From June 23 to August 29, 1944. Offensive operation "Bagration. Fighting near Mogilev
Operation Bagration and Normandy
June–August 1944
While the High Command of the Ground Forces and the Fuhrer's headquarters rejected any possibility of a Red Army offensive in Belarus, gloomy forebodings grew among units of Army Group Center on the front line. On June 20, 1944, these expectations were reinforced by "hot midsummer days, with distant peals of thunder", and the growing blows of partisans in the rear German troops. Ten days earlier, a German radio interception station had read a Soviet radiogram ordering partisan formations to intensify activity in the rear of the Fourth Army. Accordingly, the Germans launched a major operation against the partisans called "Kormoran". It involved the infamous Kaminsky brigade, whose exceptional cruelty towards civilians seemed medieval, and its violent indiscipline offended German officers who respected military traditions.
Moscow's instructions to large partisan formations in the forests and swamps of Belarus were very clear. They were ordered to first blow up the railways, and after the start of the Soviet offensive, attack Wehrmacht units. This involved capturing bridges, disrupting communications with trees on the roads, and launching attacks to delay the delivery of reinforcements to the front.
At dawn on June 20, the German 25th Motorized Division was subjected to an hour-long shelling and a short attack. Then everything was quiet again. It was either reconnaissance in force, or an attempt to unsettle the Germans. The Fuhrer's headquarters did not believe that the Soviet summer offensive would be directed against Army Group Center. They expected a big offensive north of Leningrad, against the Finns, and another massive attack south of Pripyat, in the direction of southern Poland and the Balkans.
Hitler was convinced that Stalin's strategy was to hit Germany's satellites—the Finns, Hungarians, Romanians, and Bulgarians—forcing them to withdraw from the war like the Italians. His suspicions seemed to be confirmed when first the Leningrad and then the Karelian fronts launched an offensive. Stalin, who now felt confident enough to choose not revenge, but a pragmatic approach, did not intend to completely smash Finland. It would divert too many forces needed elsewhere. He simply wanted to force the Finns into submission and take back the lands he had seized in 1940 from them. As he hoped, these operations in the north diverted Hitler's attention from Belarus.
The Red Army successfully carried out an operation to disinform the enemy, creating the appearance of preparing a major offensive in Ukraine, while in fact tank and combined arms armies were secretly transferred to the north. The task was made easier by the fact that Luftwaffe aircraft had practically disappeared from the sky on the Eastern Front. The Allied strategic bombing of Germany, and now the invasion of Normandy, has reduced the number of Luftwaffe aircraft supporting troops on the Eastern Front to catastrophic levels. The complete Soviet air superiority made it almost impossible for the Germans to conduct any reconnaissance flights, so the headquarters of the Army Group Center, located in Minsk, received very little data on the huge concentration Soviet troops which took place in the rear of the Red Army. In total, the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command concentrated up to fifteen armies with a total strength of 1607 thousand people with 6 thousand tanks and self-propelled guns, more than 30 thousand artillery pieces and heavy mortars, including a large number of Katyushas. They were supported by over 7,500 aircraft.
Army Group Center has for some time now become a "poor relative" in the Wehrmacht. Some areas in its defense zone were so poorly manned that sentries had to stand six-hour shifts every night. Neither they nor the officers had the slightest idea of the enormous and intense work that was taking place behind the Soviet positions at that time. Forest clearings were expanded for the passage of a large number of armored vehicles, gats for tanks were laid across the swamps, pontoons were brought closer to the front line, the bottom of rivers was strengthened at ford crossings, bridges hidden under the surface of the water were erected across the rivers.
This huge redeployment delayed the start of the offensive by three days. On June 22, on the third anniversary of the start of Operation Barbarossa, the First Baltic and Third Belorussian Fronts conducted reconnaissance in force. The very operation "Bagration", which Stalin personally gave the name in honor of the Georgian prince - hero Patriotic War 1812 began in earnest the next day.
The headquarters planned to first encircle Vitebsk on the northern ledge of the Army Group Center front and Bobruisk on the southern flank, then strike diagonally from these two points in order to encircle Minsk. On the northern flank, the First Baltic Front of Marshal I. Kh. Bagramyan and the Third Belorussian Front of the young Colonel General I. D. Chernyakhovsky very quickly, so that the Germans did not even have time to react, carried out an offensive in order to surround the Vitebsk ledge. They even refused artillery preparation, if it did not seem extremely necessary in certain sectors of the front. Their rushing columns of tanks were supported by waves of attack aircraft. The German Third Panzer Army was completely taken by surprise. Vitebsk was in the very middle of a vulnerable ledge, the central part of which was defended by two weak divisions recruited from Luftwaffe soldiers. The corps commander was ordered to hold Vitebsk at any cost as a stronghold of the entire German defense in this area, although his forces were completely insufficient to complete this task.
On the central sector of the front, from Orsha to Mogilev, in which the headquarters of the Russian Tsar was located during the First World War, General of the Infantry Kurt von Tippelskirch with his Fourth Army also did not expect such a powerful offensive from the Red Army. “We had a really dark day,” one non-commissioned officer of the 25th Motorized Division wrote home, “a day that I will not soon forget. The Russians began with the most powerful shelling possible. It lasted for about three hours. With all their might, they tried to suppress our defenses. Their troops were inexorably advancing on us. I had to run headlong to avoid falling into their hands. Their tanks with red flags were approaching fast." Only the 25th motorized and 78th assault divisions, supported by self-propelled artillery mounts, fiercely repulsed the Soviet offensive east of Orsha.
The next day, Tippelskirch requested permission to withdraw troops to the northern part of the Dnieper, but the Fuhrer's headquarters refused. When some divisions were already completely defeated, and the surviving soldiers and officers were at the limit of strength, Tippelskirch decided not to carry out any more insane orders to hold on to the end, which were repeated word for word by the obsequious commander of Army Group Center, Field Marshal Ernst Busch of his headquarters in Minsk. Many German unit commanders understood that the only way to save their troops at this moment was to give false reports about the combat situation and entries in the combat logs in order to justify their retreat in the face of higher command.
The German 12th Infantry Division, which was in front of Orsha, withdrew just in time. When a major asked a sapper officer why he was in a hurry to blow up the bridge after the passage of his battalion. The sapper handed him his binoculars and pointed across the river. Looking through binoculars, the major saw a column of T-34s, which were already at a distance of a shot. Orsha and Mogilev on the Dnieper were surrounded and taken three days later. The Germans had to abandon several hundred wounded. The general, who was ordered to hold Mogilev to the last, was on the verge of insanity.
In the rear of the Soviet troops, the biggest problem was the huge congestion of military vehicles on the roads. The broken tank was not easy to bypass because of the swamps and the forest that grew on both sides of the road. The chaos was such that “sometimes even a colonel could direct traffic at intersections,” one Red Army officer later recalled. He also noted how good it was for the Soviet troops that there were so few German aircraft in the air - after all, all these machines, standing one behind the other, would have been easy targets for them.
On the southern flank, the First Belorussian Front of Marshal Rokossovsky at 0400 launched an offensive with massive artillery preparation. Explosions raised fountains of earth. All the land on a vast territory was plowed up and pitted with funnels. Trees fell with a crash, German soldiers in pillboxes instinctively curled up and shook when the ground trembled.
The northern wing of Rokossovsky's troops, which covered the enemy positions with pincers, wedged into the junction between the Fourth Army of Tippelskirch and the Ninth Army, which was defending Bobruisk and the area adjacent to it. The commander of the Ninth Army, General of the Infantry Hans Jordan, brought into battle all his reserves - the 20th Panzer Division. In the evening, a German counterattack began, but soon the 20th Panzer Division was ordered to withdraw and move south of Bobruisk. The offensive of the other flank of the "pincers", in the forefront of which was the 1st Guards Tank Corps, turned out to be much more dangerous for the German troops. It threatened to encircle the city and could cut off the left flank of the Ninth Army. Rokossovsky's unexpected offensive along the edge of the Pripyat swamps was no less successful than the Germans' passage through the Ardennes in 1940.
Hitler still did not allow retreat, so on June 26, Field Marshal Busch flew to Berchtesgaden to report to the Fuhrer at the Berghof. With him was General Jordan, to whom Hitler had questions about how he used the 20th Panzer Division. But while they were absent from the headquarters of their troops, reporting the situation to Hitler, almost the entire Ninth Army was surrounded. The next day, both Bush and Jordan were removed from office. Hitler immediately resorted to the help of Field Marshal Model. But even after such a catastrophe and the threat that hung over Minsk, the Wehrmacht's High Command had no idea about the scope of the plans of the Soviet headquarters.
Model, one of the few generals who could convince Hitler, managed to carry out the necessary withdrawal of German troops to the line along the Berezina River, in front of Minsk. Hitler also allowed the 5th Panzer Division to take up defensive positions at Borisov, northeast of Minsk. The division arrived at the front on June 28, and was immediately attacked from the air by Soviet attack aircraft. Reinforced by a battalion of "tigers" and SS units, the division took up positions on both sides of the Orsha-Borisov-Minsk road. Neither the officers nor the soldiers had any idea of the general state of affairs at the front, although they heard that the Red Army had crossed the Berezina a little to the north.
That night, the vanguard of the Soviet 5th Guards Army entered into battle with the motorized infantry of the 5th division. The German command pulled up another battalion of Panther tanks to strengthen their positions in this sector, but at that very moment Chernyakhovsky's troops broke through to the north, at the junction of the positions of the German Third Tank Army and the Fourth Army. Here began a chaotic flight of the Germans under the incessant attacks of attack aircraft and the unceasing fire of Soviet artillery. The terrified German truck drivers raced at full speed towards the last remaining bridge over the Berezina, overtaking each other in order to get to the other side before the bridge was blown up. In the same places, a little north of Borisov, Napoleon's crossing took place after the catastrophic defeat in 1812.
Vitebsk was already on fire when the German troops of the LIII Corps withdrew in a futile attempt to break through the encirclement and link up with the Third Panzer Army. Warehouses and gas storage facilities were burning, spewing clouds of thick black smoke into the sky. German troops lost almost 30 thousand people killed and captured. This catastrophic defeat undermined the faith of many in the Fuhrer and in the victorious outcome of the war. “The Ivans broke through this morning,” a non-commissioned officer of the 206th Infantry Division wrote home. A short pause allows me to write a letter. We have an order to break away from the enemy. My dear ones, the situation is desperate. I no longer trust anyone, if everywhere is the same as here.
To the south, the troops of Marshal Rokossovsky surrounded almost the entire German Ninth Army and the city of Bobruisk, which was soon taken by them. “When we entered Bobruisk,” wrote Vasily Grossman, who was then part of the 120th Guards Rifle Division, which he knew from Stalingrad, “some houses in the city were on fire, others lay in ruins. The road of revenge brought us to Bobruisk. Our vehicle hardly makes its way between the burnt and mangled German tanks and self-propelled guns. The soldiers are on the German corpses. Corpses, hundreds and hundreds of corpses, line the road, lie in roadside ditches, under pine trees, in green fields of barley. In some places, vehicles have to go over the corpses, they lie so tightly on the ground. People are always busy burying the dead, but there are so many of them that this work cannot be completed in a day. The day is terribly hot, windless, and people pass and drive by, covering their noses with handkerchiefs. An infernal cauldron of death was boiling here - a terrible, ruthless revenge on those who did not lay down their arms and did not break through to the west.
After the defeat of the Germans, the townspeople took to the streets. “Our people whom we have freed are talking about themselves and crying (these are mostly old people),” a young soldier of the Red Army wrote home. “And young people are so happy that they laugh all the time - they laugh and talk without stopping.”
For the Germans, this retreat was disastrous. I had to abandon a huge amount of the most diverse equipment, because the fuel ran out. Even before the start of the Soviet offensive, everyone was limited to ten to fifteen liters a day. The strategy of General Spaats - the bombing of oil refineries - provided the Red Army with real help on the Eastern Front, as did the actions of the Allies in Normandy. The wounded Germans, who were lucky enough to be evacuated, suffered terribly on horse-drawn wagons that rattled, shook and swayed. Many died from blood loss before reaching the dressing stations. Due to the fact that first aid at the front was almost not provided due to losses among the medical staff, serious injuries meant almost certain death. Those who managed to be taken out from the front line were sent to hospitals in Minsk, but now Minsk was already at the forefront of the main attack of the Red Army.
The remnants of the German troops made their way to the west through forests, trying to get out from under the blow of the Soviet troops. They did not have enough water, because of the heat, many soldiers suffered from dehydration. Everyone was in terrible nervous tension, fearing an ambush by the partisans or that they would be taken prisoner by the soldiers of the Red Army. The retreating was driven by bombers and artillery, trees fell under bombs and shells, showering the Germans with a hail of wood chips. The intensity and scale of the battle were so great that at least seven German generals of Army Group Center were killed in the battles.
Even Hitler had to renounce the obligation to designate cities that were completely unsuitable for such a purpose as fortresses. For the same reasons, now his commanders also tried to avoid the defense of cities. By the end of June, the 5th Guards Tank Army had broken through and began to encircle Minsk from the north. Chaos reigned in the city: the headquarters of the Army Group Center and rear institutions took to flight. The seriously wounded in hospitals were left to fend for themselves. On July 3, Minsk was taken by a blow from the south, and almost the entire Fourth Army was surrounded in the area between the city and the Berezina River.
Even the chief corporal of the medical service, who did not have access to staff maps, was well aware of the bitterness of the situation. “The enemy,” he wrote, “is doing what we did in 1941: encirclement after encirclement.” The chief corporal of the Luftwaffe noted in a letter to his wife in East Prussia that he was now only 200 km from her. "If the Russians keep advancing in the same direction, they will soon be at your door."
In Minsk, they took revenge on the captured, especially the former Red Army soldiers who went to serve in the auxiliary units of the Wehrmacht. They avenged the brutal massacres in Belarus, the victims of which were a quarter of the population of the republic. “Partizan, a little peasant,” Grossman wrote, “killed two Germans with a wooden stake. He begged the guard of the column to give him these Germans. He convinced himself that it was they who killed his daughter Olya, and two sons, still boys. The partisan broke their bones, crushed their skulls, and while he was beating, he kept crying and shouting: “Here you are for Olya! Here's to you for Kolya! When they were already dead, he leaned their bodies against a tree trunk and continued to beat them.”
The mechanized formations of Rokossovsky and Chernyakhovsky rushed forward while the rifle divisions behind them destroyed the encircled German troops. By this time, the Soviet command understood very well all the advantages of continuous pursuit of the retreating enemy. The Germans could not be given time to come to their senses and gain a foothold on new frontiers. The 5th Guards Tank Army was moving towards Vilnius, the other formations were moving towards Baranovichi. Vilnius was taken on July 13 after heavy fighting. The next target was Kaunas. And behind it lay the territory of Germany - East Prussia.
The headquarters of the Supreme Command was now planning an attack towards the Gulf of Riga in order to encircle Army Group North in Estonia and Latvia. This Army Group fought desperately to hold the passage to the west while fighting off eight Soviet armies in the east. To the south of the Pripyat Marshes, on July 13, units of Marshal Konev's First Ukrainian Front went on the offensive, later called the Lvov-Sandomierz operation. Having broken through the German line of defense, Konev's troops began to develop a general offensive with the aim of encircling Lvov. In the operation to liberate the city, which began 10 days later, they were assisted by 3 thousand soldiers of the Home Army under the command of Colonel Vladislav Filipkovsky. But as soon as the city was taken, the NKVD officers, who had already seized the local Gestapo and all the documents that were there, arrested the AK officers, and the soldiers were forced to join the First Army of the Polish Army, which was commanded by the communists.
After the capture of Lvov, Konev's First Ukrainian Front continued its advance westward, reaching the Vistula, but at that time the greatest fear in the hearts of the Germans was the thought of Soviet troops approaching East Prussia - the territory of the "old Reich". As in Normandy, the German command now pinned all its hopes on the V, especially on the V-2 rockets. “Their action should be many times more powerful than that of the V-1,” one Luftwaffe chief corporal wrote home, but he, like many others, was afraid that the Allies would respond with gas attacks. Some even advised families in Germany to buy gas masks if possible. Others began to fear that their own side "might use the gas as a last resort."
Some German units retreated from one line of defense to another in the vain hope of stopping the onslaught of the enemy. “The Russians are constantly attacking,” wrote a corporal in a construction company attached to an infantry unit. - The shelling has been going on since 5 o'clock in the morning. They want to break through our defenses. Their attack aircraft coordinate their actions with artillery fire in a coordinated manner. Blow follows blow. I am sitting in our strong dugout and writing, probably, the last letter. Almost every soldier prayed to himself to get home alive, although he no longer believed in it.
“Events are developing so quickly,” as one chief corporal noted, who found himself in a unit hastily knocked together from the remnants of various formations, “that it is no longer possible to speak of any integral front. - And continued. “I can only tell you that we are not far from East Prussia now, and then the worst will probably come.” In East Prussia itself, the local population looked with increasing horror at the roads clogged with retreating troops. A woman living near the eastern border saw “columns of soldiers and refugees from Tilsit, which was heavily bombed,” passing by her porch. The raids of Soviet bombers forced the townspeople to seek shelter in the basements and board up broken windows with boards. Factories and plants practically stopped, because only a few women went to work. It was forbidden to travel over distances of more than 100 km. Gauleiter of East Prussia, Erich Koch, did not want the population to flee to the west, as this would be "defeatism".
Konev's offensive developed rapidly and the Majdanek concentration camp was discovered outside Lublin. Grossman was already on the move with General Chuikov, whose Stalingrad army, now the 8th Guards, had taken the city. Chuikov's main concern was not to miss the attack on Berlin, which was as important to him as Rome was to General Mark Clark. “This is absolutely logical and sensible,” Chuikov reasoned. “Just imagine: the Stalingraders are advancing on Berlin!” Grossman, who was indignant at the vanity of the commanders, was himself very dissatisfied with the fact that not him, but Konstantin Simonov, was sent to cover the subject of Majdanek. Then he drove north to Treblinka, which had just been discovered.
Simonov, with a large group of foreign correspondents, was sent to Majdanek by the Central Political Directorate of the Red Army to testify to the crimes of the Nazis. Stalin's position: "There is no need to separate the dead" was understandable. When talking about suffering, it is not worth mentioning the Jews as a special category. The victims of Majdanek are primarily Soviet and Polish citizens. Hans Frank, head of the Nazi-created General Government, was horrified when details of the Majdanek massacre appeared in the foreign press. The speed of the Soviet offensive caught the SS by surprise, preventing the damning evidence from being destroyed. For the first time, it dawned on Frank and the others that a noose awaited them at the end of the war.
At Treblinka, the SS had a little more time. On July 23, when Konev's artillery was already heard, the commandant of Treblinka received an order to liquidate the surviving prisoners. The SS and Ukrainian guards of the camp were given schnapps, after which they proceeded to shoot the few prisoners still alive who were part of various work teams. Max Levit, a carpenter from Warsaw, was the only survivor of this massacre. Wounded by the first volley, he fell and was covered with bodies that fell on him. He managed to crawl into the forest, from where he listened to the indiscriminate shooting. "Stalin will avenge us!" shouted a group of Russian youths before being shot.
Shortly before Operation Bagration began, as a result of which the German troops in Belarus were completely defeated, Hitler transferred the II SS Panzer Corps from the Eastern Front to Normandy. The corps consisted of two divisions: the 9th SS Panzer Division Hohenstaufen("Hohenstaufen") and the 10th SS Panzer Division Frundsberg("Frundsberg"). Interceptions Ultra warned the Allied command in Normandy that these divisions were already on their way. Eisenhower seethed with impatience because Montgomery's next attack on Caen and Villers-Bocage was delayed until June 26th. It is unlikely that this was Montgomery's fault, because a strong storm interfered with the concentration of forces for Operation Epsom. Montgomery intended to strike again west of Caen and thus, bypassing the city, encircle it.
On June 25, a diversionary strike was carried out even further to the west. There, the XXX Corps resumed the battle with the elite training tank division of the Wehrmacht. The British 49th Division, nicknamed the "Polar Bears" - because of the stripes on which the polar bear, the emblem of the division - was able to push the Panzer Division back to the villages of Tessel and Roray, where especially fierce fighting broke out. Since the 12th SS Panzer Division Hitlerjugend began to kill prisoners, both sides did not show much pity. Before the attack on Tessel Forest, Sergeant Kuhlman, commander of the mortar platoon of the King's Guards Yorkshire Light Infantry, wrote down the orders received in the field log. At the end it was written: NPT below the rank of major", which meant "not to take prisoners below the rank of major." Others also recalled receiving orders to "take no prisoners" and claimed that it was because of this that German propaganda began to call the 49th Division "Killer Polar Bears". Interceptions Ultra confirmed that the Training Panzer Division had suffered "heavy losses".
Montgomery reported Operation Epsom to Eisenhower as "decisive", although he clearly intended to fight the battle carefully, as usual. The official version of the history of the Italian campaign later noted that Montgomery "had an unusual gift for persuasively combining very loud statements with very cautious actions." This was especially evident during the campaign in Normandy.
The newly arrived English VIII Corps launched a major offensive with the 15th Scottish Division and the 43rd Wessex, advancing in the first echelon, and with the forces of the 11th Panzer Division in the second echelon, ready at any moment to enter the gap created by the divisions of the first echelon. Artillery preparation was carried out jointly by divisional and corps artillery, as well as main caliber guns of the battleships of the allied fleet stationed off the coast. The 15th Scottish advanced quite quickly, but the 43rd Division on the left flank had to repel a counterattack by the 12th SS Panzer Division. By nightfall the Scots had reached the valley of the Odon River. Although further progress was slowed down due to the dangerous accumulation of equipment on the narrow roads of Normandy, it still continued. The next day the 2nd Argyll and Sutherland Regiment, wisely disregarding the tactical doctrine then in force, crossed the Odon in small groups and captured the bridge.
On June 28, Lieutenant General Sir Richard O'Connor, who had distinguished himself by escaping from a German POW camp in Italy and was now in command of the VIII Corps, wanted to push forward with the forces of the 11th Panzer Division and seize a bridgehead on the Orna River, which was quite far beyond the river Odon. General Sir Miles Dempsey, commander of the British Second Army, knew from intelligence Ultra about the impending approach of the II SS Panzer Corps, but due to the fact that Montgomery was at his headquarters at that time, he decided not to risk it. Perhaps he would have behaved more decisively if he had known about the extraordinary events that were taking place on the German side at that time.
Just at this time, in the midst of the most important battle, Hitler called Field Marshal Rommel to the Berghof, which was completely unusual. The resulting confusion was further complicated by the fact that the commander of the Seventh Army, Colonel-General Friedrich Dolmann, died suddenly - according to the official version, from a heart attack, but many German officers suspected that it was suicide after the surrender of Cherbourg. Without consulting Rommel, Hitler appointed Obergruppenführer Paul Hausser, commander of the II SS Panzer Corps, as commander of the Seventh Army. Hausser, who had previously been ordered to counterattack the advancing British units with the forces of SS Panzer divisions Hohenstaufen and Frundsberg, had to surrender command to his deputy and rush to his new headquarters located in Le Mans.
On June 29, the vanguard of the British 11th Panzer Division, commanded by the distinguished British commander, Major General Philip Roberts (or Pip Roberts, as he was called), captured the key hill 112 - the most important position between the Odon and Orna rivers. After that, the British division had to repulse the counterattacks of the 1st SS Panzer Division Leibstandarte Adolf Hitler, parts of the 21st Panzer Division and the 7th Mortar Brigade, armed with multi-barreled rocket mortars Nebelwerfer, emitting sounds similar to the roar of a donkey when firing. Only now did the German command realize the importance of the capture of height 112 by the British. SS Gruppenführer Wilhelm Bittrich, who replaced Hausser as commander of the corps, was given an urgent order to attack enemy positions on the other flank within an hour with the forces of his II Panzer Corps, reinforced by a battle group from 2 th SS Panzer Division Das Reich. The English Second Army, therefore, was attacked by seven German tank divisions at the same time, four of them were SS, and units of the 5th SS division also took part in the attack on the positions of the British. At the same time, the entire German Army Group Center in Belarus had only three tank divisions at its disposal, and this was already after the German troops in Belarus had received reinforcements. So the sarcastic remark of Ilya Ehrenburg that the allies in Normandy fought with the dregs of the German army was very far from the truth.
Montgomery deployed his troops to meet the bulk of the counterattacking German panzer divisions for a very simple reason, which he had been warned about even before the invasion began. The English Second Army on the eastern flank was closest to Paris. If the British and Canadians managed to break through the German defenses, then the Seventh Army, which was located to the west, and all German formations in Brittany would be surrounded.
The stubborn resistance that the German troops put up in the area of the British offensive forced Montgomery to abandon the idea of \u200b\u200bcapturing the plain south of Caen in order to create field airfields there. He tried to pass off the unpleasant truth as a calculated action, claiming that he held back the enemy panzer divisions in order to give the Americans the opportunity to break through the German defense line. But he failed to convince either the Americans or the Royal Air Force, which was in desperate need of runways.
Despite all the brave assurances given to Eisenhower, Montgomery made it clear to Major General George Erskine, commander of the 7th Panzer Division, that he did not want any "decisive battles" at all. “As for us, things are changing,” an intelligence officer from General Erskine’s division noted in his diary shortly before the start of Operation Epsom, “because Monty does not want us to advance. He is pleased that the Second Army has pulled back all the German tank divisions, and now on this sector of the front he wants only Caen, and let the Americans continue to advance on the ports of Brittany. Therefore, the offensive of the VIII Corps will continue, but our goals are very limited.
The German counter-attack on the afternoon of 29 June was aimed mainly at the 15th Scottish Division in the western part of the salient. The Scots fought well, but the biggest damage to the units of the newly arrived SS Panzer Corps came from the artillery of the Royal Navy. Dempsey, fearing an even stronger German counter-attack southwest of Hill 112, ordered O'Connor to withdraw his tanks and abandon Hill. The next day, Montgomery stopped the general advance because the VIII Corps had lost more than 4,000 men. The British command was again unable to quickly develop success. Unfortunately, in the battles for Hill 112 over the next few weeks, many more soldiers and officers died than the British would have lost if they had been able to hold the hill and continued to defend it.
Both Field Marshal Rommel and General Geir von Schweppenburg were shocked when they saw the results of the shelling of the divisions on the march. Hohenstaufen and Frundsberg artillery of the allied fleet from a distance of almost 30 km. The shell craters were four meters wide and two meters deep. The need to convince Hitler that the troops needed to be withdrawn across the Orna River became absolutely urgent. Geir von Schweppenburg was shocked by the losses that his troops suffered in this defensive battle, although he would have preferred to use panzer divisions for a powerful counterattack. His divisions were brought into action in order to serve as a reinforcing "corset" for the weak infantry divisions defending this sector of the front. But now it turned out that the infantry units arriving as replenishment to the front were clearly not enough to hold their positions and thus enable him to withdraw the battered tank formations to the rear for reorganization. Thus, Montgomery, while not "ordering the music" on the battlefield, as he liked to claim, actually became embroiled in a war of extermination, which unwillingly happened because of the internal problems of the German army.
On the strategy of the German command in Normandy, Geir von Schweppenburg wrote an extremely critical memorandum in which he substantiated the need for a more flexible defense and the withdrawal of troops across the Orna River. His comments about the interference of the Supreme High Command of the Wehrmacht in command and control, clearly alluding directly to Hitler, led to the general's immediate resignation. He was replaced by Panzer General Hans Eberbach. The next high-profile victim was Field Marshal Rundstedt himself, who told Keitel that the German army would not be able to stop the Allied forces in Normandy. "You must stop this war," he told Keitel. Rundstedt, who also approved of von Schweppenburg's report, was replaced by Field Marshal Hans von Kluge. Hitler wanted to replace Rommel as well, but this would have created an undesirable impression on many, both in Germany and abroad.
Kluge arrived at Rommel's headquarters, located in a magnificent château in the town of La Roche-Guyon on the Seine River, and began to mock the way Rommel's troops were fighting. Rommel exploded and advised him to first go to the front and see for himself the state of affairs. Kluge spent the next few days at the front and was horrified by what he saw. It was strikingly different from the picture that was painted for him at the Fuhrer's headquarters, where they believed that Rommel was overly pessimistic and overestimated the strength of the Allied aviation.
A little further west, the US First Army, under General Bradley, was mired in heavy bloody fighting in the swamps south of the Cotentin Peninsula and in the rural areas north of Saint-Lô. The constant and numerous attacks of the American infantry with forces up to a battalion on the positions of the German II Parachute Corps led to numerous casualties among the advancing Americans. “The Germans don’t have much left,” the American divisional commander remarked with grim respect, “but damn it, they know how to use it.”
Using the lessons of fighting on the Eastern Front, the Germans managed to compensate for their small numbers and lack of artillery, and especially aircraft. They dug small dugouts on the high ground at the base of impenetrable hedgerows. It was laborious work, given the centuries-old interweaving of ancient roots. In this way, they equipped machine-gun nests on the front line of defense. Behind the front line was the main line of defense, on which there were enough troops for a swift counterattack. A little further, behind the main line, usually on hills, 88-mm guns were placed, which fired at the advancing Shermans, who supported the advance of the American infantry. All positions and equipment were carefully camouflaged, which meant that the Allied fighter-bombers could not help the advancing troops much. Bradley and his commanders relied heavily on artillery, and the French reasonably believed that the Americans relied on it even too much.
The Germans themselves called the fighting in Normandy, between the endless hedgerows, "a dirty war in the thickets." They planted mines at the bottom of the shell craters in front of their positions so that the American soldiers who jumped there as if for cover would have their legs torn off by the explosion. Many of the trails were booby-trapped, which American soldiers called "castrating mines" or "jumping Betty": they bounced and exploded at groin height. German tankers and gunners became masters of "tree explosions," where a shell exploded in the crown of a tree so that branches and splinters would scatter from the explosion and injure those who were hiding under it.
American tactics were based primarily on "shooting along the way" of the infantry advance, which meant constantly bombarding any possible enemy position. As a result, the Americans were wasting an incredible amount of ammunition. The Germans had to be more frugal. A German gunner tied to a tree waited for American infantrymen to pass by, then shot one of them in the back. This forced everyone else to lie flat on the ground, and the German mortar crews covered them, lying at full height and completely open to fragments. The orderlies who came to their aid were shot on purpose. Quite often, a lone German soldier stood up from the ground with his hands up, and when the Americans approached him to take him prisoner, he fell to the side, and the hiding machine gunners shot the Americans. It is clear that few Americans took prisoners after such incidents.
The Germans did not recognize combat fatigue as any special condition. She was considered cowardice. Soldiers who wanted to avoid participating in the fighting with a crossbow were simply shot. In this sense, the American, Canadian and British armies were too civilized. Most psychoneurotic casualties occurred as a result of fighting in the hedgerows, and most of these victims were replacement soldiers thrown into battle ill-prepared. By the end of this campaign, about 30,000 members of the US First Army were registered as psychological casualties. According to the chief medical officer of the US Army, in units at the forefront, psychological losses amounted to 10 percent of the personnel.
After the war, both British and American army psychiatrists wrote that they were amazed at how little combat fatigue they noted among German prisoners of war, although they suffered much more from Allied bombing and shelling. They concluded that the propaganda of the Nazi regime from 1933 onwards apparently contributed to the psychological preparation of the soldiers. It can also be noted that the hardships of life in the USSR tempered those who served in the ranks of the Red Army. The soldiers of Western democracies could not be expected to endure the same hardships.
Rommel and Kluge assumed that the main breakthrough in Normandy was to be expected on the Anglo-Canadian sector of the front near Caen. They also believed that the American offensive would go along the Atlantic coast. But Bradley concentrated on Saint-Lô, at the eastern end of his sector of the front, to concentrate his forces before the big offensive.
After the miserable results of the Epsom operation, Montgomery did not devote more to Eisenhower in the details of what was happening - he was increasingly annoyed by the undisguised complacency of the Englishman. Montgomery never admitted that any operation was not proceeding according to the "master plan" approved by him. But he knew that there was growing dissatisfaction in Eisenhower's staff and in London over his lack of progress in moving forward. He also knew about the acute shortage of human resources in England. Churchill feared that if his military power waned, then Britain would have too little weight in post-war matters.
In an attempt to break through the German defenses without great casualties, Montgomery was ready to consign one of his famous sayings to oblivion. Last fall, at a briefing for war correspondents in Italy, he categorically stated that "heavy bombers cannot be used in ground battles close to the front line." But on 6 July he requested just such support from the RAF to take Caen. Eisenhower, who was eager to achieve success in this sector of the front and do it as quickly as possible, fully supported him and the next day met with Air Chief Marshal Harris. Harris agreed and in the evening of the same day sent 467 Lancaster and Halifax bombers to the northern suburbs of Caen, which were defended by the 12th SS division. Hitlerjugend. But this raid failed due to the "flight for the target."
Just as in the raid in the Omaha sector, the navigators delayed the release of bombs for a second or two so as not to hit their forward units. As a result, the bulk of the bombs fell on the center of the ancient Norman city. The Germans suffered few losses compared to the French civilians, who remained unsung in the description of the battles in Normandy. In this campaign, a paradox appeared: in an attempt to reduce their losses, the commanders of the Allied forces killed a large number of civilians by excessive use of powerful land mines.
The offensive of the British and Canadian troops began the next morning. This delay gave the divisions Hitlerjugend more than twenty hours to strengthen the defenses and recuperate. Its fierce resistance resulted in heavy casualties for the advancing Allied forces. Then the SS men suddenly disappeared, having received an order to retreat south of the Orna River. The British quickly occupied the northern and central parts of Caen. But even this partial success did not solve the key problem of the Second Army. There was still not enough space to build the required number of field airfields, and the Allied command still could not deploy the rest of the First Canadian Army, languishing in England awaiting the landings.
With great reluctance, Montgomery agreed to Dempsey's plan to use three Panzer Divisions—the 7th, 11th, and the newly arrived Guards—to break through in the direction of Falaise, from a bridgehead east of the River Orne. Montgomery's doubts were more likely due to his prejudice against tank formations, "which are of no use." In the mind of this hardened military conservative, the plan was not the right move, but he couldn't afford more infantry losses, and in any case, something had to be done urgently at the time. Complaints and ridicule came not only from the Americans. The Royal Air Force was beside himself with anger. Calls for Montgomery's resignation now came from Eisenhower's second-in-command, Air Chief Marshal Tedder, and from Air Marshal Coningham, who never forgave Montgomery for shamelessly arrogating to himself the laurels of victory in North Africa, and the Air Force barely mentioned.
Operation Goodwood, which began on July 18, proved to be an outstanding example of Montgomery's "very militant statements and very cautious actions." He argued so strongly with Eisenhower for the possibility of a decisive offensive that the Supreme Commander replied: “I view these prospects with exceptional optimism and enthusiasm.
I wouldn't be at all surprised if I see you achieve a victory that makes the "classic victories of the old days" look like a simple clash of two reconnaissance squads. Montgomery left the same impression with Field Marshal Brooke in London, but the very next day he presented Dempsey and O'Connor with more modest goals. It all came down to moving a third of the distance to Falaise and probing the situation. Unfortunately, briefings to officers hinted that this would be a larger offensive than at Alamein. Correspondents were told of a "Russian-style" breakthrough that could have given the Second Army a hundred miles of advance. The amazed journalists noticed that “a hundred miles ahead” is the whole distance to Paris itself.
The RAF, still desperately in need of forward airfields, was once again ready to lend its bombers to help the advancing troops. Therefore, on July 18 at 05.30, 2,600 British and American Air Force bombers dropped 7,567 tons of bombs on a sector of the front that was only 7,000 meters long. Unfortunately, the reconnaissance of the Second Army could not discover that the German defense positions here had five lines going as deep as the Bourgeby ridge, which would have to be overcome if the Second Army moved on Falaise. Further complicating the situation, the three panzer divisions had a very difficult offensive route that led them over pontoon bridges across the Canal Canal and the Orna River to a small bridgehead across the river, captured by elements of the 51st Scottish Division, where the sappers had laid a very dense minefield. Fearing to alert the enemy, O'Connor only at the very last moment ordered passages to be made in it instead of removing the entire minefield. But the Germans were well aware of the impending attack. They watched the preparations from the tall factory buildings to the east, deep in their location, and also received data from their aerial reconnaissance. One of the transcripts Ultra gave confirmation that the Luftwaffe knew about the operation, but the command of the Second Army did not change its plans.
The soldiers climbed onto the armor of the tanks and looked with delight at the destruction from the bomber raids, but the traffic jams that formed due to the narrow passages in the minefield led to a fatal slowdown in the offensive. The delays were so great that O'Connor stopped the movement of infantry in trucks to allow the tanks to pass first. Having passed this bottleneck, the 11th Panzer Division began to advance rapidly, but soon fell into an ambush, finding itself under heavy fire from enemy anti-tank guns well-camouflaged on stone farms and villages. The infantry was supposed to deal with such targets, but the tanks ended up without infantry cover and suffered huge losses. In addition, at the very beginning of the battle, the division lost the officer responsible for communications with aviation, and therefore could not call for help the "typhoons" circling in the sky. Then the division came under heavy fire from 88-mm guns on the Barjby ridge and was counterattacked by the 1st SS Panzer Division. The 11th and Guards Tank Divisions together lost more than 200 vehicles that day.
Beevor Anthony
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70 years ago, one of the largest operations of the Red Army in the Great Patriotic War, Operation Bagration, was carried out in Belarus. During this operation (June 23 - August 29, 1944), the German armed forces lost 289 thousand people killed and captured, 110 thousand wounded, Soviet troops retook Belarus and a significant part of Lithuania, entered the territory of Poland.
What did the parties plan?
The development of a plan for the Belarusian operation was started by the Soviet General Staff (under the leadership of Marshal Vasilevsky) in April 1944.
During the development, some disagreements of the command came to light. The commander of the 1st Belorussian Front, General Rokossovsky, wanted to deliver one main blow in the Rogachev direction with the forces of the 3rd Army of General Gorbatov, in which it was planned to concentrate about 16 rifle divisions.
The headquarters of the Supreme High Command believed that it was necessary to strike two blows. It was supposed to deliver two converging strikes - from Vitebsk and from Bobruisk, both in the direction of Minsk. Further, it was supposed to occupy the entire territory of Belarus and Lithuania, go to the coast of the Baltic Sea (Klaipeda), to the border of East Prussia (Suwalki) and to the territory of Poland (Lublin).
As a result, the Stavka's point of view prevailed. The plan was approved by the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command on May 30, 1944. The beginning of the operation "Bagration" was scheduled for June 19-20 (on June 14, due to delays in the transportation of troops, equipment and ammunition, the start of the operation was postponed to June 23).
The Germans were expecting a general offensive of the Red Army in the south on the territory of Ukraine. From there, our troops, indeed, could deliver a powerful blow both to the rear of Army Group Center and to the strategically important oil fields of Ploiesti for the Germans.
Therefore, the German command concentrated its main forces in the south, assuming in Belarus only local operations of a nature. The Soviet General Staff strengthened the Germans in every possible way in this opinion. The enemy was shown that most of the Soviet tank armies "remain" in Ukraine. On the central sector of the front, intensive engineering and sapper work was carried out during daylight hours to create false defensive lines. The Germans believed these preparations and began to increase the number of their troops in Ukraine.
rail war
On the eve and during Operation Bagration, Belarusian partisans provided truly invaluable assistance to the advancing Red Army. On the night of June 19-20, they began a rail war in the rear of enemy troops.
The partisans seized river crossings, cut off the enemy's retreat, undermined rails and bridges, wrecked trains, made surprise raids on enemy garrisons, and destroyed enemy communications.
As a result of the actions of the partisans, the most important railway lines were completely disabled, and enemy transportation along all roads was partially paralyzed.
Then, when, during the successful offensive of the Red Army, the German columns began to retreat to the west, they could only move along major highways. On smaller roads, the Nazis inevitably became victims of partisan attacks.
Operation start
On June 22, 1944, on the day of the third anniversary of the start of the Great Patriotic War, reconnaissance in force was carried out in the sectors of the 1st and 2nd Belorussian fronts.
And the next day was the day of the Red Army's revenge for the summer of 1941. On June 23, after artillery and aviation preparation, the troops of the 1st Baltic and 3rd Belorussian fronts went on the offensive. Their actions were coordinated by the Marshal Soviet Union Vasilevsky. Our troops were opposed by the 3rd tank army of General Reinhardt, who was defending on the northern sector of the front.
On June 24, the troops of the 1st and 2nd Belorussian Fronts launched an offensive. Their actions were coordinated by Marshal of the Soviet Union Zhukov. Their opponents were the 9th army of General Jordan, who occupied positions in the south, in the Bobruisk region, as well as the 4th army of General Tippelskirch (in the region of Orsha and Mogilev). The German defense was soon hacked - and the Soviet tank troops, blocking the fortified areas, entered the operational space.
The defeat of German troops near Vitebsk, Bobruisk, Mogilev
During the operation "Bagration" our troops managed to take into the "cauldrons" and defeat several encircled German groups. So, on June 25, the Vitebsk fortified area was encircled and soon defeated. The German troops stationed there tried to withdraw to the west, but failed. About 8,000 German soldiers were able to break out of the ring, but were again surrounded - and capitulated. In total, about 20 thousand German soldiers and officers died near Vitebsk, and about 10 thousand were captured.
The Headquarters outlined the encirclement of Bobruisk on the eighth day of the operation, but in reality this happened on the fourth. The successful actions of the troops of the 1st Belorussian Front led to the encirclement of six German divisions in the area of the city of Bobruisk. Only a few units were able to break through and get out of the ring.
By the end of June 29, the troops of the 2nd Belorussian Front advanced to a depth of 90 km, crossing the Dnieper, and liberated the city of Mogilev. The 4th German Army began to retreat to the west, to Minsk - but could not go far.
The airspace was behind Soviet aviation and the actions of the pilots caused serious damage to the enemy.
The Red Army actively used the tactics of concentrated strikes by tank formations and subsequent exits to the rear of the German troops. The raids of the tank guards corps destroyed the rear communications of the enemy, disorganized the defense system, blocked the retreat routes and completed his encirclement.
Commander replacement
At the time of the start of Operation Bagration, Field Marshal Bush was the commander of the German Army Group Center. During the winter offensive of the Red Army, his troops managed to keep Orsha and Vitebsk.
However, Bush was unable to resist the Soviet troops during the summer offensive.
Already on June 28, Bush was replaced in his post by Field Marshal Model, who was considered the master of defense in the Third Reich. The new commander of Army Group Center, Field Marshal Model, showed operational flexibility. He did not occupy the defense with the arriving reserves, but, having gathered them into a fist, launched a counterattack with the forces of six divisions, trying to stop the Soviet offensive on the Baranovichi-Molodechno line.
The model to some extent stabilized the situation in Belarus, preventing, in particular, the capture of Warsaw by the Red Army, a steady exit to the Baltic Sea and a breakthrough into East Prussia on the shoulders of the retreating German army.
However, even he was powerless to save the Army Group Center, which was dismembered in the Bobruisk, Vitebsk and Minsk "cauldrons" and methodically destroyed from the ground and air, and could not stop the Soviet troops in Western Belarus.
Liberation of Minsk
On July 1, Soviet advanced units broke through to the intersection of the Minsk and Bobruisk highways. They were to block the path of the German units retreating from Minsk, hold them until the main forces approached, and then destroy them.
Tank troops played a special role in achieving high rates of advance. So, making a raid through forests and swamps behind enemy lines, the 4th Guards Tank Brigade, which was part of the 2nd Guards Tank Corps, outstripped the main forces of the retreating Germans by more than 100 kilometers.
On the night of July 2, the brigade rushed along the highway to Minsk, immediately turned into battle formation and broke into the city outskirts from the northeast. The 2nd Guards Tank Corps and the 4th Guards Tank Brigade were awarded the Order of the Red Banner.
Soon after the tankers of the 2nd Guards Tank Corps, the advanced units of the 5th Guards Tank Army entered the northern outskirts of Minsk. Pressing the enemy, tank units, supported by the troops of the 3rd Belorussian Front, who came to the rescue, began to recapture quarter after quarter from the enemy. In the middle of the day, the 1st Guards Tank Corps entered the city from the southeast, followed by the 3rd Army of the 1st Belorussian Front.
Late in the evening, the capital of Belarus was liberated from the invaders. On the same day, at 22:00, Moscow saluted the victorious soldiers with 24 volleys from 324 guns. 52 formations and units of the Red Army received the name "Minsk".
The second stage of the operation
On July 3, the troops of the 3rd and 1st Belorussian Fronts completed the encirclement of the 100,000th grouping of the 4th and 9th German armies east of Minsk, in the Borisov-Minsk-Cherven triangle. It was the largest Belarusian "cauldron" - its liquidation lasted until July 11.
With the entry of the Red Army to the line of Polotsk-Lake Naroch-Molodechno-Nesvizh, a huge gap 400 kilometers long was formed in the strategic front of the German troops. Before the Soviet troops, the opportunity arose to begin the pursuit of the defeated enemy troops.
On July 5, the second stage of the liberation of Belarus began. The fronts, closely interacting with each other, successfully carried out five offensive operations at this stage: Siauliai, Vilnius, Kaunas, Bialystok and Brest-Lublin.
The Red Army successively defeated the remnants of the retreating formations of Army Group Center and inflicted heavy losses on the troops transferred here from Germany, Norway, Italy and other regions.
Results and losses
During Operation Bagration, the troops of the advancing fronts defeated one of the most powerful enemy groupings, Army Group Center: its 17 divisions and 3 brigades were destroyed, and 50 divisions lost more than half of their strength.
The German armed forces suffered heavy losses in manpower - irretrievably (killed and captured) 289 thousand people, wounded 110 thousand.
Losses of the Red Army - irrevocably 178.5 thousand people, 587 thousand wounded.
Soviet troops advanced 300-500 kilometers. The Byelorussian SSR, part of the Lithuanian SSR and the Latvian SSR were liberated. The Red Army entered the territory of Poland and advanced to the borders of East Prussia. During the offensive, the large water barriers of the Berezina, Neman, Vistula were crossed, and important bridgeheads on their western shores were captured. Conditions were provided for delivering strikes deep into East Prussia and into the central regions of Poland.
It was a strategic victory.
In the late spring of 1944, relative calm reigned on the Soviet-German front. The Germans, having suffered major defeats during the winter-spring battles, strengthened the defense, and the Red Army rested and gathered strength for the next blow.
Looking at the map of the fighting of that time, you can see on it two large projections of the front line. The first is on the territory of Ukraine, south of the Pripyat River. The second, far to the east, is in Belarus, with a border along the cities of Vitebsk, Orsha, Mogilev, Zhlobin. This ledge was called the "Belarusian balcony", and after a discussion that took place at the end of April 1944 at the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command, it was decided to fall upon it with all the might of the Red Army troops. The operation to liberate Belarus received the code name "Bagration".
The German command did not foresee such a turn. The terrain in Belarus was wooded and swampy, with a large number of lakes and rivers and a rather poorly developed road network. The use of large tank and mechanized formations here, from the point of view of the Nazi generals, was difficult. Therefore, the Wehrmacht was preparing to repel the Soviet offensive on the territory of Ukraine, concentrating much more impressive forces there than in Belarus. So, under the command of the army group "Northern Ukraine" were seven tank divisions and four battalions of tanks "Tiger". And in the subordination of the Army Group "Center" - only one tank, two panzer-grenadier divisions and one battalion of "Tigers". In total, Ernst Busch, who commanded the Central Army Group, had 1.2 million people, 900 tanks and self-propelled guns, 9,500 guns and mortars, and 1,350 aircraft of the 6th Air Fleet.
The Germans created a fairly powerful and layered defense in Belarus. Since 1943, the construction of fortified positions has been underway, often based on natural obstacles: rivers, lakes, swamps, hills. Some cities at the most important communication nodes were declared fortresses. These included, in particular, Orsha, Vitebsk, Mogilev and others. The defensive lines were equipped with bunkers, dugouts, interchangeable artillery and machine-gun positions.
According to the operational plan of the Soviet high command, the troops of the 1st, 2nd and 3rd Belorussian Fronts, as well as the 1st Baltic Front, were to defeat the enemy forces in Belarus. The total number of Soviet troops in the operation was approximately 2.4 million people, more than 5,000 tanks, about 36,000 guns and mortars. Air support was provided by the 1st, 3rd, 4th and 16th air armies (more than 5,000 aircraft). Thus, the Red Army achieved a significant, and in many respects, overwhelming superiority over enemy troops.
In order to keep the preparations for the offensive secret, the command of the Red Army prepared and carried out a huge amount of work to ensure the secrecy of the movement of forces and to mislead the enemy. Parts moved to their original positions at night, observing radio silence. During daylight hours, the troops stopped, settling in the forests and carefully disguised themselves. In parallel, a false concentration of troops was carried out in the Chisinau direction, reconnaissance was carried out in combat in the areas of responsibility of the fronts that did not take part in the Bagration operation, whole echelons with models of military equipment were taken from Belarus to the rear. In general, the measures achieved their goal, although the preparations for the offensive of the Red Army were not completely hidden. Thus, prisoners captured in the zone of action of the 3rd Belorussian Front said that the command of the German troops noted the strengthening of the Soviet units and expected active actions from the Red Army. But the time of the beginning of the operation, the number of Soviet troops and the exact direction of the strike remained unsolved.
Before the start of the operation, Belarusian partisans became more active, committing a large number of sabotage on the communications of the Nazis. More than 40,000 rails were blown up between 20 and 23 July alone. In general, the actions of the partisans created a number of difficulties for the Germans, but they still did not cause critical damage to the railway network, which was directly stated even by such an authority in reconnaissance and sabotage as I. G. Starinov.
Operation Bagration began on June 23, 1944 and was carried out in two stages. The first stage included the Vitebsk-Orsha, Mogilev, Bobruisk, Polotsk and Minsk operations.
The Vitebsk-Orsha operation was carried out by the troops of the 1st Baltic and 3rd Belorussian fronts. The 1st Baltic Front of Army General I. Bagramyan, with the forces of the 6th Guards and 43rd Armies, hit at the junction of Army Groups "North" and "Center" in the general direction of Beshenkovichi. The 4th shock army was to advance on Polotsk.
The 3rd Belorussian Front, Colonel General I. Chernyakhovsky, attacked Bogushevsk and Senno with the forces of the 39th and 5th armies, and at Borisov with units of the 11th Guards and 31st armies. To develop the operational success of the front, the horse-mechanized group of N. Oslikovsky (3rd Guards Mechanized and 3rd Guards Cavalry Corps) and the 5th Guards Tank Army of P. Rotmistrov were intended.
After artillery preparation on June 23, the troops of the fronts went on the offensive. During the first day, the forces of the 1st Baltic Front managed to advance 16 kilometers into the depth of the enemy defense, with the exception of the Polotsk direction, where the 4th shock army met fierce resistance and had little success. The width of the breakthrough of Soviet troops in the direction of the main attack was about 50 kilometers.
The 3rd Belorussian Front achieved significant success in the Bogushevsky direction, breaking through the German defense line more than 50 kilometers wide and capturing three serviceable bridges across the Luchesa River. For the Vitebsk grouping of the Nazis, there was a threat of the formation of a "cauldron". The commander of the German troops requested permission to withdraw, but the Wehrmacht command considered Vitebsk a fortress, and the retreat was not allowed.
During June 24-26, Soviet troops surrounded the enemy troops near Vitebsk and completely destroyed the German division that was covering the city. Four more divisions tried to break through to the west, however, with the exception of a small number of disorganized units, they did not succeed. On June 27, the encircled Germans capitulated. About 10 thousand Nazi soldiers and officers were taken prisoner.
Orsha was also liberated on June 27. The forces of the Red Army entered the Orsha-Minsk highway. On June 28, Lepel was released. In total, at the first stage, parts of the two fronts advanced to a distance of 80 to 150 km.
The Mogilev operation began on June 23. It was conducted by the 2nd Belorussian Front, Colonel-General Zakharov. During the first two days, Soviet troops advanced about 30 kilometers. Then the Germans began to retreat to the western bank of the Dnieper. Their pursuit was carried out by the 33rd and 50th armies. On June 27, Soviet forces crossed the Dnieper, and on June 28, Mogilev was liberated. The German 12th Infantry Division, which was defending in the city, was destroyed. A large number of prisoners and trophies were captured. The German units retreated to Minsk under the blows of the attack aircraft of the front. Soviet troops were moving towards the Berezina River.
The Bobruisk operation was carried out by the troops of the 1st Belorussian Front, commanded by General of the Army K. Rokossovsky. According to the plan of the front commander, the blow was delivered in converging directions from Rogachev and Parichi with a general direction to Bobruisk in order to encircle and destroy the German group in this city. After the capture of Bobruisk, it was planned to develop an offensive against Pukhovichi and Slutsk. From the air, the advancing troops were supported by about 2,000 aircraft.
The offensive was carried out in an impenetrable wooded and swampy area, crossed by numerous rivers. The troops had to go through training in order to learn how to walk on bogshoes, overcome water obstacles on improvised means, and also build gati. On June 24, after a powerful artillery preparation, the Soviet troops went on the attack and by the middle of the day broke through the enemy defenses to a depth of 5-6 kilometers. The timely introduction of mechanized units into battle made it possible to reach a breakthrough depth of up to 20 km in some areas.
On June 27, the Bobruisk group of Germans was completely surrounded. There were about 40 thousand enemy soldiers and officers in the ring. Leaving part of the forces to destroy the enemy, the front began to develop an offensive against Osipovichi and Slutsk. The encircled units attempted to break through to the north. A fierce battle took place in the area of the village of Titovka, during which the Nazis, under cover of artillery, regardless of losses, tried to break through the Soviet front. To hold back the onslaught, it was decided to use bombers. More than 500 aircraft continuously bombed the concentration of German troops for an hour and a half. Leaving the equipment, the Germans tried to break through to Bobruisk, but were unsuccessful. On June 28, the remnants of the German forces surrendered.
By this time, it was clear that Army Group Center was on the verge of defeat. German troops suffered huge losses in killed and captured, was destroyed and captured Soviet forces a large amount of technology. The depth of advance of the Soviet troops ranged from 80 to 150 kilometers. Conditions were created for the encirclement of the main forces of Army Group Center. On June 28, Commander Ernst Busch was removed from his post, and Field Marshal Walter Model took his place.
Troops of the 3rd Belorussian Front reached the Berezina River. In accordance with the directive of the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command, they were ordered to cross the river and, bypassing the strongholds of the Nazis, develop a swift offensive against the capital of the BSSR.
On June 29, the advanced detachments of the Red Army captured bridgeheads on the western bank of the Berezina and in some areas deepened into the enemy’s defenses by 5-10 kilometers. On June 30, the main forces of the front crossed the river. On the night of July 1, the 11th Guards Army broke into the city of Borisov from the south and southwest, freeing it by 15:00. On the same day, Begoml and Pleschenitsy were liberated.
On July 2, Soviet troops cut off most of the retreat routes for the Minsk grouping of the enemy. The cities of Vileyka, Zhodino, Logoisk, Smolevichi, Krasnoe were taken. Thus, the Germans were cut off from all major communications.
On the night of July 3, 1944, the commander of the 3rd Belorussian Front, General of the Army I. Chernyakhovsky, ordered the commander of the 5th Guards Tank Army P. Rotmistrov, in cooperation with the 31st Army and the 2nd Guards Tatsinsky Tank Corps, to attack Minsk from the north and northwest direction and by the end of the day on July 3rd completely take over the city.
On July 3, at 9 o'clock in the morning, Soviet troops broke into Minsk. The battles for the city were fought by the 71st and 36th rifle corps of the 31st Army, the 5th Guards Tank Army and the tankers of the Tatsinsky Guards Corps. From the southern and southeastern outskirts, the offensive against the Belarusian capital was supported by units of the 1st Don Tank Corps of the 1st Belorussian Front. By 13:00 the city was liberated.
As mentioned above, Polotsk became a big obstacle for the Soviet troops. The Germans turned it into a powerful defense center and concentrated six infantry divisions near the city. The 1st Baltic Front, with the forces of the 6th Guards and 4th Shock Armies, in converging directions from the south and northeast, was to surround and destroy the German troops.
The Polotsk operation began on June 29. By the evening of July 1, the Soviet units managed to cover the flanks of the German group and reach the outskirts of Polotsk. Violent street fighting ensued, lasting until 4 July. On this day the city was liberated. The forces of the left wing of the front, pursuing the retreating German units, went west for another 110 kilometers, reaching the border of Lithuania.
The first stage of Operation Bagration brought Army Group Center to the brink of disaster. The total advance of the Red Army in 12 days amounted to 225-280 kilometers. A gap about 400 kilometers wide was formed in the German defense, which was already very difficult to fully cover. Nevertheless, the Germans tried to stabilize the situation by relying on individual counterattacks in key areas. At the same time, Model was building a new line of defense, including at the expense of units transferred from other sectors of the Soviet-German front. But even those 46 divisions that were sent to the "catastrophe zone" did not significantly affect the state of affairs.
On July 5, the Vilnius operation of the 3rd Belorussian Front began. On July 7, units of the 5th Guards Tank Army and the 3rd Guards Mechanized Corps were on the outskirts of the city and began to cover it. On July 8, the Germans brought reinforcements to Vilnius. About 150 tanks and self-propelled guns were concentrated to break through the encirclement. A significant contribution to the failure of all these attempts was made by the aviation of the 1st Air Army, which actively bombed the main centers of resistance of the Germans. On July 13, Vilnius was taken, and the encircled group was destroyed.
The 2nd Belorussian Front developed an offensive against Bialystok. As a reinforcement, the 3rd Army of General Gorbatov was transferred to the front. During the five days of the offensive, the Soviet troops, without experiencing strong resistance, advanced 150 kilometers, liberating the city of Novogrudok on July 8. Near Grodno, the Germans had already gathered their forces, the formations of the Red Army had to repel a number of counterattacks, but on July 16 this Belarusian city was also cleared of enemy troops. By July 27, the Red Army liberated Bialystok and reached the pre-war border of the USSR.
The 1st Belorussian Front was to defeat the enemy near Brest and Lublin with strikes bypassing the Brest fortified area and reach the Vistula River. On July 6, the Red Army took Kovel and broke through the German defensive line near Siedlce. Having traveled more than 70 kilometers until July 20, Soviet troops crossed the Western Bug and entered Poland. On July 25, a cauldron formed near Brest, but the Soviet soldiers failed to completely destroy the enemy: part of the Nazi forces were able to break through. By the beginning of August, Lublin was taken by the Red Army and bridgeheads on the western bank of the Vistula were captured.
Operation Bagration was a grandiose victory for the Soviet troops. During the two months of the offensive, Belarus, part of the Baltic states and Poland were liberated. During the operation, German troops lost about 400 thousand people killed, wounded and captured. 22 German generals were captured alive, 10 more were killed. Army Group Center was defeated.
/Corr. BELTA/. Preparations for the Byelorussian offensive operation began in the spring of 1944. Based on the military-political situation and the proposals of the military councils of the fronts, the General Staff developed its plan. After its comprehensive discussion at the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command on May 22-23, a final decision was made to conduct a strategic offensive operation. Its preliminary stage symbolically began on the third anniversary of the German attack on the USSR - June 22, 1944.
On that date, the front, with a length of over 1100 km in Belarus, passed along the line of Lake Nescherdo, east of Vitebsk, Orsha, Mogilev, Zhlobin, along the Pripyat River, forming a huge ledge. Here the troops of the Army Group Center defended themselves, which had a well-developed network of railways and highways for wide maneuvering along internal lines. The fascist German troops occupied a defense prepared in advance, in depth (250-270 km), which was based on a developed system of field fortifications and natural lines. Defensive lines passed, as a rule, along the western banks of numerous rivers, which had wide swampy floodplains.
The Belarusian offensive operation, codenamed "Bagration", began on June 23 and ended on August 29, 1944. Its idea was to break through the enemy defenses with simultaneous deep strikes in six sectors, dismember his troops and break them into parts. In the future, it was supposed to strike at Minsk in converging directions in order to encircle and destroy the main enemy forces east of the capital of Belarus. Then the offensive was planned to continue towards the borders of Poland and East Prussia.
Outstanding Soviet military leaders took part in the preparation and implementation of Operation Bagration. Her plan was developed by General of the Army A.I. Antonov. The troops of the fronts, whose forces carried out the operation, were commanded by army generals K.K. Rokossovsky, I.Kh. Bagramyan, colonel-generals I.D. Chernyakhovsky and G.F. Zakharov. The fronts were coordinated by representatives of the Stavka Marshals of the Soviet Union G.K. Zhukov and A.M. Vasilevsky.
The 1st Baltic, 1st, 2nd, 3rd Belorussian fronts participated in the battles - a total of 17 armies, including 1 tank and 3 air, 4 tank and 2 Caucasian corps, a horse-mechanized group, the Dnieper military flotilla , 1st Army of the Polish Army and Belarusian partisans. During the operation, the partisans cut off the enemy's retreat routes, captured and built new bridges and crossings for the Red Army, independently liberated a number of regional centers, and participated in the liquidation of encircled enemy groups.
The operation consisted of two stages. On the first (June 23 - July 4) Vitebsk-Orsha, Mogilev, Bobruisk, Polotsk, Minsk operations were carried out. As a result of the 1st stage of the Belarusian operation, the main forces of Army Group Center were defeated. At the second stage (July 5 - August 29), the Vilnius, Bialystok, Lublin-Brest, Siauliai, Kaunas operations were carried out.
On the first day of the strategic offensive operation "Bagration" on June 23, 1944, the Red Army troops liberated the Sirotinsky district (since 1961 - Shumilinsky). The troops of the 1st Baltic Front, together with the troops of the 3rd Belorussian Front, went on the offensive on June 23, by June 25 surrounded 5 enemy divisions west of Vitebsk and liquidated them by June 27, the main forces of the front captured Lepel on June 28. The troops of the 3rd Belorussian Front, successfully developing the offensive, liberated Borisov on July 1. The troops of the 2nd Belorussian Front, after breaking through the enemy defenses along the Pronya, Basya and Dnieper rivers, liberated Mogilev on June 28. By June 27, the troops of the 1st Belorussian Front surrounded 6 German divisions in the Bobruisk area and liquidated them by June 29. At the same time, the troops of the front reached the line of Svisloch, Osipovichi, Starye Dorogi.
As a result of the Minsk operation, Minsk was liberated on July 3, to the east of which formations of the 4th and 9th German armies (over 100 thousand people) were surrounded. During the Polotsk operation, the 1st Baltic Front liberated Polotsk and developed an offensive on Siauliai. In 12 days, Soviet troops advanced 225-280 km at an average daily pace of up to 20-25 km, and liberated most of Belarus. Army Group Center suffered a catastrophic defeat, its main forces were surrounded and defeated.
With the release of Soviet troops to the line of Polotsk, Lake. Naroch, Molodechno, west of Nesvizh, a gap 400 km long was formed in the strategic front of the enemy. Attempts by the fascist German command to close it with separate divisions, which were hastily transferred from other directions, could not produce any significant results. Before the Soviet troops, the opportunity arose to begin a relentless pursuit of the remnants of the defeated enemy troops. After the successful completion of the 1st stage of the operation, the Headquarters gave the fronts new directives, according to which they were to continue a decisive offensive to the west.
As a result of hostilities during the Belarusian operation, 17 enemy divisions and 3 brigades were completely destroyed, 50 divisions lost more than half of their composition. The Nazis lost about half a million people killed, wounded, captured. During Operation Bagration, Soviet troops completed the liberation of Belarus, liberated part of Lithuania and Latvia, entered Poland on July 20, and approached the borders of East Prussia on August 17. By August 29, they reached the Vistula River and organized defense at this line.
The Belarusian operation created the conditions for the further advance of the Red Army into Germany. For participation in it, more than 1,500 soldiers and commanders were awarded the title of Hero of the Soviet Union, more than 400,000 soldiers and officers were awarded orders and medals, 662 formations and units received honorary titles after the names of the cities and localities they liberated.
Northwest and southeast of the city of Vitebsk, our troops went on the offensive. Hundreds of Soviet guns of various calibers and mortars unleashed powerful fire on the enemy. Artillery and air preparation for the offensive lasted several hours. Numerous German fortifications were destroyed. Then, following the barrage of fire, the Soviet infantry went on the attack. Suppressing the surviving enemy firing points, our fighters broke through the heavily fortified defenses in both sectors of the offensive. Soviet troops advancing southeast of the city of Vitebsk cut the Vitebsk-Orsha railway and thereby deprived the Vitebsk enemy grouping of the last railway line connecting it with the rear. The enemy suffers huge losses. German trenches and battlefields are littered with the corpses of the Nazis, broken weapons and equipment. Our troops captured trophies and prisoners.
In the Mogilev direction, our troops, after heavy artillery shelling and bombardment of enemy positions from the air, went on the offensive. The Soviet infantry quickly crossed the Pronya River. The enemy built a defensive line on the western bank of this river, consisting of numerous bunkers and several full-profile trench lines. The Soviet troops broke through the enemy defenses with a powerful blow and, building on their success, moved forward up to 20 kilometers. There were many enemy corpses left in the trenches and communication passages. Only in one small area, 600 killed Nazis were counted.
***
The partisan detachment named after Hero of the Soviet Union Zaslonov attacked the German garrison in one locality Vitebsk region. In a fierce hand-to-hand fight, the partisans exterminated 40 Nazis and captured large trophies. The partisan detachment "Thunderstorm" derailed 3 German military echelons in one day. 3 steam locomotives, 16 wagons and platforms with military cargo were broken.
They liberated Belarus
Petr Filippovich Gavrilov Born October 14, 1914 in the Tomsk region in a peasant family. In the army since December 1942. A company of the 34th Guards Tank Brigade of the 6th Guards Army of the 1st Baltic Front under the command of Guards Senior Lieutenant Pyotr Gavrilov on June 23, 1944, when breaking through the defenses near the village of Sirotino, Shumilinsky District, Vitebsk Region, destroyed two bunkers, dispersed and destroyed up to a Nazi battalion. In pursuit of the Nazis, on June 24, 1944, the company entered the Western Dvina River near the village of Ulla, captured a bridgehead on its western bank and held it until our infantry and artillery approached. For the courage and courage shown during the breakthrough of the defense and the successful crossing of the Western Dvina River, Senior Lieutenant Gavrilov Petr Filippovich was awarded the title of Hero of the Soviet Union. After the war, he lived and worked in Sverdlovsk (since 1991 - Yekaterinburg). Died in 1968.
Abdulla Zhanzakov was born on February 22, 1918 in the Kazakh village of Akrab. Since 1941 in the army on the fronts of the war. The submachine gunner of the 196th Guards Rifle Regiment (67th Guards Rifle Division, 6th Guards Army, 1st Baltic Front), Guard Corporal Abdulla Zhanzakov, especially distinguished himself in the Belarusian strategic offensive operation. In the battle on June 23, 1944, he participated in the assault on the enemy stronghold near the village of Sirotinovka (Shumilinsky district). He secretly made his way to the German bunker and threw grenades at him. On June 24, he distinguished himself when crossing the Western Dvina River near the village of Buy (Beshenkovichi district). In the battle during the liberation of the city of Lepel on June 28, 1944, he was the first to break through to the high embankment of the railway track, took up an advantageous position on it and suppressed several enemy firing points with automatic fire, ensuring the success of his platoon advancement. In the battle on June 30, 1944, he died while crossing the Ushacha River near the city of Polotsk. Guard Corporal Zhanzakov Abdulla was awarded the title of Hero of the Soviet Union posthumously.
Nikolay Efimovich Solovyov was born on May 19, 1918 in the Tver region into a peasant family. During the Great Patriotic War in the army since 1941. Particularly distinguished himself during the Vitebsk-Orsha offensive operation. In the battle on June 23, 1944, when breaking through the enemy defenses near the village of Medved in the Sirotinsky (now Shumilinsky) district, under fire, he provided communication between the division commander and the regiments. On June 24, when crossing the Western Dvina River at night near the village of Sharipino (Beshenkovichi District), he established a wire connection across the river. For courage and heroism shown during the crossing of the Western Dvina, Solovyov Nikolai Efimovich was awarded the title of Hero of the Soviet Union. After the war he lived and worked in the Tver region. Died in 1993.
Alexander Kuzmich Fedyunin Born September 15, 1911 in the Ryazan region in a peasant family. During the Great Patriotic War in the army since 1941. Particularly distinguished himself during the liberation of Belarus. On June 23, 1944, the battalion under the command of A.K. Fedyunin was the first to break into the Sirotino railway station (Vitebsk region), destroyed up to 70 enemy soldiers, captured 2 guns, 2 warehouses with ammunition and military equipment. On June 24, fighters led by the battalion commander crossed the Western Dvina River near the village of Dvorishche (Beshenkovichi district, Vitebsk region), shot down enemy outposts and entrenched themselves on the bridgehead, which ensured that the river was crossed by other units of the regiment. For the skillful command of the unit, courage and heroism shown during the liberation of Belarus, Fedyunin Alexander Kuzmich was awarded the title of Hero of the Soviet Union. After the end of the war, he continued to serve in the Armed Forces, lived and worked in the city of Shakhty, Rostov Region. Died in 1975.-0-
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When, on June 22, 1941, German troops began to invade the territory of the USSR, the main and most powerful blow was delivered by Army Group Center. The Berlin-Minsk-Smolensk line was the shortest route to Moscow, and it was in this direction that the Wehrmacht concentrated the largest and most well-armed group of troops. The complete collapse of the Soviet Western Front in the first weeks of the War made it possible to capture Minsk by June 28, and by the second half of July 1941, the whole of Soviet Belarus. A long period of occupation.
After the defeat of the German troops on the Kursk Bulge, the main focus of hostilities on the Soviet-German front shifted southward to the territory of Ukraine and the Black Sea region. It was there that the main military battles of the end of 1943 - the beginning of 1944 took place. By the spring of 1944, the entire left-bank and most of the right-bank Ukraine were liberated. In January 1944, a powerful blow was dealt by the Red Army in the northwestern direction, known as "1st Stalinist blow", as a result of which Leningrad was released.
But on the central sector of the front, the situation was not so favorable. German troops still firmly held the so-called "Panther" line: Vitebsk-Orsha-Mogilev-Zhlobin. Thus, a huge ledge, with an area of about 250 thousand square kilometers, was formed on the Soviet-German front, aimed at the central regions of the USSR. This section of the front was called "Belarusian ledge" or "Belarusian balcony".
Despite the fact that most of the German generals suggested that Hitler withdraw his troops from the ledge and level the front line, the Reich Chancellor was adamant. Encouraged by the reports of scientists about the imminent appearance of a "superweapon", he still hoped to turn the tide of the War and did not want to part with such a convenient springboard. In April 1944, the command of Army Group Center presented to the top leadership of the Wehrmacht another plan to reduce the front line and withdraw troops to more convenient positions beyond the Berezina, but it was also rejected. Instead, a plan was adopted to further strengthen the positions held. The cities of Vitebsk, Orsha, Mogilev and Zhlobin were turned into fortresses, capable of conducting defensive battles with complete encirclement. At the same time, additional defensive lines were built on the Panther line, fortified with pillboxes and bunkers. The natural features of the area gave even greater stability to the German defense. Vast swampy swamps, deep ravines interspersed with dense forests, many rivers and streams made the area of the Belarusian ledge impassable for heavy equipment and at the same time extremely convenient for defense. In addition, the German headquarters believed that the Red Army troops would try to build on the spring success achieved in southern Ukraine and strike either at the oil fields of Romania, or from south to north, trying to cut off Army Groups Center and North. It was on these areas that the main attention of the top military leadership of the Wehrmacht was focused. Thus, the German command made erroneous assumptions about the direction of the offensive of the Soviet troops during summer-autumn campaign of 1944. But The Headquarters of the Supreme High Command had completely different plans for the summer and autumn of 1944..
At the beginning of April 1944 The General Staff began planning an offensive operation for the liberation of Belarus and Karelia, and the general plan for hostilities for this period was quite accurately voiced in a letter from I.V. Stalin written to Churchill: | “The summer offensive of the Soviet troops, organized in accordance with the agreement at the Tehran Conference, will begin by mid-June on one of the important sectors of the front. The general offensive of the Soviet troops will be deployed in stages through the successive introduction of armies into offensive operations. At the end of June and during July, offensive operations will turn into a general offensive of the Soviet troops. |
Thus, the plan for the summer campaign consisted in the consistent launch of offensive operations from north to south, that is, exactly where the enemy expected a “calm summer”. It is also worth noting that in the summer campaign, our troops not only set the task of further liberating the Motherland from the German invaders, but also, by their active actions, were supposed to help the allied troops in the landing of troops in northern France.
A key role in the entire campaign was to play Belarusian offensive operation, called "Bagration".
The general plan of the Belarusian operation was as follows: to eliminate the flank groupings of German troops defending the Panther line with converging strikes, while delivering several cutting strikes on the central part of the defensive line.
For the campaign to eliminate Army Group Center, it was decided to involve 4 fronts: 1st Belorussian (commander - General of the Army K.K. Rokossovsky), 2nd Belorussian (commander - Colonel General G.F. Zakharov), 3- th Belorussian (commander - Colonel General I.D. Chernyakhovsky) and 1st Baltic (commander - General of the Army I.Kh. Bagramyan).
Preparation for surgery deserves special attention.. It was thanks to a well-thought-out and well-executed preparatory phase that the Red Army managed to carry out one of the most successful and large-scale offensive operations.
The primary task for the commanders of the fronts was to ensure the secrecy of the preparations for the future offensive.
To this end, in the areas of the future offensive, the construction of defensive structures, the construction of fortified areas, and the preparation of cities for all-round defense began. Frontline, army and divisional newspapers published materials only on defensive topics, which created the illusion of weakening this strategic direction in terms of offensive. At stops, the echelons were immediately cordoned off by strong patrols and people were let out of the cars only by teams. The railway workers were not informed of any data, except for the numbers, about these echelons.
At the same time, the commander of the 3rd Ukrainian Front was given the following order: |
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A similar order was received by the command of the 3rd Baltic Front.
For German intelligence loomed the names of the picture that the military leadership of the Wehrmacht wanted to see. Namely: the Red Army in the area of the "Belarusian Balcony" is not going to take active offensive actions and is preparing an offensive on the flanks of the Soviet-German front, where the greatest results were achieved during the spring military campaign.
For even more secrecy only a few people knew the full plan of the operation, and all instructions and orders were delivered only in writing or orally, without the use of telephone and radio communications.
At the same time, the build-up of strike groups of all four fronts took place only at night and in small groups.
For additional disinformation, tank armies were left in the southwestern direction. Enemy reconnaissance vigilantly followed everything that happened in the Soviet troops. This fact additionally convinced the Nazi command that the offensive was being prepared precisely here.
Measures taken to disinform German leadership were so successful that the commander of Army Group Center, Field Marshal Ernst Busch, went on vacation 3 days before the start of the operation.
Another important stage in the preparation of the future offensive was the training of troops in operations in difficult swampy terrain. The Red Army soldiers were trained to swim across rivers and lakes, to navigate in the forest area, swamp skis or, as they were also called, "wet shoes" were massively sent to the front. Special rafts and drags were built for artillery. Each tank was equipped with fascines (bundles of twigs, brushwood, reeds to strengthen slopes, embankments, roads through the swamp), logs or special triangles for passing through wide ditches.
Simultaneously engineering and sapper troops prepared the area for a future offensive: bridges were repaired or built, crossings were equipped, passages were made in minefields. For uninterrupted supply of the armies at the entire stage of the operation, new roads and railways were laid to the front line.
Throughout the preparatory period active reconnaissance activities were carried out both front-line reconnaissance forces and partisan detachments. The number of the latter on the territory of Belarus was about 150 thousand people, about 200 partisan brigades and separate partisan groups were formed.
During intelligence activities the main schemes of German fortifications were revealed and critical documents such as maps of minefields and maps of fortified areas have been recovered.
By mid-June, without exaggeration, the titanic work in preparation for Operation Bagration was generally completed. The units of the Red Army participating in the operation secretly concentrated on their starting lines. So, for two days on June 18-19, the 6th Guards Army under the command of Lieutenant General I.M. Chistyakov made a 110-kilometer transition and stood a few kilometers from the front line. June 20, 1944 Soviet troops prepared for the upcoming operation. Marshal A.M. Vasilevsky was entrusted with coordinating the actions of the two fronts - the 1st Baltic and 3rd Belorussian fronts, and the Deputy Supreme Commander-in-Chief Marshal G.K. Zhukov. That night, more than 10,000 enemy communications were blown up, which seriously prevented the Germans from transferring reserves to dangerous areas of the breakthrough in a timely manner.
By the same time, the assault units of the Red Army advanced to their starting positions for the offensive. Only after the strike of the partisans did the Nazi military leadership realize where the main offensive of the Soviet troops would begin in the summer of 1944.
On June 22, 1944, reconnaissance and assault battalions of the breakthrough armies, with the support of tanks, began reconnaissance in force on almost 500 km of the front. The commander of Army Group Center, Field Marshal Ernst Busch, began a hasty transfer of German troops to the front line of defense of the Panther line.
On June 23, 1944, the first phase of the Belarusian operation began., consisting of a number of front-line operations.
On the central sector of the front, as part of the Mogilev offensive operation, the troops of the 2nd Belorussian Front under the command of General G.F. Zakharov launched an offensive. The front troops were faced with the task of cutting off and pinning down the enemy in the Mogilev region with the left flank, liberating the city and creating a bridgehead for the further development of the offensive. The right flank of the front was supposed to help the 3rd Belorussian Front, encircle and eliminate the Orsha enemy grouping.
In the north, the 1st Baltic Front under the command of General of the Army I.Kh. Bagramyan began the Vitebsk-Orsha offensive operation. As part of this campaign, Bagramyan's troops had to deeply encircle Vitebsk from the north with one flank, thereby cutting off Army Group Center from possible assistance from Army Group North. The left flank of the front, in cooperation with the troops of Chernyakhovsky complete the encirclement of the Vitebsk group.
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