Badge “participant of the battles at Khalkhin Gol” USSR. Badge “participant of the battles at Khalkhin Gol” USSR Mongolian orders awarded to tank crews for the Khalkhin Gol

“When we got into the car, a thought occurred to me, which I immediately expressed to Stavsky, that it would be good, when the conflict ends, instead of all the usual monuments, to erect in the steppe on a high place one of the tanks that died here, battered by shell fragments, torn apart, but victorious."

Konstantin Simonov

From May 11 to September 16, 1939, in Mongolia, near the previously unknown Khalkhin Gol River, there were clashes between Soviet and Japanese troops - starting with small border skirmishes, they ended in full-scale battles using hundreds of tanks, guns and aircraft.

Back in 1937, a new stage of the war with Japan began in China. The Soviet Union actively supported China. Soviet instructors trained Chinese crews of T-26 tanks sold to China by the USSR, and Soviet pilots fought in the skies of China, preventing Japan from achieving final victory. Naturally, the Japanese did not like this. In the summer of 1938, “reconnaissance in force” on Khasan, according to the Japanese, confirmed the low qualities of the Red Army, but the desired effect was not achieved - Soviet aid continued to flow into China.

The next place to test our strength was Mongolia. The Japanese, developing the territory of Manchuria under their control, pulled the railway towards the Soviet border - to Chita. About fifteen kilometers from the border between Mongolia and Manchuria, the first spurs of the Khingan Range began, and in the Khalkhin-Gol section, the Mongolian border formed a large protrusion towards Manchuria. Thus, the Japanese had to either build a railway through the mountains or run it close to the border within gunshot. Capturing the right bank of the Khalkhin Gol River would put the USSR “in its place”, test its determination to further aggravate relations with Japan and ensure the safety of the road. The nearest railway station on the USSR side, Borzya, was approximately 700 km from the site of the alleged battles; there were no railways at all in Mongolia, and on the Japanese side, the Hailar station was only 100 km away. The nearest settlement, Tamtsak-Bulak, was 130 km of desert steppe. Thus, the Soviet troops would have been cut off from supply bases, and the Mongolian army would not have posed a serious threat to the Japanese.

From the beginning of 1939, the Japanese shelled Mongolian outposts and crossed the border in small groups, and in May, with the support of aviation, several sections of Mongolian territory were occupied. The USSR transferred its units to the Khalkhin Gol River area (in March an order was given to move the operational group of the 11th Tank Brigade to Tamtsak-Bulak). On May 28-29, a group of Japanese soldiers in a truck, encountering a Soviet T-37 tank, threw a couple of cans of gasoline out of the back. When the tank ran over one of the canisters, it was engulfed in flames. Perhaps this incident served as an impetus for the use of gasoline bottles against tanks. On May 29, the debut of 5 HT-26 flamethrower tanks took place, defeating a Japanese reconnaissance detachment. However, in general, as a result of the May battles, Soviet troops retreated to the western bank of Khalkhin Gol. On June 12, G.K. became commander of the 57th Special Corps in Mongolia. Zhukov.

Meanwhile, General Michitar Kamatsubara, considered an expert on the USSR, decided to cross Khalkhin Gol, capture the Bain-Tsagan mountain dominating the area, cut off and destroy the Soviet units on the right bank, located 5-6 km east of the river. By the morning of July 3, two infantry regiments with sappers and artillery managed to reach Bain-Tsagan, while at the same time an offensive towards the Soviet crossing developed along the coast. On the right bank, two Japanese tank regiments (86 tanks, of which 26 Otsu and 34 Ha-Go) also advanced towards the crossing, losing about 10 tanks in the night battle on July 2-3.

The Soviet command decided to fend off the threat of encirclement by tanks. The 11th Tank Brigade, the 7th Motorized Armored Brigade and the 24th Motorized Rifle Regiment moved to the Bayin-Tsagan area. Their task was to destroy the enemy on the eastern bank, so retargeting troops that had already crossed over took place at the last moment. The 1st battalion of the brigade (44 BT-5) at a speed of 45-50 km/h encountered the Japanese front line and destroyed the enemy with fire and tracks. The attack was not supported by infantry and artillery, and the tankers withdrew, leaving 20 damaged tanks on the battlefield, which were then burned with gasoline bottles. The 3rd battalion, consistently attacking Japanese units, lost 20 out of 50 armored vehicles burned out and 11 knocked out. The battalion of armored cars was shot at point-blank range by anti-tank guns, losing 20 burned out and 13 damaged out of 50 armored vehicles.

Although the Soviet tank crews, attacking without reconnaissance and cooperation with each other, suffered huge losses, the Japanese were shocked by the number of Soviet armored vehicles, reporting an attack of as many as 1000 tanks!!! In the evening, Kamatsubara gave the order to withdraw to the eastern bank.

On the same day, a battle took place on the eastern bank between Soviet BT-5s, armored cars and Japanese tanks that had crossed at night. The advancing Japanese tanks were shot from cover from a distance of 800-1000 m. According to various sources, the Japanese lost 41-44 of the 77 tanks originally available. On July 5, the Japanese tank regiments were withdrawn from the battle and did not participate in any more battles. The plan to defeat the Soviet troops was thwarted.

Although the July Soviet attacks were also unsuccessful, by August 20, 438 tanks and 385 armored vehicles were concentrated in the Khalkhin Gol area. The units were preparing for battle, a large amount of ammunition and fuel was collected.

On August 20, the Soviet offensive began at 6:15 a.m., and by the evening of August 23, Japanese troops were surrounded. In hot pursuit, the “stubborn struggle for each dune” and the “high resistance of the surrounded individual centers of defense” were noted. By the morning of August 31, the remaining Japanese units in the cauldron were completely destroyed.

Soviet soldiers examine abandoned Japanese equipment. In the foreground is a Type 95 "Ha-Go" light tank armed with a 37 mm Type 94 gun, the exhaust system of a 120 hp Mitsubishi NVD 6120 diesel engine is visible. On the left, a soldier inspects the 75 mm gun, the "improved Type 38", the main field weapon Kwantung Army in the battles of Khalkhin Gol

The reports compiled following the battles testified:

“...the BT-5 and BT-7 tanks showed themselves very well in battle. T-26 - showed exceptionally good performance, walked perfectly on the dunes, the tank had very high survivability. There was a case in the 82nd Rifle Division when a T-26 received five hits from a 37-mm gun, the armor was destroyed, but the tank did not catch fire and after the battle it went to SPAM under its own power. Artillery tanks have proven to be an indispensable weapon in the fight against anti-tank guns. The SU-12 artillery mounts have not justified themselves, since they cannot support tanks in an attack. T-37, T-38 proved to be unsuitable for attack and defense. Slow moving, caterpillars fly off".

Flamethrower T-26s boasted:

“The introduction of only one chemical tank, which fired a stream of fire at the center of resistance, caused panic in the enemy ranks, the Japanese from the front line of trenches fled deep into the pit and our infantry arrived in time, occupying the crest of the pit, this detachment was completely destroyed.”.

The tanks and armored cars suffered the greatest losses from anti-tank artillery and “bottle shooters” - in total about 80-90% of all losses:

“Tanks and armored cars burn from throwing bottles, and from being hit by anti-tank shells, almost all tanks and armored cars also burn and cannot be restored. The cars become completely unusable, and a fire breaks out within 15-30 seconds. The crew always jumps out with their clothes on fire. The fire produces strong flames and black smoke (burns like a wooden house), observed from a distance of 5-6 km. After 15 minutes, the ammunition begins to explode, after which the tank can only be used as scrap metal.”

Japanese soldiers pose with trophies captured in the battles at Khalkhin Gol. One of the Japanese is holding a Soviet 7.62-mm tank machine gun of the Degtyarev system, model 1929, DT-29. Trophies could have been captured from both Soviet troops and the troops of the Mongolian People's Republic

In the August battles, tanks went into battle in two echelons - the second echelon shot the Japanese who appeared with bottles and mines.

Based on the results of the entire operation, among the main reasons for unnecessary losses were “inattention to reconnaissance and the inability to organize and directly conduct it, especially in night conditions... Our commanders and political workers, unfortunately, forget that the loss of an organizer and leader of a battle weakens the troops, and inappropriate, reckless courage increases casualties and harms the cause.”(it is worth noting that the commander of the 11th Tank Brigade, Yakovlev, died while raising lying infantry), “... our infantry is poorly trained in joint actions with artillery and tanks”.

At least a third of all Red Army prisoners of war were captured by the Japanese wounded, burned, shell-shocked, and sometimes unconscious. Both Soviet and Japanese documents note that the Soviet crews of damaged and burned tanks and armored vehicles desperately resisted to the last and were extremely rarely captured. Those captured were often killed soon after, especially in surrounded Japanese units. So, on August 22, several tanks of the 130th separate tank battalion of the 11th tank brigade in the Japanese rear jumped out to artillery positions and were shot at point-blank range by 75-mm cannons. At least six of their crews were captured and killed.

Thus, it can be stated that, despite the use of tanks not always in the “correct” way, especially at Bayin Tsagan on July 3, tanks made a decisive contribution to the victory. Without tank attacks, the Japanese attempt to encircle Soviet troops could well have been successful, and this was on the eve of the outbreak of World War II in Europe, in which the USSR managed to avoid fighting on two fronts.

Bibliography:

• Battles at Khalkhin Gol. Main Directorate of Political Propaganda of the Red Army.– M.:Military Publishing House, 1940.
• Kolomiets M. Fighting near the Khalkhin Gol River. – M.: KM Strategy, 2002.
• Simonov K.M. Far to the east. Khalkhin-Gol notes. – M.: Fiction, 1985.
• Svoisky Yu.M. Prisoners of war of Khalkhin Gol. – M.: Russian Foundation for the Promotion of Education and Science, 2014

14:50

Khalkhin Gol. Two years before the Great Patriotic War.

In 1932, the occupation of Manchuria by Japanese troops ended. The puppet state of Manchukuo was created in the occupied territory. The conflict began with the demands of the Japanese side to recognize the Khalkhin Gol River as the border between Manchukuo and Mongolia (the old border ran 20–25 km to the east).

On March 12, 1936, the “Protocol on Mutual Assistance” was signed between the USSR and the MPR. Since 1937, in accordance with this protocol, units of the Red Army were deployed on the territory of Mongolia. The main striking force of the Red Army in the Far Eastern District were three motorized armored brigades (7th, 8th and 9th) - unique formations consisting of armored vehicles FAI, BAI, BA-3, BA-6, BA-10 and BA-20 .

There a strong barrier has been put up for the enemy,
Standing there, brave and strong,
At the edge of the Far Eastern land
Armored Shock Battalion.

Since 1936, the 7th infantry brigade was commanded by N.V. Feklenko, who later became the commander of the 57th Special Corps (the brigade became part of the corps in August 1937, having marched under its own power from the Western Military District to the Mongolian People's Republic).

By August 15, 1938, the 57 OK included 273 light tanks (of which about 80% were BT type), 150 machine guns and 163 cannon armored vehicles.

In 1938, a two-week conflict occurred between Soviet and Japanese troops near Lake Khasan, which ended in victory for the USSR. Artillery, tanks and aircraft were widely used in combat operations. During the armed conflict at Lake Khasan, significant shortcomings were revealed in the combat training of the Far Eastern Army, especially in the interaction of military branches in battle, command and control of troops, and their mobilization readiness.

On May 11, 1939, a detachment of Japanese cavalry numbering up to 300 people attacked the Mongolian border outpost at the height of Nomon-Khan-Burd-Obo. On May 14, as a result of a similar attack with air support, the Dungur-Obo heights were occupied. The Mongolian side requested support from the USSR. The Japanese justified their actions by saying that the mentioned heights belonged to their satellite Manchukuo. In total, two infantry regiments and reinforcement units with a total number of up to 10 thousand people initially operated on the Japanese side.

Immediately after the conflict broke out, Feklenko reported to the center: “All Manchu notes sent to the MPR government indicate that clashes in the Nomon-Khan-Burd-Obo area are taking place on Manchu territory. Given this situation, he demanded documents from the MPR government. The material was checked together with Plenipotentiary Representative Choibalsan and Lunsansharab. Thus, all events take place not on Manchurian territory, but on the territory of the MPR.” It was possible to act openly.

On May 17, the commander of the 57th OK division commander N.V. Feklenko sent an operational group to Khalkhin Gol consisting of three motorized rifle companies, a company of armored vehicles, a sapper company and an artillery battery. On May 22, Soviet troops crossed the Khalkhin Gol River and drove the Japanese back from the border.

Clashes between Soviet and Japanese troops escalated into battles with the use of aviation, artillery and tanks. No one declared war on anyone, but the intensity of the fighting increased. Not everything went smoothly for the Soviet troops.

During the period from May 22 to 28, significant forces are concentrated in the conflict area. The Soviet-Mongolian forces included 668 bayonets, 260 sabers, 58 machine guns, 20 guns and 39 armored vehicles. Japanese forces consisted of 1,680 bayonets, 900 cavalry, 75 machine guns, 18 guns, 6 armored vehicles and 1 tank.

On May 28, 1939, Japanese units numbering up to 2,500 people, supported by artillery, armored vehicles and aviation, violated the border of the Mongolian People's Republic east of the Khalkhin Gol River, but by the end of May 29, Soviet-Mongolian troops had driven the aggressor out of their territory.

The importance that the Soviet leadership attached to the events at Khalkhin Gol also led to the special attention of the People's Commissariat of Defense and the General Staff of the Red Army to it. In order to check the condition and combat readiness of units of the 57th Separate Corps, on May 29, Deputy Commander of the Belarusian Military District for Cavalry, Divisional Commander G.K., flies to Mongolia. Zhukov together with brigade commander Denisov and regimental commissar Chernyshev.

On June 3, 1939, he reports: “Since May 29, they have not been able to achieve the complete introduction of hidden command and control of troops... The reason for this is that, despite promises, forgotten commander codes have not yet been delivered from winter quarters.”

According to Zhukov’s recollections, “the corps command does not know the true situation... no one from the corps command, except for the regimental commissar M.S. Nikishev, was in the area of ​​​​events. I asked N.V. Feklenko, what does he think, is it possible for 120 kilometers from the battlefield to control troops?

People's Commissar of Defense K.E. Voroshilov in an address dated June 9, 1939 to the Politburo of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks and on June 11, 1939 personally to I.V. Stalin proposes to remove division commander N.V. from leadership of the Special Corps. Feklenko, his chief of staff, brigade commander A.M. Kushchev and the chief of aviation of the corps Kalinichev.

Voroshilov accused Feklenko of the lack of “close communication with the command of the MPR,” the need for which he repeatedly pointed out, believing that this led to the fact that Feklenko was unable to timely convey to the attention of the top leadership in Moscow information about developments on the border of the MPR and Manchuria. Voroshilov, in particular, argued that “both the People’s Commissar of Defense and the General Staff still cannot establish the true picture of what happened.” Voroshilov argued that “the corps command and Feklenko personally disbanded the units, did not organize the rear at all, and there is very low discipline in the troops.”

G.K. takes command of the 57th OK. Zhukov. Brigade commander M.A. became the chief of staff of the corps. Bogdanov. Corps Commissar J. Lkhagvasuren became Zhukov’s assistant in command of the Mongolian cavalry. From the “old guard” Zhukov kept with him only divisional commissar M.S. Nikisheva.

Having completed advanced training courses for command personnel at the Academy of Motorization and Mechanization, N.V. Feklenko was appointed commander of the 14th Tank Brigade, located in Zhitomir. Subsequently, he received the rank of Major General of Tank Forces with the appointment of commander of the 8th Tank Division in June and the 15th Tank Division of the 8th MK KOVO in July 1940. And in March 1941 he became the commander of the 19th Mechanized Corps, which participated on June 26-29 in a counterattack against the 1st Tank Group, and on July 2-8 covered the retreat of the 5th Army to the line of the old state border (by July 9, 75 tanks remained in the corps out of 450 listed at the beginning of the war). On July 10-14, the mechanized corps counterattacked in the Novograd-Volyn direction, on July 23 - August 5, it fought on the main strip of the Korosten UR, after which its remnants joined the 31st Rifle Corps on August 6, and the headquarters of the corps and divisions were sent to the headquarters of the South -Western Front. War N.V. Feklenko graduated as head of the Main Directorate for the formation and combat training of armored and mechanized forces of the Red Army.

First of all, Zhukov strengthens the 100th air brigade covering the corps from the air. Discipline in the air brigade was rated as “the lowest.” Fighter pilots were trained only in the technique of piloting single aircraft and did not have the skills of group air combat. Most of them did not even have aerial shooting skills. In May 1939, Japanese pilots, who had gained experience fighting in China, fought air battles with Soviet pilots with virtually no losses.

Colonel T. Kutsevalov said: “The 57th Special Corps had aviation, which can be described in terms of combat effectiveness simply as collapsed aviation... which, of course, looked incapable of combat.” There were no air bases on the territory of the Mongolian People's Republic. A serious shortcoming in the Air Force's preparation for combat operations was the complete lack of communication between bases.

In the report compiled by Kutsevalov on the combat operations of the Soviet Air Force at Khalkhin Gol, it was directly stated: “In the initial period of the conflict, the air forces of the 57th Special Corps suffered a clear, shameful defeat.” Thus, in two days of fighting, the Soviet fighter regiment lost 15 fighters (mostly I-15s), while the Japanese side lost only one aircraft.

On May 28, after the death of Balashov’s squadron, the commander of the 57th OK corps commander Feklenko wrote in a combat report addressed to the Chief of the General Staff of the Red Army B.M. Shaposhnikov that Japanese aviation dominates the air, and our pilots are not able to cover ground troops, “Japanese aviation penetrates deep into the territory of the Mongolian People’s Republic and is chasing our aircraft.” After Feklenko’s report that maintaining a bridgehead on the eastern shore of Khalkhin Gol would only be possible at the cost of heavy losses from Japanese aviation, a whole delegation of specialists with experience of the war in Spain and China flew to Mongolia. It consisted of 48 pilots and specialists, including 11 Heroes of the Soviet Union, among whom was the deputy chief of the Red Army Air Force, corps commander Yakov Smushkevich.

Air battles resumed with renewed vigor in the twentieth of June. As a result of the battles on June 22, 24 and 26, the Japanese lost more than 50 aircraft. During the battle on June 22, the famous Japanese ace pilot Takeo Fukuda was shot down and captured (according to other sources, senior lieutenant Hero of the Soviet Union V.G. Rakhov shot down his plane on July 29, the Japanese, seeing that he had landed on Mongolian territory, tried shoot himself, but was captured).

In the early morning of June 27, Japanese aircraft managed to launch a surprise attack on Soviet airfields, which led to the destruction of 19 aircraft.

In total, Japanese air forces lost 90 aircraft in air battles from June 22 to 28. The losses of Soviet aviation were much smaller, amounting to 38 aircraft.

New air units with I-16 arrived, obsolete aircraft were withdrawn from the existing units. A number of new landing sites were equipped near the front line, which had a positive effect on the speed and efficiency of the Air Force's response to the situation at the front. Smushkevich's group ensured air superiority over the Japanese. By the beginning of July, Soviet aviation at Khalkhin Gol consisted of 280 combat-ready aircraft versus 100-110 Japanese.

In the Chita area, front-line control is being deployed under the command of Army Commander 2nd Rank G.M. Stern, a hero of the war in Spain and a participant in the battles at Lake Khasan. Divisional Commander M.A., a teacher at the General Staff Academy, became the chief of staff of the front group. Kuznetsov. Member of the Military Council of the group - divisional commissar N.I. Biryukov

The group included the 1st and 2nd separate Red Banner armies, troops of the Transbaikal Military District and the 57th Special Corps. On June 19, by order of the People's Commissar of Defense of the USSR No. 0029, the 57th Special Corps was renamed the 1st Army Group.

To restore discipline in the troops, Zhukov was given very broad powers. At the initial stage of the conflict, unfired rifle units suffered huge losses, easily succumbed to panic, voluntarily abandoned their positions and retreated to the rear in disarray. According to the memoirs of General Staff officer P.G. Grigorenko, sent to reinforcement in Mongolia, the military council of the front group, on behalf of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR, pardoned 17 people sentenced to death by the tribunal of the 1st Army Group with the wording “Tribunal. I received an order. Didn't complete it. Judge. Shoot!". Personal relations between Zhukov and Stern, according to eyewitnesses, were quite hostile, but the division commander was nevertheless obliged to follow the instructions of the army commander.

By the beginning of the next offensive, the command of the Japanese Kwantung Army concentrated up to 38 thousand soldiers and officers with the support of 310 guns, 135 tanks and 225 aircraft against 12.5 thousand soldiers, 109 guns, 266 armored vehicles, 186 tanks and 280 aircraft of the Red Army and Mongolia.

The headquarters of the Kwantung Army developed a plan for a new border operation called “The Second Period of the Nomonhan Incident.” The Japanese brought up all three regiments of the 23rd Infantry Division, two regiments of the 7th Infantry Division, a cavalry division of the Manchukuo Army, two tank and artillery regiments. The Japanese plan provided for two strikes - the main one and the restraining one. The first involved crossing the Khalkhin Gol River and access to crossings to the rear of Soviet troops on the eastern bank of the river. The group of Japanese troops for this attack was led by Major General Kobayashi. The second blow was to be launched by Lieutenant General Masaomi Yasuoka directly against the Soviet troops in the bridgehead. Due to the fact that the Japanese were unable to provide their tank units with transport means, only the Yasuoka group was reinforced with tanks.

The Yasuoka group's attack began at 10:00 on July 2. The advance of Japanese tanks continued until 2.00 am on July 3. Despite the fact that of the 73 tanks that took part in the Yasuoka group’s attack on the Soviet bridgehead on July 3, 41 tanks were lost, 13 of them irretrievably, the Japanese assessed the results of their attack as “very high.” By the night of July 3, the Soviet troops, due to the numerical superiority of the enemy, retreated to the river, reducing the size of their eastern bridgehead on its bank, but the Japanese strike group did not fully complete the task assigned to it.

The dew lay thick on the grass,
The fogs are widespread.
That night the samurai decided
Cross the border by the river.

On the night of July 2-3, the troops of Major General Kobayashi crossed the Khalkhin Gol River and captured Mount Bain-Tsagan on its western bank, located 40 kilometers from the Manchurian border. Immediately after this, the Japanese concentrated their main forces here and began to extremely intensively build fortifications and build layered defenses. In the future, it was planned, relying on Mount Bain-Tsagan, which dominated the area, to hit the rear of the Soviet troops defending on the eastern bank of the Khalkhin Gol River, cut them off and subsequently destroy them. The Mongolian cavalry division located in the area of ​​Mount Bain-Tsagan was scattered by Japanese planes.

Meanwhile, Zhukov, having no intelligence information about the bridgehead captured by the Japanese, began preparing a flank attack on the Yasuoka group. To do this, on the night of July 2-3, the concentration of the 11th tank and 7th motorized armored brigades and Mongolian cavalry began.

At 7.00 in the morning, units of a motorized armored brigade moving towards their initial positions for a counterattack encountered the Japanese. This is how information was received about the Japanese crossing and the direction of their attack. (According to the seventh chapter of “Memories and Reflections” by G.K. Zhukov, the enemy was discovered by the senior adviser to the Mongolian army, Colonel I.M. Afonin).

Zhukov makes a very risky “cavalry” decision to attack on the move a group of Japanese who crossed, unknown in composition and number, with all the mobile reserves moving forward from the rear, preventing them from burying themselves in the ground and organizing anti-tank defense. During daylight hours, as the participating forces approached, four uncoordinated attacks were launched (as three tank battalions of the 11th Tank Brigade and an armored battalion of the 7th Tank Brigade advanced from different directions for the initially planned counterattack).

11th Tank Brigade M.P. Yakovleva advanced without artillery and infantry support against the unsuppressed anti-tank defenses of the Japanese, as a result of which she suffered heavy losses. As one Japanese officer put it figuratively, “the funeral pyres of burning Russian tanks were like the smoke of the steel mills in Osaka.” The armored battalion attacked on the move after a 150-kilometer march. Later they were joined by the 24th motorized rifle regiment of Colonel I. I. Fedyuninsky.

At the same time as tanks and armored cars, air strikes were carried out on the Japanese who had crossed. Moreover, not only SB bombers operated, but also I-15bis fighters from the 22nd Fighter Aviation Regiment. The heavy artillery battalion of the 185th Artillery Regiment was ordered to reconnaissance to Mount Bain Tsagan and open fire on the Japanese group. At the same time, an order was given to the artillery located across the Khalkhin Gol River (supporting the 9th Motorized Armored Brigade) to transfer its fire to the enemy on Mount Bain-Tsagan.

Of the 133 tanks participating in the attack, 77 vehicles were lost, and of 59 armored vehicles, 37. The 2nd tank battalion lost 12 people killed and 9 wounded, the 3rd battalion 10 killed and 23 missing. The tanks and armored cars suffered the greatest losses from anti-tank artillery and from “bottle shooters” - approximately 80-90% of all losses. The 11th Tank Brigade no longer participated in hostilities at this stage, being replenished with materiel - as of July 20, the brigade already numbered 125 tanks.

It should be noted that in this situation Zhukov violated the requirements of the Battle Regulations of the Red Army, and his own order: “I forbid introducing tank and armored units into battle against an enemy who has entrenched himself and prepared his defense without serious artillery preparation. When entering battle, these units must be reliably covered by artillery fire to avoid unnecessary losses.” The division commander acted at his own peril and risk, and contrary to the opinion of army commander G.M. Stern. However, Stern subsequently admitted that in that situation the decision made turned out to be correct - at any cost it was impossible to allow the Japanese to cut off our group on the bridgehead from crossings.

The Japanese did not expect a tank attack of such a scale, and at 20.20 on July 3, an order was given to withdraw troops from the bridgehead captured in the morning. Here is what the Japanese soldier Nakamura wrote about these events in his diary on July 3: “Several dozen tanks suddenly attacked our units. We were in terrible confusion, the horses neighed and ran away, dragging the limbers of the guns behind them; cars rushed in all directions. 2 of our planes were shot down in the air. The entire staff lost heart."

The withdrawal was to begin on the morning of July 4th. A group of Japanese troops on Mount Bayin-Tsagan found themselves semi-surrounded. By the evening of July 4, Japanese troops held only the top of Bain Tsagan, a narrow strip of terrain five kilometers long and two kilometers wide. The crossing lasted all day on July 4th and ended only at 6.00 am on July 5th. All this time, the Japanese crossing were subjected to artillery fire and air attacks. SB bombers carried out two sorties a day, but were unable to bomb the Japanese crossing. I-16 fighters with 20-mm cannons were also involved in air attacks.

These events became known as the “Bain-Tsagan Massacre.” The result of the battles on July 3-6 was that in the future, Japanese troops no longer dared to cross to the western bank of the Khalkhin Gol River. All further events took place on the eastern bank of the river.

As G.K. later wrote. Zhukov: “The experience of the battle in the Bayin-Tsagan area showed that in the form of tank and mechanized troops, skillfully interacting with aviation and mobile artillery, we have a decisive means for carrying out rapid operations with a decisive goal.”

Through the special department of the corps, a report was transmitted to Moscow, which landed on I.V.’s desk. Stalin, that division commander Zhukov “deliberately” threw a tank brigade into battle without reconnaissance and infantry escort. An investigative commission was sent from Moscow, headed by Deputy People's Commissar of Defense, Army Commander 1st Rank G.I. Kulik. However, he began to interfere in the operational control of the troops, inviting Zhukov to leave the bridgehead, so the People's Commissar of Defense reprimanded him in a telegram dated July 15 and recalled him to Moscow. After this, the head of the Main Political Directorate of the Red Army, Commissar 1st Rank L.Z., was sent to Khalkhin Gol. Mehlis with instructions from L.P. Beria to “check” Zhukov.

Attacks on July 8-11 and July 24-25 were also repulsed. In the night battle on July 8, the commander of the 149th Infantry Regiment, Major I.M., died heroically. Remizov. He was posthumously awarded the title of Hero of the Soviet Union. In one of the counterattacks on July 11, the commander of the 11th Tank Brigade, M. Yakovlev, was killed, raising the lying infantry, which did not want to follow the tanks. The 24th Motorized Rifle Regiment and two battalions of the 5th Rifle-Machine-Gun Brigade were additionally transferred to the bridgehead held by the 145th Motorized Rifle Regiment and the 603rd Regiment of the 82nd Infantry Division.

During the development of the offensive operation against Japanese troops, proposals were put forward both at the headquarters of the army group and at the General Staff of the Red Army to transfer combat operations from the territory of Mongolia to Manchurian territory, but these proposals were categorically rejected by the political leadership of the country.

The Japanese command, despite major losses, began preparing a general offensive timed to coincide with Germany's supposed outbreak of war in Europe. By special decree of the Japanese Emperor on August 10, the 6th Army was formed under the command of Ogisu Rippo, numbering about 55 thousand people (according to other sources - up to 85 thousand, including the army of the Manchukuo state) with 500 guns, 182 tanks and more than 500 aircraft.

They were opposed by 57 thousand soldiers of the Soviet-Mongolian army, having 542 guns and mortars, 498 tanks, 385 armored vehicles and 515 aircraft. In addition to the previously transferred 82nd Rifle Division from the Ural Military District, the 6th Tank Brigade (M.I. Pavelkin), the 57th Infantry Division (I.V. Galanin) and the 212th Airborne Brigade were additionally transferred from the ZabVO.

General coordination of actions was entrusted to front-line control headed by Army Commander 2nd Rank G.M. Stern, who ensured continuous supply of the advanced group of troops. People, military equipment, ammunition, and food had to be transported in vehicles along dirt roads. Moreover, the distance from the nearest unloading station to the combat area was more than 700 kilometers. Despite all the difficulties (the 1,400 km flight lasted five days), a two-week supply of ammunition was accumulated before the offensive.

The movement of vehicles and military equipment, as a rule, was carried out only at night with the strictest observance of blackout. When transferring new units, combined marches were widely used - the soldiers rode part of the way in cars, and covered the rest on foot.

As Zhukov later wrote:

“To carry out the upcoming very complex operation, we needed to transport the following along dirt roads from the supply station to the Khalkhin Gol River, a distance of 650 kilometers:
- artillery ammunition - 18,000 tons;
- ammunition for aviation - 6500 tons;
- various fuels and lubricants - 15,000 tons;
- food of all types - 4000 tons;
- fuel - 7500 tons;
- other cargo - 4000 tons.

To transport all these cargoes to the start of the operation, 4,900 vehicles were required, while the army group had only 2,636 vehicles at its disposal. After August 14, another 1,250 on-board vehicles and 375 tank trucks arrived from the Soviet Union began to be delivered. The main burden of transportation fell on military vehicles and combat vehicles, including artillery tractors. We decided to take such an extreme measure because, firstly, we had no other choice and, secondly, because we considered the defense of our troops to be quite stable.”

The troops carefully prepared for the offensive operation. In the immediate rear, warriors were trained in close combat techniques. We were introduced to the peculiarities of enemy tactics and defense. Particular attention in the classes was paid to the interaction of infantry with tanks, artillery and aviation in combat.

“In order to camouflage and keep our activities in the strictest confidence, the Military Council of the army group, simultaneously with the plan for the upcoming operation, developed a plan for operational-tactical deception of the enemy, which included:

Conducting covert movements and concentrations of arriving troops from the Soviet Union to strengthen the army group;
- secretive regroupings of forces and assets located in defense across the Khalkhin Gol River;
- carrying out secret crossings of troops and material supplies across the Khalkhin Gol River;
- carrying out reconnaissance of initial areas, sectors and directions for troops to operate;
- highly secret training of the tasks of all branches of the military participating in the upcoming operation;
- conducting covert additional reconnaissance by all types and branches of the military;
- issues of disinformation and deception of the enemy in order to mislead him regarding our intentions.

By these measures, we sought to create the impression among the enemy that there were no preparatory measures of an offensive nature on our side, to show that we were carrying out extensive work to organize defense, and only defense. For this purpose, it was decided that all movements, concentrations, and regroupings should be carried out only at night, when enemy air reconnaissance activities and visual observation were extremely limited.

Until August 17-18, it was strictly forbidden to withdraw troops to areas from which it was planned to launch attacks with the aim of our troops reaching the flanks and rear of the entire enemy group. The command staff carrying out reconnaissance on the ground had to travel in Red Army uniform and only in trucks.

We knew that the enemy was conducting radio reconnaissance and eavesdropping on telephone conversations, and we developed an entire program of radio and telephone messages for the purpose of disinformation. Negotiations were conducted only on the construction of defenses and preparing them for the autumn-winter campaign. Radio deception was based mainly on a code that could easily be deciphered.

Many thousands of leaflets and several reminders to fighters in defense were published. These leaflets and memos were planted on the enemy so that it could be seen in what direction the political preparation of the Soviet-Mongolian troops was going.”

General Ogisu and his staff also planned an offensive, which was scheduled for 24 August. At the same time, taking into account the sad experience of the battles on Mount Bain-Tsagan for the Japanese, this time an enveloping strike was planned on the right flank of the Soviet group. Crossing the river was not planned.

Early in the morning of August 20, having forestalled an enemy attack, Soviet artillery carried out a surprise artillery raid on Japanese command posts and anti-aircraft batteries. After the first fire raid there was a massive bomber strike, then artillery preparation lasting 2 hours 45 minutes. At the moment the fire was transferred from the front edge to the depths, Soviet rifle divisions, motorized armored and tank brigades launched attacks on the northern and southern flanks of the Japanese group.

Tanks rushed, raising the wind,
A formidable armor was advancing.
And the samurai flew to the ground
Under the pressure of steel and fire.

The main blow from the south was delivered by Potapov’s group, including the 57th Infantry Division and the 6th Tank Brigade. Alekseenko’s group (the new commander of the 11th Tank Brigade, replenished with BT-7 tanks to 200 vehicles) struck from the north. The maneuver of the 11th Tank Brigade was identical to that interrupted by the Japanese attack on July 3. The 9th Motorized Armored Brigade and the Airborne Brigade were in reserve. The center of the formation was the 82nd Rifle Division under the command of brigade commander D.E. Petrov. Also participating in the operation were the Mongol 6th and 8th Cavalry Divisions under the overall command of Marshal Khorlogiin Choibalsan.

Before a large-scale offensive, it was vital to obtain accurate intelligence about the opposing enemy, but obtaining this information had certain difficulties.

“The difficulty of obtaining information about the enemy was aggravated by the absence of a civilian population in the area of ​​​​operations from whom something could be learned. There were no defectors from the Japanese side. And the Barguts (Mongol herders living in the northwestern part of Manchuria) who fled to us, as a rule, knew nothing about the location and number of Japanese units and formations. We received the best data from reconnaissance in force. However, this data only covered the front line and the nearest artillery and mortar firing positions.

Our reconnaissance aircraft provided good aerial photographs of the depth of the defense, but given that the enemy usually made extensive use of dummies and other deceptive actions, we had to be very careful in our conclusions and establish through repeated checks what was real and what was false.

It was rare for small reconnaissance groups to penetrate into the depths of the enemy’s defenses, since the Japanese had a very good look at the terrain in the area where their troops were located.”

The northern and southern attack groups crossed to the western shore of Khalkhin Gol only on the night of July 19. This ensured the surprise of the attack on the morning of July 20.

“By dawn, everything had to be hidden in the thickets along the river in prepared shelters. The artillery equipment, mortars, means of propulsion and various equipment were carefully covered with camouflage nets made from local scrap materials. Tank units were withdrawn to their original areas in small groups from different directions, immediately before the start of artillery and air preparation. Their speed allowed them to do it.”

Poor reconnaissance work was again revealed: the northern group was unable to immediately break through the defense, the key to which, as it turned out, was the heavily fortified height of “Palea”. During the offensive of the southern group, the 6th Tank Brigade was late in crossing - the pontoon bridge built by the sappers could not withstand the weight of the tanks. The crossing and concentration of the brigade were completely completed by the end of the day.

By the end of the day, the rifle troops had advanced up to 12 km, overcoming desperate resistance, and began to encircle the Japanese army, and the mechanized units reached the Mongolian-Chinese border.

On August 22, the Japanese troops, having come to their senses, fought stubborn defensive battles, so G.K. Zhukov had to bring the reserve 9th motorized armored brigade into the battle.

On August 23, in the central sector of the front, G. K. Zhukov even had to bring his last reserve into battle: an airborne brigade and two companies of border guards, although in doing so he took considerable risks. By the end of the day, the main forces of the 6th Army were surrounded on Mongolian territory, unable to retreat towards China, which they occupied.

On August 24, four regiments of the Japanese army nevertheless went on the offensive from the territory of Manchuria according to plan, but were driven back by the 80th Infantry Regiment, which was covering the border.

On August 24 and 25 alone, SB bombers made 218 combat group sorties and dropped about 96 tons of bombs on the enemy. During these two days, fighters shot down about 70 Japanese aircraft in air battles.

On August 27, Soviet troops split the Japanese group into two parts and, despite the fanatical tenacity of the Yamato soldiers, by the morning of August 31, the resistance of the remnants of the 6th Army was suppressed. The Red Army captured about 200 guns, 100 vehicles, 400 machine guns, 12 thousand rifles and a lot of ammunition as trophies.

In September, senior teacher of the General Staff Academy A.I. was appointed chief of staff of the 1st Army Group. Gastilovich (following the Great Patriotic War - lieutenant general, commander of the 18th Army of the 4th Ukrainian Front). The reasons for Bogdanov's removal are not advertised. G.K. Zhukov does not mention him at all in his “Memoirs and Reflections”, getting off with the dry impersonal “chief of staff” - “the development of the plan for the general offensive at the headquarters of the army group was personally carried out by the commander, a member of the Military Council, the head of the political department, the chief of staff, the head of the operational department.” Perhaps a conflict occurred between the categorical corps commander, who sought, first of all, for unity of command in his army group, and his chief of staff, which, unlike the Cold War with Stern, escalated into an open phase, after which they decided to separate the opponents. Bogdanov's removal could have a more prosaic explanation, for example, due to injury or illness. Because the hero of Spain and Khalkhin Gol will not receive his next assignment very soon - only in December 1941 corps commander Bogdanov will receive the 461st Infantry Division.

The fighting ended only on September 16. During the entire battle, the losses of the Japanese side in killed, wounded and prisoners ranged from 61 to 67 thousand people, according to various estimates (of which about 25 thousand were irrevocable). Including about 45 thousand in July-August 1939. The Japanese lost a large amount of weapons and military equipment, lost 160 aircraft (according to other sources - up to 600).

The total losses of the Soviet-Mongolian troops ranged from 18.5 to 23 thousand, according to various estimates, 108 tanks and 207 aircraft. Of these, the losses of the Red Army: 6831 people were killed, 1143 were missing, 15,251 were wounded.

After the end of hostilities, Stalin received Zhukov and noted his actions by appointing him commander of the largest and most important military district - Kyiv. Thus, the “Hassan syndrome” of 1938, which cost the life of Marshal Blucher, was overcome in the military clash with Japan.

At a report by I.V. Stalin G.K. Zhukov assessed the imperial army opposing him as follows:

“The Japanese soldier is well trained, especially for close combat. Disciplined, efficient and tenacious in battle, especially defensively. The junior command staff is very well prepared and fights with fanatical tenacity. As a rule, junior commanders do not surrender and do not hesitate to face hara-kiri. The officers, especially senior and senior officers, are poorly trained, have little initiative and are inclined to act according to a template. As for the technical state of the Japanese army, I consider it backward. Japanese tanks like our MS-1 are clearly outdated, poorly armed and with a small power reserve. I must also say that at the beginning of the campaign, Japanese aircraft beat our aircraft. Their planes were superior to ours until we received the improved Chaika and I-16. Our artillery was superior to the Japanese in every respect, especially in shooting. In general, our troops are significantly higher than the Japanese. The Mongolian troops, having received experience, hardening and support from units of the Red Army, fought well, especially their armored division on Mount Bain-Tsagan. It must be said that the Mongol cavalry was sensitive to air raids and artillery fire and suffered heavy losses.”

G.M. Stern and G.K. Zhukov received the high title of Hero of the Soviet Union for the battles at Khalkhin Gol. In addition, in 1972, by Decree of the Great People's Khural of the Mongolian People's Republic, Zhukov was awarded the title of Hero of the Mongolian People's Republic for his participation in the defeat of Japanese troops at Khalkhin Gol.

I'M IN. Smushkevich became Twice Hero of the Soviet Union.

Chief of Staff of the 1st Army Group, Brigade Commander M.A. Bogdanov did not receive any awards for Khalkhin Gol, and ended the Great Patriotic War as commander of the 8th Guards Airborne Division with the rank of major general. Some modern researchers believe that it was he who played a key role in the general encirclement and defeat of the Japanese troops, but there is no documentary evidence of this version. Bogdanov was noted as an excellent methodologist, an officer with a broad outlook and great knowledge. He personally supervised many tactical exercises, but upsurges of military thought similar to Khalkhin Gol can no longer be traced in his career.

At the beginning of hostilities in the area of ​​the Khalkhin Gol River, Ivan Ivanovich Fedyuninsky held the position of assistant regiment commander for economic affairs, then headed the 24th Motorized Rifle Regiment. At the end of hostilities, I.I. Fedyuninsky was appointed commander of the 82nd division. In the first period of the Patriotic War, this division fought extremely stubbornly in the Mozhaisk direction. Major General Fedyuninsky successfully commanded the Rifle Corps on the Southwestern Front, and then the 42nd Army near Leningrad.

Divisional Commissioner M.S. Nikishev died in Ukraine at the beginning of the Great Patriotic War, where he was a member of the Military Council of the 5th Army of the Southwestern Front.

Brigade commander Mikhail Ivanovich Potapov, who led the main strike group on the southern flank of the army group, commanded the 5th Army of the Southwestern Front during the Great Patriotic War.

G.M. During the Finnish War, Stern commanded the 8th Army (in continuous heavy battles it inflicted serious losses on the Finns, most of all in artillery and aviation, but failed to fully complete the task assigned to it by the main command), in 1940 he received the Order of the Red Star and the rank of Colonel General .

I'M IN. In 1940, Smushkevich received the military rank of lieutenant general of aviation, the position of inspector general of the Red Army Air Force, and in December of the same year - assistant chief of the General Staff of the Red Army for aviation.

October 28, 1941 G.M. Stern, Ya.V. Smushkevich, P.V. Rychagov and other high-ranking officers were shot on charges of participation in a military conspiratorial organization. The name of the army commander G.M. Stern was erased from textbooks, and Khalkhin Gol for a long time seemed to be the sole victory of G.K. Zhukova.

In 1954, those convicted in this case were posthumously rehabilitated with the wording “for lack of evidence of a crime.”

After Japan's defeat in this border conflict, Prince Konoe admitted to the German Ambassador Ott: “I realized that it will take another two years to achieve the level of technology, weapons and mechanization that the Red Army showed in the battles in the Khalkhin Gol region.” At the negotiations that took place after the end of the fighting, the representative of the Japanese command, General Fujimoto, told the chairman of the Soviet commission, Zhukov’s deputy, brigade commander Mikhail Potapov: “Yes, you have placed us very low...”

The Mongolian people warmly thanked the soldiers and commanders of the Red Army who protected them from Japanese aggression:

“On behalf of all the working people of Mongolia, we warmly welcome you, the defenders of our Motherland from the Japanese invaders, and congratulate you on the successful encirclement and complete defeat of the samurai who made their way to our land.

Our people will write in golden letters into the history of the struggle for their freedom and independence your heroic fight against the Japanese pack in the area of ​​the Khalkhin Gol River. If it were not for your fraternal, selfless help, we would not have an independent Mongolian revolutionary state. If it were not for the help of the Soviet state, we would have faced the same fate as the people of Manchuria are experiencing. The Japanese invaders would have destroyed and plundered our land and the brotherhood of labor. This did not happen and will never happen, since the Soviet Union helps us and saves us from the Japanese invasion.

Thank you and thank you to the Soviet people!”

And this gratitude was not empty words. In 1941 alone, the Mongolian People's Republic received 140 carriages of various gifts for Soviet soldiers totaling 65 million tugriks. Vneshtorgbank received 2 million 500 thousand tugriks and 100 thousand American dollars, 300 kilograms of gold. 53 tanks were built, of which 32 were T-34 tanks, on the sides of which were the glorious names of Sukhbaatar and other heroes of the MPR. Many of these tanks reached Berlin as part of the 112th Tank Brigade of the 1st Guards Tank Army.

In addition to tanks, the Mongolian Arat aviation squadron was transferred to the Soviet Air Force. She became part of the 2nd Orsha Guards Aviation Regiment. The Mongolian Arat squadron carried out a victorious battle path throughout the war. In 1941-42, 35 thousand horses were donated to the Red Army, which were used to equip Soviet cavalry units.

When in 1945 the Soviet government, in accordance with an agreement with its allies in the anti-Hitler coalition, declared war on Japan, the Mongolian army, led personally by H. Choibalsan and Y. Tsedenbal, acted on the right wing of the Soviet troops, as part of the Soviet-Mongolian cavalry mechanized group under the command of General I. A. Pliev.

For skillful leadership of military operations, Marshal of the MPR X. Choibalsan was awarded the Order of Suvorov, 1st degree, and Yu. Tsedenbal was awarded the Order of Kutuzov, 1st degree. 26 people were awarded the Order of the Red Banner, the Order of Glory II degree - 13 people, the medal "For Courage" - 82 people.

The successful completion of military operations at Lake Khasan and on the Khalkhin Gol River on the eve of the Second World War saved the USSR from the serious threat of a war on two fronts.

2010-11-22 at 15:12

Life is good!

Thanks for the article, interesting

2010-11-22 at 15:33

"You can beg for anything! Money, fame, power, but not your Motherland... Especially one like my Russia"

2010-11-22 at 16:15

On January 12, 1918, the Japanese battleship Iwami appeared in the Vladivostok roadstead. Two days later, the Japanese cruiser Asahi and the English cruiser Suffolk entered the Golden Horn Bay.
The Japanese consul in Vladivostok hastened to assure local authorities that the warships had arrived to protect Japanese citizens living there. The need for such protection was proven quite quickly. On April 4, in Vladivostok, unknown persons killed two Japanese, employees of the local branch of one of the Japanese companies. The very next morning, a Japanese military force landed in Vladivostok. Thus began open military intervention in the Far East of Soviet Russia.
However, at the first stage, military operations were carried out by detachments of White Guards under the leadership of atamans Semenov, Kalmykov and Gamov, armed with money from Japan and the United States. The uprising of the Czechoslovak legionnaires, who captured a number of cities in Siberia and the Far East along the Trans-Siberian Railway, also played into the hands of the interventionists. On August 2, 1918, the Japanese government announced that it would send troops to Vladivostok to assist the Czechoslovak corps. On the same day, Japanese troops captured Nikolaevsk-on-Amur, where there were no Czech legionnaires. Soon American, British and French troops began to land in Vladivostok. The joint expeditionary force of interventionists was headed by the Japanese General Otani.
By the beginning of October 1918, the number of Japanese troops in the Russian Far East reached 70 thousand people. They captured railways and ships of the Amur Flotilla, gradually expanding the occupation zone. Meanwhile, the situation in Japan itself was very alarming. In August 1918, “rice riots” broke out in the country. By this time, the contrast between the speculators who had profited during the war years and the poor people of the city and village, who had lost the opportunity to make ends meet, had become especially striking. But government officials continued to rake out the remaining grain from peasant barns for the needs of the army. In addition, a considerable number of recruits were needed to be sent to Russia. The anger of the masses has reached its limit.
In the ranks of the Japanese Expeditionary Force, cases of soldiers disobeying officers became more frequent, soldier riots occurred, and there were cases of Japanese military personnel defecting to the side of the Red Army and partisans. Anti-war propaganda among the troops was carried out by Japanese socialists and communists.
In February-May 1920, events occurred in Nikolaevsk-on-Amur that were used to justify the intervention and its expansion. The city, occupied by Japanese troops, was besieged by a red partisan detachment. On February 28, as a result of negotiations, an agreement “On Peace and Friendship between the Japanese and Russians” was concluded, according to which the partisans peacefully entered the city. However, on March 12, an armed conflict began. As a result, the Japanese were defeated, and some of them were captured. A month later, a large Japanese contingent was sent to Nikolaevsk. During the retreat, the commander of the partisan detachment ordered the shooting of all prisoners (including the Japanese), as well as all residents who refused to leave the city with him.
Japanese troops occupied Northern Sakhalin, justifying this by the need to “pay for the blood” of Japanese soldiers who died during the intervention.
The brutal civil war in European Russia tied the hands of the government in Moscow. Unable to openly oppose intervention in the Far East, it proposed in April 1920 the creation of a democratic Far Eastern Republic (FER) as a buffer state between the RSFSR and Japan. The Far Eastern Republic united the entire Russian territory from Vladivostok to Lake Baikal. The Japanese refused to recognize the government of the Far Eastern Republic and continued to provide assistance to Ataman Semenov, who kept Chita under his control.
But the Japanese troops failed to stay in Transbaikalia. Under the blows of the People's Revolutionary Army, they were forced to retreat to Khabarovsk. In August 1920, the Japanese government sent an order to the headquarters of its expeditionary force in Siberia, which stated: “The general situation in Europe, the victories of the Soviet armies on the Polish front, the increasing danger from the Soviet government, the perceived antipathy on the part of the United States and China<…>are forcing us to abandon our occupation plans in Siberia for some time, remaining, however, in the places where our troops are located."
The occupied zone of the Far East continued to shrink steadily. In October 1920, the Japanese left Khabarovsk. Together with the White Guards, they organized armed coups in a number of cities in Primorye, trying to wrest power from the hands of the government of the Far Eastern Republic. A pro-Japanese government of the Merkulov brothers was formed in Vladivostok. At the same time, attempts were made with the help of the White Guard formations of Ataman Semenov, General Sychev, and Baron Ungern to return to the Amur region and Transbaikalia. These plans could not be realized, and Japan was forced to enter into peace negotiations with the government of the Far Eastern Republic. In August 1921, in Dairen, the Japanese presented representatives of the Far Eastern Republic with a draft agreement, which in its nature was reminiscent of the ultimatum “21 demands” to China of 1915. Among other points in the agreement were demands to grant Japanese subjects the right to own land, develop mining and forestry industries and complete freedom trade, as well as freedom of navigation of Japanese ships along the Amur and in coastal waters, to turn Vladivostok into a “free port” under foreign control. Finally, Japan demanded that, as compensation for losses incurred during the intervention, the northern part of Sakhalin Island be leased for 80 years.
These demands met a decisive rebuff from the government of the Far Eastern Republic, and in April 1922, the Dairen Conference, which had lasted for nine months, was interrupted. The Japanese, with the help of the White Guards, reoccupied Khabarovsk. The People's Revolutionary Army, together with the partisans, went on the offensive. After a decisive battle on February 12 near Volochaevka, the Whites rolled back south under the protection of Japanese bayonets. The government of the Merkulov brothers resigned. The former Kolchak General Diterikhs became the “ruler”. But this could no longer change the course of events. On August 15, 1922, the Japanese military command announced the upcoming evacuation from Primorye.
In September 1922, a new peace conference was opened in Changchun, China, designed to regulate relations between the Far Eastern Republic and Japan. The Japanese again offered the Russians a slightly modernized, but absolutely unacceptable version of the Dairen project, while at the same time refusing to document the timing of the withdrawal of their troops from Northern Sakhalin. After three weeks of fruitless debate, the conference ended inconclusively.
In October, the People's Revolutionary Army of the Far Eastern Republic resumed its offensive against the White Guards, defeated Diterikhs' troops and, having stormed the Spassk fortifications, approached Vladivostok. It was impossible to wait any longer, and the Japanese command announced the withdrawal of its troops from Primorye on October 25, 1922. On this day, the partisans occupied Vladivostok, and already on November 15, 1922, the All-Russian Central Executive Committee declared the Far Eastern Republic an integral part of the RSFSR. The intervention ended in complete failure. But the Japanese remained in Northern Sakhalin, from where they left only in 1925, after the establishment of diplomatic relations with the USSR. The march of the Japanese army at Vladivostok city.

The Illustration of the Siberian War, no. 3.
The battle of Usri, Siberia. Captain Konomi died in the battle, fighting.

The Illustration of the Siberian War, no. 4.
The Japanese army defeated the German-Austrian Army near Usri, Siberia.

The Illustration of the Siberian War, no. 5.
The first battle near Manturia. The Japanese soldiers defeated the enemy's cavalry.

The Illustration of the Siberian War, no. 6.
The brilliant exploit of the Noshido(?) Infantry Company destroyed rail road, going around the back of the ememy.

The Illustration of the Siberian War, no. 7.
The Japanese cavalry taken possession of Khobarovsk pursuing and attacking the enemies.

The Illustration of the Siberian War, no. 8.
The Japanese cavalry advanced furiously in storm.

The Illustration of the Siberian War, no. 9.
The Japanese army occupied Habalofsk -- Amur Fleet surrendered.

The Illustration of the Siberian War, no. 10.
Furious fighting at Amur.

It was the first award established in the USSR. During the Civil War, Red Army soldiers were awarded the Order of the Red Banner. At that time it was the highest award. In 1924, it was replaced by the Order of the Red Banner, but it was decided to consider these awards to be of equal value.

This could mark not only people, but also military formations, units and ships. After the award they were called “Red Banners”. This award is worn on the left side of the chest.

The order was awarded to military personnel, employees of the Ministry of Internal Affairs and special services, citizens of the USSR and other states for outstanding services. The award was given for ensuring state security, courage and bravery in a combat situation, excellent leadership of combat operations, and special missions. If a person was given the Order of the Red Banner for the second time (third or fourth, etc.), then the corresponding number was engraved on it, depending on the type of award.

The award is made in the form of a sign depicting an unfurled red banner with the call: “Workers of all countries, unite!” The lower circumference of the order is surrounded by a ribbon with the inscription: “USSR”. In the central part on a white enamel background there is a rifle, a shaft, a torch, a plow and a hammer. They are covered by a star. In its center there is a hammer and sickle with a laurel wreath. The upper rays of the star are covered with a banner. On repeated awards, the corresponding number is marked on the bottom of the white shield. The star's rays, ribbon and banner are covered with ruby ​​red enamel, the plow, hammer and rifle are oxidized, and the wreaths and other images are gilded.

Like many USSR awards and WWII medals, the order is made of silver, of which it contains about 22.719 grams. Its total weight is about 25.134 grams. The width of the award is 36.3 mm and the height is 41 mm. Using a ring and an eyelet, it is connected to a pentagonal block, which is covered with a silk moire ribbon. In its middle there is a white longitudinal stripe, closer to the edges there is one red stripe on the right and left, and along the edges there is one white stripe. The block has a pentagonal shape. Until 1932, the order was worn on a bow in the shape of a red rosette.

Until the 30s, this insignia was used to mark heroes of the revolution and security officers. In 1929, it was awarded to many participants in the incident on the Chinese Eastern Railway. The Chinese then tried to seize the railway, but were defeated. This conflict was one of the first for the young state. In 1937, the Order of the Red Banner was often awarded to Soviet soldiers who participated in hostilities in Spain. It was awarded to participants in the incident near the Khalkhin Gol River, as well as to those who took part in the Soviet-Finnish conflict.

During the Patriotic War, 238,000 people and 3,148 formations and units were awarded this award. This was the most widespread order of the Second World War. After the war, it was awarded for special merits and participation in various local conflicts, including internationalist soldiers who fought in Afghanistan. During the existence of the USSR, 581,333 awards were made. Only eight people received the award with the number “7” and only Air Marshal I.I. Pstygo was awarded this honor 8 times.

After the end of the armed conflict near the Khalkhin Gol River, which occurred in 1939, the Mongolian government founded the sign “Participant in the battles at Khalkhin Gol.” The corresponding Decree of the Great People's Khural appeared on September 16, 1940. This award was intended to be presented to both Mongolian and Soviet soldiers.

Award procedure

The leadership of the USSR, apparently for political reasons, did not establish an award to commemorate the victory at Khalkhin Gol. The Mongolian government assumed this responsibility. At the end of 1966, the badge received the status of a medal.

Previously, it was believed that this Mongolian badge was not awarded to the Red Army soldiers, because those who distinguished themselves in battle were rewarded with USSR awards. They were awarded the Order of the Red Star and the medal "For Courage". In fact, it was calculated that the badge would be given to the Mongolian and Soviet fighters who fought in that place.

However, only those Red Army soldiers who remained to serve in the Transbaikal Military District received the Khalkhin Gol badges. The soldiers who, after the end of the conflict, went to permanent duty stations did not receive awards. This, for example, happened to the personnel of the 1st Bomber Aviation Regiment.

The outbreak of the Second World War prevented the completion of the award process. The first of them was carried out in 1942, the last in 1973. Among the most famous recipients of the award is Marshal G.K. Zhukov and Secretary General of the CPSU L.I. Brezhnev.

Badge design

The badge is made in the form of a circle, the surface of which is covered with blue enamel. On it is a silver fighter riding on a horse. His right hand is extended forward, holding a saber. Under the flying horse is a mountain range. A scarlet enamel banner flutters above the fighter. It says "August 1939". Below is a scarlet ribbon with the inscription “HALHINGOL”. The month of August, which is mentioned on the badge, became a turning point in the armed conflict.

The badge was minted at the mint. However, there are examples of the award made in a handicraft way in some Mongolian workshops.

What preceded the conflict

The Battle of Khalkhin Gol is an armed conflict with Japan that took place on Mongolian territory near the Khalkhin Gol River, which flows near the Manchurian border. They lasted from the end of spring to the beginning of autumn 1939. The result was the complete defeat of the Japanese. In Japan, many people call this conflict the 2nd Russo-Japanese War.

Since the end of the 19th century, Japan has made every effort to become one of the superpowers. Little by little she annexed more and more territories. Gradually, Japanese militarists captured Taiwan and Korea. In 1932, Manchuria was occupied, and 5 years later the invasion of central China began.

Plans were hatched to seize the Soviet Far East. Beginning in 1936, armed conflicts provoked by the Japanese constantly occurred on the border with Manchuria, which at that time was called Manchukuo. To prevent the plans of the Japanese military from being realized and a major war not breaking out, in the Mongolian People's Republic since 1936, according to a mutual assistance agreement, the 57th Separate Corps, numbering about 20 thousand military personnel, was stationed.

Japan declared its claims to the territory east of the Khalkhin Gol River. In reality, the border was 25 km to the east. The fact is that Japan was building a railway near the border and thus wanted to ensure its safety. The first conflicts on the border of Mongolia and Manchukuo began to occur in 1935.

In 1938, battles between Soviet and Japanese troops took place near Lake Khasan for 3 weeks. The Japanese were driven back. After this, cases of Japanese attacks on Mongolian border guards became more frequent.

Beginning of the conflict - May

On the night of May 8, a group of Japanese soldiers tried to occupy one of the islands on Khalkhin Gol, but their attack was repulsed. After 3 days, 300 Japanese cavalrymen with machine guns broke through 15 kilometers deep into Mongolian territory. They attacked the Mongolian border post, but were also driven back to the border. This date is considered the beginning of the conflict.

After another 3 days, 300 Japanese cavalrymen, supported by aviation, attacked the 7th border outpost and managed to capture the Dungur-Obo heights. The next day, significant reinforcements arrived. Soviet units were sent to this place, which crossed the river on May 22 and forced the Japanese to return to the border.

Until May 28, there was a concentration of forces on both sides. On May 28, the Japanese launched an attack, planning to encircle the enemy and make sure that he could not cross to the west bank of the river. Their attempt failed, but the Soviet soldiers were forced to retreat; however, on the 29th, as a result of a counteroffensive, the enemy was driven back.

Events of June

There were no battles on the ground in June. But a real war in the air began in the sky. At first, Japan had the advantage. However, ours soon received significant reinforcements - Soviet ace pilots arrived in Mongolia and began training pilots. At the beginning of June, G.K. took command of the 57th Corps. Zhukov. A new action plan was developed, involving a counterattack. Forces began to gather towards this place.

On June 20, fighting in the air intensified. In just a few days, over 50 Japanese planes were shot down. On the 27th, the Japanese bombed Soviet airfields and destroyed 19 aircraft. Fortifications were built on the eastern bank of the river throughout June. Modern aircraft were deployed. As a result, since June 22, our pilots managed to gain air supremacy.

July events

On July 2, the Japanese went on the offensive. They crossed the river, captured the heights of Bayan-Tsagan, and began to actively build fortifications there. The plan was to go to the rear of our troops from there and destroy them. There were also battles on the eastern bank of the river. At first, the Japanese were successful. Zhukov brought the newly arrived tank brigade into battle.

Battles also took place near Bayan-Tsagan. In total, about 400 tanks and over 800 artillery pieces took part in them. There were several hundred planes in the sky. As a result, the Japanese were able to be captured in a semicircle. On July 5, the enemy began to retreat. To prevent defeat, the Japanese command ordered the destruction of the only bridge across the river. But the outcome was a foregone conclusion. Several thousand Japanese were killed at Bayan-Tsagan.

But the Japanese leadership did not calm down and made plans for the next operations. Therefore, Zhukov began to develop an offensive plan that involved the complete defeat of enemy forces located on the territory of the Mongolian People's Republic. Reinforcements were constantly arriving.

On July 8, the Japanese went on the attack again and managed to push our units back to the river. Although the enemy even managed to capture the heights, our troops returned them to their original positions a few days later. Until the 22nd there was relative calm. On the 23rd the Japanese offensive began, but was unsuccessful.

August events

The decisive offensive of our troops took place on August 20. Our command managed to do this before the enemies, who expected an attack 4 days later. First there was artillery preparation, then an air raid. The Japanese soldiers stubbornly resisted, so they managed to advance a maximum of a kilometer.

The next day the Japanese strengthened their defenses. They fought stubbornly, to the last man. As a result, we had to use even our last reserve. But it was all in vain. On the 24th, units of the Kwantung Army arrived and entered the battle, but were unable to break through. As a result, they went back to Manchukuo.

Fighting continued on the 29th and 30th; by August 31st, the territory of the Mongolian People's Republic was completely liberated from the Japanese. But they didn't give up. On September 4, they took the peak of Eris-Ulyn-Obo, but their attack was repulsed. On the 8th the attempt was repeated, the result was the same. After this there were only air battles.

A peace agreement between the parties was signed on September 15. But the final agreement was signed only in the spring of 1942. It operated until 1945.

Results of the conflict

The victory over Japan at Khalkhin Gol was one of the reasons that this country did not attack the USSR during WWII. In addition, a myth has developed about the invincibility of the Red Army in a future war. This conflict marked the beginning of the career of G.K. Zhukov. Before that, he was a division commander practically unknown to anyone. Afterwards he headed the Kiev Military District, after which he became the chief of the General Staff of the spacecraft.

According to official data, the Japanese lost over 61 thousand killed, wounded and prisoners. On the Soviet and Mongolian side, 9.8 thousand people were killed. Of these, 895 were Mongol warriors.