our common interest in increasing the practical impact of the activities of the Black Sea Economic Cooperation organization. Real progress along this path was actively promoted by the Russian chairmanship of the organization last year. One of the promising areas of cooperation between Russia and Turkey is the speedy adaptation of the Black Sea Naval Operational Cooperation Group "Blackseafor" to solving anti-terrorism and non-proliferation tasks. The same goal is pursued by the recent joining of the Russian Navy to the national operation of the Turkish Navy “Black Sea Harmony”.

IN Lately The humanitarian component is becoming increasingly important in the interaction between the two countries. Bilateral cultural and educational programs are being successfully implemented. The decision taken by the two countries to hold the Year of Russian Culture in Turkey and Turkish Culture in Russia is intended to intensify this process. As part of the Year of Russian Culture in Turkey, the official opening of which is scheduled for mid-March, a large number of different events are planned to allow the Turkish public to gain a more complete understanding of the multinational Russian culture and art.

Thus, times, people, circumstances change. Our sincere interest in each other remains unchanged. Russian-Turkish friendship has stood the test of time and continues to grow stronger, being embodied in mutually beneficial projects of equal cooperation and partnership. Moscow and Ankara are ready to do everything possible to ensure that this continues to be the case. Our countries and peoples, Europe and the world will only benefit from this.

Among Russia's foreign trade partners, including 5th in exports and 13th in imports. Turkey's share in Russia's foreign trade turnover is 4%.

According to official Russian statistics, in 2013, investments worth $953.9 million came from Russia to Turkey, and $526.4 million from Turkey to Russia.

Russian investments were directed mainly into the authorized capital of small and medium-sized enterprises in the service sector. Recently, there has been a tendency to expand areas of investment cooperation with Turkey in such areas as the fuel and energy sector and ferrous metallurgy, nuclear energy, banking, mobile communications and Internet technologies.

The largest one is the construction by Russian specialists of the Akkuyu nuclear power plant (NPP) in the city of Mersin (the investment volume will be about 20 billion dollars). The start of construction of the nuclear power plant itself is scheduled for the end of 2016.

One of the priorities is the implementation of the project for the construction of a new gas pipeline "from Russia to Turkey along the bottom of the Black Sea. Gazprom considers it realistic to build two strings of the gas pipeline with a total capacity of up to 32 billion cubic meters of gas per year. Construction was planned to begin in June 2015, but the project is still remains under discussion.

The Omsktekhuglerod group of companies registered a representative office in Istanbul in 2013, OMSK CARBON ISTANBUL Dis Tic Ltd. The products of two plants are supplied to Turkey - the Volgograd and Omsk carbon black plants, which are part of the Omsktekhuglerod group, both directly from Russia to customer factories, and through organized own warehouses in Gebze and Mersin.

In 2012, the Russian Sberbank acquired the Turkish Denizbank, which ranked sixth in the top ten largest banks in Turkey (the transaction amount was $3.5 billion). The scope of the transaction also included subsidiary branches of Denizbank in Russia, Austria, as well as financial, leasing and other financial companies.

Another major project was the contract between the Russian Alfa Group and the Çukurova holding for the acquisition of a stake in the largest Turkish cellular operator Turksel in the amount of $3.3 billion.

OJSC Magnitogorsk Iron and Steel Works (OJSC MMK), together with a Turkish partner, implemented a project to build a plant for the production of sheet metal in the city of Iskenderun in 2011 and is currently its sole owner (total investment is about $2 billion).

In 2010, Mechel OAO acquired 100% of the shares of the Turkish trading group Ramatex, whose main activity was the distribution of rolled structural and stainless steel, as well as other types of metal products. The transaction amount was $3 million.

In 2009, NK OJSC LUKOIL, represented by LukoilEurasiaPetrol A.S, completed payments under the contract for the purchase of 100% of the shares of a large network operator gas stations Turkey Akpet (5% of the Turkish retail petroleum products market). The total amount of the transaction was $555 million.

An example of industrial cooperation is the project for the assembly production of GAZelle BUSINESS cars of the Russian holding company GAZ and the Turkish company Mersa Automotive in Sakarya province (150 kilometers from Istanbul), which was launched on December 2, 2012. The company assembles GAZelle BUSINESS vehicles with diesel engine from kits supplied by GAZ Group.

Currently, Turkish investments in Russia are mainly directed to the textile, food, chemical, woodworking, electronic and electrical industries, production of construction and finishing materials, automotive industry and production of auto components, services, trade, tourism, and the banking sector.

At the present stage, a feature investment activities Turkish companies are transferring capital investments from large cities to the regions, in particular from Moscow to the Moscow region, Tatarstan, Vladimir and Penza regions.

Turkish business pays significant attention to the development of investment cooperation with the subjects of the Southern federal district Russia, as well as investing in special economic zones(SEZ).

There remains a wide presence of Turkish companies in the Russian contracting services market. About 100 Turkish companies work in Russia construction organizations at facilities in Moscow and the region, St. Petersburg, as well as Tatarstan, Bashkortostan, Sverdlovsk, Vladimir, Rostov regions and Krasnodar Territory. In total, from the late 1980s to the present, Turkish companies have built over 800 facilities in Russia.

As an example of the successful work of enterprises with Turkish capital, one can cite the activities of the Novorossiysk shoe factory "Bris-Bosphorus". The Rockland joint venture operates stably in Serpukhov, Moscow Region (40% of the capital of which belongs to the Aimasan company, and 60% to Russian partners). The products of this enterprise are sold under the Tervolina brand.

Similar cooperation is being established in the cities of Tver and Galich, Kostroma region, at a tannery with the participation of the Turkish company Sarkem.

An example of cooperation with Turkish textile companies is CJSC Gloria-Jeans Corporation in the Rostov region.

The material was prepared based on information from RIA Novosti and open sources

Russian-Turkish relations can hardly be called cloudless. During the period of sanctions pressure alone, they experienced periods of rise and fall several times. The Kremlin has repeatedly relied on strengthening this vector, and in response it has received mostly “a new stab in the back.” Let us consider the main events of Russian-Turkish relations in their time course from 2014 to the present.

2014—2016

After the introduction of sanctions, the Kremlin began searching for alternative partners. Turkey was considered a suitable candidate in this regard, since it could offer alternative routes for laying the gas pipeline, supplied food to the Russian market and invested in the Russian economy.

The Kremlin was not embarrassed by traditional historically determined relations of hostility between states. Turkey is a traditional geopolitical adversary, the heir of the Ottoman Empire, with which Russia waged numerous wars, a state hostile to its political ally in the post-Soviet space - Armenia, and, finally, a potential center of gravity for Muslim republics, for example, Azerbaijan. Turkey, standing in line to join the EU and, accordingly, vulnerable to pressure from it, could only be an unpredictable partner for Russia. But despite this, a full course was taken to strengthen cooperation with Turkey, which over the past three years has developed very dramatically. Let us recall the main milestones of Russian-Turkish relations.

1. In August 2014, Russia announced a food embargo on goods from Europe and replaced the falling volume of goods with Turkish ones. During the same period, the main documents on the Turkish Stream were signed.

2. Russia begins a ground operation in Syria, which results in shelling of the area where Turkomans live. The Russian leader states that “I haven’t heard anything. I know that Turkmen live, our native Turkmen, in Turkmenistan, but here we don’t understand anything... No one told us anything,” while Erdogan says that he personally notified Putin about the area where Turkomans live. Turkish forces shoot down a Russian plane. Relations with the republic are on the verge of a diplomatic break, which was primarily facilitated by the hysterical reaction of the Kremlin, which demanded a public apology and compensation. In a short period of time, a set of anti-Turkish actions was adopted: an embargo on food supplies from the republic, the cessation of investment cooperation, the severance of cultural ties, the closure of access to Turkish resorts for Russians, the stoppage of large-scale projects - the Turkish Stream and the Akkuyu nuclear power plant, the abolition of the visa-free regime, a hiring ban Turkish work force, for the performance of certain types of work by Turkish companies, for charter air transportation between the Russian Federation and the Republic of Turkey, strengthening control over the activities of Turkish road carriers in Russia and reducing such permits to 2000 units, strengthening port control and control over ensuring transport security of the water areas of Russian seaports in Azovo -Black Sea basin, suspension of the activities of the Mixed Intergovernmental Russian-Turkish Commission on Trade and Economic Cooperation.

This period of Russian history foreign policy showed that Russian elite is unable to predict, build consistent relationships, and cannot respond to force majeure situations in a balanced manner. The conclusion from this is disappointing: a nervous, emotional reaction, excesses, including locally, an unbalanced reaction that completely excludes the assessment of damage to one’s own people and one’s own business.

3. The Kremlin, ready to continue the dialogue, took advantage of Turkey's apology to the family of the deceased pilots. In fact, Turkey asked for forgiveness not from the people or its ruler, but from an individual family. And the text of the letter was drawn up in close consultation with the Kremlin administration. As one of the mediators in the truce process, the head of Dagestan Ramazan Abdulatipov, said, in the first version of Erdogan’s letter to Putin there was no apology. The letter had to be revised several times to reflect wording that was acceptable to Putin. And in the end, the published version was corrected and included an apology, while the Press Secretary of the Turkish President emphasized that Erdogan’s letter did not contain an apology. But the Kremlin made it look like it had won.

The process of normalizing relations began, first of all, the Turkish Stream project was restored. On October 9, 2016, the Russian government lifted the ban on the import of oranges, tangerines, apricots, peaches (including nectarines) and plums from Turkey. From March 9, 2017, the ban on supplies was lifted onions and shallots, cauliflower and broccoli, as well as salt and cloves. The Kremlin has begun to normalize relations and long-term partnership. On the Syrian issue, the Kremlin is making significant concessions. He leaves no comment on Turkey's direct intervention in Syria. As a result, a coalition consisting of Iran, Turkey and Russia is formed in Syria. If the first two republics have their own geopolitical goals in the region, diametrically opposed to each other, then the Russian position remains vague and boils down to the formula “we were invited, we came.”

4. The provocative murder of the Russian ambassador in Ankara, according to the criminals, was supposed to complicate bilateral relations, but gas turned out to be more important. The murder of Karlov did not lead to a worsening of relations.

By the end of 2016, Turkey was one of the priority partners with which the Kremlin was building long-term projects based on the gas issue. For the sake of the Turkish Stream, issues of national security, the safety of Russian citizens, and Russia’s allied relations with Iran and Syria were deliberately ignored. However, the beginning of 2017 showed that the strategic line needs to be worked out more systematically and consistently.

YEAR 2017: NEW IMPACT

In March of this year, the relationship seemed to be developing steadily. Putin announced the restoration of political dialogue and pointed to “the solid potential for progressive development and good neighborly ties.” Erdogan, in turn, announced that Moscow and Ankara had already passed the stage of normalization of relations.

In February-March 2017, Turkey taught a new lesson to the Kremlin, which relied on long-term cooperation, primarily within the gas project. Firstly, the country's authorities reminded that they consider Crimea not Russian territory. The republic's Foreign Minister stated that "Turkey fully supports the territorial integrity, sovereignty, independence and political unity of Ukraine." In February, Turkish Foreign Minister Mevlüt Çavuşoğlu said that Ankara does not recognize Crimea’s entry into Russia. For greater clarity, they stopped the ferry service with Crimea, thereby jeopardizing relations with Russia. Turkey refused to accept ships arriving from Crimea, although this restriction did not apply to other regions of Russia. Formally, Turkey did not join the sanctions against Crimea; in fact, the blockade is nothing more than sanctions. Türkiye's main emphasis in this issue is on protecting the Crimean Tatars. Secondly, Türkiye has introduced customs barriers to trade with Russia - customs duties for leading export items.

‍Ankara deprived Russia of the right to duty-free supplies of wheat, corn and sunflower meal, stopping the issuance of licenses for the import of these Russian products. Russian wheat will now be subject to a duty of 130%, rice - 45%, sunflower oil - 36%, 13.5% for sunflower meal and more than 9.5% for legumes. For sunflower oil in essence, protective restrictions have been formed. In fact, with such a duty, supplies to Turkey will be unprofitable. On the technical side, everything was done in such a way that it did not raise suspicions of politicization of the topic. If previously Turkish producers imported Russian wheat for processing and then exported it to other countries and used it for wheat zero rate, then now the criterion of “countries of origin of goods” was introduced, Russia was removed from the list. Before March 15, such a list of countries did not exist. The National Association of Agricultural Exporters (NAESP) said that Turkey has effectively imposed an embargo on the supply of agricultural products from Russia. Russian manufacturers, according to Tkachev, will be able to reorient themselves only after five months, during which time they will incur losses. The Russian reaction, voiced by Peskov, was in the traditional form of ignoring direct signals. Peskov said that “this is a normal economic process.” It’s not even this that is surprising, but the fact that all these years Russia has only been engaged in importing grain to Turkey, from which the latter made flour, thanks to which it occupied essentially all the Arab-Asian markets. The Kremlin has created all the conditions for the export of grain, and not for the export of higher value-added products.

It is possible that Turkey introduced duties in order to punish Russia for the fact that the latter has not yet opened its market to Turkish vegetables (primarily tomatoes) and fruits. In this case, the entire partnership comes down to interaction in a “tit-for-tat” format.

Thirdly, Turkey’s pro-American approaches in Syria will further complicate the republic’s relations with Russia. Erdogan, on the eve of the US strike on Syria, said that he was ready to support a possible US military operation in Syria, which Trump spoke about in the context of a chemical attack in Syria. The US airstrike on Syria from April 6 to 7, which the Russian leader called aggression, was supported by Turkey. Along with the fact that Turkey opposes Assad, on whose side Russia is fighting, relations are aggravated by the problem of the Syrian Kurds, who threaten the territorial integrity of Turkey. Ankara accuses Russia of supporting the latter. And in the draft Syrian constitution prepared by Russia, the Kurds received their autonomy. In March, a sniper shot from Kurdish-controlled territory led to the death of a Turkish soldier. According to the ceasefire agreement, it is Russia that is responsible for monitoring violations in the mentioned region. In connection with the incident, Türkiye has already called the Russian charge d'affaires ad interim. Let us recall that in Moscow there is an informal office of the Syrian Kurdish Democratic Union party.

All these aggravations occur against the backdrop of the Kremlin’s policy, which is completely loyal to Turkey:

— The government planned to lift restrictions on the import of Turkish tomatoes. On March 9, 2017, Russia lifted the ban on the supply of cloves, onions and shallots, cauliflower, broccoli and salt to the Russian Federation from Turkey. Tomatoes and poultry products remained prohibited;

— back in March, Rosoboronexport announced its readiness to resume military-technical cooperation (MTC) with Turkey. Rostec reported that Moscow provided Turkey with a loan for the purchase of military equipment. The Turkish side was going to purchase S-400 for it;

— The Russian Direct Investment Fund (RDIF) signed a memorandum on the creation of a Russian-Turkish partnership with Turkey’s sovereign wealth fund investment fund, which will focus on medium-sized private projects in agriculture and other sectors;

— Negotiations are underway to speed up the process of introducing a visa-free regime between Turkey and Russia. It was previously canceled by a Russian decision on January 1, 2016 due to the incident with the Russian Su-24 bomber;

— the Russian side has intensified cooperation in the tourism sector. From April 21, Pobeda Airlines planned to open regular flights from Moscow to the Turkish resort town of Alanya.

These facts confirm the Russian leader’s thesis that the country has taken a course of systematic development of cooperation with Turkey. However, despite this, relations with the republic are always on the brink. Russia seems to be locked in a circle of unfriendly partners. And the reason lies not only and not so much in Turkey, but in the fact that the Kremlin does not know how to identify strategic partners: it brings traditional opponents closer to itself, while pushing away its allies. For example, Ukraine, Moldova and Georgia, once allied states, are already integrated into the structures of the Western bloc. Belarus, with which Russia formally built a Union State, is experiencing the “subtleties” of the Kremlin’s strategy in the form of gas conflicts and customs barriers. Syria, which invited the Kremlin to defend its territory, was faced with both the open statement that Syria is not our ally, made by Medvedev, and the fact that Russia allowed military intervention in the conflict and Turkish intervention on Syrian territory.

Betting on Trump as the president who would come and restore US-Russian relations was also very reckless. Airstrikes on Syria have already shown that there can be no talk of any joint actions by Russia and the United States in the region, and that the parties are in opposite camps.

Turkey only serves as proof of the inconsistency of the Kremlin’s strategy when choosing foreign policy guidelines and partners.

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