Pros and cons of Gorbachev's rule! (detailed plan). M. s. Gorbachev: years of government. perestroika, glasnost, collapse of the ussr. Gorbachev's foreign policy Gorbachev's political sphere pros and cons

As D. Volkogonov aptly noted, for the West, Gorbachev's popularity was primarily due to the fact that he became "a symbol of the departure from the political scene of the Bolshevik monster" (See: Volkogonov D. Seven Leaders. Gallery of USSR Leaders. Book 2, M ., 1995, P. 362).

In December 1990, Gorbachev was awarded the Nobel Peace Prize, but the situation inside the country did not allow the president to go to receive the prize awarded to him. A considerable part of the population wondered: why was Gorbachev given the award? The country is in ruins - and he gets a bonus! It was towards the end of 1990 that the gap between the president's foreign policy triumph and the consequences of his domestic policies became apparent to many. The situation remained tense in Tbilisi, South Ossetia, Nagorno-Karabakh, Baku, Chechnya, and the Baltic states. At the 4th Congress of People's Deputies of the USSR, the Minister of Foreign Affairs of the country, E. Shevardnadze, who resigned, issued a warning about the impending coup. Prime Minister N.I. Ryzhkov spoke at the congress about the activities of destructive forces with “far-reaching goals”. It was also proposed at the congress to include on the agenda the issue of no confidence in the President of the USSR, which indicated serious dissatisfaction with Gorbachev's policy in internal and external affairs. Observers noted the president's break with the progressive part of his entourage. In December, the Moscow Council adopted a decision on the normalized distribution of food products. A budget crisis arose, and the USSR entered the new year of 1991 without a plan or budget. These are just a few touches that characterize the situation of the outgoing 1990.

According to his assistant Chernyaev, these days the general secretary received “packages of telegrams” from the population, in which Gorbachev was congratulated on the “imperialist award” for “destroying” the Soviet Union, “betraying” Eastern Europe, and “giving away” resources to the Americans , and the media - to the "Zionists" (See: Chernyaev A.S. Six years with Gorbachev: According to diary entries. M., 1993, P. 384).

Against this background, Gorbachev's foreign policy began to lose support within the country. Describing the situation of those days, Shevardnadze noticed that the “shadow” authorities were reclaiming their lost positions, coming out of the shadows and starting to act openly.” If the democratic forces were united, he notes, this offensive could be "stopped." However, the lack of "unanimity" among like-minded people forced him to resign. Political opponents of the retired Minister of Foreign Affairs explained his voluntary resignation "by the desire to evade responsibility for the miscalculations allegedly made in foreign policy" (See: Sheverdnadze E. My Choice. In Defense of Democracy and Freedom. M., 1991, pp. 20-21 ).

What was the foreign policy in the Gorbachev era according to the testimony of those who created it? What is its assessment by historians?

The biographer of the first president of the USSR, Grachev, notes that back in the spring of 1985, Gorbachev had a list of priority foreign policy tasks to be solved. In the working notebooks of the Secretary General, among the priorities were: “end the arms race”, “leave Afghanistan”, “improve relations with the USA and China” (See: Grachev A.S. Gorbachev. M., 2001, p. 179). The biographer points out that Gorbachev had to reckon with the foreign policy stereotypes that had developed between the two superpowers - to look at each other "through the embrasure." By encroaching on this strategic "balance of fear," Gorbachev, his biographer emphasizes, knocked out one of the most important pillars from under his own chair. If earlier Soviet people put up with their miserable life and voluntarily gave up their last for defense, then the transformation of yesterday's enemy into a partner changed their consciousness - they turned their dissatisfaction with their lives on those who ruled them.

Gorbachev's opponents blamed him for the fact that while carrying out perestroika, he and his associates "did not care about the ideological, socio-economic, political and historical systemic foundations" of the Soviet system, that the doom of perestroika lay in its "top" character, as a result of which " power gradually became a foreign body within the system, primarily in relation to its foundations”, that behind the facade of perestroika “there was an energetic process of changing landmarks”, in which Yakovlev and Shevardnadze played the first violin. Among the main and, according to these opponents, “destructive” slogans for the Soviet system of perestroika were the following: universal human values ​​and their priority over class, which led to the revision of the results of the Second World War, the violation of the agreements of the Yalta and Potsdam conferences, the Helsinki meeting, which proclaimed the inviolability of the post-war borders, caused the liquidation of the Warsaw Pact, the CMEA, the GDR and "prepared" the collapse of the USSR; entry into world civilization which became possible for our country only “after the collapse” of the socialist system; democratization of society, which led to the "decentralization and disintegration of the power" of Russia; rethinking history, which in fact turned into “spitting on the past”, into a reliable mechanism for “destroying the historical memory of the people” (See: Russia - 2000. Modern political history (1985-1999). V. 1. Chronicle and Analytics. M., 2000 , pp. 572-573, 617-618).

Soviet leaders, primarily Gorbachev and Shevardnadze, were criticized "for losing" of Eastern Europe and Germany, for the isolation and weakening of the country, for canceling out by unreasonable political actions the results of the war and its conquests, for which entire generations paid an exorbitant price, for the “blood shed by the Soviet people in vain in the name of liberating Europe from Nazism.” At the ceremony of signing the Treaty on Conventional Arms in Europe, the Minister of Defense of the USSR, Marshal D. Yazov, said in a narrow circle: “We lost the third world war without firing a shot” (See: Boffa J. From the USSR to Russia: The Story of an Unfinished Crisis. 1964- 1994. M., 1994, P. 202).

Responding to such accusations, in particular that Gorbachev "surrendered the socialist countries", ex-president The USSR wrote that these ideas were put forward by "adherents of the imperial ideology", for whom the right of the strong to dispose of foreign countries as their own property, "to play the destinies of peoples" is customary. Referring to the recent history of relations between the USSR and the countries of the "socialist community", Gorbachev pointed out that in these countries we planted a modified "Stalinist model of socialism", and all attempts by these countries to escape from the "friendly embrace" of the superpower "were strictly suppressed." As an example, he cited the events in the GDR in 1953, in Hungary in 1956, in Czechoslovakia in 1968 (See: Gorbachev M.S. Life and reforms. Book 2, M., 1995, p. 474-475).

There was no unanimity regarding political line Gorbachev and the leaders of the "socialist camp". Kadar and Honecker did not believe in the "irreversibility" of perestroika and took a wait-and-see attitude, Zhivkov warned, referring to Khrushchev's policies, that perestroika could "destabilize the socialist community", and the leader of the Romanian communists, Ceausescu, took an openly hostile position.

A.V. Kozyrev, appointed in 1990 as the Minister of Foreign Affairs of Russia, when he was an employee of the USSR Foreign Ministry, saw his main task during the perestroika years as participating in the “dismantling of obsolete ideological dogmas”. “The crux of the matter,” he writes in his memoirs, “was to advance into official Soviet documents, up to speeches on foreign policy issues by the General Secretary of the Central Committee of the CPSU, “seditious” formulations that, if not immediately, then potentially would open up opportunities for undermining, and then a complete revision of the communist dogma. He called E.K. Ligachev his opponents in the Politburo, G. M. Kornienko in the Foreign Ministry, and G. Kh. Shakhnazarov and A. S. Chernyaev his supporters, with A. N. Yakovlev and E. A. Shevardnadze. In his opinion, Gorbachev, with his statements about the new political thinking, "created a kind of cover for such far-reaching interpretations." Kozyrev was skeptical about Gorbachev and his followers, believing that by 1989 they had exhausted themselves, primarily because they “strived at all costs to remain faithful to the socialist choice, to renew, modernize the Soviet system, with a complete lack of understanding of its doom.” Kozyrev saw the origins of the new Russian concept of national security in the “ideas of A.D. Sakharov”, which, in his opinion, combined the thesis of curbing the nuclear arms race with the solution of the problem of “the relationship between man and the state in our country” (See: Kozyrev A. Transfiguration, Moscow, 1995, pp. 42-46, 72).

Soviet diplomats objected to such a simplistic approach in assessing the most complex foreign policy problems facing the Soviet Union at the turn of the 1970s and 1980s. So, according to the same G.M. Kornienko, it was during these years that there were opportunities to reach a compromise with the West in the field of disarmament. He called A. Gromyko a "staunch supporter" of the disarmament line, "the main generator" of ideas in this area. Another thing, Kornienko noted, was that when it came to working out specific positions, and the military were against this or that decision, Gromyko "did not go into conflict with them." In general, he believed that Soviet foreign policy was characterized by “underestimation” and sometimes “ignorance” of the possibilities of strengthening the security of the state by “political means”, and not by further increasing the already excessive defense spending (See: Akhromeev S.F. , Kornienko G.M. Through the eyes of a marshal and a diplomat: A critical look at the foreign policy of the USSR before and after 1985, M., 1992, pp. 40-45).

The XXVII Congress of the CPSU officially proclaimed the new foreign policy of the country and defined three main areas of activity: overcoming the confrontation between East and West, settlement of regional conflicts, rejection of ideological preferences in relations with other states and recognition of the existing world order. For the solution of the first task, the meetings of M.S. Gorbachev with US President R. Reagan in Geneva in 1985, in Reykjavik and Washington in 1986, in Moscow in 1988 were of the utmost importance. The result of the first meetings was the signing of a joint statement stating that "nuclear war is unacceptable" because "there can be no winners" and that "the parties will not seek military superiority over each other". In December 1987, an agreement was reached on the elimination of Soviet and American medium and short-range missiles in Europe; the agreement was supplemented by the establishment of a system of mutual control. In addition, the USSR eliminated part of its medium and short-range missiles located in Siberia and Far East. The military, primarily Chief of the General Staff S. Akhromeev, completely shared the position of President Gorbachev.

Western historians and politicians emphasize the fact that it was largely thanks to Gorbachev's foreign policy that they managed to end the Cold War and the arms race.

In February 1988, Gorbachev announced the withdrawal of troops from Afghanistan, which began on May 15, and in February 1989 the last soviet soldier left Afghanistan. This decision was not easy for Gorbachev. Even under Brezhnev, in 1981, the Politburo decided to “lead the matter towards leaving”, but the whole question was only how, when and under what conditions to leave. According to Soviet data, our country annually spent 1 billion rubles on the Afghan adventure. Gorbachev was worried not only about the fall of the authority of the USSR in the countries of the "third world", but, as he put it: "We will not pay before our people: why so many people were put to death?" Defense Minister Marshal Sokolov confirmed that "it is impossible to win the war by military means." Gorbachev's decision to withdraw Soviet troops from Afghanistan was supported by the Politburo and his closest associates, Ryzhkov and Ligachev. However, even having made the decision to leave, Gorbachev set, as the development of subsequent events in this region showed, an impossible task - not only "to restore a friendly and neutral country", but to make sure that the United States did not settle in Afghanistan with its bases.

During this period, opposition came to power in almost all socialist countries. In March 1991, the Warsaw Treaty Organization officially ceased to exist. Thus, for the first time since 1945, the Soviet Union found itself without military allies in Europe.

The most important event of this period was the unification of Germany. In November 1989, the Berlin Wall, which had divided the German people for more than thirty years, collapsed. On September 12, 1990, in Moscow, the FRG, the GDR, France, the USSR, Great Britain and the USA signed the Treaty on the Final Settlement with Respect to Germany. Article 1 stated that a united Germany would include the territories of the GDR, the FRG and "all of Berlin". This treaty also confirmed the "final nature of the borders" of united Germany, that she "has no territorial claims against other states" and will not put forward such claims "in the future." The governments of the FRG and the GDR reaffirmed their renunciation of the "production, possession and disposal of nuclear, biological and chemical weapons" and declared that a united Germany would also adhere to these obligations. The agreement provided for the timing of the withdrawal of Soviet troops from the territory of the GDR and Berlin. The right of united Germany "to participate in unions" was established, the country acquired "full sovereignty over its internal and external affairs" (See: Russia - 2000. Modern political history (1985-1999). V. 1. Chronicle and analytics. M ., 2000, pp. 621-623).

How could this significant event happen, what is its assessment in modern historical literature?

According to Western researchers, the problem of the post-war reorganization of Germany was "central" in relations between the victorious powers, and it also became an "obstacle" for the USSR's alliance with the Western powers. When the cohesion of one of the opposing military-political blocs - the Warsaw Treaty Organization - "began to collapse", the factors of the division of Germany began to seem to German society "less weighty" than the factors of reunification, and the speed and political strength of the reunification process "overturned all resistance" (See. : Ennio Di Nolfo, History of International Relations (1918-1999), in 2 volumes, translated from Italian, V.2, M., 2003, P. 726).

Russian historians have noted that when the German issue turned into a practical solution, neither Gorbachev, nor the country's political elite, nor Soviet society itself "were not ready for such a turn of events." Initially, Gorbachev limited himself to “general reasoning”, but then at a narrow meeting in January 1990, the Soviet leadership put forward the idea of ​​the “six” - the formation of a special negotiating mechanism consisting of the four victorious powers (USSR, USA, Great Britain, France) and two German states (GDR and FRG) to discuss international aspects of German unification. At the same time, according to Russian historians, the Soviet leadership was afraid of the situation getting out of control and the emergence of an armed conflict in Europe; it was also "unwilling" and "unable" to use military force to prevent the unification of Germany. Not the last role was played by the fact that in the conditions of the deteriorating economic situation in the Soviet Union, Gorbachev counted on obtaining foreign loans, including from German banks. Historian Narinsky believes that Gorbachev and his associates "overestimated" the readiness of Western partners to play by the new "rules of the game", and therefore "did not fix the agreement" on the refusal of the subsequent advance of NATO to the east. His general assessment of the activities of a reformer in foreign policy is as follows - Gorbachev made a "great contribution" to the end of the Cold War, but "failed (or did not have time)" to lay the foundations of a new world order (See: Narinsky M.M. M.S. Gorbachev and Unification of Germany Based on new materials / New and recent history. 2004, no. 1, p. 14-30).

According to Falin, at the final stage of making decisions on the unification of Germany did not participate neither the Security Council, nor the Presidential Council, nor any other state bodies. “The new military-political map of Europe in 1989-1990,” Falin wrote in his memoirs, “was cut by Western standards by one M. Gorbachev and his friend (E. Shevardnadze - V.P.).” He wrote that he was trying to warn Gorbachev against huge concessions from the USSR to the West on the German issue, in particular, in his opinion, it was necessary to provide for in the agreement "non-participation of a united Germany in NATO." To this proposal, Gorbachev said: "I'm afraid that the train has already left." There were other alternatives for solving the German problem, Falin is convinced, and no worse than those implemented by Gorbachev (See: Falin V. Conflicts in the Kremlin. Twilight of the Gods in Russian. M., 1999, pp. 180-193).

According to the Italian historian J. Boffa, German unity in practice meant "the annexation of East Germany by the FRG" (See: J. Boffa. From the USSR to Russia: The History of an Unfinished Crisis. 1964-1994. M., 1996, p. 198) .

There is an opinion expressed by members of the Soviet secret services that the fall of the Berlin Wall, the collapse of the GDR came as a surprise to everyone, that no one in the world could have foreseen such a development of events. Therefore, the widespread version that "everything went according to Gorbachev's plan", that "he is a traitor" seems absolutely "absurd". “From all the actions of Gorbachev, it is clear,” wrote I. Kuzmin, an employee of the KGB of the USSR, “that he did not want the collapse of the GDR, sought to preserve it, but acted indecisively” (See: Karpov M. The fall of the Berlin Wall. Even the Chekists did not expect this // Nezavisimaya Gazeta, November 5, 1994).

Answer left Guest

Pros and cons of Gorbachev's rule The choice of religion by the people is always determined by its rulers. The true religion is always the one professed by the sovereign; the true god is the god whom the sovereign orders to worship; thus, the will of the clergy, which leads the sovereigns, always turns out to be the will of God himself. Gorbachev Mikhail Sergeevich was born in with. Privolnoe (Stavropol Territory) March 2, 1931 Father, Sergei Gorbachev was Russian, and mother, Maria Gopkalo, Ukrainian, which is the reason for the special tolerance of the future politician in the national question. Mikhail, while still a teenager, worked on a collective farm and in the MTS, helping his parents, since the family lived very modestly. At the age of fifteen, Mikhail Sergeevich becomes an assistant to a combine operator. Pros and cons of Gorbachev's rule At the age of 19, Gorbachev enters the ranks of candidates for the CPSU, receiving patronage from teachers and the director of his school. In 1950, Mikhail Sergeevich entered Moscow State University without any exams, and three years later he married Titarenko Raisa Mikhailovna, with whom he would live in a happy marriage until the death of his wife (1999). In 1952, Mikhail Sergeevich joins the CPSU. In 1968, in August, Gorbachev was elected First Secretary of the CPSU of the Stavropol Regional Committee, holding this position until April 1970. Since 1970, Gorbachev was appointed a member of the Supreme Soviet. While in power, Mikhail Sergeevich carried out many different reforms, because of which the USSR also collapsed, and the monopoly of the CPSU was also destroyed. Although very often Gorbachev's actions were criticized by politicians for inconsistency of actions, for an attempt to preserve socialism and the former centrally planned economy. In 1862 (May 15), a company was formed to combat unearned income. The question of the fight against chauffeurs, tutors, flower sellers, etc. was raised. Many people lost illegal labor earnings. On the other hand, Gorbachev is partly responsible for increasing life expectancy, the working capacity of the population and reducing crimes motivated by alcohol intoxication. On May 17, 1985, the anti-alcohol campaign in the USSR came into force. The pros and cons of Gorbachev's rule Because of this innovation, alcohol prices increased by 45%, vineyards were cut down, and sugar used by craftsmen for home brewing disappeared from stores, which led to the sale of this product only by coupons. As a result of Gorbachev's reforms, in 1989 many goods disappeared from stores, there was a hidden inflation, the introduction, as already mentioned, of cards for a certain group of goods. The hard life of most citizens led to a decline in the birth rate, which was observed until 2001. Under Mikhail Sergeyevich, troops were withdrawn from Afghanistan, which was positively received by many compatriots. But in 1986, the facts of the explosion at the Chernobyl nuclear power plant 26 were partially hidden, such "mystery" left a negative imprint on the politician's biography. At the end of 1991, Gorbachev resigned, voluntarily relinquishing his powers as head. However, five years later (1996) Mikhail Sergeevich became the Chairman of the Board of the International Green Cross. In 2011, on his 80th birthday, Mikhail Sergeevich received the award of St. Andrew the First-Called. Do not judge a person by what views he holds, but judge by what he has achieved with their help.

Please tell me what were the pros and cons of Gorbachev's rule? and got the best answer

Answer from Yatiana Sharapova[guru]
minus - dry law,
pluses - perestroika, glasnost, acceleration
ps Gorbachev did not break up the USSR, it was destroyed by top officials and heads of governments of the three union republics:
Boris Yeltsin and Gennady Burbulis (RSFSR),
Stanislav Shushkevich and Vyacheslav Kebich (BSSR),
Leonid Kravchuk and Vitold Fokin (Ukraine).
Source: Belovezhskaya agreement

Answer from -=Boatswain=-[master]
+ USSR razed, -destroyed the Berlin Wall.

Answer from Experienced[guru]
the collapse of a great state ... there are no pluses.

Answer from Jovetlana[guru]
No pros, only cons! Break - do not build! broke. everything that could be broken and built nothing in return. Fuck him!!

Answer from Trust[guru]
there was neither one nor the other, Gorbachev - there was none and the board is the same

Answer from Konstantin Petrov[guru]
for Gaider's pluses and praises addressed to you -1

Answer from Sergei Semenkov[guru]
Women listened to him so much that men were even alert to drink))

Answer from Mikhas[guru]
Of the benefits appeared cooperatives.
Of the minuses - racketeers 🙂

Answer from Ђimur Ivanov[guru]
I respect Gorbachev, but he cannot be asked for political miscalculations. As a politician, he turned out to be useless. However, we must give him his due, he was a good man, and most importantly, his thoughts were completely bright. He wished well for Russia...

Answer from Alexander Guzhvenko[guru]
A huge plus for the gypsies. I myself heard that the gypsies were ready to cast a monument to him out of gold, in gratitude for the vodka speculation.

Answer from Vladimir Gribov[guru]
He said a lot, even right, did a lot, but wrong. As a result, the collapse of the USSR.

Answer from Heinrich Zhukov[guru]
Big minus! Inability to govern the country! And when he chooses "caudle" but not the people, it will always be so, collapse

Answer from User deleted[guru]
Not a single plus! .. He seemed to do everything on purpose the other way around! First of all, with his fucking liberalization, he destroyed the entire system of government and the national economy! Could it have been done without it? Of course yes! The main problem of Socialism in the USSR is LOW LABOR PRODUCTIVITY!... Where did it come from? There are two reasons for this - outdated equipment, productive equipment that did not correspond to the time, and the worker's low interest in the results of his labor .... from each according to his ability, to each according to his work! Was this principle unrealistic to implement???? As for the outdated material and technical base .... there were resources .... for example, the military-industrial complex regularly updated weapons and military equipment in the army .... In terms of the quality of army equipment, we were ahead of the rest! So what prevented the creation of such a complex on the SCALE OF THE WHOLE (and not just the army) ECONOMY ?? ? In extreme cases, it was possible to direct a significant part of the resources of the military-industrial complex to modernize the economy ... We had a COMMAND-ADMINISTRATIVE management system and liberalizing it is tantamount to SUICIDE! (a simple example ... plant A was obliged to supply components to plant B .... but since now he does not owe anything to anyone, he is looking for a more profitable "buyer" of his products ... this can lead, among other things, to the fact that plant B will default on its obligation to C, and that in turn to A ... that is, the one who started this process suffered about it .... so throughout the economy ... the failure of one enterprise to default on its obligations could cause a chain of failures paralyzing the whole industry!) This Hunchback COULD NOT UNDERSTAND!! ! Did he hope for the consciousness of citizens?? ? I doubt it... Strange behavior... Having SIGNIFICANT ECONOMIC DIFFICULTIES... WE ARE REMOVING THE IDEOLOGICAL SHIELD... and thereby opening up to the enemy!! WHY?? ? WHAT IS THE PURPOSE?? ? Why destroy the FOUNDATIONS of SOCIETY if you just wanted economic prosperity? ... and much, much more .... looking at the era of Gorbachev-Yeltsin, you come to the conclusion that THE PEOPLE'S ECONOMY WAS CONSCIOUSLY AND PURPOSELY DESTROYED .... in many ways, this process is still continues!... I really, really want to know when this process will stop and we will start to CREATE?!

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Gorbachev himself presents this problem in a different way, arguing that this issue was the subject of extensive discussion in party circles: “Back in the years of perestroika, we wanted to social democratize the CPSU (Italics is ours - V.P.). An appropriate program was prepared for the upcoming 29th Congress. But the putsch and B. Yeltsin's policy, which actually banned the CPSU, made it impossible to carry out” (See: Unfinished History. Conversations between Mikhail Gorbachev and political scientist Boris Slavin. M., 2001, p. 106).

According to D. Volkogonov, when Gorbachev came to power, the Soviet Union, like an ancient hero at a crossroads, stood at a “historical crossroads”, from which three possible paths diverged: radical reforms, liberal development, and conservative restoration. Gorbachev took a middle path, trying, according to Volkogonov, to create a model that included "the best socialist and capitalist elements." Gorbachev had to act “according to the situation”, there was “no one to learn from”, and hence the “indecisiveness and half-heartedness” of many of the steps taken. Volkogonov emphasizes that perestroika caused "very profound changes in public mindsets", the myths about the CPSU, about the "advantages of the socialist system", the "democratism" of the Soviet system, and many others gradually disintegrated. The results of perestroika, Volkogonov believes, were also affected by the personal factor, with which he explains the so-called Gorbachev paradox. In his opinion, the general secretary "is a man of great intelligence, but of weak character." Therefore, having started perestroika under the slogan of renewing socialism, Gorbachev, “against his will and desire,” came to eliminate it six years later. (See: Volkogonov D. Seven leaders: Gallery of leaders of the USSR. M., 1995, Book 2, pp. 310-312; 320-323; 330-331).

Far from all historians agree with the above characterization, attempts to find an explanation for the "political vagueness" of the first stage of perestroika in the gentleness of the general secretary's nature. So, A.S. Grachev refers to the following opinion of E. Ligachev: “It is often heard that Gorbachev is a weak-willed person. This is not true. This is an apparent impression." He also cites Gorbachev's remark to his assistant: "I will go as far as necessary, and no one will stop me." According to Grachev himself, Gorbachev's seeming indecisiveness was due to the fact that in his policy he was under pressure from two forces - conservative (in the person of the ruling nomenklatura, who survived many reformers and reforms and did not want to go further than "refreshing" the socialist facade) and radical, pushing the leader to populist improvisations and for the sake of this, using the administrative resource with might and main. Gorbachev tried not to follow the tastes of either one or the other force, and therefore "earned a reputation as a vacillating and indecisive politician" (See: Grachev A.S. Gorbachev. M., 2001, pp. 151-152).

Vorotnikov described this feature of Gorbachev as a politician quite figuratively in his memoirs: “Serious disputes often arose at meetings of the Politburo. After listening to everyone, Gorbachev with general phrases, calls to think again (our italics - V.P.), to work on remarks, as if bringing together various positions, curtailed the discussion ”(See: Vorotnikov V.I. And it was like this ... From the diary member of the Politburo of the Central Committee of the CPSU. M., 1995, P. 165).

The problem posed in the title seems to be one of the most controversial in the literature on perestroika. Naturally, success is understood as the completion of perestroika in the interests of the entire society, and not just the Soviet elite. Most scientists believe that the fate of political projects (including perestroika) is ultimately determined by the "structure of society", i.e. representatives of various "interest groups" exercising power.

According to Academician T.I. Zaslavskaya, there were two forces in the Soviet Union that were "most interested" in perestroika and "ready to fight for it." The first was represented by the reformist wing of the nomenklatura - the more “young, educated, Westernized”, which was dissatisfied not only with its position in the system of power “on the sidelines”, but also with the general state of affairs in the country. The second force was the intelligentsia, "deeply interested" in democratic rights and freedoms. According to another scholar M. Castells, the fate of perestroika in the USSR was determined by representatives of the following “interest groups”: communist ideologists, the ruling elite of the state, Soviet and party apparatus, heads of large state enterprises and a network “formed by the nomenklatura and bosses of the shadow economy.” Struggling with representatives of these groups in the course of his reforms, which contradicted the "selfish interests" of the state bureaucracy and party nomenklatura, Gorbachev "inadvertently initiated the process of the collapse of the USSR" (See: 10 years without the USSR: Perestroika - our past or future? ... Materials of the conference. M., 2002, pp. 18-19 Castells M. Information Age: Economics, Society, Culture Translated from English M., 2000, pp. 438, 477-479).

In connection with the foregoing, it is of considerable interest to assess the content of the political reform, during which the interests of various social forces clashed, primarily within the Soviet nomenklatura - the ruling class of the USSR.

In modern scientific literature, with all the variety of approaches, one of the most common definitions of the concept of "elite" is the following: "a minority that has a monopoly on power, on decision-making regarding the content and distribution of core values ​​in society" (See: Kodin M.I. Social -political associations and the formation of the political elite in Russia (1990-1997), M., 1998, pp. 67-68).

According to historian A.D. Chernev, the total number of nomenklatura workers who took place in the late 80s of the XX century. approval in the Politburo, Secretariat or departments of the Central Committee of the CPSU, amounted to about 15 thousand people. The same nomenclature principle of selection and placement of leading cadres as in the Central Committee of the CPSU was carried out in all other party organizations of the country, up to the primary ones, which allowed the CPSU to manage the economic, political and cultural life of the country, to control all spheres of Soviet society. According to a number of scholars, the definition of the Soviet elite as a "nomenklatura" indicates its fundamental feature - inseparability into separate functional groups. At the same time, the Soviet elite had a "hierarchical character" and was "stable" due to strong vertical ties between its various levels. The indisputable priority was given to the party elite, followed by the state and economic elites. Scientists note that in the course of perestroika, the elite changed "structurally and essentially." Instead of a monolithic nomenklatura pyramid, numerous elite groups appeared, which are “in competition with each other”. The new elite has lost most of the power levers of the old ruling class. As a result of the reforms, the role of economic factors for managing society has grown, and there is a need to search for allies, temporary alliances "for the sake of achieving specific goals." These elite groups have become more dynamic, their number has increased dramatically, and "horizontal and informal ties" have become more active between them. According to the sociologist O. Kryshtanovskaya, about a third of the elite of the early 1990s was in the nomenklatura of the Central Committee of the CPSU in 1988, and the remaining two-thirds came to the ruling stratum from "pre-nomenklatura" positions, which gave scientists reason to talk about a change of elites at the turn of the 80s. -90s as a “revolution of deputies” (See: Chernev A.D. The ruling party in the system of Soviet state administration / Problems of national history. Issue 8. M., 2004, pp. 168-169, 185; Kodin M. I. Socio-political associations and the formation of the political elite in Russia (1990-1997), M., 1998, pp. 74-76, Kryshtanovskaya O. Transformation of the old nomenklatura into a new one Russian elite/ Social sciences and modernity. 1995, no. 1, p. 62).

For a better understanding of this process, let us turn to historical facts. By the autumn of 1987, according to the General Secretary of the Central Committee of the CPSU Gorbachev, there was a need to change the current system of economic management, leave only political functions to the party, and transfer state power to the Soviets. The main question was how to solve these problems: to do it with evolutionary, gradual transformations, trying to maintain stability, or revolutionary breaking? According to Gorbachev, those members of the Politburo who served government posts, advocated a resolute release of the Central Committee apparatus from "uncharacteristic functions" (guardianship of defense, foreign policy), while the secretaries of the Central Committee tried to preserve their "allotments". In this situation, Gorbachev decided to actively pursue political reform, the meaning of which he saw in the "transfer of power" from the hands of the Communist Party, which monopolized it to the Soviets through "free elections of people's deputies" (See: Gorbachev M.S. Life and reforms. M., 1995 , Book 1, pp. 407, 423). The difficulty of carrying out the reform, Gorbachev noted in this regard, was to keep in the hands of the party-state bureaucracy "the main levers of power", so it was necessary to organize "powerful pressure" on this bureaucracy from the side of the radical part of society, as well as by "cutting off" conservatives from party-state environment.

In June 1988, the XIX All-Union Party Conference was held, which approved the reform of the central authorities. It was decided to recreate the Congress of People's Deputies as the supreme body of representative power. The apparatus of the Central Committee of the CPSU was subjected to sharp criticism at the conference.

At the initial stage of perestroika, most of the party cadres were sure that, despite the shortcomings, “we do not have, and in the foreseeable future, no other political force is expected, except for Communist Party able to carry out the planned reforms and ensure the stability of the country”. Over time, more and more people came to the conclusion that the party was becoming "unnecessary to society", that the party institutions "weave a web" of legitimate administrative structures - the Soviets, ministries, trade unions, that a head of cabbage or carrots successfully grow even "without the political leadership of the CPSU". Often the most radical-minded people wondered: since the party, “always wise, led along the only correct, Leninist path and led it into stagnation, doesn’t all this give the party the right to express what they think about it?” (See: Party and perestroika: Pravda discussion sheets. M., 1990, pp. 12, 53, 85, 207-208).

In practice, political reform meant a reduction in the party apparatus by 700-800 thousand people. Historians note that with his reform, Gorbachev not only reduced the size of the apparatus, in fact he "destroyed the stability of the ruling class of the USSR." His attempt to carry out the "denationalization" of the party, to rid it of supervision over the activities of state bodies, meant the risk that neither the party nor the state "would survive this operation."

The previously unified party apparatus began to stratify, realizing that perestroika was a threat, primarily to its well-being. Most of the rank-and-file members stopped paying party dues and left the party en masse: if in 1988 18 thousand people surrendered their party cards, then in 1989 - 137 thousand. More than half of those who left the party were workers.

However, unlike the previous practice of the Soviet era, parting with the party under Gorbachev did not at all mean the end of a career for yesterday's nomenklatura. Perestroika opened up previously unseen opportunities: in 1990, about 1 million people participated in cooperative activities alone, shareholder excitement unfolded, commercial banks began to be created, accumulating significant funds by laundering money received from the state budget. And the former Soviet nomenklatura did not stand aside from the market processes that were gaining strength, but actively participated in them, making full use of their administrative resources. A significant part of the hierarchs of the past moved into the private sector.

Historians note that part of the former nomenklatura moved to the Communist Party of the Russian Federation and began to take shape in an "aggressive anti-perestroika force", the other - to the camp of democrats, and the regional elites, freed from fear of the center, "turned towards the now safe nationalist and separatist movements" (See. : Grachev A.S. Gorbachev. M., 2001, P. 237, 241-243).

The most visible split within the ruling class Soviet Union manifested itself during the August putsch of 1991, which was the last act of the tragedy of the collapse of the USSR.

Author's opinion

We fully share the opinion of those historians who believe that in the course of perestroika, the ruling class of the Soviet Union as a whole turned out to be incapable of anything other than protecting its own privileges. The quality of the Soviet elite turned out to be very low - even among Gorbachev's inner circle, gradually, as difficulties increased, personal ambitions and political claims took precedence over national interests - therefore, the task of restructuring society in the interests of this society turned out to be beyond the capacity of the Soviet nomenklatura, which for the most part remained the same who could only command and obey orders. Not only was society unprepared for perestroika, most of which showed features of social dependency familiar from previous years and were still waiting for instructions from above on the question of “how to live on,” but also the ruling bureaucracy, since the loss of power of the CPSU in fact meant the loss of the only the power she possessed of directive control.

What “ruined” perestroika: politics or economics?

This topic has at least two aspects that still cause numerous disputes and discussions. And not only in the scientific community.

The first aspect is expressed in the works of economists who are convinced that in the Gorbachev era, without political changes, "economic reforms were impossible." A striking example- the work of an economist, professor at Moscow State University, and then a People's Deputy of the USSR and Mayor of Moscow G.Kh. Popov. This figure is largely significant: the evolution of his views and political activities reflected the moods and views of a significant layer of the capital's intelligentsia, which became one of the leading forces of perestroika. In the first years of perestroika, G. Popov saw the main task of economic science in "refining the model of socialism." The slogans of his election platform as an elect for the post of People's Deputy of the USSR included a bizarre mixture of new and old: "socialist property - the owners", "land to those who cultivate it", "income - according to work", "republics and regions - economic independence" , "prices are regulated by the market", but at the same time, he demanded the "stability" of state retail prices and the preservation of state orders for essentials. In this matter, he was ready to go even to the "introduction of cards." However, in December 1989, he considered the question of property to be the central issue requiring submission to the Supreme Council - "we must recognize the pluralism of all types of property." In words, he still did not break with socialism, although he admitted that the administrative economy "has not decided and cannot solve," to use Lenin's expression, the fundamental task of socialism - "to create a higher labor productivity in comparison with the previous system." At the same time, G. Popov is convinced that it is “impossible” to implement real economic transformation in the current political system, i.e. in his scale of priorities, the political aspect of the reform came out on top in comparison with the economic one. This transformation of an economist into a politician happened when it became clear to the majority of the population of the Soviet Union that among the entire package of reforms, it was the economic achievements of perestroika that turned out to be minimal - the people began to live worse than in previous years. It was necessary not only to give an explanation for this fact, but also to find the culprits. The roots of the economic failures of perestroika began to be seen in the imperfection of the Soviet political system. The involvement of many active participants in perestroika in the political confrontation between Gorbachev and Yeltsin also had an effect. Largely for these reasons, in December 1990, Popov considered the main thing in the democratic program to be "overcoming the omnipotence of the Soviets, de-Sovietization." In his opinion, when different types of property, a market, new classes of society, their parties appear, then "conditions will be created for a normal democratic mechanism." This democratic platform was the voicing of the policy of Gorbachev's main rival, B.N. Yeltsin. -643).

Another point of view on the problems of the economic reform of the Soviet system is represented mainly by the works of politicians, many of whom are convinced that “if M. Gorbachev could be encouraged to subordinate everything else to economic tasks, the fate of the Soviet Union would undoubtedly have been to another." Thus, the Secretary of the Central Committee of the CPSU Falin, being one of the conductors of Gorbachev's policy, in memorandums addressed to the main reformer of the country tried to prove that the time of state socialism had irretrievably gone and it was "dead", that the former forms of "production, distribution and exchange" should be abandoned. , which give rise to the main antagonism in Soviet society - "alienation of a person from property and power." As one of the main measures, the "immediate" introduction of free trade and "real equality of all types of property" were proposed. Without this, the author warned, perestroika "is doomed to the terror of half-wits and smart villains." (See: Falin V. Conflicts in the Kremlin: Twilight of the Gods in Russian. M., 1999, pp. 69, 243-245, 269).

Thus, despite the painful search for a way out of the crisis, the theoretical thought of the reformers revolved mainly in the circle of the ideas of Marxism-Leninism - not owning other ideological guidelines, the leaders of perestroika tried to adapt "socialism in Lenin's edition" for their own purposes.

The refrain that the economic problems of the country were brought by Gorbachev "for the sake of his personal political interests" is also repeated many times in the memoirs of V. Pavlov, N. Ryzhkov, V. Vorotnikov and many other associates of Gorbachev. Thus, Vorotnikov argued that it was only in December 1989 that the government developed and presented a “comprehensive, balanced program for the economic reform of the country’s economy”, and before that there were only talks concerning “private economic problems” (See: Vorotnikov V.I. But it was like this… From the diary of a member of the Politburo of the Central Committee of the CPSU, M., 1995, P. 322).

By this time, in the West, socialist thought had developed a critical approach to evaluating the Soviet experience. Thus, in 1982, at the plenum of the Central Committee of the Italian Communist Party, the thesis was formulated that "the phase of development of socialism, which began with the October Revolution, has exhausted its motive force, the ability of these countries for political, economic, cultural renewal has entered a state of crisis." It was emphasized that this is not about a simple lag, but about a crisis, about the historical futility of "state socialism" (See: World History of Economic Thought. V. 5, M., 1994, pp. 283 - 286). These ideas became popular during the perestroika years in the Soviet Union as well.

Both foreign and Russian scientists are characterized by several points of view on the problem raised.

First, an approach is highlighted according to which the idea of ​​"improved" or market socialism "is completely far-fetched and unrealistic" The capitalist market economy is considered the only effective economy, and the modernization of Soviet-style socialism is "doomed to fail." In the most complete form, this point of view was expressed as early as 1922 by the famous economist B. Bruckus, who argued in his works that socialism as a positive system is “impossible”, and the economic problem of socialism is “unsolvable”, since this system “does not have a mechanism for to bring production in line with social needs. All the most important elements of economic freedom (economic initiative, freedom to organize consumption and freedom of labor) in socialist society exist only in the form of "state coercion". By direct order of Lenin, Brutskus was expelled from Soviet Russia as an ideological opponent of Bolshevism (See: Brutskus B.D. Socialist economy. Theoretical thoughts about the Russian experience. M., 1999, pp. 48-49, 58, 68-69, 72). Brutskus's point of view is shared today by many modern domestic economists, but by no means all.

The second direction is those who argued that the reform of the Soviet economy is possible, but extremely complex and contradictory, that the reform process will inevitably entail “difficulties and temporary deterioration”, therefore, success requires “restraint and gradualness” both on the part of the people and and the political elite. Thus, Ryazanov believed that all post-war economic reforms in our country should be characterized as a period of breaking the administrative-command system and a real revival of commodity-market relations. In his opinion, by 1985 the Soviet economy was "actually a mixed, multi-sectoral economy with a limited effect of market mechanisms," which manifested themselves primarily in the market for goods and services. He believed that in the 1970s the Soviet Union missed a historic chance in the implementation of the overdue technical modernization of the national economy, which consisted in the rational use of the huge export earnings received by the USSR from the export of energy resources (oil, gas, electricity). One of the main reasons for the failure of perestroika in the field of economics, Ryazanov believed that the implementation of economic reforms led to the "revival" in Russia of the strategy of catching up development, the imitation and use in our country of the economic forms of the leading countries. Thus, in his opinion, the “historically outgoing” type of early industrial capitalism was reproduced. A long-term goal, in his opinion, should be associated with a focus on manufacturing industries and “especially” science-intensive products (See: Ryazanov V.T. Economic development of Russia. Reforms and the Russian economy in the XIX - XX centuries. M., 1998, pp. 390, 392-393, 432-434, 449).

As a rule, scientists emphasized, the supporters of this approach focused on the mistakes of Gorbachev and his colleagues, which allowed them to justify the correctness of their own theoretical constructions.

Adherents of the third direction considered the crisis of the Soviet economy as the result of an "unsuccessful attempt" to adapt the socialist system to the needs of the post-industrial era - the state authorities tried to use the previous mobilization model "to break beyond industrialism", but the Soviet economy "could not" adapt to the challenges of the time (See. : The Economy in Transition: Essays on the Economic Policy of Post-Communist Russia, 1991-1997, edited by E. Gaidar, Moscow, 1998, pp. 55-57.

A group of economists led by E.T. Gaidara drew attention to the fact that the choice of the model for reforming the Soviet economy in the 1980s was explained by two main points. First, there was an ideological alternative between the mobilization (war communism or accelerated industrialization) organization of economic life and the liberal (with elements of decentralization and the market). According to Gaidar, the economic successes achieved during these years in the USA, Great Britain and Chile were considered by public opinion in the USSR as the results of the implementation of the "liberal course". Thus, the penetration of liberal ideology into the environment of the Soviet scientific intelligentsia created a real basis for reform. Secondly, the choice of a specific program was connected with political circumstances, the practical experience that had been accumulated by the communist countries by that time. The Soviet leadership, led by Andropov, leaned more in favor of the Czech-Hungarian model, rather than the Chinese one. By the time of Gorbachev's rule, the USSR already had a program of reforms, Gaidar believes, although "not in the form of a coherent document," but in the form of numerous notes to policymakers. One of the most famous is the closed report of Academician T. Zaslavskaya in 1983, which received scandalous fame thanks to its publication in the West (See: Economy in transition. Essays on the economic policy of post-communist Russia. 1991-1997. M., 1998, P. 58- 65).

Scientists note that Gorbachev adopted the ideas that formed the basis of the program of "improvement of the economic mechanism", the distinguishing features of which were: the revitalization of enterprises and workers; the presence of the State Planning Commission and other directive bodies that ensure the "balance" of the Soviet economy; a ban on the problem of "property reform", which was completely passed over in silence. The unresolved issue of ownership left hope for program developers that the "wise center" would intervene and correct market processes "when they faltered."

Thus, the program attempted to combine the advantages of two systems - planned socialist and market capitalist - which, according to economists, initially made this program "inconsistent and internally inconsistent". Many elements of this program were known to Gorbachev when he was at the head of the Stavropol Territory. It was then that the experience of introducing brigade contracts and "full cost accounting" in the primary labor collectives led to a sharp increase in labor productivity and earnings. Despite this, according to N. Petrakov, Gorbachev's assistant in economics, in the general secretary's own store of economic knowledge there was only an "empty suitcase" that still had to be filled. Gorbachev did not hide from his colleagues in the Politburo what they knew even without him: “the country is standing in lines; we live in a constant deficit - from energy carriers to women's tights; fats only the military sector; technological record from the West is accumulating.”

Economists believe that at the time Gorbachev came to power, the Soviet elite did not realize the fact that not only the economy, but the entire Soviet system was in crisis. Therefore, Gorbachev's first steps towards acceleration in the field of the national economy were due to the usual logic of the "mobilization approach" - it was necessary to intensively develop the machine-building complex. By October 1985, in the USSR, on the basis of the concept of acceleration, drafts of a new edition of the party program and the main directions for the twelfth five-year plan and for the period up to 2000 were prepared, approved at the XXVII party congress. In essence, the new course replaced the directive contained in the previous Khrushchev version of the program, about building the "foundations of communism" in 20 years. At the same time, the mention of the “communist perspective” as the highest phase has been preserved. It was also proposed at the congress to “overcome prejudice regarding commodity-money relations”, declared the principle of cost accounting, according to which enterprises and associations “are fully responsible for the break-even of their work”, and the state “does not bear responsibility for their obligations” (See: Materials of the XXVII Congress of the CPSU Moscow, 1986, pp. 5, 139-140, 39-41, 147, 331).

The well-known economist L. Piyasheva believed that the idea of ​​economic independence of state enterprises was to transfer them to the mode of self-sufficiency and self-financing, but “without excommunication” from the budget and the introduction of an inexorably operating bankruptcy mechanism for all “not self-sustaining” enterprises. For this reason, the implementation of the idea did not give either economic growth or additional income for the budget. The winners were only the directors of enterprises, who used the freedom they received to "satisfy their personal needs." The concept provided for the division of products manufactured at state-owned enterprises into "planned" (socialist) and "extra-planned" (commercial). As soon as state-owned enterprises had the opportunity to sell part of their “extra-planned” products through the cooperatives they opened, an outflow of resources from the main industries to “subsidiaries” immediately began, and through them to the sphere of personal consumption of those who “sat” on resources, property and money. “It was inevitable,” notes Piyasheva, as the funds received from the commercial sale of “extra-planned” products could not be legalized and they had to go “into the shadows”. In her opinion, Gorbachev's attempt to implement economic reform was untenable, since in Russia "there was no right" for everyone to be a private owner and freely engage in entrepreneurial activities. In addition, Piyasheva notes, Gorbachev did not go for more radical transformations “out of fear of mass unemployment,” which could begin as a result of privatization (See: Russia: 21st century ... Where are you going? M., 2002, pp. 78-81) .

On the pros and cons of Gorbachev's foreign policy

As D. Volkogonov aptly noted, for the West, Gorbachev's popularity was primarily due to the fact that he became "a symbol of the departure from the political scene of the Bolshevik monster" (See: Volkogonov D. Seven Leaders. Gallery of USSR Leaders. Book 2, M ., 1995, P. 362).

In December 1990, Gorbachev was awarded the Nobel Peace Prize, but the situation inside the country did not allow the president to go to receive the prize awarded to him. A considerable part of the population wondered: why was Gorbachev given the award? The country is in ruins - and he gets a bonus! It was towards the end of 1990 that the gap between the president's foreign policy triumph and the consequences of his domestic policies became apparent to many. The situation remained tense in Tbilisi, South Ossetia, Nagorno-Karabakh, Baku, Chechnya, and the Baltic states. At the 4th Congress of People's Deputies of the USSR, the country's Minister of Foreign Affairs E. Shevardnadze, who resigned, issued a warning about the impending coup. Prime Minister N.I. Ryzhkov. It was also proposed at the congress to include on the agenda the issue of no confidence in the President of the USSR, which indicated serious dissatisfaction with Gorbachev's policy in internal and external affairs. Observers noted the president's break with the progressive part of his entourage. In December, the Moscow Council adopted a decision on the normalized distribution of food products. A budget crisis arose, and the USSR entered the new year of 1991 without a plan or budget. These are just a few touches that characterize the situation of the outgoing 1990.

According to his assistant Chernyaev, these days the general secretary received "packages of telegrams" from the population, in which Gorbachev was congratulated on the "imperialist award" for having "destroyed" the Soviet Union, "betrayed" Eastern Europe, "gave" resources to the Americans , and the media - to the "Zionists" (See: Chernyaev A.S. Six years with Gorbachev: According to diary entries. M., 1993, P. 384).

Against this background, Gorbachev's foreign policy began to lose support within the country. Describing the situation of those days, Shevardnadze noticed that the “shadow” authorities were reclaiming their lost positions, coming out of the shadows and starting to act openly.” If the democratic forces were united, he notes, this offensive could be "stopped." However, the lack of "unanimity" among like-minded people forced him to resign. Political opponents of the retired Minister of Foreign Affairs explained his voluntary resignation "by the desire to evade responsibility for the miscalculations allegedly made in foreign policy" (See: Sheverdnadze E. My Choice. In Defense of Democracy and Freedom. M., 1991, pp. 20-21 ).

What was the foreign policy in the Gorbachev era according to the testimony of those who created it? What is its assessment by historians?

The biographer of the first president of the USSR, Grachev, notes that back in the spring of 1985, Gorbachev had a list of priority foreign policy tasks to be solved. In the working notebooks of the Secretary General, among the priorities were: “end the arms race”, “leave Afghanistan”, “improve relations with the USA and China” (See: Grachev A.S. Gorbachev. M., 2001, p. 179). The biographer points out that Gorbachev had to reckon with the foreign policy stereotypes that had developed between the two superpowers - to look at each other "through the embrasure." By encroaching on this strategic "balance of fear," Gorbachev, his biographer emphasizes, knocked out one of the most important pillars from under his own chair. If earlier Soviet people put up with their miserable life and voluntarily gave up their last for defense, then the transformation of yesterday's enemy into a partner changed their consciousness - they turned their dissatisfaction with their lives on those who ruled them.

Gorbachev's opponents blamed him for the fact that while carrying out perestroika, he and his associates "did not care about the ideological, socio-economic, political and historical systemic foundations" of the Soviet system, that the doom of perestroika lay in its "top" character, as a result of which " power gradually became a foreign body within the system, primarily in relation to its foundations”, that behind the facade of perestroika “there was an energetic process of changing landmarks”, in which Yakovlev and Shevardnadze played the first violin. Among the main and, in the opinion of these opponents, “destructive” slogans for the Soviet system of perestroika were the following: universal human values ​​and their priority over class ones, which led to a revision of the results of the Second World War, violation of the agreements of the Yalta and Potsdam conferences, the Helsinki Conference, which proclaimed the inviolability of post-war borders, caused the liquidation of the Warsaw Pact, CMEA, the GDR and "prepared" the collapse of the USSR; entry into world civilization, which became possible for our country only "after the collapse" of the socialist system; the democratization of society, which led to the "decentralization and disintegration of the power" of Russia; rethinking of history, which in fact turned into “spitting on the past”, into a reliable mechanism for “destroying the historical memory of the people” (See: Russia - 2000. Modern political history (1985-1999). Vol. 1. Chronicle and analytics. M. , 2000, pp. 572-573, 617-618).

Soviet leaders, primarily Gorbachev and Shevardnadze, were criticized for "losing" Eastern Europe and Germany, for isolating and weakening the country, for canceling out by unreasonable political actions the results of the war and its people's blood in the name of the liberation of Europe from Nazism. At the ceremony of signing the Treaty on Conventional Arms in Europe, the Minister of Defense of the USSR, Marshal D. Yazov, said in a narrow circle: “We lost the third world war without firing a shot” (See: Boffa J. From the USSR to Russia: The Story of an Unfinished Crisis. 1964- 1994. M., 1994, P. 202).

Responding to such accusations, in particular, that Gorbachev "surrendered the socialist countries", the former president of the USSR wrote that these thoughts were put forward by "adherents of the imperial ideology", for whom the right of the strong to dispose of foreign countries as their own property is customary, "to play the destinies of peoples ". Referring to the recent history of relations between the USSR and the countries of the "socialist community", Gorbachev pointed out that in these countries we planted a modified "Stalinist model of socialism", and all attempts by these countries to escape from the "friendly embrace" of the superpower "were strictly suppressed." As an example, he cited the events in the GDR in 1953, in Hungary in 1956, in Czechoslovakia in 1968 (See: Gorbachev M.S. Life and reforms. Book 2, M., 1995, p. 474-475).

There was no unanimity regarding Gorbachev's political line among the leaders of the "socialist camp". Kadar and Honecker did not believe in the "irreversibility" of perestroika and took a wait-and-see attitude, Zhivkov warned, referring to Khrushchev's policies, that perestroika could "destabilize the socialist community", and the leader of the Romanian communists, Ceausescu, took an openly hostile position.

A.V. Kozyrev, who was appointed Russian Foreign Minister in 1990, saw his main task during the years of perestroika as his main task during the years of perestroika was to participate in the "dismantling of obsolete ideological dogmas." “The crux of the matter,” he writes in his memoirs, “was to advance into official Soviet documents, up to speeches on foreign policy issues by the General Secretary of the Central Committee of the CPSU, “seditious” formulations that, if not immediately, then potentially would open up opportunities for undermining, and then a complete revision of the communist dogma. He called E.K. his opponents in the Politburo. Ligachev, in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs - G.M. Kornienko, and their supporters - G.Kh. Shakhnazarov and A.S. Chernyaev, with the "leading role" of A.N. Yakovlev and E.A. Shevardnadze. In his opinion, Gorbachev, with his statements about the new political thinking, "created a kind of cover for such far-reaching interpretations." Kozyrev was skeptical about Gorbachev and his followers, believing that by 1989 they had exhausted themselves, primarily because they “strived at all costs to remain faithful to the socialist choice, to renew, modernize the Soviet system, with a complete lack of understanding of its doom.” Kozyrev saw the origins of the new Russian concept of national security in “the ideas of A.D. Sakharov", which, in his opinion, combined the thesis of curbing the nuclear arms race with the solution of the problem of "the relationship between man and the state in our country" (See: Kozyrev A. Transfiguration. M., 1995, pp. 42-46, 72) .

Soviet diplomats objected to such a simplistic approach in assessing the most complex foreign policy problems facing the Soviet Union at the turn of the 1970s and 1980s. So, according to the same G.M. Kornienko, it was during these years that there were opportunities to reach a compromise with the West in the field of disarmament. He called A.A. Gromyko "a staunch supporter" of the disarmament line, "the main generator" of ideas in this area. Another thing, Kornienko noted, was that when it came to working out specific positions, and the military were against this or that decision, Gromyko "did not go into conflict with them." In general, he believed that Soviet foreign policy was characterized by “underestimation” and sometimes “ignorance” of the possibilities of strengthening the security of the state by “political means”, and not by further increasing the already excessive defense spending (See: Akhromeev S.F. , Kornienko G.M. Through the eyes of a marshal and a diplomat: A critical look at the foreign policy of the USSR before and after 1985, M., 1992, pp. 40-45).

The XXVII Congress of the CPSU officially proclaimed the new foreign policy of the country and defined three main areas of activity: overcoming the confrontation between East and West, settlement of regional conflicts, rejection of ideological preferences in relations with other states and recognition of the existing world order. Meetings of M.S. Gorbachev with US President R. Reagan in Geneva in 1985, in Reykjavik and Washington in 1986, in Moscow in 1988. there can be no winners" and that "the parties will not seek military superiority over each other". In December 1987, an agreement was reached on the elimination of Soviet and American medium and short-range missiles in Europe; the agreement was supplemented by the establishment of a system of mutual control. In addition, the USSR eliminated part of its medium and short-range missiles located in Siberia and the Far East. The military, primarily Chief of the General Staff S. Akhromeev, completely shared President Gorbachev's position.

Western historians and politicians emphasize the fact that it was largely thanks to Gorbachev's foreign policy that they managed to end the Cold War and the arms race.

In February 1988, Gorbachev announced the withdrawal of troops from Afghanistan, which began on May 15, and in February 1989 the last Soviet soldier left Afghanistan. This decision was not easy for Gorbachev. Even under Brezhnev, in 1981, the Politburo decided to “lead the matter towards leaving”, but the whole question was only how, when and under what conditions to leave. According to Soviet data, our country annually spent 1 billion rubles on the Afghan adventure. Gorbachev was worried not only about the fall of the authority of the USSR in the countries of the "third world", but, as he put it: "We will not pay before our people: why so many people were put to death?" Defense Minister Marshal Sokolov confirmed that "it is impossible to win the war by military means." Gorbachev's decision to withdraw Soviet troops from Afghanistan was supported by the Politburo and his closest associates, Ryzhkov and Ligachev. However, even having made the decision to leave, Gorbachev set, as the development of subsequent events in this region showed, an impossible task - not only to “restore a friendly and neutral country”, but to make sure that the United States with its bases did not settle in Afghanistan.

During this period, opposition came to power in almost all socialist countries. In March 1991, the Warsaw Treaty Organization officially ceased to exist. Thus, for the first time since 1945, the Soviet Union found itself without military allies in Europe.

The most important event of this period was the unification of Germany. In November 1989, the Berlin Wall, which had divided the German people for more than thirty years, collapsed. On September 12, 1990, in Moscow, the FRG, the GDR, France, the USSR, Great Britain and the USA signed the Treaty on the Final Settlement with Respect to Germany. Article 1 stated that a united Germany would include the territories of the GDR, the FRG and "all of Berlin". This treaty also confirmed the "final nature of the borders" of united Germany, that she "has no territorial claims against other states" and will not put forward such claims "in the future." The governments of the FRG and the GDR reaffirmed their renunciation of the "production, possession and disposal of nuclear, biological and chemical weapons" and declared that a united Germany would also adhere to these obligations. The agreement provided for the timing of the withdrawal of Soviet troops from the territory of the GDR and Berlin. The right of united Germany "to participate in unions" was established, the country acquired "full sovereignty over its internal and external affairs" (See: Russia - 2000. Modern political history (1985-1999). V. 1. Chronicle and analytics. M ., 2000, pp. 621-623).

How could this significant event happen, what is its assessment in modern historical literature?

According to Western researchers, the problem of the post-war reorganization of Germany was "central" in relations between the victorious powers, and it also became an "obstacle" for the USSR's alliance with the Western powers. When the cohesion of one of the opposing military-political blocs - the Warsaw Treaty Organization - "began to collapse", the factors of the division of Germany began to seem to German society "less weighty" than the factors of reunification, and the speed and political strength of the reunification process "overturned all resistance" (See. : Ennio Di Nolfo, History of International Relations (1918-1999), in 2 volumes, translated from Italian, V.2, M., 2003, P. 726).

Russian historians have noted that when the German issue turned into a practical solution, neither Gorbachev, nor the country's political elite, nor Soviet society itself "were not ready for such a turn of events." Initially, Gorbachev limited himself to "general reasoning", but then, at a narrow meeting in January 1990, the Soviet leadership put forward the idea of ​​the "six" - the formation of a special negotiating mechanism consisting of the four victorious powers (USSR, USA, Great Britain, France) and two German states (GDR and FRG) to discuss international aspects of German unification. At the same time, according to Russian historians, the Soviet leadership was afraid of the situation getting out of control and the emergence of an armed conflict in Europe; it was also "unwilling" and "unable" to use military force to prevent the unification of Germany. Not the last role was played by the fact that in the conditions of the deteriorating economic situation in the Soviet Union, Gorbachev counted on obtaining foreign loans, including from German banks. Historian Narinsky believes that Gorbachev and his associates "overestimated" the readiness of Western partners to play by the new "rules of the game", and therefore "did not fix the agreement" on the refusal of the subsequent advance of NATO to the east. His general assessment of the activities of a reformer in foreign policy is as follows - Gorbachev made a "great contribution" to the end of the Cold War, but "failed (or did not have time)" to lay the foundations of a new world order (See: Narinsky M.M. M.S. Gorbachev and Unification of Germany, Based on New Materials / Modern and Contemporary History, 2004, No. 1, pp. 14-30).

According to Falin, neither the Security Council, nor the Presidential Council, nor any other state bodies participated in the final stage of making decisions on the unification of Germany. “The new military-political map of Europe in 1989-1990,” Falin wrote in his memoirs, “was cut by Western standards by one M. Gorbachev and his friend (E. Shevardnadze - V.P.).” He wrote that he was trying to warn Gorbachev against huge concessions from the USSR to the West on the German issue, in particular, in his opinion, it was necessary to provide for in the agreement "non-participation of a united Germany in NATO." To this proposal, Gorbachev said: "I'm afraid that the train has already left." There were other alternatives for solving the German problem, Falin is convinced, and no worse than those implemented by Gorbachev (See: Falin V. Conflicts in the Kremlin. Twilight of the Gods in Russian. M., 1999, pp. 180-193).

According to the Italian historian J. Boffa, German unity in practice meant "the annexation of East Germany by the FRG" (See: J. Boffa. From the USSR to Russia: The History of an Unfinished Crisis. 1964-1994. M., 1996, p. 198) .

There is an opinion expressed by members of the Soviet secret services that the fall of the Berlin Wall, the collapse of the GDR came as a surprise to everyone, that no one in the world could have foreseen such a development of events. Therefore, the widespread version that "everything went according to Gorbachev's plan", that "he is a traitor" seems absolutely "absurd". “From all the actions of Gorbachev, it is clear,” wrote I. Kuzmin, an employee of the KGB of the USSR, “that he did not want the collapse of the GDR, sought to preserve it, but acted indecisively” (See: Karpov M. The fall of the Berlin Wall. Even the Chekists did not expect this // Nezavisimaya Gazeta, November 5, 1994).

Was there a putsch?

On August 18, 1991, a group of leaders of the USSR arrived in Foros to see President M.S. Gorbachev, who was on vacation. The next day, the USSR announced the transfer of power to the State Committee for the State of Emergency, which went down in history under the name of the State Emergency Committee. Troops were transferred to Moscow and other major cities of the Soviet Union. Thus began a three-day coup that led to the banning of the CPSU and, ultimately, to the demise of the USSR. This phenomenon gave rise to a huge flow of literature, mainly from the pen of the participants in the events. However, as Gorbachev told reporters immediately after his return from Foros, “You will never know the whole truth!” The Dictionary of Foreign Words defines a coup as "an adventurous attempt by a small group of conspirators to carry out a coup d'état." To what extent did the events that took place more than ten years ago correspond to the given concept? How is this phenomenon perceived by today's population of Russia? What are the opinions of historians on this matter?

A survey conducted by the Public Opinion Foundation in the summer of 2003 on the topic “How do you assess the dramatic events of twelve years ago?” showed that the majority of respondents (48%) consider everything that happened then "an episode of the struggle for power in the country's top leadership." Another ROMIR-Monitoring Foundation asked the respondents about their personal attitude towards the main participants in the events of those years. Sympathy was distributed as follows: today Yeltsin would be supported by 13% of the respondents, the State Committee for the State of Emergency - 10%, President Gorbachev - 8%. 54% of the respondents refused their support to all the heroes of August-91. For some, the August events of 1991 were a phenomenon of global significance, when the issue of “changing the state system” of the country and “the impossibility of returning to socialism” was finally resolved. For others - "a tragedy not only of our people, but of the entire world community", which caused "bloody upheavals throughout the world." For the third - only "the beginning of the collapse of the USSR" and a missed opportunity "to carry out deep democratic transformations within the existing Union" (See: Three days of fear // Novye Izvestia. 2003. August 19).

On August 19, at six o'clock in the morning, the radio began broadcasting an announcement declaring a state of emergency in some regions of the USSR, a decree by the Vice-President of the USSR Yanaev on his assumption of the duties of the President of the USSR in connection with Gorbachev's ill health, a statement by the "Soviet leadership" on the creation of the State Committee for Emergency situation in the USSR, the appeal of the State Emergency Committee to the Soviet people. By its decrees, the State Emergency Committee announced the suspension of the activities of political parties, public organizations and mass movements that “obstruct the normalization of the situation”, the disbandment of power and administration structures that acted contrary to the Constitution of the USSR, the ban on rallies and demonstrations, and the establishment of control over the media. Troops and military equipment occupied key points on the highways leading to the center of Moscow, surrounded the area adjacent to the Kremlin. At about 12 noon, several dozen tanks came close to the White House of the RSFSR government.

These incidents were preceded by the following event: on August 18, Boldin, Baklanov, Shenin, Varennikov and Plekhanov, head of the security service of the KGB of the USSR, arrived in Foros. According to Boldin, at the end of the conversation, Gorbachev said: "The fool is with you, do as you like!" - and even gave some advice on how best, from his point of view, to introduce a state of emergency. The purpose of the creation of the State Emergency Committee, according to Boldin, is “to take over the key points of control, to restore order in the country” (See: Boldin V. The collapse of the pedestal: Strokes to the portrait of M.S. Gorbachev. M., 1995, 15-17; State shortfall // Kommersant power, 2001. August 21, pp. 9-10).

Former Prime Minister Pavlov, referring to the testimony of the Moscow visitors present at the Foros meeting, wrote that Gorbachev “no one suggested resigning”, he was only asked “either to agree to sign himself, or to instruct G. Yanaev to sign the declaration of a state of emergency and convene a session Supreme Soviet of the USSR. According to the retired prime minister, Gorbachev's real aim and position, which they initially interpreted as agreeing to a state of emergency, was to "deal with Yeltsin with our hands, pushing us to bloodshed. Then, as the President of the USSR, to deal with the perpetrators of this bloodshed, that is, with us. As a result, the country is in collapse, division and lawlessness, he is on the throne, and everyone who could resist is in the next world or in prison. Pavlov also refuted the conventional wisdom that Gorbachev was isolated in Foros. As evidence, he referred to the conclusion of one of the creators of the government communications system in Foros, who stated “the allegations about the complete disconnection of Foros's communication with the outside world are fiction (our italics - V.P.). This can't happen even with a nuclear attack." For Pavlov, this is a key moment in the whole story, because if “there is no isolation, there is no conspiracy” (See: Pavlov V.S. August from the inside. Gorbachev putsch. M., 1993, pp. 32-33, 47, 72-73 ).

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Lord, give me the patience to accept what I cannot change, the courage to change what I can, and the wisdom to know the difference between the two...

Mikhail Sergeevich Gorbachev was born on March 2, 1931 in the village of Privolnoye, Krasnogvardeisky District, Stavropol Territory, into a Russian-Ukrainian family of immigrants from the Voronezh province and Chernihiv region.

Mikhail Gorbachev's father, Sergei Andreevich, worked as a machine operator at a machine and tractor station. In August 1941, he was mobilized into the army, commanded a squad of sappers, was a participant in many famous battles of the Great Patriotic War. At the end of May 1944, the Gorbachev family received a funeral. For three days there was crying in the family. However, they soon received a letter from Sergei Andreevich, in which he said that everything was in order with him. At the end of the war, Sergei Andreevich received a shrapnel wound in his leg. S.A. Gorbachev was awarded the medal "For Courage" and two Orders of the Red Star. Returning to his homeland, he again began to work as a machine operator. “My father knew the combine very well and taught me,” recalls M.S. Gorbachev. - I could adjust any mechanism after a year or two. A matter of special pride - by ear I can immediately determine what was wrong in the work of the combine. In 1949, M.S. Gorbachev was awarded the Order of the Red Banner of Labor.

Mikhail Gorbachev's mother, Maria Panteleevna (nee Gopkalo), worked all her life on the collective farm. The repressions that unfolded in the mid-1930s did not bypass the Gopkalo and Gorbachev families either. In 1937, grandfather M.S. Gorbachev Pantelei Efimovich Gopkalo was arrested as "a member of the counter-revolutionary right-wing Trotskyist organization." For fourteen months he was in prison, being under investigation, endured torture and abuse. Pantelei Efimovich was saved from execution by the assistant prosecutor of Stavropol. Pros and cons of Gorbachev's rule In December 1938, he was released, returned to Privolnoye, and in 1939 was elected chairman of the collective farm. Pantelei Gopkalo enjoyed great prestige among his fellow villagers. Another grandfather of Mikhail Sergeevich - Andrei Moiseevich Gorbachev at first did not join the collective farm, but lived as an individual farmer on a farm. In 1933, as a result of a drought in the south of the country, there was a terrible famine. In the family of Andrei Moiseevich, out of six children, three died of starvation. In the spring of 1934, he was arrested for not fulfilling the grain sowing plan: there was nothing to sow. Andrei Moiseevich as a "saboteur" was sent to forced labor at a logging site in the Irkutsk region. Two years later, in 1936, he was released early for good work and good behavior. Returning to Privolnoe, A.M. Gorbachev joined the collective farm, where he worked until the end of his life.

Before school, Mikhail Gorbachev lived most of the time in the house of Panteley Efimovich and Vasilisa Lukyanovna Gopkalo, who doted on their grandson. Michael studied very well at school. During his school years, he showed a passion for knowledge, an interest in the new, which remained in him forever. Michael enthusiastically participated in amateur performances. Once the drama club, in which he participated, went on a "tour" in the villages of the region. With the proceeds from paid performances, 35 pairs of shoes were bought for children who had nothing to go to school. In 1950 M.S. Gorbachev graduated from high school with a silver medal. The father insisted that Michael continued to study. The choice fell on the main university of the country - Moscow State University. M.V. Lomonosov (Moscow State University). M.S. Gorbachev was enrolled in the law faculty of Moscow State University not only without entrance exams, but even without an interview. He was called by telegram - "enrolled with the provision of a hostel." Several factors influenced this decision: Gorbachev's worker-peasant origin, seniority, a high government award - the Order of the Red Banner of Labor, and the fact that in 1950 (while studying in the 10th grade of school) Gorbachev was accepted as a candidate member of the CPSU. Mikhail Sergeevich recalls: “The years of study at the university were not only extremely interesting for me, but also quite stressful. I had to fill in the gaps in the rural school, which made themselves felt - especially in the first years, and, frankly, I never suffered from a lack of pride. “... Moscow University provided me with solid knowledge and a spiritual charge that determined my life choice. It was here that the long process of rethinking the history of the country, its present and future began, stretching for years.

In his student years, M.S. Gorbachev met his future wife, Raisa Maksimovna Titarenko, who studied at the Faculty of Philosophy at Moscow State University. On September 25, 1953 they got married. In 1955 M.S. Gorbachev graduated with honors from the Faculty of Law. According to the distribution, he was sent to the disposal of the Stavropol Regional Prosecutor's Office. In Stavropol, M.S. Gorbachev was remembered for his activities in the school Komsomol organization, noted for his social activity and talent as an organizer. Almost immediately M.S. Gorbachev was offered a job as deputy head of the Department of Propaganda and Agitation in the regional committee of the All-Union Leninist Communist Youth Union (VLKSM). So, having worked only 10 days in the prosecutor's office (from August 5 to August 15, 1955), M.S. Gorbachev took on new duties. In September 1956 M.S. Gorbachev became the first secretary of the Stavropol city committee of the Komsomol; On April 25, 1958, he was elected second secretary of the Komsomol regional committee, and on March 21, 1961, first secretary of the Komsomol regional committee. September 26, 1966 M.S. Gorbachev becomes First Secretary and member of the Bureau of the Stavropol City Committee of the CPSU. August 5, 1969 - Second Secretary of the Stavropol Regional Committee of the CPSU. April 10, 1970 M.S. Gorbachev was approved as the First Secretary of the Stavropol Regional Committee of the CPSU. The most important elements of his program for the development of the Stavropol region were the rational distribution of agricultural enterprises, their specialization; creation of advanced poultry and agricultural complexes; introduction of industrial technologies; the construction of the Great Stavropol Canal and irrigation and watering systems, which was vital for the region with risky agriculture, 50% of whose territories were arid steppes; completion of the modernization of the light and food industries.

During his work in the Stavropol Territory, M.S. Gorbachev managed to prepare and implement a long-term program for the development of the region. Pros and cons of Gorbachev's rule. In those years, the young secretary of the regional committee of the CPSU had to come face to face with the decision-making system in the conditions of an administrative-command economy and a bureaucratic state. The Stavropol Territory is one of the most beautiful and famous resort places in Russia. Top party leaders of the USSR regularly came here to relax. It is here that M.S. Gorbachev met A.N. Kosygin and Yu.V. Andropov. Gorbachev developed a close and trusting relationship with Andropov. Later, Andropov would call Gorbachev "the Stavropol nugget." For Raisa Maksimovna Gorbacheva, the Stavropol Territory also became native. After several years of searching for a job in her specialty, she began teaching at the Faculty of Economics of the Stavropol Agricultural Institute. Raisa Maksimovna gave lectures to undergraduate and graduate students on philosophy, aesthetics, and problems of religion. On January 6, 1957, the Gorbachevs' daughter, Irina, was born. In 1967 P.M. Gorbacheva defended her thesis on the topic “Formation of new features of the life of the collective farm peasantry (based on sociological research in the Stavropol Territory) on November 27, 1978 at the plenum of the Central Committee of the CPSU M.S. Gorbachev was elected Secretary of the Central Committee of the CPSU. On December 6, 1978, he arrived with his family in Moscow. After moving to Moscow, M.S. Gorbachev at first dealt with agricultural issues, traveled a lot around the country, made official visits abroad. MS Gorbachev quickly showed himself as an enterprising, energetic and principled politician. Two years after moving to Moscow, he became a member of the highest governing body of the party - the Politburo of the CPSU Central Committee.

In March 1985 M.S. Gorbachev was elected General Secretary of the Central Committee of the CPSU. With the advent of Gorbachev to power in the USSR, a process of democratization began, which was called "perestroika" (1985-1991). Glasnost became the driving force behind perestroika. A program was being developed to transfer the economy to a socially oriented market basis. There was a dismantling of the totalitarian regime in the USSR. In 1990, power was transferred from the CPSU to the Congress of People's Deputies of the USSR, the first parliament in Soviet history. alternatively elected in free democratic elections. On March 15, 1990, the Congress elected Gorbachev as President of the USSR. In international relations, Gorbachev pursued an active policy of detente based on the principles of "new thinking" he formulated and became one of the key figures in world politics in the 20th century. During 1985-1991, there was a radical change in relations between the West and the USSR - a transition from military and ideological confrontation to dialogue and the formation of partnership relations. Gorbachev's activities played a decisive role in ending the Cold War, the nuclear arms race, and the unification of Germany. In recognition of the great merits of MS Gorbachev as an outstanding reformer, a world-class politician who made a unique contribution to changing the very nature of international development for the better, he was awarded the Nobel Peace Prize (October 15, 1990). The destructive processes that the fragile democracy could not resist led to the August 1991 coup and the collapse of the USSR. In an effort to prevent such an outcome, Gorbachev did everything possible - with the exception of the use of force, which would be contrary to the basic principles of his political philosophy and morality. December 25, 1991 MS Gorbachev resigned as head of state.

After retiring, in 1992 M.S. Gorbachev created the International Foundation for Socio-Economic and Political Science Research (Gorbachev-Fund), becoming its president. The Gorbachev Foundation is a research center, a platform for public discussions, and carries out humanitarian projects and charity events. After the death of Raisa Maksimovna Gorbacheva (August 20, 1999), the family continues to play a big role in the life of Mikhail Sergeevich - daughter Irina, granddaughters Xenia and Anastasia, great-granddaughter Alexander. Since 1999, Irina Mikhailovna Gorbacheva-Virganskaya has been the Vice President of the Gorbachev Foundation. In 1993 M.S. Gorbachev, on the initiative of representatives of 108 countries, founded the international non-governmental environmental organization International Green Cross. This organization aims to inform the public about environmental issues, to foster a new environmental consciousness, to overcome the environmental consequences of the Cold War and the arms race. Pluses and minuses of Gorbachev's rule National organizations of the International Green Cross work in 23 countries of the world. M.S. Gorbachev is one of the initiators of the creation in 1999 of the Forum of Nobel Peace Prize Laureates. At the annual meetings of the Forum, global problems of concern to mankind are discussed: violence and wars, problems of poverty, and the ecological crisis. In 2001-2009 M.S. Gorbachev served as Russian co-chair of the Petersburg Dialogue Forum, a regular meeting between Russia and Germany that takes place alternately in both countries. Politicians, public figures, representatives of business circles, youth participate in the Forum events. On May 21, 2010, Luxembourg hosted the first meeting of the Scientific Advisory Board of the New Policy Forum, where a board of founders headed by M.S. Gorbachev was formed. This is a new international organization created by M.S. Gorbachev and continuing the mission of the World Policy Forum (2003-2009) - a platform for informal discussion of topical issues of global politics by the most authoritative political and public leaders from around the world. M.S. Gorbachev takes an active part in the political life of Russia: during the 1996 elections, he was one of the candidates for the post of President of the Russian Federation. M.S. Gorbachev, is a staunch social democrat, the founder of the Russian United Social Democratic Party and the Social Democratic Party of Russia (2001-2007), the all-Russian public movement "Union of Social Democrats" (formed in the fall of 2007. ), the Civil Dialogue Forum (2010).

MS Gorbachev characterizes his political credo as follows: “... I tried to combine politics with science, morality, morality, and responsibility to people. For me it was a matter of principle. It was necessary to put a limit to the rampant desires of the rulers, their tyranny. I did not succeed in everything, but I do not think that this approach was erroneous. Without this, it is difficult to expect that politics will be able to fulfill its unique role, especially today, when we have entered a new century, when we are facing dramatic challenges.”

For the period since 1992, M.S. Gorbachev made over 250 international visits, visiting 50 countries. He has been awarded more than 300 state and public awards, diplomas, certificates of honor and distinctions. Since 1992 M.S. Gorbachev published dozens of books in 10 languages ​​of the world. Pros and Cons of Gorbachev's Rule

Rejoice in what you have and who you are, be generous in the disposal of both - and you will never have to chase after happiness.