Judging by the documents, on June 22, 1941, the Nazi troops entered the Soviet Union almost without hindrance ...

The Ministry of Defense has published unique documents about the first battles of the Red Army in the Great Patriotic War.

Today, June 22, on the Day of Memory and Sorrow, the website of the Ministry of Defense of the Russian Federation published unique historical documents telling about the first battles of the Great Patriotic War. The department of information and mass communications of the department, together with the Central Archive of the Ministry of Defense, carried out large-scale work to find and digitize previously unpublished primary sources from the period of late June - early July 1941.

Of undoubted interest will be the first published copy of the Directive of the People's Commissar of Defense of the USSR No. 1 dated June 22, 1941, signed by Zhukov and Timoshenko and handed over on the night of June 22 by the commanders of the 3rd, 4th and 10th armies. Also in the project, for the first time, a trophy map of the initial stage of the “Plan Barbarossa” is presented, where, in addition to the detailed deployment of Nazi troops near the borders of the USSR, the planned directions of the main attacks of the Wehrmacht troops in the first days of the war are indicated. Particular attention deserves the declassified Combat Order of the People's Commissar of Defense No. 2 dated June 22, 1941, personally compiled by the Chief of the General Staff of the Red Army Zhukov three hours after the start of the war - at 7:15 in the morning. It is noteworthy that the order instructs the troops of the Red Army "by all means and means to fall upon the enemy forces and destroy them in areas where they violated the Soviet border", and bomber and attack aircraft to destroy enemy aircraft at airfields based and grouping ground forces "to the depth of German territory up to 100-150 kilometers. At the same time, it was indicated that “no raids should be made on the territory of Finland and Romania until special instructions.” On the back of the last page of this document is G. Zhukov's postscript: “T[ov]. Vatutin. Bomb Romania.

Behind the handwritten lines of this unique document - in fact, the first combat order of the People's Commissariat of Defense - one can read the colossal tension and tragedy of the first hours of the outbreak of war. According to the documents, all participants in the first battles describe the conditions under which our troops entered the war in one word “unexpectedly”, and the Soviet leadership delayed open resistance to the invaders to the last. So, despite cases of shelling of Soviet military personnel by German aircraft and fighting with border guards, an instruction was received from the headquarters of the 5th Army: “Do not succumb to provocation, do not shoot at aircraft ... The Germans in some places began to fight with our frontier posts. This is yet another provocation. Do not go for provocation. Raise the troops on alert, but do not give cartridges to your hands.

The published documents of the Ministry of Defense are the fruit of the work of a group of specialists led by Colonel-General A.P. Pokrovsky, who in 1952 began to develop a description of the Great Patriotic War of 1941-1945. Apparently, the project was approved by Stalin. For a more complete and objective presentation of events, questions were formulated relating to the period of deployment of the troops of the Baltic, Kiev and Belorussian special military districts according to the "Plan of Defense of the State Border of 1941".

Five main questions were identified:

1. Was the state border defense plan communicated to the troops? If yes, then when and what was done by the command and troops to ensure the implementation of this plan.
2. From what time and on the basis of what order, the covering troops began to reach the state border, and how many of them were deployed to defend the border before the start of hostilities.
3. When the order was received to put the troops on alert in connection with the expected attack Nazi Germany on the morning of June 22. What and when instructions were given to the troops in pursuance of this order and what was done.
4. Why most of the artillery of the corps and divisions was in training camps.
5. To what extent the headquarters of the unit was prepared for command and control, and to what extent this affected the conduct of operations in the first days of the war.

Assignments were sent to the commanders of districts, armies, commanders of corps, divisions, who exercised control in the first days of the war. Received materials authored by well-known Soviet military leaders were carefully studied and analyzed. The conclusions were quite shocking: “The Soviet government and the high command, realistically assessing the situation in the period 1940-1941, felt the incomplete readiness of the country and the army to repel an attack from fascist Germany, a strong and well-armed enemy due to the robbery of countries Western Europe, with two years of combat experience. Based on the objective reality of that time, by ordering the troops to be on full alert, the country's leadership did not want to give Hitler a pretext for unleashing a war in extremely unfavorable conditions for us, hoping to delay the war. Therefore, for the army and commanders of the troops, the attack of the Nazis came as a "complete surprise", despite the fact that Soviet intelligence was well aware of the plans of the Wehrmacht.

From the report of Lieutenant General Kuzma Derevyanko, who in 1941 was the deputy head of the intelligence department of the headquarters of the Baltic Special Military District (North-Western Front):

“The grouping of Nazi troops on the eve of the war in the Memel region, in East Prussia and in the Suwalki region in the last days before the war was known to the district headquarters quite fully and in large part and in detail. The uncovered grouping of Nazi troops on the eve of hostilities was regarded by the intelligence department [of the district headquarters] as an offensive grouping with a significant saturation with tanks and motorized units. The command and headquarters of the district had reliable data on the intensive and direct preparation of fascist Germany for a war against the Soviet Union 2-3 months before the start of hostilities. Starting from the second week of the war, much attention was paid to the organization of detachments sent behind enemy lines for the purpose of reconnaissance and sabotage, as well as the organization of reconnaissance radio-equipped groups behind enemy lines and radio-equipped points on the territory occupied by our troops in case of their forced withdrawal. “In the following months, the information received from our groups and detachments working behind enemy lines improved all the time and was of great value. It was reported on the personally observed concentration of Nazi troops in the border areas, starting from the end of February, on the reconnaissance conducted by German officers along the border, the preparation of artillery positions by the Germans, the intensification of the construction of long-term defensive structures in the border zone, as well as gas and bomb shelters in the cities of East Prussia ".

But if for reconnaissance the preparation of the Germans for the German offensive was an obvious fact, then for the commanders of the troops on June 22 it was a complete surprise.

From the report of Lieutenant General Pyotr Sobennikov, who in 1941 commanded the troops of the 8th Army of the Baltic Special Military District (North-Western Front):

“How unexpectedly for the approaching troops the war began can be judged, for example, by the fact that the personnel of the heavy artillery regiment, moving by rail to
dawn on June 22, arriving at st. Siauliai and seeing the bombing of our airfields, believed that "maneuvers had begun." “At this time, almost all aviation of the Baltic Military District was burned at the airfields. For example, from the mixed air division, which was supposed to support the 8th Army, by 15 hours on June 22, 5 or 6 SB aircraft remained.

“... at about 10-11 o’clock on June 18, I received an order to withdraw parts of the divisions to my defense sectors by the morning of June 19, and Colonel General Kuznetsov [Commander of the PriOVO]
ordered me to go to the right flank, and he personally went to Taurage, taking upon himself the duty to put the 10th rifle corps of Major General Shumilov on alert. I sent the chief of staff of the army to the settlement. Kelgava with an order to withdraw the Army headquarters to the command post.

“During June 19, 3 rifle divisions (10th, 90th and 125th) were deployed. Parts of these divisions were located in prepared trenches and bunkers. The permanent structures were not ready. Even on the night of June 22, I personally received an order from the chief of staff of the Klenov front in a very categorical form - by dawn on June 22, withdraw the troops from the border, withdraw them from the trenches, which I categorically refused to do and the troops remained in position.

From the report of Major General Nikolai Ivanov, who in 1941 was the chief of staff of the 6th Army of the Kiev Special Military District (Southwestern Front):

“Despite the undeniable signs of a major concentration German troops, the commander of the troops of the Kiev Special Military District forbade the advancement of cover units, putting the troops on alert, and even more so reinforcing them even after the start of shelling of the state border and air raids at night from June 21 to June 22, 1941. Only on the afternoon of June 22 was this allowed, when the Germans have already crossed the state border and acted on our territory.”

From the report of Major General Pavel Abramidze, who in 1941 was the head of the operational department of the headquarters of the Kiev Special Military District (Southwestern Front):

“Before the treacherous attack ... I and the commanders of the units of my unit did not know the content of the mobilization plan, the so-called MP-41 of the year. After it was opened, in the first hour of the war, everyone was convinced that defensive work, command and staff exercises with access to the field, proceeded strictly from the 41-year mobilization plan, developed by the headquarters of the Kiev Special Military District and approved by the General Staff.

As Major General Boris Fomin, head of the operations department of the headquarters of the 12th Army of the Belarusian Special Military District (Western Front), testified, “extracts from the plans for the defense of the state border (...) were kept at the headquarters of corps and divisions in sealed“ red ”packages. The order to open the red packets from the district headquarters followed at the end of June 21. An enemy air strike (3.50 on June 22) caught the troops at the moment of their advancement for defense. According to the approved state border defense plan of 1941, in connection with the concentration of large German forces to the state border, an increase in the number of troops included in the plan was envisaged. “The defense of the border before the start of hostilities was not engaged in divisions. The radio stations in the army headquarters were destroyed by bombing.

Management had to be carried out by communications officers, communications were maintained by U-2, SB aircraft, armored vehicles and cars. “To deliver the encrypted order, I sent one U-2 aircraft to each army with the order to land near the command post and hand over the order; one SB aircraft in each army with an order to drop a paratrooper near the command post with an encrypted order for delivery; and one armored car with an officer to present the same encrypted order. Results: all U-2s were shot down, all armored vehicles were burned, and only at the command post of the 10th Army, 2 paratroopers with orders were dropped from the SB. To clarify the front line had to use fighters.

Major General Mikhail Zashibalov, commander of the 86th Rifle Division of the 5th Rifle Corps of the 10th Army of the Belarusian Special Military District (Western Front) in 1941, said that he “at one in the morning on June 22, 1941, was called by the corps commander to the telephone and received the following instructions - to raise the headquarters of the division, the headquarters of the regiments on alarm and collect them at their location. Do not raise rifle regiments on combat alert, why wait for his order. At 0200, the division chief of staff reported the information received from the Chief of the Nurskaya frontier outpost that the Nazi troops were approaching the Western Bug River and bringing up crossing facilities. After the report of the chief of staff of the division at 02:10 on June 22, 1941, he ordered the “Storm” signal to be given and the rifle regiments to be alerted and to make a forced march to occupy sectors and defense areas. At 2.40 on June 22, I received an order to open the package of the corps commander stored in my safe, from which it became known to me - to raise the division on alert and act in accordance with the decision I made and the order for the division, which I did on my own initiative an hour earlier.

In turn, in 1952, Marshal of the Soviet Union Ivan Bagramyan (June 22, 1941 - Head of the Operations Department of the Headquarters of the Kiev Special Military District (South-Western Front) noted in his report that “the troops that directly covered the state border had detailed plans and documentation up to the regiment, inclusive. Along the entire border, field positions were prepared for them. These troops were the first operational echelon, and were deployed directly at the borders. They began to deploy under the cover of fortified areas with the outbreak of hostilities. Their advance access to prepared positions by the General It was banned by the headquarters in order not to give a reason for provoking war on the part of fascist Germany.

In 1952, the specialists of the group of Colonel-General A.P. Pokrovsky received contradictory information on the questions asked. So, to the very first and important question - was the plan for the defense of the state border brought to the troops, some commanders reported that the plan was brought to them in advance, and they had the opportunity to develop their plans with the formation of battle formations and the definition of combat areas. Others replied that they had not been acquainted with the plan, but received it in sealed packages directly in the first days of the war. So in one of the reports that the researchers received, it was said: “Parts of the 99th Infantry Division of the 26th Army of the Kiev Special Military District were located on the state border, being in constant combat readiness, and in a very short time they could occupy their harrow areas, but conflicting orders from the high command did not allow our gunners to open fire on the enemy until 10:00 am on June 22. And only at 4.00 am on June 23, after a 30-minute artillery preparation, our troops drove the enemy out of the city of Przemysl occupied by him and liberated the city, where there were many Soviet citizens, including families of officers. There were also such confessions of the commanders of the troops: “Parts of the divisions of the 5th Army of the Kiev Special Military District entered the battle with the Germans in extremely difficult conditions, since the hostilities began suddenly and came as a surprise, while one third of the troops were on defensive work, and the corps the artillery was at the army camp." “In the Baltic Special Military District, the Germans started the war at 4.00 am on June 22 with artillery preparation and direct fire at bunkers, frontier posts, settlements, creating many fires, after which they went on the offensive. The main efforts of the enemy concentrated in the direction of Palanga-Libava, along the coast of the Baltic Sea bypassed the city of Kretinga, along the Klaipeda highway.

Parts of the 10th Infantry Division repelled German attacks with fire and repeatedly went over to counterattacks, fought stubborn defensive battles throughout the entire depth of the forefield to the river. Minia, Plungi, Retovas. In view of the current situation, by the end of June 22, the division commander received an order from the commander of the 10th Rifle Corps to withdraw. The fact that the Soviet leadership tried to delay hostilities with the enemy to the last, thereby hoping to avoid war, says a document with the following content: an order was received: “Do not succumb to the provocation, do not shoot at the planes ... The Germans in some places began to fight with our frontier posts. This is yet another provocation. Do not go for provocation. Raise the troops on alert, but they don’t give cartridges to their hands. ”

According to the disclosed documents, at dawn on June 22, almost all PriOVO aircraft were burned at the airfields. From the mixed air division attached to the 8th army of the district, by 15 hours on June 22, 5 or 6 SB aircraft remained. As for the participation of artillery in the first days of the war, for the most part it was at the district and army training camps in accordance with the orders of the district headquarters. As soon as active clashes with the enemy began, artillery units arrived on their own in the areas of hostilities and took up the necessary positions. The units that remained in the places of deployment of their units took a direct part in supporting our troops as long as there was fuel for the tractors. When the fuel ran out, the gunners were forced to blow up the guns and equipment. The conditions under which our troops entered the war are described by all the participants in the first battles in one word, "unexpectedly." The situation was the same in all three districts. But by June 26, having recovered from the sudden blow, the headquarters took over the leadership of the fighting. Difficulties in command and control of troops were manifested in almost everything: the understaffing of some headquarters, the lack of the required number of communications equipment (radio and transport), the protection of the headquarters, vehicles for movement, broken wire communications. The management of the rear was difficult due to the supply system remaining from peacetime - the "district-regiment". For these and many other reasons, in the first days of the war, the German army inflicted serious damage on the Soviet defense system: military headquarters were destroyed, the activities of communications services were paralyzed, and strategically important objects were captured. The German army was rapidly advancing deep into the USSR, and by July 10, Army Group Center (commander von Bock), having captured Belarus, approached Smolensk, Army Group South (commander von Rundstedt) captured Right-Bank Ukraine, Army Group North ( Commander von Leeb) occupied part of the Baltic. The losses of the Red Army (including those who were surrounded) amounted to more than two million people. The current situation was catastrophic for the USSR. But the Soviet mobilization resources were very large, and by the beginning of July, 5 million people were drafted into the Red Army, which made it possible to close the gaps formed at the front. And after 4 years soviet soldiers raised the red flag over the Reichstag.

The first and most difficult day of the Great Patriotic War

The implementation of Hitler's plan "Barbarossa" began at dawn on June 22, 1941. It was at this time that the Wehrmacht troops concentrated on the border of the USSR received the order to start the invasion.

That first day of the war began unusually early, not only for the troops of the western border military districts, but also for the Soviet people living in the border regions of the USSR. At dawn, hundreds of German bombers invaded the airspace of the Soviet Union. They bombarded airfields, areas where troops were stationed in the western border districts, railway junctions, communication lines and other important objects, as well as large cities in Lithuania, Latvia, Estonia, Belarus, Ukraine, and Moldova.

At the same time, Wehrmacht troops concentrated along the entire length of the State Border of the USSR opened heavy artillery fire on border outposts, fortified areas, as well as formations and units of the Red Army stationed in its immediate vicinity. After artillery and aviation preparation, they crossed the State Border of the USSR along a huge stretch - from the Baltic Sea to the Black Sea.

The Great Patriotic War began - the most difficult of all wars ever experienced by Russia and its people.

Germany and its allies (Finland, Romania and Hungary)

for the war against the Soviet Union deployed a powerful grouping,

numbering 190 divisions, 5.5 million people, over 47 thousand guns and mortars,

about 4300 tanks and assault guns, 4200 aircraft.

They were united in three army groups - "North", "Center" and "South",

which were intended to strike in the directions of Leningrad, Moscow and Kyiv.

The immediate strategic goal of the German military leadership was to defeat the Soviet troops in the Baltic States, Belarus and the Right-Bank Ukraine.

The main blows of the Wehrmacht were directed at Leningrad, Moscow and Kyiv. The efforts of one of the army groups were concentrated in each direction.

The troops of Army Group North deployed in East Prussia advanced on Leningrad. They were supposed to destroy Soviet troops in the Baltic states, seize ports on the Baltic Sea and the North-Western regions of the USSR. In cooperation with this group of armies, a little later, the German army "Norway" and the Karelian army of the Finns, who had the task of capturing Murmansk, were to act. The enemy grouping directly operating in the Baltic direction was opposed by the troops of the Baltic Special Military District under the command of General F.I. Kuznetsov, and in the Murmansk sector the troops of the Leningrad Military District, which was headed by General M.M. Popov.

In the main Moscow direction, the troops of the Army Group Center operated, which were supposed to defeat the Soviet troops in Belarus and develop an offensive to the East. In this direction, the USSR State Border was covered by the troops of the Western Special Military District under the command of General D.G. Pavlova.

Army Group South, deployed from Vlodava to the mouth of the Danube, struck in the general direction of Kyiv. This grouping of enemy troops was opposed by the forces of the Kiev Special Military District, commanded by General M.P. Kirponos and the Odessa Military District under the command of General Ya.T. Cherevichenko.

In Moscow, the first reports of the invasion came from the border guards. "Advance on all fronts. Parts of the border guards are fighting ... - the command of the Bialystok border section reported to the Main Directorate of the Border Troops, - The Germans are advancing Kretinga ... Bialystok. At the same time, the General Staff received similar information from the western border districts. At about 4 o'clock in the morning, his boss, General G.K. Zhukov reported to I.V. Stalin about what happened.

Only an hour and a half after the invasion of the Wehrmacht troops into Soviet territory, the German Ambassador to the USSR F. Schulenburg arrived at the People's Commissar for Foreign Affairs V.M. Molotov, and gave him an official note from his government, which stated: “In view of the further intolerable threat, due to the massive concentration ... of the armed forces of the Red Army. The German government considers itself compelled to immediately take military countermeasures. However, even after receiving an official document from the German embassy, ​​I.V. Stalin could not fully believe that this was a war. He demanded that Marshal S.K. Timoshenko and Chief of the General Staff General G.K. Zhukov, so that they would immediately figure out if this was a provocation of the German generals, and ordered the troops to order the border not to cross until special instructions.

The whole country learned about the German attack only at 12 noon, when the Deputy Chairman of the Council of People's Commissars, People's Commissar for Foreign Affairs V.M. Molotov. The appeal ended with the words that became the slogan of the Soviet people in the fight against the invaders: “Our cause is just. The enemy will be defeated. Victory will be ours".

Already after the speech of V.M. Molotov, the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR adopted a number of decrees aimed at mobilizing all the forces of the state to repel the attack, as well as to ensure public order and state security within the country:

• "On the announcement of mobilization on the territory of 14 military districts from June 23";
• "On the introduction of martial law in certain areas of the USSR."

Crowding around loudspeakers installed on the streets and industrial enterprises, people listened to Molotov's speech, afraid to miss a word. At first, almost none of them doubted that the Red Army would need only a few weeks to defeat the enemy "with little blood, with a mighty blow." The tragedy of the situation was not fully realized by the military-political leadership of the country due to the lack of objective information from the front.

Only by the end of that day, it became clear to the head of the Soviet government that military operations on the western borders of the USSR were by no means a large-scale military provocation by Germany, but the beginning of a war - the most terrible and cruel. “At dawn on June 22, 1941, the regular troops of the German army attacked our border units on the front from the Baltic to the Black Sea,” the population of the country was informed in the first report of the High Command of the Red Army, “and during the first half of the day they were held back. In the afternoon ... after fierce fighting, the enemy was repulsed with heavy losses. Only in the Grodno and Krystynopol directions did the enemy manage to achieve minor tactical successes ... ".

Already in this report from the front, to some extent, the whole drama of the first border battles and battles, the most severe in their intensity and consequences, was visible. But then, on the first day of the war, no one could even imagine what inhuman tests would fall on the shoulders of every Soviet person, not only at the front, but also in the rear.

The population of Germany learned about the beginning of a new war from Hitler's appeal to the people, which at 5:30 a.m. was read out on the Berlin radio by the Minister of Propaganda I. Goebbels. Judging by this appeal, the political leadership of Germany sought not only to justify the aggression in the eyes of the world community, but also to attract Western powers to participate in the anti-Soviet war and thereby deprive the USSR of possible allies. However, both the leaders of the leading powers and the majority of sober-minded European politicians clearly understood that the Nazi statements were just a propaganda trick with which they hoped to justify another act of their aggressive aspirations.

The British were the first to react. Already in the evening of the same day, British Prime Minister W. Churchill made a statement about the support of the USSR in the war against Nazi Germany. He clearly articulated the purpose of British policy in the war and guaranteed a tough and consistent position for his country:

“We have only one single unchanging goal. We are determined to destroy Hitler and all traces of the Nazi regime..."

He ended his speech with promises "to provide Russia and the Russian people with all the help we can."

The speech of the British Prime Minister had a huge resonance all over the world. All points were placed: England clearly defined its attitude towards the Soviet Union, which was subjected to aggression. To clarify the positions of many other states of the world, primarily the countries of the British Commonwealth, which are accustomed to traditionally orient themselves on the opinion of London, Churchill's speech was of fundamental importance. In a certain sense, it also influenced the position of the United States of America. True, the events that took place in Europe did not affect the Americans much. After all, they were away from the world war. Nevertheless, on the morning of June 23, Acting Secretary of State S. Welles, at the direction of President F. Roosevelt, made an official statement about rendering assistance to the USSR. The next day, Roosevelt himself at a press conference at the White House said that the United States would provide all possible assistance to the USSR in its struggle against Germany, but noted that it was not yet known what form it would take.

And yet, at the very beginning of the Great Patriotic War, the Western powers spoke more about supporting the USSR than actually helping it. The reasons for this slowness are obvious. The temptation was already very great to strengthen their own positions - to take advantage of the mutual weakening and exhaustion of the two irreconcilable enemies of Germany and the Soviet Union. And there was not so much confidence that the Red Army would withstand the battle with the seemingly invincible Wehrmacht. Indeed, already on June 22, the strike groups of the German troops achieved tangible success in all directions, due to the decisive concentration by his command in the first strategic echelon of more than 80% of all forces intended for the eastern campaign - 130 divisions, 8 brigades, 3350 tanks, about 38 thousand people. guns and mortars and about 5 thousand aircraft.

A strike of such force for all the troops of the western border districts was a complete surprise. They were not ready for such a development of events. The Soviet border guards, who were the first to stand in the way of the German troops, did not expect this blow either. The enemy hoped to crush the border outposts in a short time, but he did not succeed. The border guards fought to the death.

In extremely unfavorable conditions, the formations and cover units of the western border districts had to start hostilities. Not put on alert in advance, they were unable to provide a proper rebuff to the enemy. As early as half past two in the night of June 22, the headquarters of the border military districts received the directive of the People's Commissar of Defense No. 1 that an attack on the country by the German armed forces was possible on June 22 or 23. But, this document did not give permission to put into effect a plan to cover the state border in full, since it only prescribed "not to succumb to any provocative actions that could cause major complications ...".

The insufficiently specific content of the given order caused many questions from commanders of all levels, and most importantly, it fettered their initiative. So, in the directive of the Baltic Special Military District, it was indicated to the 8th and 11th armies:

“During the night of June 22, covertly occupy the defense of the main zone ... Do not issue live ammunition and shells ... Do not open fire in case of provocative actions by the Germans.”

At 02:25, similar instructions were given to the armies by the military council and the Western Special Military District.

The army headquarters, having received district directives a few minutes before the start of the war, brought this order to subordinate formations and units until 5-6 in the morning. Therefore, only a few of them were put on alert in a timely manner. Most of them were alerted by the first explosions of enemy artillery shells and aerial bombs. The commanders of the 3rd and 4th armies of the Western Special Military District managed to give the formation commanders only some preliminary orders. At the headquarters of the 10th Army, the directive was received after the outbreak of hostilities. There were several reasons. On the night of June 22, in the entire border zone, as a result of the actions of enemy sabotage groups, wire communications in the army-corps-division link were largely disrupted. The lack of pre-worked out documents on covert command and control of troops, the low provision of headquarters with radio equipment, as well as radio fear led to the fact that they practically did not use this type of communication.

Former Chief of Staff of the 11th Army of the North-Western Front, General I.T. Schlemin noted:

“On June 22, in the afternoon, wire and radio communications with the district were interrupted. It was impossible to find the district ... The district headquarters, receiving cipher telegrams from the army by radio, believed that the ciphers were coming from the enemy, and, afraid to give out their plan and their location, decided not to respond to the army's requests.

As a result of the first massive enemy air strikes on the places of deployment of troops, a large number of means of communication and transport were destroyed. Already in the first hours of the war, the commander of the 3rd Army, General V.I. Kuznetsov reported to the headquarters of the Western Front:

"Wire communication with the units is broken, radio communication is not established until 8 o'clock."

A similar situation was observed at the headquarters of the 14th mechanized corps. Later, its commander, General S.I. Oborin also reported to the headquarters of the Western Front:

“The communications battalion was killed by 70% on June 22, 1941 in the morning, during the bombardment of the city of Kobrin. The headquarters of the 14th mechanized corps remained in the composition of 20% of the regular number.

Lacking accurate information from the troops about the development of events, the commanders and staffs were unable to assess the seriousness of the situation. The installation of the People's Commissar of Defense, in his directive No. 1 "not to succumb to any provocations," still continued to operate, which limited the decisive actions of the commanders of formations and units of the covering armies. Thus, the commander of the 3rd Army reported to the headquarters of the Western Front:

"Enemy aviation is bombing Grodno, waiting for orders from General Pavlov ... artillery and machine-gun fire from the Germans ... waiting for instructions."

Practically the same was noted by the commander of the 11th Rifle Corps of the 8th Army of the North-Western Front, General M.S. Shumilov: “The war began at 0400... I immediately reported to the commander of the 8th Army... I received an order: “Do not open fire, do not succumb to provocation.” But the troops, without orders, returned fire.

The commanders of most formations and units acted similarly in other sectors of the state border cover of the western border districts. Orders "from above" came much later. So, the Military Council of the Western Front sent a directive to the commanders of the 3rd, 4th and 10th armies only at 5 hours and 25 minutes: “In view of the mass hostilities that have emerged from the Germans, I order: to raise troops and act in a combat manner.”

Hard-to-replace losses from enemy air strikes were suffered by army aviation, destroyed for the most part at airfields. 66 airfields, where the most combat-ready aviation regiments of the western border districts were stationed, were subjected to massive raids. Thus, in the 10th mixed aviation division of the 4th Army of the Western Front, more than 70% of the aircraft of the attack and fighter aviation regiments were destroyed at airfields in the Vysokoye and Pruzhany regions. In the 7th mixed aviation division of the 8th Army of the North-Western Front by 15 o'clock there were only five or six aircraft left, the rest were destroyed. As a result, Soviet aviation lost over 1,200 aircraft that day.

Already from the very first hours of the war, the enemy, taking advantage of the almost complete absence of anti-aircraft weapons in the military air defense units, ensured complete air supremacy. Commander of the 3rd mechanized corps, General A.V. Kurkin, in one of his reports to the commander of the 8th Army of the North-Western Front, noted:

“... there is no our aviation. The enemy is bombing all the time."

The troops of the western border military districts, raised on alarm, sought to reach their cover areas, but, having no information about the situation, not knowing what was happening on the border, they were still attacked by German aviation and its ground forces while still in march formations. Even before they came into contact with the enemy, they suffered huge losses. On this occasion, the commander of the 3rd Panzer Group, General G. Goth, in the reporting document indicated:

“There were no signs of purposeful and planned command and control of enemy forces in general. The direct command and control of the troops was distinguished by inactivity, sketchiness ... Not a single Soviet military commander made an independent decision to destroy crossings and bridges.

In such a situation, at 7:15 a.m., the headquarters of the North-Western, Western and South-Western fronts received Directive No. 2 of the People's Commissar of Defense, in which the commander of the front troops was tasked: "to attack enemy forces with all their forces and means and destroy them in areas where they violated the Soviet border.

However, under the circumstances, this order of the People's Commissar was not feasible. Already at 8 o'clock in the morning, the commander of Army Group Center, Field Marshal F. Bock, reported to the command of the Wehrmacht:

“The offensive continues successfully. On the entire front of the offensive, the enemy still offers little resistance ... the enemy in all sectors was taken by surprise.

A few documents testify to the complexity of the first day of the war. So, the commander of the North-Western Front, General F.I. Kuznetsov reported to Marshal S.K. Tymoshenko:

“Large forces of tanks and motorized units break through to Druskeniki. The 128th Rifle Division is mostly surrounded, there is no exact information about its condition ... I can’t create a grouping to eliminate the breakthrough. Please help."

Head of the Operational Directorate of the Western Front, General I.I. Semenov reported to the General Staff: “Rifle-machine-gun and artillery fire along the entire border ... We don’t have wired communications with the armies.”

Some formations and units of the front were already fighting in the encirclement during these first hours, it was not possible to establish contact with them. From the commander of the 3rd armies, General V.I. Kuznetsov, the headquarters of the Western Front from the beginning of the war until 10 a.m. received only three combat reports. From the commander of the 10th Army, General K.D. Golubev received only one message during the same time, and the commander of the 4th Army, General A.A. Korobkov was able to send the first combat report only at 06:40.

Nevertheless, commanders of all levels and in these difficult conditions withdrew their subordinate formations and units to their cover areas. So, in the zone of the Western Front, out of ten formations of the first echelon of the 3rd, 10th and 4th armies, three rifle divisions still managed to reach their operational areas. In the zone of the Southwestern Front, the advanced units of the 62nd and 87th rifle divisions of the 26th Army were the first to reach the state border.

In total, 14 divisions from 57 planned formations of the first echelon were withdrawn to cover the border on June 22, mainly on the flanks of the Soviet-German front. They entered the battle on the move, defended in wide lanes, in one-echelon combat formations, sometimes on terrain not equipped in engineering terms, moreover, without significant artillery support, without proper air cover and anti-aircraft weapons, having a limited amount of ammunition. In this regard, they were forced to retreat with heavy losses.

By the middle of the day, the Wehrmacht strike groups managed to create a large gap on the adjacent flanks of the Northwestern and Western fronts, into which the 3rd Panzer Group of General G. Hoth rushed. Not knowing the true state of affairs, the commander of the North-Western Front, General F.I. Kuznetsov reported to the People's Commissar of Defense that the formations of the 11th Army continued to hold back the enemy, although in reality they retreated hastily and disorganized with heavy losses.

Toward evening, the most threatened situation developed in the zone of the Western Front. His command, which had not yet realized the threat of deep bilateral coverage of the front troops by enemy tank formations, was more concerned about the situation on the northern face of the Bialystok ledge, where the enemy was rushing towards Grodno. The situation in the Brest direction was assessed by him as more or less stable. However, by the end of the day, formations and units of the 4th Army were thrown back from the border by 25-30 km, and the advanced tank units of the enemy managed to advance even deeper - by 60 km, and occupy Kobrin.

Without understanding the situation, the commander of the front, General D.G. Pavlov at 5 pm sent a report to the General Staff, which essentially disorientated the political and military leadership of the country:

“Parts of the Western Front during the day of 22.6.41 fought holding battles ... providing stubborn resistance to superior enemy forces ... Parts of the 4th Army fought defensive battles, presumably at the line ... Brest, Vlodava.”

In fact, the troops of the Western Front continued to hastily retreat to the east in scattered groups.

Based on reports from the headquarters of the North-Western and Western fronts, not fully imagining the real situation, the People's Commissar of Defense and the Chief of the General Staff concluded that most of the fighting was taking place near the border. At that time, they were most worried about the situation in the Grodno direction, where a deep coverage of the Bialystok ledge from the north was already observed. Because of the misleading reports of the headquarters of the Western Front, the People's Commissar of Defense and the Chief of the General Staff clearly underestimated the powerful enemy grouping that was striking from the Brest region.

Trying to turn the tide of events and believing that there were quite enough forces for a retaliatory strike, the High Command at 21:15 sent directive No. enemy. However, aiming them at defeating the enemy groupings, which posed the greatest danger in the zone of each front, the General Staff did not take into account the difficulties that the front command would have in organizing and preparing strikes against the enemy during one night.

The real situation that had developed by the end of the first day of the war on the entire Soviet-German front turned out to be much more complicated than the military-political leadership of the country knew. Therefore, the requirements of the High Command were no longer realistic, since they did not meet the rapidly changing situation.

Meanwhile, the position of the troops of the Western Front became more and more critical: “The enemy, having bypassed the right flank of the army, strikes in the Lida direction ... - the commander of the 3rd Army, General Kuznetsov, reported to the front headquarters, - we have no reserves, and to fend off the blow nothing." By the end of the first day of the war, the troops of the North-Western, Western and South-Western fronts, under the unrelenting onslaught of the enemy, were forced to retreat, conducting rearguard battles.

The events of June 22 took place differently on the flanks of the Soviet-German front, where the enemy did not show activity or acted with limited forces. It allowed Soviet troops, operating in a relatively calm environment, advance to the border and take up defense lines in accordance with the cover plans.

In general, by the end of the first day of hostilities in the western direction, an extremely difficult situation developed for the Red Army. The enemy forestalled formations and covering units in occupying defensive zones and lines. By the end of the day, the forward detachments of the German 2nd and 3rd Panzer Groups penetrated the defenses of the Soviet troops to a depth of 60 km. Thus, they began to cover the main forces of the Western Front from the north and south and created favorable conditions for their troops operating in other directions.

Thus ended the first day of the war. Under the onslaught of the superior forces of the enemy, the Soviet troops with heavy fighting retreated into the interior of the country. They still had a whole war ahead of them, which lasted 1418 days and nights. During the Great Patriotic War, there were undoubtedly more fateful days for our country, but that first day will forever remain in the memory of the peoples of Russia.

In the absence of a land front in Europe, the German leadership decided to defeat the Soviet Union during a short-term campaign in the summer and autumn of 1941. To achieve this goal, the most combat-ready unit of the German armed forces 1 was deployed on the border with the USSR.

Wehrmacht

For Operation Barbarossa, out of the 4 headquarters of army groups available in the Wehrmacht, 3 were deployed ("North", "Center" and "South") (75%), out of 13 headquarters of field armies - 8 (61.5%), out of 46 headquarters of army corps - 34 (73.9%), out of 12 motorized corps - 11 (91.7%). In total, 73.5% of the total number of divisions available in the Wehrmacht was allocated for the Eastern Campaign. Most of the troops had combat experience gained in previous military campaigns. So, out of 155 divisions in military operations in Europe in 1939-1941. 127 (81.9%) participated, and the remaining 28 were partially manned by personnel who also had combat experience. In any case, these were the most combat-ready units of the Wehrmacht (see table 1). The German Air Force deployed 60.8% of the flying units, 16.9% of the air defense troops and over 48% of the signal troops and other units to support Operation Barbarossa.

German satellites

Together with Germany, its allies were preparing for a war with the USSR: Finland, Slovakia, Hungary, Romania and Italy, who allocated the following forces for waging war (see table 2). In addition, Croatia provided 56 aircraft and up to 1.6 thousand people. By June 22, 1941, there were no Slovak and Italian troops on the border, who arrived later. Consequently, there were 767,100 men, 37 calculated divisions, 5,502 guns and mortars, 306 tanks, and 886 aircraft in the German allied troops deployed there.

In total, the forces of Germany and its allies on the Eastern Front numbered 4,329.5 thousand people, 166 settlement divisions, 42,601 guns and mortars, 4,364 tanks, assault and self-propelled guns and 4,795 aircraft (of which 51 were at the disposal of the Air Force High Command and together with 8.5 thousand people of the Air Force personnel are not taken into account in further calculations).

Red Army

Under the conditions of the outbreak of war in Europe, the armed forces of the Soviet Union continued to increase, and by the summer of 1941 they were the largest army in the world (see Table 3). In the five western border districts, 56.1% of the ground forces and 59.6% of the air force were stationed. In addition, since May 1941, the concentration of 70 divisions of the second strategic echelon from the internal military districts and from the Far East began in the Western Theater of Operations (TVD). By June 22, 16 divisions (10 rifle, 4 tank and 2 motorized) arrived in the western districts, in which there were 201,691 people, 2,746 guns and 1,763 tanks.

The grouping of Soviet troops in the Western theater of operations was quite powerful. The general balance of forces by the morning of June 22, 1941 is presented in Table 4, judging by the data of which the enemy outnumbered the Red Army only in terms of the number of personnel, because his troops were mobilized.

Mandatory clarifications

Although the above data gives a general idea of ​​the strength of the opposing factions, it should be borne in mind that the Wehrmacht completed the strategic concentration and deployment in the theater, while in the Red Army this process was in full swing. How figuratively described this situation A.V. Shubin, "a dense body was moving from the West to the East at high speed. From the East, a more massive, but looser block was slowly moving forward, the mass of which was growing, but not at a fast enough pace" 2 . Therefore, the correlation of forces at two more levels should be considered. Firstly, this is the balance of forces of the parties in various strategic directions on the scale of the district (front) - army group, and secondly, on individual operational directions in the border zone on the scale of the army - army. At the same time, in the first case, only the ground forces and the Air Force are taken into account, and for the Soviet side, the border troops, artillery and aviation of the Navy are also taken into account, but without information on the personnel of the fleet and internal troops of the NKVD. In the second case, only ground forces are taken into account for both sides.

Northwest

In the North-West direction, the troops of the German Army Group "North" and the Baltic Special Military District (PribOVO) opposed each other. The Wehrmacht had a rather significant superiority in manpower and some in artillery, but was inferior in tanks and aircraft. However, it should be borne in mind that only 8 Soviet divisions were located directly in the 50 km border strip, and another 10 were located 50-100 km from the border. As a result, in the direction of the main attack, the troops of the Army Group "North" managed to achieve a more favorable balance of forces (see Table 5).

Western direction

In the Western direction, the troops of the German Army Group Center and the Western Special Military District (ZapOVO) with part of the forces of the 11th Army of PribOVO confronted each other. For the German command, this direction was the main one in Operation Barbarossa, and therefore Army Group Center was the strongest on the entire front. 40% of all German divisions deployed from the Barents to the Black Sea (including 50% motorized and 52.9% tank) and the largest air fleet of the Luftwaffe (43.8% aircraft) were concentrated here. Only 15 Soviet divisions were located in the offensive zone of Army Group Center in the immediate vicinity of the border, and 14 were located 50-100 km from it. In addition, troops of the 22nd Army from the Ural Military District were concentrated on the territory of the district in the Polotsk region, from which, by June 22, 1941, 3 rifle divisions arrived at the place, and the 21st mechanized corps from the Moscow Military District - with a total number of 72,016 people, 1241 guns and mortars and 692 tanks. As a result, the troops of the ZAPOVO, contained in peacetime states, were inferior to the enemy only in personnel, but surpassed him in tanks, aircraft, and slightly in artillery. However, unlike the troops of Army Group Center, they did not complete their concentration, which made it possible to smash them piece by piece.

Army Group Center was supposed to carry out a double envelopment of the ZapOVO troops located in the Bialystok ledge, with a blow from Suwalki and Brest to Minsk, so the main forces of the army group were deployed on the flanks. From the south (from Brest) the main blow was delivered. On the northern flank (Suwalki) the 3rd Panzer Group of the Wehrmacht was deployed, which was opposed by units of the 11th Army of PribOVO. Troops of the 43rd Army Corps of the 4th German Army and the 2nd Panzer Group were deployed in the zone of the Soviet 4th Army. In these areas, the enemy was able to achieve significant superiority (see table 6).

Southwest

In the South-Western direction, Army Group South, which united German, Romanian, Hungarian and Croatian troops, was opposed by parts of the Kiev Special and Odessa Military Districts (KOVO and OdVO). The Soviet grouping in the South-Western direction was the strongest on the entire front, since it was she who was supposed to deliver the main blow to the enemy. However, even here the Soviet troops did not complete their concentration and deployment. So, in KOVO in the immediate vicinity of the border there were only 16 divisions, and 14 were located 50-100 km from it. In the OdVO, there were 9 divisions in the 50-km border zone, and 6 were located in the 50-100-km zone. In addition, troops of the 16th and 19th armies arrived in the districts, from which by June 22 concentrated 10 divisions (7 rifle, 2 tank and 1 motorized) with a total number of 129,675 people, 1,505 guns and mortars and 1,071 tanks. Even without being staffed according to the wartime staff, the Soviet troops outnumbered the enemy grouping, which had only some superiority in manpower, but was significantly inferior in tanks, aircraft, and somewhat less in artillery. But on the direction of the main attack of the Army Group "South", where the Soviet 5th Army was opposed by units of the 6th German Army and the 1st Panzer Group, the enemy managed to achieve a better balance of forces for himself (see Table 7).

The situation in the North

The most favorable for the Red Army was the ratio on the front of the Leningrad Military District (LVO), where it was opposed by Finnish troops and units of the German army "Norway". In the Far North, the troops of the Soviet 14th Army were opposed by the German units of the mountain infantry corps "Norway" and the 36th Army Corps, and here the enemy had superiority in manpower and insignificant in artillery (see Table 8). True, it should be borne in mind that, since hostilities on the Soviet-Finnish border began in late June - early July 1941, both sides were building up their forces, and the data given do not reflect the number of troops of the parties by the start of hostilities.

Results

Thus, the German command, having deployed the main part of the Wehrmacht on the Eastern Front, was unable to achieve overwhelming superiority not only in the zone of the entire future front, but also in the zones of individual army groups. However, the Red Army was not mobilized and did not complete the process of strategic concentration and deployment. As a result, units of the first echelon of covering troops were significantly inferior to the enemy, whose troops were deployed directly at the border. Such an arrangement of Soviet troops made it possible to smash them piece by piece. On the directions of the main attacks of the army groups, the German command managed to create superiority over the troops of the Red Army, which was close to overwhelming. The most favorable balance of forces developed for the Wehrmacht in the zone of Army Group Center, since it was in this direction that the main blow of the entire Eastern campaign was dealt. In other directions, even in the bands of the covering armies, the Soviet superiority in tanks affected. The overall balance of forces allowed the Soviet command to prevent the enemy's superiority even in the directions of his main attacks. But in reality the opposite happened.

Since the Soviet military-political leadership incorrectly assessed the degree of threat of a German attack, the Red Army, having begun in May 1941 the strategic concentration and deployment in the Western theater of operations, which was to be completed by July 15, 1941, was taken by surprise on June 22 and did not have neither offensive nor defensive grouping. Soviet troops were not mobilized, did not have deployed rear structures, and were only completing the creation of command and control bodies in the theater of operations. On the front from the Baltic Sea to the Carpathians, out of 77 divisions of the Red Army covering forces in the first hours of the war, only 38 incompletely mobilized divisions could repulse the enemy, of which only a few managed to take up equipped positions on the border. The rest of the troops were either in places of permanent deployment, or in camps, or on the march. If, however, we take into account that the enemy immediately threw 103 divisions into the offensive, then it is clear that an organized entry into the battle and the creation of a solid front of Soviet troops was extremely difficult. By preempting the Soviet troops in strategic deployment, creating powerful operational groupings of their fully combat-ready forces in the chosen directions of the main attack, the German command created favorable conditions for seizing the strategic initiative and successfully carrying out the first offensive operations.

Notes
1. For more details, see: Meltyukhov M.I. Stalin's missed chance. Scramble for Europe 1939-1941 (Documents, facts, judgments). 3rd ed., corrected. and additional M., 2008. S. 354-363.
2. Shubin A.V. The world is on the edge of the abyss. From global crisis to the world war. 1929-1941. M., 2004. S. 496.

June 21, 1941, 13:00. German troops receive the code signal "Dortmund", confirming that the invasion will begin the next day.

Commander of the 2nd Panzer Group, Army Group Center Heinz Guderian writes in his diary: “Careful observation of the Russians convinced me that they did not suspect anything about our intentions. In the courtyard of the fortress of Brest, which was visible from our observation posts, to the sounds of the orchestra, they were holding guards. Coastal fortifications along the Western Bug were not occupied by Russian troops.

21:00. Soldiers of the 90th border detachment of the Sokal commandant's office detained a German soldier who had crossed the border river Bug by swimming. The defector was sent to the headquarters of the detachment in the city of Vladimir-Volynsky.

23:00. German minelayers, who were in Finnish ports, began to mine the way out of the Gulf of Finland. At the same time, Finnish submarines began laying mines off the coast of Estonia.

June 22, 1941, 0:30. The defector was taken to Vladimir-Volynsky. During interrogation, the soldier named himself Alfred Liskov, servicemen of the 221st regiment of the 15th infantry division of the Wehrmacht. He reported that at dawn on June 22 the German army would go on the offensive along the entire length of the Soviet-German border. The information has been passed on to the higher command.

At the same time, the transfer of directive No. 1 of the People's Commissariat of Defense for parts of the western military districts begins from Moscow. “During June 22-23, 1941, a sudden attack by the Germans on the fronts of the LVO, PribOVO, ZAPOVO, KOVO, OdVO is possible. The attack may begin with provocative actions,” the directive said. “The task of our troops is not to succumb to any provocative actions that could cause major complications.”

The units were ordered to be placed on combat readiness, covertly occupy the firing points of fortified areas on the state border, and aviation was dispersed over field airfields.

It is not possible to bring the directive to the military units before the start of hostilities, as a result of which the measures indicated in it are not carried out.

Mobilization. Columns of fighters are moving to the front. Photo: RIA Novosti

“I realized that it was the Germans who opened fire on our territory”

1:00. The commandants of the sections of the 90th border detachment report to the head of the detachment, Major Bychkovsky: "nothing suspicious was noticed on the adjacent side, everything is calm."

3:05 . A group of 14 German Ju-88 bombers drops 28 magnetic mines near the Kronstadt raid.

3:07. The commander of the Black Sea Fleet, Vice Admiral Oktyabrsky, reports to the Chief of the General Staff, General Zhukov: “The VNOS [airborne surveillance, warning and communications] system of the fleet reports on the approach from the sea of ​​a large number of unknown aircraft; The fleet is on full alert.

3:10. The UNKGB in the Lvov region transmits by telephone to the NKGB of the Ukrainian SSR the information obtained during the interrogation of the defector Alfred Liskov.

From the memoirs of the head of the 90th border detachment, Major Bychkovsky: “Not having finished interrogating the soldier, I heard strong artillery fire in the direction of Ustilug (the first commandant's office). I realized that it was the Germans who opened fire on our territory, which was immediately confirmed by the interrogated soldier. I immediately began to call the commandant by phone, but the connection was broken ... "

3:30. Chief of Staff of the Western District General Klimovsky reports on enemy air raids on the cities of Belarus: Brest, Grodno, Lida, Kobrin, Slonim, Baranovichi and others.

3:33. The chief of staff of the Kiev district, General Purkaev, reports on air raids on the cities of Ukraine, including Kyiv.

3:40. Commander of the Baltic Military District General Kuznetsov reports on enemy air raids on Riga, Siauliai, Vilnius, Kaunas and other cities.

"Enemy raid repulsed. An attempt to strike our ships has been thwarted."

3:42. Chief of the General Staff Zhukov calls Stalin and announces the start of hostilities by Germany. Stalin orders Tymoshenko and Zhukov to arrive at the Kremlin, where an emergency meeting of the Politburo is being convened.

3:45. The 1st frontier post of the 86th Augustow border detachment was attacked by an enemy reconnaissance and sabotage group. Outpost personnel under command Alexandra Sivacheva, having joined the battle, destroys the attackers.

4:00. The commander of the Black Sea Fleet, Vice Admiral Oktyabrsky, reports to Zhukov: “The enemy raid has been repulsed. An attempt to strike our ships has been thwarted. But there is destruction in Sevastopol.”

4:05. The outposts of the 86th August Frontier Detachment, including the 1st Frontier Post of Senior Lieutenant Sivachev, are subjected to heavy artillery fire, after which the German offensive begins. The border guards, deprived of communication with the command, engage in battle with superior enemy forces.

4:10. The Western and Baltic Special Military Districts report the start of hostilities by German troops on land.

4:15. The Nazis open massive artillery fire on the Brest Fortress. As a result, warehouses were destroyed, communications were disrupted, and there were a large number of dead and wounded.

4:25. The 45th Infantry Division of the Wehrmacht begins an attack on the Brest Fortress.

The Great Patriotic War of 1941-1945. Residents of the capital on June 22, 1941 during the announcement on the radio of a government message about the perfidious attack of fascist Germany on Soviet Union. Photo: RIA Novosti

"Defending not individual countries, but ensuring the security of Europe"

4:30. A meeting of members of the Politburo begins in the Kremlin. Stalin expresses doubt that what happened is the beginning of the war and does not exclude the version of a German provocation. People's Commissar of Defense Timoshenko and Zhukov insist: this is war.

4:55. In the Brest Fortress, the Nazis manage to capture almost half of the territory. Further progress was stopped by a sudden counterattack by the Red Army.

5:00. German Ambassador to the USSR Count von Schulenburg presents the People's Commissar for Foreign Affairs of the USSR Molotov“Note from the German Foreign Ministry to the Soviet Government”, which states: “The German government cannot be indifferent to a serious threat on the eastern border, therefore the Führer ordered the German armed forces to ward off this threat by all means.” An hour after the actual start of hostilities, Germany de jure declares war on the Soviet Union.

5:30. On German radio, the Reich Minister of Propaganda Goebbels read out an appeal Adolf Hitler to the German people in connection with the outbreak of war against the Soviet Union: “Now the hour has come when it is necessary to oppose this conspiracy of the Jewish-Anglo-Saxon warmongers and also the Jewish rulers of the Bolshevik center in Moscow ... what the world has only seen ... The task of this front is no longer the protection of individual countries, but the security of Europe and thereby the salvation of all.

7:00. Reich Minister for Foreign Ribbentrop begins a press conference at which he announces the start of hostilities against the USSR: "The German army invaded the territory of Bolshevik Russia!"

“The city is on fire, why aren’t you broadcasting anything on the radio?”

7:15. Stalin approves the directive on repulsing the attack of Nazi Germany: "The troops will attack the enemy forces with all their strength and means and destroy them in areas where they have violated the Soviet border." The transfer of "Directive No. 2" due to the violation by saboteurs of the communication lines in the western districts. Moscow does not have a clear picture of what is happening in the war zone.

9:30. It was decided that at noon Molotov, People's Commissar for Foreign Affairs, would address the Soviet people in connection with the outbreak of war.

10:00. From the memories of the announcer Yuri Levitan: “They call from Minsk: “Enemy planes are over the city”, they call from Kaunas: “The city is on fire, why are you not transmitting anything on the radio?”, “Enemy planes are over Kyiv.” Women's crying, excitement: “Is it really a war? ..” However, no official messages are transmitted until 12:00 Moscow time on June 22.

10:30. From the report of the headquarters of the 45th German division on the battles on the territory of the Brest Fortress: “The Russians are fiercely resisting, especially behind our attacking companies. In the citadel, the enemy organized defense by infantry units supported by 35-40 tanks and armored vehicles. The fire of enemy snipers led to heavy losses among officers and non-commissioned officers.

11:00. The Baltic, Western and Kyiv special military districts were transformed into the Northwestern, Western and Southwestern fronts.

“The enemy will be defeated. Victory will be ours"

12:00. People's Commissar for Foreign Affairs Vyacheslav Molotov read out an appeal to the citizens of the Soviet Union: "Today at 4 o'clock in the morning, without presenting any claims against the Soviet Union, without declaring war, German troops attacked our country, attacked our borders in many places and bombed from our cities - Zhytomyr, Kyiv, Sevastopol, Kaunas and some others - more than two hundred people were killed and wounded. Enemy aircraft raids and artillery shelling were also carried out from Romanian and Finnish territory ... Now that the attack on the Soviet Union has already taken place, the Soviet government has given an order to our troops to repel the piratical attack and drive the German troops from the territory of our homeland ... The government calls on you, citizens and citizens of the Soviet Union, to rally their ranks still more closely around our glorious Bolshevik Party, around our Soviet government, around our great leader Comrade Stalin.

Our cause is right. The enemy will be defeated. Victory will be ours" .

12:30. Advanced German units break into the Belarusian city of Grodno.

13:00. The Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR issues a decree "On the mobilization of those liable for military service ..."
“On the basis of Article 49 of paragraph “o” of the Constitution of the USSR, the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR announces mobilization on the territory of the military districts - Leningrad, Special Baltic, Western Special, Kiev Special, Odessa, Kharkov, Oryol, Moscow, Arkhangelsk, Ural, Siberian, Volga, North - Caucasian and Transcaucasian.

Those liable for military service who were born from 1905 to 1918 inclusive are subject to mobilization. Consider June 23, 1941 as the first day of mobilization. Despite the fact that June 23 is named the first day of mobilization, recruiting offices at the military registration and enlistment offices begin to work by the middle of the day on June 22.

13:30. The Chief of the General Staff, General Zhukov, flies to Kyiv as a representative of the newly created Headquarters of the High Command on the Southwestern Front.

Photo: RIA Novosti

14:00. The Brest Fortress is completely surrounded by German troops. Soviet units blockaded in the citadel continue to offer fierce resistance.

14:05. Foreign Minister of Italy Galeazzo Ciano declares: “In view of the current situation, due to the fact that Germany has declared war on the USSR, Italy, as an ally of Germany and as a member of the Tripartite Pact, also declares war on the Soviet Union from the moment the German troops enter Soviet territory.”

14:10. The 1st frontier post of Alexander Sivachev has been fighting for more than 10 hours. The border guards, who had only small arms and grenades, destroyed up to 60 Nazis and burned three tanks. The wounded head of the outpost continued to command the battle.

15:00. From the notes of Field Marshal Commander of Army Group Center bokeh background: “The question of whether the Russians are carrying out a planned withdrawal is still open. There is now ample evidence both for and against this.

It is surprising that nowhere is any significant work of their artillery visible. Strong artillery fire is conducted only in the north-west of Grodno, where the VIII Army Corps is advancing. Apparently, our air force has an overwhelming superiority over Russian aviation.

Of the 485 frontier posts attacked, none retreated without an order.

16:00. After a 12-hour battle, the Nazis occupy the positions of the 1st frontier post. This became possible only after all the border guards who defended it died. The head of the outpost, Alexander Sivachev, was posthumously awarded the Order of the Patriotic War, 1st class.

The feat of the outpost of Senior Lieutenant Sivachev became one of the hundreds accomplished by the border guards in the first hours and days of the war. The state border of the USSR from the Barents to the Black Sea on June 22, 1941 was guarded by 666 border outposts, 485 of them were attacked on the very first day of the war. None of the 485 outposts attacked on June 22 withdrew without orders.

The Nazi command took 20 minutes to break the resistance of the border guards. 257 Soviet frontier posts held the defense from several hours to one day. More than one day - 20, more than two days - 16, more than three days - 20, more than four and five days - 43, from seven to nine days - 4, more than eleven days - 51, more than twelve days - 55, more than 15 days - 51 outposts. Up to two months, 45 outposts fought.

The Great Patriotic War of 1941-1945. The working people of Leningrad listen to the message about the attack of fascist Germany on the Soviet Union. Photo: RIA Novosti

Of the 19,600 border guards who met the Nazis on June 22 in the direction of the main attack of Army Group Center, more than 16,000 died in the first days of the war.

17:00. Hitler's units manage to occupy the southwestern part of the Brest Fortress, the northeast remained under the control of Soviet troops. Stubborn battles for the fortress will continue for another week.

"The Church of Christ blesses all Orthodox for the defense of the sacred borders of our Motherland"

18:00. The Patriarchal Locum Tenens, Metropolitan Sergius of Moscow and Kolomna, addresses the faithful with a message: “Fascist robbers have attacked our homeland. Trampling all sorts of treaties and promises, they suddenly fell upon us, and now the blood of peaceful citizens is already irrigating our native land ... Our Orthodox Church has always shared the fate of the people. Together with him, she carried trials, and consoled herself with his successes. She will not leave her people even now… The Church of Christ blesses all Orthodox to defend the sacred borders of our Motherland.”

19:00. From the notes of the Chief of the General Staff of the Wehrmacht Ground Forces, Colonel General Franz Halder: “All the armies, except for the 11th Army of the Army Group South in Romania, went on the offensive according to the plan. The offensive of our troops, apparently, was a complete tactical surprise for the enemy on the entire front. The border bridges across the Bug and other rivers have been everywhere captured by our troops without a fight and in complete safety. The complete surprise of our offensive for the enemy is evidenced by the fact that the units were taken by surprise in the barracks, the planes stood at the airfields, covered with tarpaulins, and the advanced units, suddenly attacked by our troops, asked the command what to do ... The Air Force command reported, that today 850 enemy aircraft have been destroyed, including entire squadrons of bombers, which, having taken to the air without fighter cover, were attacked by our fighters and destroyed.

20:00. Directive No. 3 of the People's Commissariat of Defense was approved, ordering the Soviet troops to go on the counteroffensive with the task of defeating the Nazi troops on the territory of the USSR with further advancement into enemy territory. The directive prescribed by the end of June 24 to capture the Polish city of Lublin.

Great Patriotic War 1941-1945. June 22, 1941 Nurses assist the first wounded after the Nazi air raid near Chisinau. Photo: RIA Novosti

"We must give Russia and the Russian people all the help we can"

21:00. Summary of the High Command of the Red Army for June 22: “At dawn on June 22, 1941, the regular troops of the German army attacked our border units on the front from the Baltic to the Black Sea and were held back by them during the first half of the day. In the afternoon, the German troops met with the advanced units of the field troops of the Red Army. After fierce fighting, the enemy was repulsed with heavy losses. Only in the Grodno and Krystynopol directions did the enemy manage to achieve minor tactical successes and take the towns of Kalvaria, Stojanow and Tsekhanovets (the first two at 15 km and the last at 10 km from the border).

Enemy aircraft attacked a number of our airfields and settlements, but everywhere met a decisive rebuff from our fighters and anti-aircraft artillery, which inflicted heavy losses on the enemy. We shot down 65 enemy planes."

23:00. Message from the British Prime Minister Winston Churchill to the British people in connection with the German attack on the USSR: “At 4 o’clock this morning, Hitler attacked Russia. All his usual formalities of treachery were observed with scrupulous precision ... suddenly, without a declaration of war, even without an ultimatum, German bombs fell from the sky on Russian cities, German troops violated Russian borders, and an hour later the German ambassador, who just the day before generously lavished his assurances to the Russians in friendship and almost an alliance, paid a visit to the Russian Minister of Foreign Affairs and declared that Russia and Germany were in a state of war ...

No one has been a more staunch opponent of communism over the past 25 years than I have been. I will not take back a single word said about him. But all this pales before the spectacle unfolding now.

The past, with its crimes, follies and tragedies, recedes. I see Russian soldiers standing on the border of their native land and guarding the fields that their fathers have plowed since time immemorial. I see how they guard their homes; their mothers and wives pray—oh, yes, because at such a time everyone prays for the preservation of their loved ones, for the return of the breadwinner, patron, their protectors ...

We must give Russia and the Russian people all the help we can. We must call on all our friends and allies in all parts of the world to follow a similar course and pursue it as steadfastly and steadily as we will, to the very end.

June 22 has come to an end. Ahead were another 1417 days of the most terrible war in the history of mankind.

Original taken from Soviet childhood on June 22, 1941

Here - German troops cross the border of the USSR. Reptiles. They will bring us a myriad of grief and misfortune. But they themselves do not yet know what they will receive in full. It will not be France for them ... Today I will remember my grandfather

These photographs have one thing in common: they were taken in the first hours and days of the beginning of the Great Patriotic War. Source: http://www.lionblog.net/obszee/1146058318-22-iyunya-1941-goda.html

Here it is - the beginning of the war.
Shooting time: 06/22/1941

Soviet border guards on patrol. The photograph is interesting because it was taken for a newspaper at one of the outposts on the western border of the USSR on June 20, 1941, that is, two days before the war.

Shooting time: 06/20/1941

The first day of the war in Przemysl (today - the Polish city of Przemysl) and the first dead invaders on Soviet soil (soldiers of the 101st light infantry division). The city was occupied by German troops on June 22, but the next morning it was liberated by the Red Army and border guards and held until June 27.

Shooting time: 06/22/1941

June 22, 1941 near the bridge over the San River near the city of Yaroslav. At that time, the San River was the border between German-occupied Poland and the USSR.

Shooting time: 06/22/1941

The first Soviet prisoners of war, under the supervision of German soldiers, head west along the bridge over the San River near the city of Yaroslav.

Shooting time: 06/22/1941

After the failure of the sudden capture of the Brest Fortress, the Germans had to dig in. The photo was taken on the North or South Island.

Shooting time: 06/22/1941

Battle of the German strike units in the Brest area.

Shooting time: June 1941

A column of Soviet prisoners crossed the San River along the sapper bridge. Among the prisoners, there are noticeable not only the military, but also people in civilian clothes: the Germans detained and captured all men of military age so that they could not be recruited into the enemy army. District of the city of Yaroslav, June 1941.

Shooting time: June 1941

Sapper bridge over the San River near the city of Yaroslav, on which German troops are transported.

Shooting time: June 1941

German soldiers are photographed on a Soviet T-34-76 tank, model 1940, abandoned in Lvov.

Location: Lviv, Ukraine, USSR

Shooting time: 30.06. 1941

German soldiers inspect a T-34-76 tank, model 1940, stuck in a field and abandoned.

Shooting time: June 1941

Captured Soviet female soldiers in Nevel (now the Nevelsky district of the Pskov region).

Shooting time: 07/26/1941

German infantry passes by broken Soviet vehicles.

Shooting time: June 1941

The Germans are inspecting Soviet T-34-76 tanks stuck in a water meadow. Floodplain of the Drut River, near Tolochin, Vitebsk region.

Shooting time: July 1941

Start of the German Junkers Yu-87 dive bombers from a field airfield in the USSR.

Shooting time: summer 1941

Red Army soldiers surrender to the soldiers of the SS troops.

Shooting time: June 1941

Destroyed by Soviet artillery, the German light tank Pz.Kpfw. II Ausf. C.

German soldiers next to a burning Soviet village.

Shooting time: June 1941

German soldier during the battle in the Brest Fortress.

Shooting time: June-July 1941

A rally at the Leningrad plant named after Kirov about the beginning of the war.

Shooting time: June 1941

Location: Leningrad

Residents of Leningrad near the window of LenTASS "Latest News" (Socialist street, house 14 - Pravda printing house).

Shooting time: July 1941

Location: Leningrad

Aerial photograph of the Smolensk-1 airfield taken by German air reconnaissance. An airfield with hangars and runways is marked in the upper left of the image. Other strategic objects are also marked in the image: barracks (bottom left, marked "B"), large bridges, anti-aircraft artillery batteries (vertical line with a circle).

Shooting time: 06/23/1941

Location: Smolensk

Red Army soldiers examine a wrecked German tank Pz 35 (t) (LT vz.35) of Czech production from the 6th Panzer Division of the Wehrmacht. Neighborhood of the city of Raseiniai (Lithuanian SSR).

Shooting time: June 1941

Soviet refugees walk past an abandoned BT-7A tank.

Shooting time: June 1941

German soldiers examine a burning Soviet tank T-34-76 of the 1940 model.

Shooting time: June-August 1941

The Germans on the march at the beginning of the invasion of the USSR.

Shooting time: June 1941

Soviet field airfield, captured by the Germans. One can see an I-16 fighter shot down or dismantled on the ground, a Po-2 biplane and another I-16 in the background. A picture from a passing German car. Smolensk region, summer 1941.

Shooting time: July 1941

Artillerymen of the 29th motorized division of the Wehrmacht from an ambush shot Soviet tanks into the side from a 50-mm PaK 38 cannon. The closest, on the left, is the T-34 tank. Belarus, 1941.

Shooting time: summer 1941

German soldiers ride along the street along the destroyed houses on the outskirts of Smolensk.

Shooting time: July 1941

Location: Smolensk

At the captured airfield of Minsk, German soldiers are examining an SB bomber (or its training version of the CSS, since the nose of the aircraft is visible, which differs from the glazed nose of the SB). Early July 1941.

I-15 and I-153 Chaika fighters are visible behind.

Shooting time: July 1941

Soviet 203-mm howitzer B-4 (model 1931), captured by the Germans. The barrel of the gun, which was transported separately, is missing. 1941, presumably Belarus. German photo.

Shooting time: 1941

The city of Demidov, Smolensk region in the early days of the occupation. July 1941.

Shooting time: July 1941

Destroyed Soviet tank T-26. On the tower, under the hatch cover, a burnt tanker is visible.

Shooting time: summer 1941

Surrendering Soviet soldiers go to the rear of the Germans. Summer 1941. The picture was apparently taken from the back of a truck in a German convoy on the road.

Shooting time: summer 1941

A lot of broken Soviet aircraft: I-153 Chaika fighters (to the left). In the background is a U-2 and a twin-engine SB bomber. The airfield of Minsk, captured by German troops (in the foreground - a German soldier). Early July 1941.

Shooting time: July 1941

A lot of broken Soviet Chaika I-153 fighters. Minsk airport. Early July 1941.

Shooting time: July 1941

German collection point for Soviet captured equipment and weapons. On the left are Soviet 45 mm anti-tank guns, then a large number of Maxim machine guns and DP-27 light machine guns, on the right - 82 mm mortars. Summer 1941.

Shooting time: summer 1941

Dead Soviet soldiers at the captured trenches. This is probably the very beginning of the war, the summer of 1941: the soldier in the foreground is wearing a pre-war SSH-36 helmet, later such helmets were extremely rare in the Red Army and mainly in the Far East. It can also be seen that a belt has been removed from him - apparently, the work of the German soldiers who captured these positions.

Shooting time: summer 1941

A German soldier is knocking at the house of local residents. City of Yartsevo, Smolensk region, early July 1941.

Shooting time: July 1941

The Germans inspect the wrecked Soviet light tanks. In the foreground - BT-7, the far left - BT-5 (characteristic cabin of the tank driver), in the center of the road - T-26. Smolensk region, summer 1941

Shooting time: summer 1941

Soviet artillery wagon with a gun. A shell or air bomb exploded right in front of the horses. Neighborhood of the city of Yartsevo, Smolensk region. August 1941.

Shooting time: summer 1941

Grave of a Soviet soldier. The inscription on the tablet in German reads: "Here rests an unknown Russian soldier." Perhaps the fallen soldier was buried by his own, so at the bottom of the tablet you can make out the word "Here ..." in Russian. For some reason, the Germans made the inscription in their own language. The photo is German, the shooting location is presumably the Smolensk region, August 1941.

Shooting time: summer 1941

German armored personnel carrier, German soldiers on it and local residents in Belarus.

Shooting time: June 1941

Ukrainians welcome the Germans in Western Ukraine.

Shooting time: summer 1941

The advancing units of the Wehrmacht in Belarus. The picture was taken from a car window. June 1941

Shooting time: June 1941

German soldiers in captured Soviet positions. A Soviet 45mm cannon is visible in the foreground, and a Soviet T-34 tank of the 1940 model is visible in the background.

Shooting time: 1941

German soldiers are approaching the freshly knocked out Soviet BT-2 tanks.

Shooting time: June-July 1941

Smoke break crews tractor tractors "Stalinets". The photo is dated in the summer of 41

Shooting time: summer 1941

Soviet female volunteers are sent to the front. Summer 1941.

Shooting time: 1941

Soviet girl-rank-and-file among prisoners of war.

Shooting time: summer 1941

The machine-gun crew of the German rangers fires from the MG-34 machine gun. Summer 1941, Army Group North. In the background, the calculation covers the StuG III self-propelled guns.

Shooting time: summer 1941

The German column passes the village in the Smolensk region.

Shooting time: July 1941

Wehrmacht soldiers are watching the burning village. The territory of the USSR, the date of the picture is approximately the summer of 1941.

Shooting time: summer 1941

A Red Army soldier near a captured Czech-made German light tank LT vz.38 (designated Pz.Kpfw.38(t) in the Wehrmacht). About 600 of these tanks took part in military operations against the USSR, which were used in battles until mid-1942.

Shooting time: summer 1941

SS soldiers at the destroyed bunker on the "Stalin Line". The defensive structures located on the "old" (as of 1939) border of the USSR were mothballed, however, after the invasion of German troops, some fortified areas were used by the Red Army for defense.

Shooting time: 1941

Soviet railway station after the German bombardment, on the tracks there is an echelon with BT tanks.

German columns pass by a cart with a Red Army soldier, who had previously come under fire.

The dead Soviet tankers and tank landing soldiers at the gates of the border outpost. Tank - T-26.

Shooting time: June 1941

Refugees in the Pskov region.

Shooting time: July 1941

German soldiers finish off a wounded Soviet sniper.

Shooting time: summer 1941

The dead Soviet soldiers, as well as civilians - women and children. The bodies are dumped in a roadside ditch, like household garbage; dense columns of German troops are calmly moving past along the road.

Shooting time: summer 1941

A cart with the bodies of dead Red Army soldiers.

Soviet symbols in the captured city of Kobrin ( Brest region, Belarus) - T-26 tank and a monument to V.I. Lenin.

Shooting time: summer 1941

A column of German troops. Ukraine, July 1941.

Shooting time: July 1941

Red Army soldiers inspect a German fighter Bf.109F2 (from Squadron 3/JG3) hit by anti-aircraft fire and made an emergency landing. West of Kyiv, July 1941

Shooting time: July 1941

The banner of the 132nd NKVD escort battalion captured by the Germans. Photo from the personal album of one of the Wehrmacht soldiers.

"Brest Fortress. The defense was held for two months by border guards and the 132nd separate battalion of escort troops of the NKVD of the USSR. The city of Brest was hastily abandoned by the Red Army at 8:00 am on 06/22/1941 after a battle with enemy infantry that had crossed the Bug River in boats. In Soviet times, everyone remembered the inscription of one of the defenders of the Brest Fortress: “I am dying, but I do not give up! Farewell Motherland! 20.VII.41”, but few people knew that it was made on the wall of the barracks of the 132nd separate battalion of escort troops of the NKVD of the USSR.”

A slow river flows at dawn.

Sleep creeps, trying to close the eyelids.

Fog washed away nearby haystacks ...

Stop this moment forever!

Seconds fly like bullets into eternity,

While the light of the rocket is bleeding on the coast.

Another moment will pass - and the projectile

Will overwhelm a sixth of the planet with war.

The outpost was raised by an explosion at the gate.

The crushing of heels on the washed steps.

Dew trail. Coastal break.

Alien oars foam our water.

An obedient hand will send a cartridge,

Fury will hit the trilinear on the shoulder.

... He took the fight, and for him the river

So forever the border remained.

In the victorious May, the path lay from here,

Crowned with unfading fireworks,

And he was the first to make a breakthrough into this distance

A soldier who fought for three minutes.