Institute for Strategic Analysis of FBK. Igor Nikolaev, economist. Igor Nikolaev - what will happen to the ruble

And director of the FBK Institute for Strategic Analysis. freelance advisor Vice Chairman .

http://www.fbk.ru/company/topmanagement/5006/

Education

• 1984 im. M.V. Lomonosov, teacher of political economy, economist
• 1996 Doctor of Economics

Economist Igor Nikolaev has extensive experience in strategic consulting (macroeconomics, budget and investment policy, structural reforms) and teaching experience.

Igor Nikolaev about published more than 350 papers in scientific and business publications on economic topics. Edited by I.A. Nikolaev published, among other things, such books as “How Much Russia Costs” (2004) and “Strategic Analysis. Collection of FBK reports” (2006).

IGOR NIKOLAEV - What will happen to the ruble?

Career of economist Igor Nikolaev

Since June 2013, he has been the head of the FBK Institute for Strategic Analysis.

From 2000 - present time. FBK LLC, Director of the Strategic Analysis Department.

From 1998 to 2000 - Ministry of Railways of Russia. Deputy Head of the Department of Economics.

Since 1997 he has lectured at the Higher School of Economics.

From 1997 to 1998 - Government Office Russian Federation. Advisor.

From 1992 to 1996 - Ministry of Science of Russia. Head of the Department for Analysis, Forecasting and Priorities of Scientific and Technical Development, Deputy Head of the Department of Economic and Legal Regulation of the Scientific and Technical Progress.

From 1990 to 1992 State Committee of Russia for Science and Higher Education. Head of the Economic and Methodological Department.

From 1986 to 1990 - Moscow State University. M.V. Lomonosov. Faculty of Economics, Department of Industrial Economics, researcher.

Awards

In 2006, for merits in strengthening cooperation with the Accounts Chamber of the Russian Federation and a great contribution to the development of the state financial control system, he was awarded the distinction "For merits in strengthening cooperation with the Accounts Chamber of the Russian Federation."

In 2009 he was awarded the Diploma of the International Development Fund "Eurasia" in the special nomination "For the unique economic study of Russia's potential."

In 2013, he was awarded the Badge of Honor of the Russian Risk Management Society "For personal contribution to the development of risk management in Russia" .

Blogs Nikolaev Igor

• https://vk.com/club96532509
• http://www.site/users/160139/posts
• http://echo.msk.ru/blog/nikolaev_i/
• http://polit.pro/board/1-1-0-90

In recent weeks, there have been more and more statements from high tribunes that the economy has reached the bottom, and further we are expected to grow, albeit slowly. Minister talks about it economic development Alexey Ulyukaev, his deputy Alexei Vedev, Deputy Finance Minister Maxim Oreshkin. Analysts of the Central Bank write about the stabilization of the financial market. Finally, the president of the country, at a meeting with members of the government, claims that the worst days for the domestic economy are over. Whether this is so, we decided to discuss with the Director of the FBK Institute for Strategic Analysis, Doctor of Economics, Professor of the Higher School of Economics Igor Nikolaev.

— So, Igor Alekseevich, are the high-ranking officials of the economic bloc of the government right in asserting that the bottom of the crisis has already been reached and it will be better in the future?

We have indeed heard quite a few such statements. That it is necessary to move on to the development agenda, that there is no crisis, that only growth will continue. The question is when will this growth start? The timing of its onset is shifted and shifted - it seems, to infinity. Officials operate on the latest monthly data on GDP: September to August, when there was an increase of 0.3%. They are prepared by the Ministry of Economic Development. But it is not for nothing that Rosstat does not give anything of the kind - it does not have statistics on the dynamics of monthly GDP, it is quarterly or annual, which complies with international statistical rules. Monthly data are very unreliable in this regard, they are purely estimates. It is impossible to take them as a basis and say that we have already begun to grow. In general, there is no clear improvement in the situation.

— Well, what are the prospects - tomorrow will be better than yesterday?

- Unfortunately no. At the end of the year, we expect deterioration in performance. Not only because oil prices remain low and sanctions continue to apply. There is also a base effect, although this reason may seem formal. The end of last year turned out to be very good in terms of the main types of economic activity - in industry, in trade. In December, the growth of industrial production amounted to 3.9%, retail trade in general rose by 5.1%, and trade in non-food products - by 10.7%. If you remember, there was a consumer boom, people tried to save their depreciating rubles before our eyes by investing them in purchases. Now we will compare the November and December macroeconomic parameters with that "productive" November-December, and therefore their growth is impossible, taking into account the base effect. In addition, the fundamental factors that gave rise to the crisis have not disappeared - the imbalance of the raw materials and manufacturing sectors of the economy, public and private capital, social and budgetary spheres. Therefore, I believe that official estimates are overly optimistic.

— Well, what about another optimistic argument of the Ministry of Finance: for the first time in several years, in the third quarter of this year, there was not an outflow, but an inflow of capital?

- Indeed, the inflow of capital was formally recorded. But here it is fundamentally important to understand what we are talking about. The funds come that entrepreneurs are forced to return from abroad so that their business does not collapse, since it is difficult or impossible to find money on the domestic market. This does not mean that investors ran to us again.

— What are the main negative factors affecting the economy and the main risks?

- This is still an extremely high dependence of the national currency on the price of oil. There is a significant risk that oil prices will go below $40 a barrel, and in the very near future. In addition, after the release of the latest data on the US labor market, the likelihood that the Federal Reserve will raise rates in December has significantly increased. This means that stock players will redirect their funds from oil to dollar assets.

Plus, at the beginning of next year, Iran should enter the oil market, further increasing its supply on the market.

The second, but, in my opinion, the most important problem is that in Russia there are no signs of any progress in correcting the disproportions and structural distortions that have developed in the economy, which I spoke about above. When these distortions and disproportions remain, the crisis takes on a protracted character—at least four to five years. At the same time, the main risks for the economy will arise after 2016, when almost all the funds of the Reserve Fund and the National Wealth Fund will be spent.

— To what extent can the authorities be blamed for the current decline in the economy, and to what extent external circumstances, including geopolitical ones?

- The answer to this question is quite simple. We need to look at what was happening with the economy before powerful external negative factors turned on in mid-2014 — first international sanctions, then the fall in oil prices. In the first half of last year, oil prices, let me remind you, exceeded $100 per barrel, there were no serious sectoral sanctions, only personal sanctions against individual Russian officials.

Despite this, in the first half of the year, GDP grew by only 0.8% compared to the first half of 2013. The economy has already stagnated. That is, we would have entered the crisis without external shocks.

Another thing is that the shocks that followed aggravated the situation. But this is an additional effect, not the main one. All structural disproportions are just the result of incorrect, inefficient economic policy, untimely decisions.

— With what macroeconomic results will Russia approach the end of 2015?

— A year ago, our institute predicted a fall in GDP in 2015 ranging from -2 to -4%. The Ministry of Economic Development then gave a figure of +1.2%, and then during the year it was corrected downward six times. We have never revised our forecast. And now we expect -4%.

In terms of inflation, when the budget for 2015 was adopted a year ago, the official forecast was 5.5%. Our estimate from a year ago - 12-14% - turned out to be a 100% hit. By the end of December it will be 14%, maybe a little more.

Now about the ruble exchange rate. The average annual rate in fact will be about 60 rubles per dollar. And in this we were not mistaken. Officially, a year ago, the figure was 37.7, which the authorities then also had to adjust many times.

As for the budget deficit, by the end of this year it will be relatively small - maybe within 1-1.5%. It will be much harder to make ends meet in the budget in a year - for 2016, let me remind you, there is a deficit of 3%.

— What are the main macroeconomic risks in 2016?

— The economic downturn is starting to be conserved — that's the main risk. If you do not take the necessary measures in time, the crisis becomes protracted. Getting out of this situation is much more difficult. We are again in the red and again eating up the last reserves.

— What do you think the authorities should do to bring the country out of the crisis and ensure economic growth?

It's hard to give a short answer here. It is necessary that the authorities finally understand what they are dealing with. Stop repeating like a mantra: "This is a structural crisis." That's right, structural. Then let them name the structural imbalances and suggest ways to resolve them. It is not clear what they are hoping for by including 0.7% GDP growth in the draft budget for 2016. I tried in vain to understand where this figure came from, what caused it. I heard, in particular, the following explanation: "Due to the increase in reserves."

But then the question arises: what kind of reserves and why will they suddenly grow?

Let's start with the simplest thing - lift the anti-sanctions. The Ministry of Economy and the Central Bank actually admitted that they do more harm than good, primarily from the point of view of unwinding inflation. The authorities want sanctions to be lifted from Russia. Why then was it decided in August to extend the anti-sanctions for a year?

And then we can reconsider the priorities of the federal budget, which has a clearly anti-social orientation: we cannot now afford to spend colossal funds on defense. And I am sure: we need to unfreeze the funded part of the pension. And taxes should not be increased, but reduced - this will help to revitalize business and, in the end, economic growth.

“The exchange rate has stabilized, but the crisis continues”

In order to globally assess whether the crisis has ended or not, one must first ask the question: “Have the causes that caused this crisis disappeared?” If so, then we can really say that the crisis is over. But when the reasons remain, and now the state is exactly like this, then how can we talk about the end of the crisis?

For many, the crisis is associated with the exchange rate of the ruble. The ruble is falling, which means there is a crisis. But we economists should not judge by this indicator alone. Let's see what we are doing with the volume of production, with GDP? What is being done with the real incomes of the population? What happens to investments in fixed assets? With key activities? If we evaluate the situation as a whole, we will see that the exchange rate has stabilized, but the crisis continues.

Igor Nikolaev against the background of other well-known economists, he stands out for his pessimism.

His forecasts for GDP growth and inflation are usually twice as bad as the official ones, but what's really bad is that they come true.

Doctor of Economic Sciences. Professor at the Higher School of Economics. Candidate for the State Duma in the September elections in the Kuntsevo single-mandate constituency.

The ruble exchange rate is, by and large, “checkers”. You "checkers" or go? And “to go” - they didn’t come up with anything better for this than the same indicator of GDP. Yes, inflation has slowed down. But we still have high inflationary risks. It must be assessed collectively.

According to the results of the second quarter, our official estimate of GDP is minus 0.6% in annual terms. We fell more slowly than in the first quarter, then it was minus 1.2%. But let's see what happened a year ago. Then the figure for the first quarter was minus 2.8%, for the second quarter - minus 4.5%. That is, the fact that our decline rates have slowed down can only be explained by the effect of a low base.

Already, probably, a callus on the tongue from these words - "structural crisis". But this is indeed a structural crisis. Moreover, weighed down by external shocks in the form of low oil prices and sanctions confrontation. Then, thinking about the prospects, we must ask: have we solved the structural problems? No. Sanctions confrontation stopped? No. Have oil prices risen sharply? No. And even $100 per barrel was not enough for us, as 2014 showed. At such a price level, we practically rolled into a crisis then.

"The world economy is on the verge of a new cyclical crisis"

Growth sectors do not provide overall economic growth

Our budget is still critically dependent on how much we get from oil and gas exports. Yes, there is growth in certain sectors of the economy. But let's take agriculture. Over the past year, it has grown by 3% against the backdrop of a general decline in the economy by 3.7%. But until 2015, the average annual growth rate in agriculture was 3.5%. By the way, the latest monthly growth data for agriculture is a little more than 2% in annual terms.

The problem, however, is that those industries that are growing do not contribute to the overall growth of the economy. share Agriculture in the country's GDP - about 4%. The military-industrial complex also does not change the overall picture. Our industrial production is zero in the first half of the year. In addition, it must be taken into account that the military-industrial complex is developing with budget money. And everyone knows the state of the budget: we have already sequestered it this year and will be next. And no matter what the priority would be the defense complex, the reduction in funding will be there. In addition, there are few such industries where there is growth.

The share of construction in GDP, for example, is 6-6.5%. Latest data for June: a drop of 9.7%. We fall very strongly in construction even in relation to a very low base.

We have entered a super cycle of low world oil prices

Now about consumption. In June, car sales fell 12%. In July - already by 17%. This is on an annualized basis, that is, by July 2015, when the decline was even faster. Retail in recent months it has been falling by 5-6%.

We have now entered a super cycle of low world oil prices. It was caused, first of all, by the shale revolution, which we happily overslept. But other factors will keep prices low.

The world economy is on the verge of a new cyclical crisis. Over the past 50 years, they occur with a frequency of 7-12 years. We had the last global crisis in 2008-2009, and there are already signs of a new crisis. For example, the slowdown in China. The same Brexit will play its role.

"Meaning key rate Central Bank exaggerated"

Let's look at financial results banking sector. The share of profitable credit institutions at the beginning of the year was slightly more than 75%, and now it is over 60%. There are no miracles: if the economy is in crisis and if your customers, businesses, are experiencing difficulties, then, naturally, debt problems arise. This cannot but affect the banking sector.

By how much did the share of unprofitable credit institutions increase? As of June 1, there were 39% of them. And at the beginning of the year it was 25%.

Beyond the inflation target, we can miss the situation in the banking business

Assets of credit institutions: for the first five months of this year, the top five have a slight decrease - a little more than 1%. But look what happens in the fifth and sixth hundred. There is a decrease in assets, respectively, 24% and 32%. It seems to me that with such indicators it will be necessary to clean up in the near future not two or three credit organizations a week, and much more.

I am worried that beyond the inflation target we may miss the situation in the banking business. Now is not the situation of 2008-2009, when the state pumped trillions of rubles into the banking sector. Last year there was support, now it is not. And it won't be any more: the state has no money, even to index pensions, it indexed them in February by 4% with actual inflation of 12.9%. The state has not indexed pensions for working pensioners, maternity capital, payments to honorary donors, etc. at all.

Let's remember the factors that make the ruble so stable now. It is known that the indicator on mandatory ratios for liabilities in foreign currency has been significantly increased. From 4.25% it was increased on deposits for individuals up to 6%, and for legal entities - even higher. You can keep the ruble exchange rate thanks to this factor, but for the time being. A structural distortion is formed.

The problem can be solved either with a sledgehammer or a chisel. Our economy needs a sledgehammer

I believe that the value of the key rate of the Central Bank is exaggerated. When they nod at the experience of the US Federal Reserve, I want to say: “Well, when our economy is as highly developed institutionally, then such instruments as the 0.25% rate will be of great importance.”

The problem can be solved either with a sledgehammer or a chisel. Our economy still needs a sledgehammer. Thin toolkits are not for us yet.

There is a certain stabilization in lending. Growth is when we see that investments in fixed capital have started. This figure is still falling. We do not yet have data for the second quarter, but the data for the first quarter is minus 4.8%.

"80 rubles per dollar by the end of the year"

There should be no euphoria. There has been some stabilization. Or rather, some kind of adaptation. But no more.

The economy will continue to sink under the influence of new negative factors or external shocks that already exist and will worsen. For example, oil prices. It is one thing, about 50, and another - below 40. Or a new round of sanctions confrontation, the same talk is constantly underway. The geopolitical situation remains difficult. Or the Reserve Fund will run out. Or the world economy will slow down too sharply.

We do not have time to decide for a long time what we need to do with all this. Now a program of structural reforms will be developed, it should be ready by the middle of next year. That is, it is preparing for the 2018 presidential election. It makes me want to say, “Guys! We don't have time for that."

The government has something to do, even if there is no time

But there are decisions that can be made quickly. For example, in the tax area. It is possible to completely exempt microbusinesses from taxes. Or reconsider the priorities of the federal budget. You can still choose the defense complex as an unconditional priority, and at the same time cut investments in the same social sphere, or you can choose a different priority. The government has something to do, even if there is no time left.

I would be guided by 80 rubles per dollar by the end of the year.

Institute management:

Director- Andrey Ilyich Fursov, Academician of the International Academy of Sciences (Innsbruck, Austria).

Deputy Director- Ponomareva Elena Georgievna, Doctor of Political Sciences.

Special project manager c - Fursov Kirill Andreevich, Candidate of Historical Sciences.

The activities of the Institute reflect the changes taking place in the world science of society. In the last 10-15 years, the following shifts have been clearly outlined in the socio-historical research field and the educational field, which is somewhat lagging behind it:

1. The narrow regional approach gives way to:

a) regional (sometimes macro-regional), the basic objects of research are not individual countries, but large complexes of production and exchange, what F. Braudel once called world-economy; these are, for example, the North Atlantic, the Indian Ocean zone (al-Hind), East Asian, the Mediterranean (with the southern, Arab, part), steppe Eurasia;

b) comparative-historical (and most often in the long-term historical perspective): Western Europe- Russia, China - Japan; India - China; Western Europe - China; etc. Comparative analysis "West - East - Russia" is developing especially actively in the field of economic history;

c) analysis of certain large country (USA, China, India), imperial (British Empire) or regional (Middle East, Southeast Asia) complexes as elements of the world system; we are talking about such scientific programs as "world-system analysis" of the school of I. Wallerstein, "world-historical approach" (school at the University of Hawaii), etc.; all together it can be presented as historical globalistics.

2. Logic of development modern world shifts the focus of research to the problems of modern (XX-XXI centuries) and new (from the 16th - early 20th centuries) history. This does not mean that antiquity and the Middle Ages are neglected. However, the priorities are set unambiguously (this is very clearly seen in the scientific and information flow).

3. For the last decade in the development of socio-historical science in the West, a return of interest in theoretical problems, especially in its Marxist versions, is clearly visible. The period of the 1980-1990s differed from the previous 30 years in the development of socio-historical science in that theoretical discussions, which were so stormy in the 1950s-1970s, practically disappeared.

Temporal detheoretization was associated with the neoliberal (counter)revolution and the empiricism characteristic of neoliberal economic schemes, which also influenced non-economic disciplines. Today the situation is changing in favor of a new round of theory development, pseudo-scientific schemes such as the “clash of civilizations”, the liberal “end of history”, etc., are becoming a thing of the past.

The main areas of work of the Institute:

• methodology of socio-historical research;
• the study of complex social systems (special attention - capitalist), including a comparative historical analysis of systems (systemology, comparative studies;
• study of systemic and transsystemic subjects (religious-political, financial, etc. corporations - order, neo-order, network structures, etc.);
• analysis of the real mechanisms of the global struggle for power, information and resources (conspiracy theories);
• analysis of global processes (globalistics);
• analysis of processes (including current history) in the main macro-regions of the world (Russia; Anglosphere; Germanosphere; Europe - North, South, East; Arab world; Middle East; Central Asia; South Asia; Southeast Asia; East Asia; Africa south of Sahara; Latin America);
• study of the contemporary ideological situation, ideological and psychohistorical struggle.

The Institute carries out

• research and information and analytical activities;
• advising legal entities and individuals on the subject of the institute's activities;
• implementation of design studies on the subject of the institute's activities by order of legal entities and individuals;
• holding seminars, round tables, conferences, webinars, etc. at the Russian and international levels. on research issues of the institute;
• conducting unlicensed educational activities carried out by conducting one-time classes of various types (lectures, seminars), not accompanied by final certification and the issuance of documents on education.

Contacts:

Legal address: Russian Federation, 111398, Moscow, st. Kuskovskaya, 16

Postal address: 117418, Moscow, PO Box 7, ISAN.

Email: [email protected]

There are no factors capable of strengthening the domestic currency in the foreseeable future. The pre-New Year statements by the authorities about the end of the weakening of the ruble and the change in trend are nothing more than “Wishlist” out of a desire to inspire the population with New Year’s optimism, wrote Igor Nikolaev from FBK in personal blog on "Echo of Moscow".

A change in the negative trend for the national currency will occur after the disappearance of the fundamental factors that are the root cause of the depreciation of the ruble.

- Oil prices started to rise? Has the economy picked up? Have the sanctions been lifted? the expert asks rhetorically. - Everything is exactly the opposite. Then why talk about a change in trend, if the above negative remains in force?

The absence of prerequisites for the disappearance of the mentioned pressure factors suggests the weakening of the ruble throughout 2015.

“In the spring, the domestic currency rate can reach 70 or even 80 rubles per dollar,” the analyst is sure.

Russian economy Nikolaev and his colleagues at the Institute for Strategic Development predict "full-scale".

We reiterate our September forecast of a 4% decline. It was only in the fall that we allowed GDP to fall within 2-4% at the end of 2015, but recent events force us to clarify that a 2% decline looks too optimistic. Now we are talking about a fall within 4%. Someone can say, they say, it's okay, they say in 2009, GDP fell by 7.8%. All this is true, only then this fall ended everything. Now everything is just beginning,” Nikolaev concluded.

According to the results of the coming year, the head of the Institute for Strategic Analysis did not expand on the ruble exchange rate. Nikolaev's colleagues in the analytical department are also not eager to predict the numbers on the scoreboard of exchangers in December 2015. However, reporters' persistence is taking its toll...

— A fair exchange rate of 62 rubles/$ can only be at the price of domestic Urals oil of $40. The collapse of the ruble to 80/USD. is possible only with oil prices of $20–30,” VTB Capital analysts calculated.

“Based on the statistics of the balance of payments and other macroeconomic indicators, the fair exchange rate will be less than 45/dollar,” says Platon Maguta from the manager of his own fund.

- On the wave of oil sales, the dollar may exceed 100 rubles. However, such a course in 2015 is unlikely to last long. The dollar will confidently trade above the mark of 100 rubles in 2016. This level seems to be objective in the long term in the event that oil falls to $40 at the end of 2015, says Alexander Kuptsikevich from FxPro.

Analysts from the Economic Forecasting Agency expect the dollar exchange rate to be 57 rubles 12 kopecks in early January. Reasons for optimism are the resumption of growth in oil prices and the return of exporting companies to the market after the holidays.

At the end of January, the Agency's analysts expect the dollar at 65.69 rubles. Their forecast for the euro is 69.36 and 79.76 rubles. at the beginning and end of January, respectively. Expected exchange rates for February: 70.62 rubles/$ and 82.48 rubles/€, for March - 77.15 rubles/$ and 86.13 rubles/€.