November 19, 1942 The offensive of the Soviet troops near Stalingrad. Women and children welcome the soldiers-liberators

The largest military-political event of the Second World War

February 2, 2018 will mark the 75th anniversary of the Battle of Stalingrad, which has become a symbol of courage and resilience of our people unprecedented in world history. B Itva, which unfolded on the banks of the Volga from July 17, 1942 to February 2, 1943, marked the beginning of a radical change not only in the Great Patriotic War, but also in the Second World War as a whole.

The victory near Moscow was of great international importance. Japan and Turkey refrained from entering the war against Soviet Union. The increased prestige of the USSR on the world stage contributed to the creation of an anti-Hitler coalition. However, in the summer of 1942, due to the mistakes of the Soviet leadership, the Red Army suffered a number of major defeats in the North-West, near Kharkov and in the Crimea. German troops reached the Volga - Stalingrad and the Caucasus. The Germans again seized the strategic initiative, and went on the offensive. General G. Blumentritt, Deputy Chief of Staff of the High Command of the German Armed Forces, recalled: “Industrial and economic circles in Germany exerted strong pressure on the military, proving the importance of continuing offensive operations. They told Hitler that they could not continue the war without Caucasian oil and Ukrainian wheat.” Hitler fully shared the point of view of his economists, and in the spring of 1942, the General Staff developed a plan for a summer offensive (all the largest operations of the Wehrmacht were called options. The German summer offensive in the USSR was given the code name "Fall Blau" ("Fall Blau") - a blue version.) the main purpose of which was to seize the North Caucasian oil fields of Maykop and Grozny and capture Baku. It was also supposed to capture the entire Black Sea coast of the Caucasus and force Turkey to enter the war on the side of Germany. However, unexpectedly, in early July, Hitler, without waiting for the capture of Stalingrad and the turn to the Caucasus, ordered the removal of 11 divisions from the advancing troops, and some parts of the reserve, which were sent to Army Group North with the order to take Leningrad. The 11th German army was also transported there from the Crimea. Hitler's next step was the signing of Directive No. 45 on July 23, 1942. It ordered Army Groups "A" and "B" to split up - the first was to advance through the Black Sea coast of the Caucasus and through the Caucasus to Grozny and Baku, and the second - to capture Stalingrad, and then Astrakhan. Almost all tank and motorized units were attached to Army Group A. Stalingrad was supposed to take the 6th field army of General Paulus.

The Soviet command, attaching paramount importance to the Stalingrad direction, believed that only a stubborn defense of this area could frustrate enemy plans, ensure the integrity of the entire front, and keep Stalingrad in their hands. It was also taken into account that in the current situation, the Stalingrad direction became extremely advantageous in operational terms, since from there it was possible to deliver a very dangerous blow to the flank and rear of the enemy grouping advancing through the Don to the Caucasus. Thus, the idea of ​​the Headquarters to organize a strategic defense was to bleed and stop the enemy in stubborn defensive battles, preventing him from reaching the Volga, to win the time necessary to prepare strategic reserves and move them to the Stalingrad region, so that in the future go on a decisive offensive.

On July 17, 1942, the vanguards of the divisions of the 6th German Army met at the turn of the Chir and Tsimla rivers with the forward detachments of the 62nd and 64th armies of the Stalingrad Front. The battles of the detachments marked the beginning of the great Battle of Stalingrad.

Failures in the summer battles had a negative impact on combat capability Soviet troops. On July 28, 1942, the famous order of the People's Commissar of Defense No. 227 was issued, later known as the order "Not a step back!" For the first time in the war soviet soldiers, officers and generals, who were in a difficult state of mind under the influence of the successes of the Wehrmacht, heard the truth about the current state of affairs. Stalin was able to find simple, precise words that really reached the consciousness and heart of everyone.

“... Some stupid people at the front console themselves with talk that we can continue to retreat to the east, since we have a lot of territory, a lot of land, a lot of population, and that we will always have an abundance of bread ... Every commander, Red Army soldier and The political worker must understand that our means are not unlimited. The territory of the Soviet state is not a desert, but people - workers, peasants, intellectuals, our fathers, mothers, wives, brothers, children ... After the loss of Ukraine, Belarus, the Baltic states, Donbass and other regions, we have much less territory, therefore, much less people, bread, metal, plants, factories. We no longer have superiority over the Germans either in manpower reserves or in grain reserves. Retreating further means ruining yourself and at the same time ruining our Motherland. Each new piece of territory left by us will strengthen the enemy in every possible way and weaken our defense in every possible way ...

It follows from this that it is time to end the retreat. No step back! This should be our main call now.”

These words, according to the recollections of many veterans, worked as a release from uncertainty, strengthened the morale of the entire army.

In August, fierce battles of the Soviet troops unfolded on the near approaches to Stalingrad. And in September, German troops began to storm the city. After two weeks of exhausting battles, they captured the center of the city, but they could not complete the main task - capturing the entire bank of the Volga in the region of Stalingrad. Fierce fighting in the city itself lasted more than two months. In military history before Stalingrad, such stubborn urban battles were not known. For every home. For each floor or basement. For every wall. Twice Hero of the Soviet Union Colonel-General Alexander Rodimtsev described those August days as follows: « The city looked like hell. The flames of the fires rose several hundred meters. Clouds of smoke and dust hurt my eyes. Buildings collapsed, walls fell, iron warped". A very characteristic statement appeared in a London radio message on October 11, 1942: “Poland was conquered in 28 days, and in Stalingrad, in 28 days, the Germans took several houses. In 38 days, France was conquered, and in Stalingrad, in 38 days, the Germans advanced from one side of the street to the other. Forever entered the history of the Battle of Stalingrad "Lyudnikov Island" - a small piece of land 700 meters along the front and 400 meters deep in the Lower village of the "Barricades" plant. Here the 138th Red Banner Rifle Division under the command of Colonel I.I. Lyudnikov stood to death. On three sides, the division was surrounded by the Nazis, the fourth side was the Volga. Regardless of the huge losses, the Nazis from November 11 continuously attacked parts of the division. On that day alone, six enemy attacks were repulsed, up to a thousand Nazis were destroyed. The defense of the city lasted more than two months and ended in the collapse of enemy plans. Hitler did not achieve his goal. The city was held. Thus ended the first half of the heroic Battle of Stalingrad, unparalleled in history.

For Nazi Germany, the end of 1942, despite the seizure of large territories, was characterized by a deterioration in the economic, political and military situation. During defensive operations, all enemy plans to defeat the Red Army and seize the Caucasus with its oil sources were thwarted. The offensive capabilities of the German armed forces on the Soviet-German front were exhausted. The strike forces were weakened. The front of the advancing armies turned out to be stretched out, there were no large operational reserves. In such a situation, on October 14, 1942, the Hitlerite high command issued Order No. 1, according to which the Nazi army was to go on the defensive along the entire Soviet-German front in order to hold the occupied territory, exhaust the Soviet troops, make up for losses and create the prerequisites for the resumption offensive in the spring of 1943.

The headquarters of the Supreme High Command of the Soviet troops decided to defeat in the winter of 1942-1943. the southern wing of the fascist German front from Voronezh to the Black Sea and simultaneously carry out a number of operations to improve the strategic position of Moscow and Leningrad. The ultimate goal of these operations was to achieve favorable conditions to launch new major offensive operations. The Soviet command decided to initially go on a counteroffensive near Stalingrad in order to defeat the main enemy grouping in the south, and further develop the offensive in the Kharkov, Donbass and North Caucasian directions. By the beginning of the counteroffensive near Stalingrad, our troops were opposed by a grouping that included: the 6th field and 4th tank German fascist armies, the 8th army of fascist Italy, the 3rd and 4th armies, the 6th army and 4 th Cavalry Corps of Royal Romania. The enemy troops included more than a million people (660 thousand of them in combat units), about 700 tanks, 10,300 guns and mortars of all calibers (including field guns - up to 5 thousand, anti-tank guns - 2.5 thousand, mortars of caliber from 81 mm and above - 2.7 thousand) and more than 1,200 aircraft. Although the German troops suffered heavy losses in previous battles, they still retained the ability to stubborn resistance.

The main forces of the Germans occupied tactical defense. There were only 6 divisions in the operational reserve. The absolute majority of the Nazi divisions were drawn into the struggle for Stalingrad. The weakest areas of defense were on the flanks of the enemy's Stalingrad grouping. The Romanian troops, which were less armed and trained, defended themselves here, and most of their personnel did not share the aggressive aspirations of both the German fascist ruling clique and their sold-out fascist and pro-fascist rulers.

By the second half of November 1942, the Soviet troops near Stalingrad were united into three fronts: Southwestern, Donskoy, Stalingrad. In total, by the beginning of the counteroffensive, there were ten combined arms, one tank and four air armies in the fronts. The Soviet troops had to decide difficult task. Its difficulty was explained, first of all, by the relatively unfavorable balance of forces. Therefore, the fronts and armies experienced great difficulty in creating shock groupings, the fronts did not have the opportunity to allocate a sufficient number of forces to their reserves, and the creation of second echelons in them turned out to be generally impossible. In this regard, by order of the Supreme Commander-in-Chief and under his personal control, during September and October 1942, in an atmosphere of the deepest secrecy, a huge number of Soviet troops and military equipment from Siberia was transferred to the Stalingrad Front. Of course, all measures of secrecy and secrecy were observed, even mail messages were banned. Our foreign intelligence did a good job. As the head of the NKVD department, Sudoplatov, said in his book, through the double agent Max (who worked for both the NKVD and the Abwehr) and served in the communications department at Rokossovsky's headquarters, the Germans were "leaked" information that a major operation was being prepared in the Rzhev direction. Moreover, shortly before the start of the counteroffensive, Stalin removed Zhukov from Stalingrad and instructed him to start preparing the Rzhev-Vyazemsky operation. The Germans were informed of this appointment in a timely manner. And they hastily transferred four tank divisions here, believing that where Zhukov was, Stalin would strike the main blow.

Indeed, the Germans did not know anything about the upcoming counter-offensive of the Soviet troops. Subsequently, the chief of the general staff of the German 6th Field Army Arthur Schmidt admits: "We all did not realize the scale of the threat and again underestimated the Russians." The mistake of the intelligence department of foreign Eastern armies, which was then headed by the future chief of West German intelligence, Reinhard Gehlen, also attracts attention. On October 31, he reported that there were no signs of an impending major Russian offensive anywhere. .

It should be noted that the situation at the beginning of the counteroffensive near Stalingrad was incomparably more favorable than at the beginning of the counteroffensive near Moscow. As part of the fronts, a powerful means of developing operational success appeared in the form of tank and mechanized corps. In his order on the occasion of the 25th anniversary of the Great October Socialist Revolution, I. V. Stalin promised: “There will be a holiday on our street!”. And these were not empty words, since the date of the counter-offensive of the Red Army on the Stalingrad front - November 19 - had already been precisely determined.

The purpose of the counter-offensive near Stalingrad was to defeat the main strategic grouping of the enemy, wrest the initiative from the hands of the enemy and initiate a radical change in the course of the Great Patriotic War and the entire Second World War in favor of the Soviet Union and all the progressive forces of the world. In accordance with this goal, according to the plan of the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command, the troops of the Southwestern, Don and Stalingrad fronts were to break through the enemy’s defenses in a number of sectors and, developing a strike in converging directions on Kalach-Soviet, surround and destroy the main enemy grouping near Stalingrad.

The counteroffensive began on November 19, 1942 with strikes from the Southwestern and Don fronts. The next day, the troops of the Stalingrad Front began hostilities. The Southwestern Front, with the forces of the 5th Panzer and 21st Armies, went on the offensive at 0850 hours after an 80-minute artillery preparation. In three hours of battle, rifle divisions captured the first position of the main line of defense. After that, tank corps were brought into battle, which quickly completed the breakthrough of the enemy's main line of defense and rushed into the operational depth. Following the tank corps, cavalry corps entered the gap. By the end of the day, the troops of the shock group of the Southwestern Front had advanced as rifle divisions up to 10-19 km, and tank corps - up to 18-35 km. Having completed the breakthrough of the enemy's defense, the troops of all three fronts continued to develop the offensive in the operational depth. Tank and mechanized corps advanced with great success, sometimes in a day, advancing up to 60-70 km. Thus, the encirclement of the enemy was achieved. Subsequently, a fierce struggle of our troops unfolded for the liquidation of the encircled enemy and the consolidation of the situation on the external front.

Thus, as a result of the combat operations of our troops at the first stage of the operation, the enemy's defenses were broken through, the encirclement of his main forces was completed, and favorable conditions were created for their subsequent destruction. The 273,000-strong group of Nazi troops was surrounded. In addition, during the hostilities, the 3rd Army of Royal Romania was defeated, consisting of fifteen divisions, of which four divisions were captured in the Raspopinskaya area. Major defeats south of Stalingrad were also suffered by the formations of the 6th Army and 4th Cavalry Corps of the 4th Romanian Army.

Meanwhile, the fascist German command decided to rescue its encircled troops at all costs. To carry out this operation, a new army group "Don" was created under the command of Field Marshal Manstein, which included up to 30 divisions. Part of the forces of this group was to operate against the Southwestern Front and concentrated in the Tormosin area. The other part of its troops was concentrated in the Kotelnikovo area and was intended for operations against the Stalingrad Front. The greatest danger was represented by the Kotelnikovskaya group, in which there were up to 350 tanks. From the areas of Tormosin and Kotelnikovo, the Don group was supposed to strike in the general direction on Sovetsky, Marinovka and connect with the encircled troops. The encircled troops were also preparing a strike towards the Don group.

Preparing an offensive against the encircled enemy grouping, since the end of November 1942, the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command launched preparations for a further offensive by our troops on the external front, with its general development on Rostov. It was decided to start the defeat of the enemy in the Rostov direction with a powerful blow from the troops of the South-Western and part of the forces of the Voronezh fronts. In November, five rifle divisions, four tank divisions, and two mechanized corps were sent to reinforce the Southwestern Front. The success of our troops in this operation greatly facilitated the struggle of the Stalingrad Front against the enemy's Kotelnikov grouping. However, despite the success achieved by the Soviet troops, the fascist German command managed to launch its counterattack in this direction, and the troops of the Stalingrad Front had to fight heavy defensive battles in the period from December 12 to 14, 1942. During this time, the Kotelnikovskaya group of German troops managed to advance up to 40 km and reach the line of the Myshkov River; no more than 40 km remained to the encircled group. According to Manstein, it was during these days that Paulus had the last opportunity to break out of the clutches with his army. To do this, it was necessary to strike with all available means towards Gotha's tanks. But Paulus did not try to do this, although Manstein, according to him, took full responsibility. After the war, Paulus angrily denied this, but this did not change the essence of the matter - he, together with the Fuhrer, took full responsibility for the death of his soldiers. Goth could not wait for Paulus for a long time at Myshkovo, and already on December 22, under the powerful blows of the Soviet troops, he began to quickly retreat and, as a result, was able to gain a foothold only 100 km from the “boiler”. The death warrant of the 6th Army was signed. In the early 1950s, Erich von Manstein, captured by the British, revealed the harsh logic of war. Despite the fact that I myself, he writes, urged the Fuhrer to decide on a breakthrough, I was firmly convinced that the 6th Army "was obliged to tie down the enemy forces opposing it for as long as possible," even at the cost of self-sacrifice.

On January 30, Paulus sent Hitler a warm congratulations on the occasion of the tenth anniversary of his coming to power. In a response radiogram, the Fuhrer awarded Paulus the rank of Field Marshal and said that not a single German field marshal had been captured yet. Paulus understood everything perfectly, but did not want to shoot. With the advent of the new year, 1943, a severe famine came to the 6th Army, especially unbearable against the backdrop of a 20-degree frost. The Soviet command knew about the position of the German troops, and was in no hurry to attack - hunger, cold and typhus were doing well anyway. An eyewitness to these events, the commander of the 767th Grenadier Regiment, Colonel Steidle, wrote about the situation in which Paulus's subordinates were then: “The field, littered with dead bodies, is indescribably scary. We looked with horror at the corpses with naked limbs, torn chests and cramped hands, with faces frozen in mournful grimaces, and pewter eyes bulging from fear from fear. And the living encroached on the dead, taking off their boots and uniforms, using a knife and an ax for this. Everyone thinks only of himself. This is how they will leave you, and your icy corpse will be desecrated in the same way. And we all tremble at the thought that the same fate inevitably awaits us as these inhabitants of the field. If earlier they dug graves and put up crosses, now there are not enough living people to dig graves for the dead.”

Our troops went on the offensive against the Kotelnikovskaya grouping on December 24, 1942 at 6 am after a 15-minute powerful fire raid. By the end of December 26, the enemy defense was broken through, and on December 30, the troops of the Stalingrad Front completed the defeat of the Kotelnikov group. So, the successful actions of our troops in December 1942 on the external front thwarted the enemy's attempt to unblock the encircled group near Stalingrad, and its position became hopeless. The liquidation of the encircled enemy grouping was entrusted to the troops of the Don Front (commanded by Lieutenant General K.K. Rokossovsky). The front included seven combined-arms armies, from the air the offensive of the troops was supported by the forces of the air army. According to the plan of the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command in this operation, called the "Ring", the troops of the Don Front were to deliver the main blow from west to east, given that in the western part of the ledge there were enemy troops who suffered the greatest losses, and their defense was less prepared. The main blow was delivered by the forces of the 65th Army (commanded by Lieutenant General P.I. Batov) and the 21st Army (commanded by Major General I.M. Chistyakov). From the south towards st. Voroponovo carry out the strike of the 57th and 64th armies. From the north and from the region of Stalingrad, the 24th, 66th and 62nd armies attacked Gorodishche. The delivery of these blows was supposed to lead to the dismemberment of the encircled enemy grouping, its destruction in parts.

To avoid unnecessary bloodshed, the commander of the Don Front, Colonel-General K.K. Rokossovsky and the representative of the Headquarters, Colonel-General of Artillery N.N. Voronov on January 8, 1943 presented an ultimatum to the commander of the encircled troops, Field Marshal Paulus. This ultimatum was humane, saved lives and did not humiliate the dignity of those surrounded. However, it was not accepted. Then, on January 10, 1943, the Soviet troops launched a decisive offensive.

Overcoming the fierce resistance of the enemy, the troops of the 21st Army on January 26, in the area west of Mamaev Kurgan, united with the troops of the 62nd Army. The encircled enemy troops were pressed against the Volga and cut into two parts. On January 31, the southern strike force was captured along with Field Marshal Paulus and his headquarters. On February 2, after the strongest artillery fire strike, the northern group also laid down their arms. The great historical battle of Stalingrad ended with the complete victory of the Soviet Armed Forces.

Thus, the great battle on the Volga ended with a brilliant victory for the Soviet Armed Forces. Five armies were defeated Nazi Germany and its allies: two German, two Romanian and one Italian. In total, the enemy lost up to one and a half million people killed, wounded and captured, lost three and a half thousand tanks, over three thousand combat and transport aircraft, more than twelve thousand guns and mortars.

The Battle of Stalingrad is rightfully defined as the largest military-political event of the entire Second World War. It was the Stalingrad victory that predetermined the beginning of the collapse of the fascist bloc, increased the scope of the liberation movement in the countries that fell under the yoke of Nazi occupation, and obviously showed that fascism was doomed to inevitable death. The world perceived the victory on the Volga as a victory of Soviet military art over German.

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Tsobechia Gabriel

On November 19, 1942, the counter-offensive of the Red Army near Stalingrad began (Operation Uranus).

The Battle of Stalingrad is one of the greatest battles in the Great Patriotic War and World War II. The military chronicle of Russia has a huge number of examples of courage and heroism, the valor of soldiers on the battlefield and the strategic skill of Russian commanders. But even in their example, the Battle of Stalingrad stands out.

For two hundred days and nights on the banks of the great rivers Don and Volga, and then at the walls of the city on the Volga and directly in Stalingrad itself, this fierce battle continued. The battle unfolded over a vast territory of about 100 thousand square meters. km with a front length of 400 - 850 km. More than 2.1 million soldiers took part in this titanic battle from both sides at different stages of hostilities. In terms of significance, scale and fierceness of hostilities, the Battle of Stalingrad surpassed all previous battles in world history.

This battle includes two stages. The first stage was the Stalingrad strategic defensive operation, which lasted from July 17, 1942 to November 18, 1942. At this stage, in turn, one can distinguish: defensive operations on the distant approaches to Stalingrad from July 17 to September 12, 1942 and the defense of the city itself from September 13 to November 18, 1942. There were no long pauses or truces in the battles for the city, the battles and skirmishes went on without interruption. Stalingrad for the German army became a kind of "graveyard" of their hopes and aspirations. The city ground thousands of enemy soldiers and officers. The Germans themselves called the city "hell on earth", "Red Verdun", noted that the Russians fought with unprecedented ferocity, fighting to the last man. On the eve of the Soviet counter-offensive, the German troops launched the 4th assault on Stalingrad, or rather its ruins. On November 11, against the 62nd Soviet Army (by this time it numbered 47 thousand soldiers, about 800 guns and mortars and 19 tanks), 2 tank and 5 infantry divisions were thrown into battle. By this time, the Soviet army was already divided into three parts. A fiery hail fell on the Russian positions, they were ironed by enemy aircraft, it seemed that there was nothing alive there anymore. However, when the German chains went on the attack, Russian arrows began to mow them down.

By mid-November, the German offensive had fizzled out in all major directions. The enemy was forced to make a decision to go on the defensive. On this, the defensive part of the Battle of Stalingrad was completed. The troops of the Red Army solved the main problem by stopping the powerful offensive of the Nazis in the Stalingrad direction, creating the prerequisites for a retaliatory strike by the Red Army. During the defense of Stalingrad, the enemy suffered heavy losses. The German armed forces lost about 700 thousand people killed and wounded, about 1 thousand tanks and assault guns, 2 thousand guns and mortars, more than 1.4 thousand combat and transport aircraft. Instead of mobile warfare and rapid advance, the main enemy forces were drawn into bloody and furious urban battles. The plan of the German command for the summer of 1942 was thwarted. On October 14, 1942, the German command decides to transfer the army to strategic defense along the entire length of the Eastern Front. The troops received the task of holding the front line, offensive operations were planned to continue only in 1943.

It must be said that at that time the Soviet troops also suffered huge losses in personnel and equipment: 644 thousand people (irretrievable - 324 thousand people, sanitary - 320 thousand people, over 12 thousand guns and mortars, about 1400 tanks, more than 2 thousand aircraft.

The second period of the battle on the Volga is the Stalingrad strategic offensive operation (November 19, 1942 - February 2, 1943). The Headquarters of the Supreme High Command and the General Staff in September-November 1942 developed a plan for the strategic counteroffensive of the Soviet troops near Stalingrad. The development of the plan was led by G.K. Zhukov and A.M. Vasilevsky. On November 13, the plan, codenamed "Uranus", was approved by the Stavka under the chairmanship of Joseph Stalin. The southwestern front under the command of Nikolai Vatutin was given the task of inflicting deep blows on enemy forces from bridgeheads on the right bank of the Don from the areas of Serafimovich and Kletskaya. The grouping of the Stalingrad Front under the command of Andrei Eremenko was advancing from the Sarpinsky Lakes region. The offensive groupings of both fronts were to meet in the Kalach area and take the main enemy forces near Stalingrad into an encirclement ring. At the same time, the troops of these fronts created an external encirclement ring in order to prevent the Wehrmacht from deblocking the Stalingrad grouping with strikes from outside. The Don Front under the leadership of Konstantin Rokossovsky delivered two auxiliary blows: the first - from the Kletskaya region to the southeast, the second - from the Kachalinsky region along the left bank of the Don to the south. In the areas of the main attacks, due to the weakening of secondary areas, a 2-2.5-fold superiority in people and a 4-5-fold superiority in artillery and tanks were created. Due to the strictest secrecy in the development of the plan and the secrecy of the concentration of troops, the strategic surprise of the counteroffensive was ensured. During defensive battles, the Headquarters was able to create a significant reserve that could be thrown into the offensive. The number of troops in the Stalingrad direction was increased to 1.1 million people, about 15.5 thousand guns and mortars, 1.5 thousand tanks and self-propelled guns, 1.3 thousand aircraft. True, the weakness of this powerful grouping of Soviet troops was that about 60% of the personnel of the troops were young recruits who had no combat experience.

The Red Army was opposed by the German 6th field (Friedrich Paulus) and 4th tank armies (Hermann Goth), the Romanian 3rd and 4th armies of Army Group B (commander Maximilian von Weichs), which numbered more than 1 million people. soldiers, about 10.3 thousand guns and mortars, 675 tanks and assault guns, more than 1.2 thousand combat aircraft. The most combat-ready German units were concentrated directly in the Stalingrad area, participating in the assault on the city. The flanks of the group were covered by the weaker Romanian and Italian divisions in terms of morale and technical equipment. As a result of the concentration of the main forces and means of the army group directly in the Stalingrad region, the line of defense on the flanks did not have sufficient depth and reserves. The Soviet counter-offensive in the Stalingrad region would come as a complete surprise to the Germans, the German command was sure that all the main forces of the Red Army were tied up in heavy battles, bled dry and did not have the strength and material means for such a large-scale strike.

On November 19, 1942, after a powerful 80-minute artillery preparation, the troops of the Southwestern and Don fronts went on the attack. By the end of the day, the formations of the South-Western Front advanced 25-35 km, they broke the defenses of the 3rd Romanian army in two sectors: southwest of Serafimovich and in the Kletskaya area. In fact, the 3rd Romanian was defeated, and its remnants were engulfed from the flanks. On the Don Front, the situation was more difficult: the advancing Batov's 65th Army met fierce resistance from the enemy, advanced only 3-5 km by the end of the day and could not even break through the enemy's first line of defense.

On November 20, after artillery preparation, parts of the Stalingrad Front went on the attack. They broke through the defenses of the 4th Romanian army and by the end of the day they walked 20-30 km. The German command received news of the offensive of the Soviet troops and the breakthrough of the front line on both flanks, but there were actually no large reserves in Army Group B. By November 21, the Romanian armies were finally defeated, and the tank corps of the Southwestern Front were irresistibly rushing towards Kalach. On November 22, tankers occupied Kalach. Parts of the Stalingrad Front were moving towards the mobile formations of the South-Western Front. On November 23, formations of the 26th tank corps of the South-Western Front quickly reached the Sovetsky farm and connected with units of the 4th mechanized corps of the Northern Fleet. The 6th field and main forces of the 4th tank armies were surrounded by encirclement: 22 divisions and 160 separate units with a total number of about 300 thousand soldiers and officers. The Germans did not know such a defeat during the Second World War. On the same day, in the area of ​​\u200b\u200bthe village of Raspopinskaya, an enemy group capitulated - more than 27 thousand Romanian soldiers and officers surrendered. It was a real military disaster. The Germans were stunned, confused, they did not even think that such a catastrophe was possible.

On November 30, the operation of the Soviet troops to encircle and block the German group in Stalingrad as a whole was completed. The Red Army created two encirclement rings - external and internal. The total length of the outer ring of encirclement was about 450 km. However, the Soviet troops were unable to immediately cut through the enemy grouping in order to complete its elimination. One of the main reasons for this was the underestimation of the size of the encircled Stalingrad group of the Wehrmacht - it was assumed that it had 80-90 thousand people. In addition, the German command, by reducing the front line, was able to condense their battle formations, using the already existing positions of the Red Army for defense (their Soviet troops occupied the summer of 1942).

After the failure of an attempt to unblock the Stalingrad grouping by the Don Army Group under the command of Manstein on December 12-23, 1942, the encircled German troops were doomed. An organized "air bridge" could not solve the problem of supplying the encircled troops with food, fuel, ammunition, medicines and other means. Hunger, cold and disease mowed down the soldiers of Paulus. January 10 - February 2, 1943, the Don Front carried out the offensive operation "Ring", during which the Stalingrad grouping of the Wehrmacht was liquidated. The Germans lost 140 thousand soldiers killed, about 90 thousand more surrendered. This ended the Battle of Stalingrad.

On November 19, 1942, Operation Uranus began - the strategic offensive of the Soviet troops near Stalingrad, which led to the encirclement and subsequent defeat of the Paulus army. Having suffered a heavy defeat in the Battle of Moscow and suffered huge losses, in 1942 the Germans could no longer advance along the entire Soviet-German front. Therefore, they decided to concentrate their efforts on his southern flank. Army Group "South" was divided into two parts - "A" and "B". Army Group "A" was intended to attack on North Caucasus with the aim of capturing oil fields near Grozny and Baku. Army Group B, which included the 6th Army of Friedrich Paulus and the 4th Panzer Army of Hermann Goth, was supposed to move east towards the Volga and Stalingrad. This army group initially included 13 divisions, in which there were about 270 thousand people, 3 thousand guns and mortars and about 500 tanks.

On July 12, 1942, when it became clear to our command that Army Group B was advancing on Stalingrad, was created Stalingrad Front. The front included the 62nd Army advanced from the reserve under the command of General Kolpakchi (from August 2 - General Lopatin, from September 5 - General Krylov, and from September 12, 1942 - Vasily Ivanovich Chuikov), 63rd, 64th armies, also the 21st, 28th, 38th, 57th combined-arms and 8th air armies of the former Southwestern Front, and from July 30 - the 51st Army of the North Caucasian Front. The Stalingrad Front received the task, defending in a strip 530 km wide, to stop the further advance of the enemy and prevent him from reaching the Volga. By July 17 Stalingrad Front had 12 divisions (160 thousand people in total), 2200 guns and mortars, about 400 tanks and over 450 aircraft. In addition, 150-200 long-range bombers and up to 60 fighters of the 102nd Air Defense Aviation Division (Colonel I. I. Krasnoyurchenko) operated in its lane. Thus, by the beginning of the Battle of Stalingrad, the enemy had superiority over the Soviet troops in people by 1.7 times, in tanks and artillery - in 1.3 and in aircraft - more than 2 times.

Under these conditions, on July 28, 1942, People's Commissar of Defense I. V. Stalin issued No. 227, in which he demanded to strengthen resistance to the enemy and stop his offensive at all costs. The most severe measures were envisaged for those who would show cowardice and cowardice in battle. Practical measures were outlined to strengthen morale and fighting spirit and discipline in the troops. “It’s time to end the retreat,” the order noted. - No step back!" This slogan embodied the essence of Order No. 227. Commanders and political workers were tasked with bringing to the consciousness of every soldier the requirements of this order.

(Light tank MZl "Stuart" of the 241st tank brigade near the city of Kalach-on-Don, northeast of Stalingrad)

To strengthen the defense Stalingrad by decision of the front commander, the 57th Army was deployed on the southern face of the outer defensive bypass. Part Stalingrad Front the 51st Army was transferred (Major General T.K. Kolomiets, from October 7 - Major General N.I. Trufanov). The situation in the zone of the 62nd Army was difficult. On August 7-9, the enemy pushed her troops across the Don River, and surrounded four divisions west of Kalach. Soviet soldiers fought in the encirclement until August 14, and then in small groups they began to break through from the encirclement. Three divisions of the 1st Guards Army (Major General K. S. Moskalenko, from September 28 - Major General I. M. Chistyakov) that approached the Reserve Headquarters launched a counterattack on the enemy troops and stopped their further advance.

(in the trenches of Stalingrad ....)

The Soviet defenders used the emerging ruins as defensive positions. German tanks could not move among piles of rubble up to eight meters high. Even if they could move forward, they came under heavy fire from Soviet anti-tank rifles hidden in the ruins of buildings.

Soviet snipers, using the ruins as cover, also inflicted heavy damage on the Germans. So, only one Soviet sniper Vasily Grigorievich Zaitsev during the battle destroyed 225 enemy soldiers and officers, including 11 snipers.

(sniper Vasily Grigorievich Zaitsev)

During the period of defense Stalingrad at the end of September 1942, a reconnaissance group of four soldiers, led by sergeant Pavlov, captured a four-story house in the city center and entrenched in it. On the third day, reinforcements arrived at the house, delivering machine guns, anti-tank rifles (later - company mortars) and ammunition, and the house became an important stronghold in the division's defense system. German assault groups captured the lower floor of the building, but could not capture it entirely. For the Germans, it was a mystery how the garrison on the upper floors was supplied.

(Pavlov's House..)

(Soviet armor-piercers with PTRD)

By the end of the defensive period Battle of Stalingrad The 62nd Army held the area north of the Tractor Plant, the Barrikady plant and the northeastern quarters of the city center, the 64th Army defended the approaches to its southern part. The general offensive of the German troops was stopped. On November 10, they went on the defensive on the entire southern wing of the Soviet-German front, with the exception of sectors in the areas Stalingrad, Nalchik and Tuapse.

The German command believed that after many months of heavy fighting, the Red Army was not in a position to carry out a major offensive and therefore did not take care of covering the flanks. On the other hand, they had nothing to cover the flanks with. the losses suffered in previous battles forced the troops of the would-be allies to be used on the flanks.

Since September, the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command and the General Staff have begun to develop a counteroffensive plan. On November 13, the strategic counteroffensive plan, codenamed "Uranus", was approved by the Headquarters under the chairmanship of I.V. Stalin.

The plan provided for: to direct the main blows against the most vulnerable sectors of the enemy's defense, to the flank and rear of his most combat-ready formations; strike groups to use terrain advantageous for the attackers; with a generally equal balance of forces in the breakthrough areas, by weakening the secondary areas, create a 2.8-3.2-fold superiority in forces. Due to the deepest secrecy of the development of the plan and the enormous secrecy of the concentration of forces achieved, the strategic surprise of the offensive was ensured.

The offensive of the troops of the South-Western and right wing of the Don Fronts began on the morning of November 19 after a powerful artillery preparation. Troops of the 5th tank armies broke through the defenses of the 3rd Romanian army. German troops they tried to stop the Soviet troops with a strong counterattack, but were defeated by the 1st and 26th tank corps brought into battle, the advanced units of which went into the operational depth, advancing to the Kalach area. On November 20, the strike force of the Stalingrad Front went on the offensive. On the morning of November 23, the advanced units of the 26th Panzer Corps captured Kalach. On November 23, the troops of the 4th Panzer Corps of the Southwestern Front and the 4th Mechanized Corps of the Stalingrad Front met in the area of ​​​​the Sovetsky farm, closing the encirclement ring of the Stalingrad enemy grouping in the interfluve of the Volga and Don. The 6th and main forces of the 4th tank armies were surrounded - 22 divisions and 160 separate units with a total strength of 330 thousand people. By the same time, a large part of the outer front of the encirclement was created, the distance of which from the inner one was 40-100 km.

(street fighting…)

On January 8, 1943, the Soviet command presented the command of the encircled troops with an ultimatum to surrender, but on Hitler's orders, it rejected it. On January 10, the liquidation of the Stalingrad cauldron began by the forces of the Don Front (Operation "Ring").

(German prisoners)

At this time, the number of encircled troops was still about 250 thousand, the number of troops of the Don Front was 212 thousand. The enemy stubbornly resisted, but the Soviet troops moved forward and on January 26 cut the group into two parts - the southern one in the city center and the northern one in the area of ​​​​the tractor plant and the factory "Barricades". On January 31, the southern group was liquidated, its remnants, led by Paulus, surrendered.

On February 2, the northern group was finished. This ended the Battle of Stalingrad.

November 19, 1942 76 years ago The beginning of the counteroffensive of the Soviet troops near Stalingrad (the beginning of the Stalingrad operation).

The Battle of Stalingrad (November 19, 1942 - February 2, 1943) is one of the largest strategic operations of the Soviet troops in the Great Patriotic War.

Its code name is Operation Uranus. The battle included two periods.

The first is the Stalingrad strategic defensive operation (July 17 - November 18, 1942), as a result of which not only the offensive power of the enemy was crushed and the main strike force of the German army on the southern front was bled, but also conditions were prepared for the transition of Soviet troops to a decisive counteroffensive.

The second period of the battle - the Stalingrad strategic offensive operation - began on November 19, 1942.

During the operation, Soviet troops surrounded and destroyed the main forces of the German armies.

In total, during the Battle of Stalingrad, the enemy lost about one and a half million people - a quarter of his forces operating on the Soviet-German front.

The victory of the Soviet troops in the Battle of Stalingrad was of great political and international significance, it had a significant impact on the development of the Resistance Movement on the territory of European states occupied by the fascist invaders.

As a result of the battle, the Soviet armed forces wrested the strategic initiative from the enemy and held it until the end of the war.

In the Battle of Stalingrad, hundreds of thousands of Soviet soldiers showed unparalleled heroism and high military skill. 55 formations and units were awarded orders, 179 - converted into guards, 26 received honorary titles. About 100 fighters received the title of Hero of the Soviet Union.

Stalingrad became a symbol of the steadfastness, courage and heroism of the Soviet people in the struggle for the freedom and independence of the motherland.

On May 1, 1945, by order of the Supreme Commander-in-Chief, Stalingrad was awarded the honorary title of Hero City.

On the 516th day of the war, from a massive artillery shelling in the early morning, our troops began to surround and destroy the enemy.

By the beginning of the counteroffensive in the Stalingrad direction, the troops of the South-Western (1st Guards and 21st A, 5th TA, 17th and from December - 2nd VA), Donskoy (65th, 24th and 66th A, 16th VA) and Stalingrad (62, 64, 57, 51 and 28th A, 8th VA) fronts.

The Soviet troops were opposed by the 8th Italian, 3rd and 4th Romanian, German 6th field and 4th tank armies of Army Group "B".

Breakthrough of the enemy defenses was carried out simultaneously in several areas. In the morning, a heavy fog hung over the Stalingrad region, so we had to abandon the use of aviation.

Artillery cleared the way for Soviet soldiers. At 07:30, the enemy heard volleys of Katyushas.

The fire was fired at previously reconnoitred targets, so it inflicted heavy losses on the enemy. 3500 guns and mortars smashed the enemy defenses. The crushing fire inflicted heavy damage on the enemy and had a frightening effect on him. However, due to poor visibility, not all targets were destroyed, especially on the flanks of the strike force of the Southwestern Front, where the enemy offered the greatest resistance to the advancing troops. At 8 o'clock. 50 min. the rifle divisions of the 5th Panzer and 21st Armies, together with tanks of direct infantry support, went on the attack.

The advance was slow, the enemy connected reserves, in some areas not losing ground to the last. Even the tank army was not able to ensure such a pace of advancement of the Soviet troops, which was originally planned.

At the same time, the troops of the Don Front went on the offensive. The main blow was delivered by the formations of the 65th Army, commanded by Lieutenant General P.I. Batov. At 8 o'clock. 50 minutes - 80 minutes after the start of artillery preparation - rifle divisions went on the attack.

The first two lines of trenches on the coastal high ground were taken at once. The battle for the nearest heights unfolded. The enemy's defense was built according to the type of separate strongholds connected by trenches of a full profile. Each height is a heavily fortified point.

Only by 2 p.m. the enemy’s stubborn resistance was broken, the first, most heavily fortified positions were hacked, the enemy’s defenses were broken through in two sectors: southwest of Serafimovich and in the Kletskaya area, the 21st and 5th tank armies launched an offensive. By the end of the day, the tankers fought 20-35 km.

At first, the 6th Army of Paulus did not feel the imminent danger. At 18.00 on November 19, 1942, the army command announced that on November 20 it plans to continue the operations of reconnaissance units in Stalingrad.

However, the order of the commander of army group "B", given at 22.00, left no doubt about the imminent danger. General M. Weichs demanded that F. Paulus immediately stop all offensive operations in Stalingrad and allocate 4 formations to strike in a northwestern direction against the advancing troops of the Red Army.

Throughout the day on November 19, 1942, the soldiers of the Southwestern and Don fronts show in offensive battles near Stalingrad, high fighting qualities, an unshakable will to win. Describing the main reasons for the successful actions of the fronts in offensive operation, the head of the political department, divisional commissar M.V. Rudakov, in a report to the Main Political Directorate of the Red Army, wrote: “Our offensive was sudden for the enemy, which to a large extent ensured the success of units and formations of the front. But not only the suddenness of the strike decided the outcome of the battles. Victory over enemy - the result, above all, of the high offensive impulse of our troops ... ".

Thus begins a radical change in the course of the Great Patriotic War and the entire Second World War as a whole.

Interview with Georgy Zhukov about Operation Uranus. Archive video: