Napoleon's Italian campaign. Beginning of a commander's career. Italian campaign (1796-1797) Italian campaign 1796 1797

1796 General maritime list. Part II. pp. 378–379. The decree on this was received on February 24, 1769: RGAVMF. F. 212. Op. 4. D. 2. L.

1797 Sokolov A.K. Decree. op. P. 22.

Bonaparte arrived in Nice, the main headquarters of the Italian army, on March 27, 1796. General Scherer handed him command and brought him up to date. Although the army numbered one hundred and six thousand men, there were actually only thirty-eight thousand under arms; of these, eight thousand formed the garrisons of Nice and the coastal zone; No more than thirty thousand people could go on a campaign. The remaining seventy thousand were dead souls; they dropped out - prisoners, deserters, died, lay in hospitals, transferred to other military units.

The army was hungry, naked, barefoot. Salaries had not been paid for a long time, there was little artillery; there were only thirty guns. There were not enough horses. The army included two cavalry divisions, but they numbered only two thousand five hundred sabers.

The enemy army in the Italian theater numbered eighty thousand people with two hundred guns, therefore, two and a half times larger than the French. It had almost seven times more artillery.

The Austro-Sardinian army was commanded by Field Marshal Beaulieu, a Belgian by birth, a participant in the Seven Years' War. The age of both commanders was determined by the same numbers, but in different combinations: Beaulieu was seventy-two years old, Bonaparte was twenty-seven years old.

The military history of the Italian campaign of 1796–1797 was described and analyzed by such major authorities as Bonaparte, Clausewitz, Jomini, and developed in detail in a number of special military historical works. There is therefore no need to describe in detail the course of military operations. Let us dwell only on those issues that were significant for Bonaparte’s subsequent life.

Heading into the Italian army, Bonaparte knew that according to the general plan of military operations of 1796, approved by the Directory, the main tasks were assigned to the so-called army of the Sambre-Meuse under the command of Jourdan and the Army of the Rhine, led by General Moreau. Both of these armies were supposed to inflict a decisive defeat on the Austrians in southern Germany and pave the way to Vienna. The Italian army was assigned a supporting role: it was supposed to divert part of the enemy forces to itself. Napoleon Bonaparte saw his tasks differently. It is usually emphasized that for Bonaparte the Italian campaign of 1796 was the first large-scale military operation in his life, and that during ten to eleven years of service in the army he did not even have to command a regiment.

These considerations are generally correct, but they lose sight of the fact that Bonaparte had been preparing for a campaign in Italy for a long time. Beginning in 1794, he drew up several versions of carefully developed plans for offensive operations in Italy. For two years, he perfectly studied the map of the future theater of military operations; as Clausewitz put it, he “knew the Apennines like his own pocket.” Bonaparte's plan was basically simple. The French were opposed in Italy by two main forces: the Austrian army and the army of the Piedmontese king - the “gatekeeper of the Alps,” as Bonaparte called him. The task was to separate these forces, deal decisive blows first of all to the Piedmontese army, force Piedmont to peace and then fall with all its might on the Austrians.

The plan was simple, and that was its irresistible power. The main difficulty was how to translate this idea into practice. The enemy was significantly superior in strength. It was possible to eliminate such an advantage only by achieving superiority in speed and maneuverability.

This tactical decision was not Bonaparte's discovery. It was a skillful application of the experience accumulated by the armies of Republican France during three and a half years of war against a coalition of European monarchies. These were new principles of warfare created by the revolution, new strategy and tactics, and Bonaparte, like a son of his time, mastered them perfectly.

And, completing his long journey from Paris to Nice, Bonaparte flew by express and drove, drove the horses in order to quickly move from plans to action.

A few days after arriving in Nice, General Bonaparte gave the order to the army to set out on a campaign.

It would, of course, be wrong to imagine that Bonaparte, having taken command of the Italian army, immediately followed the path of victory and glory, without experiencing any difficulties or failures. In reality, this was not and could not be.

In the coverage of the Italian campaign - Bonaparte's first major campaign, which brought him pan-European fame - two opposite extremes were observed in historical literature. Some authors, primarily Ferrero, in every possible way downplayed Bonaparte's merits in the campaign of 1796 - they reduced his role to a simple function of executing the orders of the Directory (or Carnot's plans) or even accused him of appropriating the fruits of the successes and victories of his subordinates.

On the contrary, historians, inclined to apology for their hero, extolled his personal merits in every possible way and painted with a generous brush the obstacles that only Napoleon’s genius could overcome. Such authors, in particular, were especially willing to talk about the resistance, almost the rebellion, that the old military generals raised when they met the young commander-in-chief. Researchers of modern times (let's name, for example, Rene Valentin and others) drew attention to the fact that such resistance by the generals subordinate to Bonaparte was impossible, if only because parts of the Italian army were stationed in different points: Massena was in Savoy, Augereau in Pietra, La Harpe - in Voltri and so on. Both of these opposing tendencies, precisely because they represented extremes, gave a one-sided and therefore incorrect image. The truth was somewhere in the middle.

Arriving in the Italian army, Bonaparte faced numerous difficulties, including personal ones. Who was Bonaparte in the eyes of experienced, combat commanders of the Italian army? An upstart, “General Vandemiere.” There was a clear sense of mockery in this nickname. It wasn't a matter of age. Ghosh was appointed commander at the age of twenty-five, but he had Dunkirk and victories over the British and Austrians behind him. Bonaparte earned his general's epaulettes not in battles with foreign armies, but through exploits against the rebellious French. His military biography did not give him the right to the title of commander in chief.

Bonaparte still had many external vestiges of his Corsican origins. Not only his accent, unusual for French ears, clearly proved that Italian speech was native to him. He made gross phonetic and semantic errors in French. He pronounced the word “infantry” (infanterie) so that it sounded like “children” (enfanterie); he said “section”, meaning session; he confused the meaning of the words “truce” and “amnesty” (armistice et amnistie) and made many other gross mistakes. He also wrote with spelling errors. Subordinates noticed everything about the commander-in-chief; they did not forgive him a single mistake, not a single blunder.

Even before the commander arrived in the army, he was given offensive nicknames. Some called him a “Corsican intriguer,” some “the general of the alcove,” some “the military man from the hallway.” When they saw the short, thin, pale, casually dressed general, the mocking gossip intensified. Someone coined the word “gringalet”, and it stuck. Bonaparte understood that he needed to break the ice of mistrust and prejudice of the highest and senior commanders of the army; he understood that it was impossible to achieve the tasks that he set for himself by the force of an order alone.

In the Italian army there were four generals equal to him in rank: Massena, Augereau, Laharpe, Serurier, just like him, had the rank of division generals, but, of course, surpassed him in combat experience.

The most authoritative among them was Andre Massena. He was eleven years older than Napoleon and had learned a lot in life. He lost his father early, ran away from his relatives at the age of thirteen, joined a merchant ship as a cabin boy, sailed on it for four years, then entered the army as a soldier in 1775. He served in the army for fourteen years, but his non-noble origins blocked the path to promotion; he left the army in 1789, having achieved only the rank of sergeant's stripes. After retiring, Massena got married, opened a shop, and was involved in smuggling. After the revolution, he joined the National Guard and became a captain; During the war he was elected commander of a battalion of volunteers. After a year of service in the army of revolutionary France, in August 1793, he was promoted to brigadier general.

Then he successfully fought in the Maritime Alps and distinguished himself during the capture of Toulon. For Toulon he was promoted to general of division.

General Thiébault, who first saw Massena in 1796, left a colorful portrait of him: “Massen received neither upbringing nor even primary education, but his entire appearance bore the stamp of energy and insight; he had an eagle's gaze, and in the very manner of holding his head high and slightly turned to the left there was an imposing dignity and defiant courage. His commanding gestures, his ardor, his extremely concise speech, which proved the clarity of his thoughts... everything revealed in him a man created to command and dispose...” Marmont spoke of him in similar expressions: “In his iron body was hidden a fiery soul... no one ever was not braver than him."

Augereau, who was usually spoken of disparagingly, was in his own way also an extraordinary person. He was born in 1757 into a poor family of a footman and a greengrocer in the Parisian suburb of Saint-Marceau; At the age of seventeen he joined the army as a soldier, deserted from it, then served in the Prussian, Russian, Spanish, Portuguese, Neapolitan troops, abandoning them when he got tired of it. In between, Augereau supplemented himself with dancing and fencing lessons, duels, and kidnapping other people's wives; an adventurer and raider, he wandered around the world in search of adventure, until the revolution opened up the opportunity for him to return to his homeland. In 1790, he joined the National Guard and, like an experienced man and by no means a timid one, began to quickly push forward. According to the general judgment of his contemporaries, Augereau was a brave soldier. However, in a peaceful environment, it was difficult for colleagues to discern where courage ends and arrogance begins.

General Sérurier was the eldest in age and military experience; he served as an officer in the old army. They treated him with distrust, but took into account his experience and knowledge. This silent, reserved general, who had seen a lot in his life, but due to the vicissitudes of fate was prone to pessimism, enjoyed great authority among the troops. Bonaparte valued him highly: he was one of the first to receive the marshal's baton. But it is worth noting that the well-informed Russian ambassador in Turin, Count Stackelberg, in one of his communications to Emperor Paul I, reported that Serurier “hates Bonaparte.”

Divisional generals La Harpe, brother of Alexander I's tutor, and the Alsatian cavalry commander Stengel, both died at the beginning of the 1796 campaign.

There is a well-known story about how the first meeting of the new commander with the division commanders took place. Bonaparte summoned Massena, Augereau, Serurrier and Laharpe to his headquarters. They all appeared at the same time - huge, broad-shouldered, one larger than the other, immediately filling the commander's small office. They entered without taking off their hats, decorated with tricolor feathers. Bonaparte was also wearing a hat. He greeted the generals politely, but dryly, officially, and invited them to sit down. When they sat down and the conversation began, Bonaparte took off his hat, and the generals followed his example.

A little later Bonaparte put on his hat. But he looked at his interlocutors in such a way that not one of them dared to reach out to his hat. The generals continued to sit in front of the commander with their heads uncovered. When the commanders dispersed, Massena muttered: “Well, this fellow gave me fear.” Bonaparte understood that it was possible to win the trust of senior commanders, soldiers, and the army not with words, but with deeds, military successes, and victory.

The versions spread by anti-Napoleonic literature that the Italian army largely consisted of Savoy brigands and galley convicts were, of course, a deliberate lie. In terms of its political sentiments, it was considered one of the most republican armies. Some traditions of the Jacobin era were preserved here, which had already been abandoned in other armies: for example, officers addressed each other as “you”. But in general, both among the soldiers and officers, dissatisfaction was clearly felt, and it sometimes manifested itself quite sharply. Bonaparte took these sentiments into account and reckoned with them: the success of the campaign was ultimately decided by the soldiers.

There were also some special problems.

Shortly before Bonaparte arrived in Nice, Commissioners of the Directory Salicetti and Garro arrived at the headquarters of the Italian army.

The quarrel between Bonaparte and Salicetti in 1794–1795 was left behind. Friendly relations were again established between the two Corsicans. Massena even believed that Salicetti's appointment was arranged by Bonaparte, but this is unlikely to be the case.

The very appearance of commissars in the army could not embarrass Bonaparte; He knew from his own experience how great their role was in the troops. The difficulty was different. Salicetti was inspired by the idea of ​​raising a broad revolutionary movement in Italy. He established close contacts with Italian revolutionary circles, and in particular with their overseas committee in Nice. Buonarroti served as a link between Salicetti and the Italian revolutionaries. A friend of Babeuf and one of the most prominent figures in the Conspiracy of Equals, he had long maintained business and friendly ties with Salicetti. In the spring of 1796, in connection with the expected development of revolutionary events in Italy, Buonarroti was supposed to come to Nice: he received a corresponding order from the Directory. He was already getting ready to set off, but due to coinciding reasons (opposition to his appointment and, apparently, Babeuf’s reluctance for him to leave on the eve of the performance of the “equals”) he remained in Paris.

Upon Bonaparte's arrival in Nice, representatives of the Italian Revolutionary Committee immediately sent him a memorial note. The army commander answered her vaguely. He stated that the Government of the Republic highly values ​​peoples who are ready “by noble efforts to contribute to the overthrow of the yoke of tyranny. The French people took up arms for the sake of freedom." But although Bonaparte confirmed his readiness to enter into negotiations with representatives of the Italian committee, the idea of ​​an Italian revolution at the initial stage of the campaign did not meet with his sympathy. He, naturally, was not an opponent of the revolution in Italy, on the contrary. But his campaign plan was based on the calculation of the separation of enemy forces; for this it was necessary to achieve a truce with the king of Piedmont as soon as possible. The revolution could make this task difficult. It was necessary to return to the Italian revolution, but later, when tangible success had been achieved during the campaign.

On April 5, 1796, the army set out on a campaign. The French regiments stretched along the narrow road quickly marched towards the enemy. Bonaparte chose the shortest, although the most dangerous, path. The army marched along the coastal edge of the Maritime Alps (along the so-called cornice) - the entire road was shot from the sea. But this made it possible to bypass the mountain ridge and speed up the movement much more. Ahead of the rapidly moving ranks, on foot, in a gray field uniform, without gloves, walked the army commander. Next to him, also in inconspicuous civilian clothes, contrasting with the bright, multi-colored uniforms of the officers, walked Directory Commissar Salichetti.

Bonaparte's calculation turned out to be correct. The command of the Austro-Sardinian troops did not even think that the French would risk such audacity. Four days later, the most dangerous part of the journey was left behind - on April 9, the French regiments entered Italy.

Bonaparte's army had no choice, it could only go forward. Hunger drove the soldiers; barefoot, undressed, with heavy guns at the ready, outwardly resembling a horde of ragamuffins rather than a regular army, they could only hope for victory; anything else meant death for them.

On April 12, the French met the Austrians near Montenotte - “Night Mountain”. Bonaparte led the battle. The center of the Austrian army under the command of General Argenteau was defeated by the divisions of Massena and Laharpe. The French took four banners, five cannons and two thousand prisoners. This was the first victory of the Italian campaign. “Our ancestry comes from Montenotte,” Bonaparte later said proudly.

In Vienna they were puzzled, but considered the incident an accident. "Troops of Gen. The Argentos suffered some setback in the case at Montenotte... but this does not matter,” wrote the Tsar’s ambassador Count Razumovsky from Vienna on April 12 (23), 1796.

Two days later, on April 14, the Piedmontese army was struck at the Battle of Millesimo. The trophies of the French were fifteen banners, thirty guns and six thousand prisoners. The first tactical objective was achieved - the Austrian and Piedmontese armies were separated; The roads to Turin and Milan opened before the French.

Now it was necessary to intensify attacks on the Piedmontese army. The Battle of Mondovi on April 22 ended in heavy defeat for the Italians. Again the trophies were banners, guns, and prisoners. Pursuing the enemy, the French entered Cherasco, ten leagues from Turin. Here, on April 28, a truce was signed with Piedmont on conditions very favorable to the French side. The agreement at Cherasco not only took Piedmont out of the war. The tsarist diplomat Simolin duly reported to St. Petersburg that thanks to the agreement of April 28, the French “became masters of all Piedmont and the entire territory of Genoa.”

In an order to the army on April 26, Bonaparte wrote: “Soldiers, within fifteen days you won six victories, took 21 banners, 55 guns, many fortresses and conquered the richest part of Piedmont, you captured 15 thousand prisoners, you disabled the dead and wounded 10 thousand people. You were deprived of everything - you received everything. You have won battles without guns, crossed rivers without bridges, made difficult treks without shoes, rested without wine and often without bread. Only the phalanx of Republicans, the soldiers of Freedom, are capable of such feats!”

What ensured the success of the Italian army? First of all, its extreme speed and maneuverability. The enemy could not have expected such a pace of offensive operations. Marmont wrote to his father that he did not get off his horse for twenty-eight hours, then rested for three hours and then remained in the saddle for fifteen hours again. And he added that he would not trade this frantic pace “for all the pleasures of Paris.” The lightning speed of operations of Bonaparte's army allowed him to maintain the initiative in his hands and impose his will on the enemy.

Other circumstances were also important. Although Bonaparte and the Directory were wary of the idea of ​​“revolutionizing” Piedmont, as the French troops advanced, anti-feudal, anti-absolutist sentiments in the country grew. When French troops entered the small towns of Alba and Cuneo, one of the Piedmontese patriots, Ranza, established revolutionary committees here. Cities were illuminated, Liberty trees were planted in squares, and revolutionary religious songs were sung in churches. This gave Salicetti a reason to express a severe condemnation of the Italian revolutionaries: “Instead of illuminating churches, it would be much more useful to illuminate (by fire) the castles of the feudal lords.” Salicetti, not content with the teachings of the Italian patriots, imposed an indemnity of one hundred and twenty-three thousand lire on the rich people of the city.

But, despite the relatively modest beginning of the revolutionary movement, the Turin court was extremely frightened by it. Massena turned out to be right in explaining the hasty search by the Piedmontese king for a separate agreement with France not so much by military defeats as by fear of a popular uprising in Turin and throughout the kingdom.

After the signing of the truce, Junot and then Murat took enemy banners and other trophies to the Directory in Paris; On May 15, peace was signed with Piedmont in Paris. However, there was some confusion in the French army after the armistice at Cherasco. Why didn't you enter Turin? Why was there a rush to make a truce?

Bonaparte so persistently sought a speedy conclusion of a truce with Piedmont primarily because the small and poorly armed French army was unable to fight for a long time against two strong opponents.

Having secured his rear from the Piedmontese army, having disabled one of the opponents, Bonaparte continued the offensive. Now he had only one enemy left, but a powerful one - the Austrian army. Its superiority over the French army in numbers, artillery, and material supplies was undeniable. Bonaparte had to continue to act in accordance with his basic principle: “Weakness in numbers must be compensated by speed of movement.” On May 7, the French army crossed the Po River. Three days later, in the famous battle of Lodi, Bonaparte, having captured the seemingly impregnable bridge over the Adda River, defeated the rearguard of the Austrian army. Bonaparte won the hearts of the soldiers in this battle, showing enormous personal courage. But that was not the significance of Lodi. Clausewitz wrote: “... the storming of the bridge at Lodi represents an enterprise that, on the one hand, deviates so much from conventional techniques, on the other, is so unmotivated that the question involuntarily arises whether it can be justified or whether it is impossible.” In fact, the bridge, three hundred paces long, was defended by seven thousand soldiers and fourteen guns. Was there any hope of success?

Bonaparte proved by victory that his actions were justified. Let us give the floor to Clausewitz again: “The enterprise of the brave Bonaparte was crowned with complete success... Undoubtedly, no military feat caused such amazement throughout Europe as this crossing of the Adda... So, when they say that the assault on Lodi is not strategically motivated, since Bonaparte could get this bridge the next morning for nothing, then they mean only the spatial relations of the strategy. But don’t the moral results we pointed out belong to strategy?” Clausewitz was right. On May 11, Bonaparte wrote to Carnot: “The Battle of Lodi, my dear Director, gave the whole of Lombardy to the Republic... In your calculations, you can proceed as if I were in Milan.”

It wasn't bragging. On May 26, the French army triumphantly entered Milan. A ceremonial meeting was arranged for her in the capital of Lombardy. Flowers, flowers, garlands of flowers, smiling women, children, huge crowds of people who took to the streets, vigorously greeted the soldiers of the Republic; The Milanese saw them as warriors of the revolution, liberators of the Italian people. Tired, exhausted and happy, with faces blackened by gunpowder soot, regiment after regiment of soldiers of the Republican army passed among the jubilant population of Milan. The day before, the Austrian Archduke Ferdinand fled from the capital of Lombardy with his retinue and gendarmes. The French liberated Lombardy from the hated Austrian oppression.

Who doesn’t remember the famous lines from Stendhal’s “The Monastery of Parma”? “Together with the ragged poor French, such a mighty wave of happiness and joy poured into Lombardy that only the priests and some of the nobles noticed the severity of the six-million indemnity, which was followed by other monetary penalties. After all, these French soldiers laughed and sang from morning to evening, they were all under 25 years old, and their commander-in-chief had recently turned 27, and he was considered the oldest man in the army.”

This army of twenty-year-olds carried hopes for tomorrow. In the army order, the commander wrote: “Soldiers, from the peaks of the Apennines you fell like a torrent, crushing and overturning everything that tried to resist you. Let those who raised the daggers of civil war over France tremble; the hour of vengeance has come. But let the peoples be calm. We are friends of all peoples, and especially of the descendants of Brutus and the Scipios... The free French people, respected by the whole world, will bring a worthy peace to Europe..."

In Lombardy, Bonaparte, in full agreement with Salicetti, fully supported the Italian revolutionary forces. Their awakening was entirely consistent with French interests. The Italian Revolution became an ally in the war against the feudal Habsburg Empire. In Milan, the Friends of Freedom and Equality club was created, a new municipal council was elected, and the newspaper Giornale dei patrioti d'ltalia, edited by Matteo Galdi, began to be published. Its main slogan was the unification of Italy. Lombardy was experiencing its 89th year. In the revolutionary movement, two directions emerged: the Jacobins (giacobini) led by Porro, Salvador, Serbellonni and the moderates - Melzi, Verri, Resta. Common to both parties was the desire for independence and freedom of Lombardy. Bonaparte urgently requested instructions from the Directory: if the people demand the organization of a republic , should it be granted? "This is the question you must decide and make known your intentions. This country is much more patriotic than Piedmont, and it is more ripe for freedom."

But the army of the Republic brought Italy not only liberation from the hated Austrian oppression. From the time the armies of the French Republic transferred the war to foreign territory, they firmly adhered to the rule of shifting the costs of maintaining the army of the victors to the vanquished. Godchaux, in an excellent study of the Commissioners of the Directory, proved that from the autumn of 1794, representatives of the Thermidorian Convention in the army began to widely resort to indemnities imposed on the population of the conquered lands. Even a man of leftist views, Bourbotte, being a representative of the Convention in the army of the Sambre-Meuse, imposed an indemnity of three million francs on the occupied Treves region in August 1794, and four million on Koblenz in November of the same year. In June 1795, representatives of the Convention in the army that occupied the territory of Mastricht - Bonn imposed an indemnity of twenty-five million on the occupied area, which was later reduced to eight million. At the direction of the Directory, in the Bonn-Koblenz region, Joubert established a forced loan from large merchants, bankers and other rich people. The Commissioners of the Convention and then the Directory widely resorted to massive requisitions of grain, livestock, vegetables, and horses for the needs of the cavalry.

Bonaparte acted in full accordance with the practice of the Directory. The army supplied itself with everything it needed from the conquered lands.

Acting according to government instructions, Salichetti and Bonaparte took the path of the most extensive requisitions and indemnities. The Duke of Tuscany had to contribute two million lire in specie, give one thousand eight hundred horses, two thousand bulls, ten thousand quintals of grain, five thousand quintals of oats, etc.

This was just the beginning. In January 1797, the Grand Duke of Tuscany, under an additional agreement providing for the evacuation of French troops from Livorno, undertook to pay another million ecus. “This final blow will complete the destruction of Tuscany’s finances,” Count Mozenigo expressed his opinion. However, the losses of the vanquished were not limited to the established payments. When leaving Livorno, the French removed twenty-six cannons, gunpowder, shells and "most of the silverware from the palace." The Tuscan government wisely turned a blind eye to this. The Duchy of Parma was to provide, in the form of a loan (a loan that was never repaid), two million livres in gold. Even in Milan, in jubilant Lombardy, which covered the roads along which the soldiers of the Republic marched with flowers, Bonaparte and Salicetti were not afraid in the very first days to demand a huge indemnity of twenty million lire.

However, the commander and the commissar, who acted unanimously at that time, tried to ensure that the burden of taxation fell primarily on the shoulders of the propertied and reactionary circles of Lombardy. Their actions in Lombardy had a very definite political content. In the war against feudal Austria, they sought to use the battle slogan: “War of peoples against tyrants.”

The “Appeal to the People of Lombardy,” signed by Bonaparte and Salicetti on the 30th floreal of the year IV (May 19, 1796), said: “The French Republic has sworn an oath of hatred towards tyrants and brotherhood with peoples... The Republican army, forced to wage war to the death against monarchs, is friendly to the peoples liberated by her victories from tyranny. Respect for property, respect for the individual, respect for the religion of the people - such are the feelings of the government of the French Republic and the victorious army in Italy." And further, explaining that to defeat Austrian tyranny means were needed and that the twenty million lire of indemnity imposed on Lombardy served this purpose, the appeal emphasized that the burden of payments must be placed on rich people and the highest circles of the church: the interests of the propertyless classes must be protected. This did not exclude the possibility that when, as, for example, in Pavia, an anti-French uprising began in which peasants participated, Bonaparte brutally suppressed it.

The 1796 campaign was different from subsequent wars, even from the 1797 campaign. The victories of Napoleon's army in 1796, which amazed the world, cannot be correctly understood unless the social policies of Bonaparte and Salicetti are taken into account.

The advance of French troops in Italy, despite indemnities, requisitions and robberies, contributed to the awakening and development of the revolutionary movement throughout the Apennine Peninsula. In January 1797, Mocenigo, one of the most knowledgeable tsarist diplomats in Italy, expressed confidence that if “the British leave the Mediterranean, within a year all of Italy will be engulfed in revolution.” Indeed, even in those Italian states that retained independence and independence, such as in Piedmont, no government repressions or concessions could stop the growth of the revolutionary wave. In the summer of 1797, the whole of Piedmont was engulfed in revolutionary ferment. To maintain the throne, the royal court was forced to make major concessions. The edicts issued in early August meant, according to the definition of the royal ambassador, “the final blow to the feudal system in the country.”

It would be ahistorical to downplay the merits of Bonaparte, his generals and soldiers in the victories of 1996, as Ferrero did, to deny his undeniable talent as a commander. But it would be equally ahistorical to underestimate the social content of the war in Italy. Despite all the requisitions, indemnities, and violence, it was basically an anti-feudal war, a war of the historically advanced bourgeois system at that time against the outdated feudal-absolutist order. And the victories of French weapons over Austrian ones were made even easier by the fact that the sympathy of the progressive social forces of Italy, the Italians of tomorrow, “Young Italy”, was on the side of the “soldiers of Liberty” - the army of the French Republic, which carried liberation from the alien Austrian and feudal oppression.

In the long and complex life of Napoleon Bonaparte, the spring of 1796 has forever remained the most remarkable page. Neither the thundering glory of Austerlitz, nor the gold-embroidered velvet of the empire, nor the power of the all-powerful emperor who commanded the destinies of Western Europe bowing before him - nothing could compare with the tumultuous, dangerous days of the sunny spring of 1796.

Fame did not come to Bonaparte in the days of Toulon and even less in the 13th of Vendémière. She came when, commanding a small army of naked and hungry soldiers, he miraculously won one victory after another - Montenotte, Millesimo, Dego, San Michele, Mondovi, Lodi, Milan - brilliant victories that forced all of Europe to repeat the name of the general, previously unknown to it Bonaparte. Then the military generals believed in him, then the soldiers began to call him “our little corporal”; for the first time that spring Bonaparte believed in himself. He admitted later that this new feeling - a feeling of enormous possibilities - came to him for the first time after the victory at Lodi.

His youth and youth were an ominous chain of failures, miscalculations, and defeats. For ten years fate was merciless to him. Hopes, dreams, expectations - everything was dispelled, everything turned into defeat. He was in danger of feeling like a failure. But as he himself said, he had a premonition, a subconscious feeling of success, good luck ahead. How many times has it deceived him! And finally my hopes came true. The Schönbrunn court sent its best, most experienced commanders against Bonaparte. Arjanto, Beaulieu, Alvintsi, Davidovich, Provera, Wurmser, Archduke Charles - these were truly honored military generals of the Habsburg Empire. The largest military authorities paid tribute to them. And yet, this army of half-naked, hungry boys, inferior to the Austrian in numbers and artillery, inflicted defeat after defeat on it.

Beginning the war in April 1796, Bonaparte acted according to a carefully thought out and proven plan. He calculated, as in a delicately conceived game of chess, all the options, all possible moves - his own and his opponent's - until about the twentieth move. But the time came when the twentieth move was made, when the previously thought-out options for the plan were exhausted. The war has entered a new stage - into the realm of the unexpected; The time has come for improvisation, a time for instantaneous decisions that cannot be delayed. And then Bonaparte discovered for the first time that this sphere was his true element, in it he had no equal, it brought the greatest success.

“We need to get involved in a fight, and then we’ll see!” - this famous principle of Napoleonic tactics was born for the first time in 1796–1797. It was the principle of free, daring thought, triumphing over routine, over dogma, over the inertia of centuries-old rules. We must dare, we must look for new solutions, not be afraid of the unknown, take risks! Search and find the simplest and best ways to victory! This twenty-seven-year-old army commander overturned all the centuries-old rules of warfare. He ordered to simultaneously besiege the Milanese fortress, General Serurier to surround and blockade the fortress of Mantua, which was considered impregnable, and, continuing the siege of Mantua, to move the main forces to the east - to the Venetian Republic and to the south - against Rome and Naples. Everything was connected: the stubborn, methodical siege of Mantua, and the maneuverable war, brought to the limit by the speed of movements and the swiftness of strikes.

After the triumphant entry into Milan in May 1796, the war lasted for a long time - a whole year. It was marked by battles that went down in the history of military art - Castiglione, Arcole Bridge, Rivoli. These battles, which have long become classics, were fought with varying degrees of success: the French army came as close to the brink of defeat as to victory in these battles. Of course, Bonaparte took the greatest risks in these battles. In the now legendary battle on the Arcole Bridge, he was not afraid to put both the fate of the army and his own life at stake. Having rushed forward under a hail of bullets with a banner on the Arcole Bridge, he remained alive only because Muiron covered him with his body: he took upon himself the fatal blows intended for Bonaparte. The three-day battle of Rivoli could have seemed completely lost by its end. But at the last moment (and there was a pattern in this accident!) the French command surpassed the Austrian - the battle was won!

In the campaign of 1796–1797, Bonaparte showed himself to be a brilliant master of maneuver warfare. In principle, he continued only the new things that had been created before him by the armies of revolutionary France. This was a new tactic of columns, combined with a loose formation and the ability to ensure, with extraordinary speed of movement, quantitative superiority over the enemy in a limited area, the ability to concentrate forces into a strike fist that penetrates the enemy’s resistance at its weak point. This new tactic has already been used by Jourdan, Gauche, Marceau; it had already been analyzed and generalized by the synthetic mind of Lazare Carnot, but Bonaparte managed to breathe new strength into it, to reveal the possibilities hidden in it.

Bonaparte's military talent could be revealed so fully in the campaign of 1796–1797 also because he relied in his actions on generals of first-class talent. Andre Massena - “the beloved child of victory,” a nugget of talent - himself had the right to the glory of a great commander, if fate had not made him a comrade-in-arms of Napoleon. The Italian campaign revealed the initiative, courage, and military gift of Joubert, who was relatively little known until then; his services to the victorious outcome of the battle of Rivoli and Tyrol were very great. Stendhal was right to praise Joubert highly. Since the time of Toulon, Bonaparte began to group around himself young people with some special inherent traits that forced him to distinguish them from the rest. He managed to instill in them faith in his star: they were all people completely devoted to him. At first there were only three of them - Junot, Marmont, Muiron. Then Duroc and Murat joined them. This small circle of officers, who enjoyed the full confidence of the commander, then included Lannes, Berthier, Sulkowski, Lavalette.

Jean Lannes, the same age as Bonaparte, the son of a groom, began serving in the army as a soldier; in 1796 he was already a colonel. His initiative, ingenuity, and personal courage attracted the attention of the commander. Lannes was promoted to brigadier general and showed remarkable abilities in independently directing operations. Lannes was known as a staunch republican, and his leftist views were also known in foreign embassies. He sincerely became attached to Bonaparte, seeing in him the embodiment of republican virtues. In the campaign of 1796–1797 he saved Napoleon's life twice. Lannes was one of the most outstanding military leaders of the brilliant Napoleonic galaxy. Brave, direct, sharp, he earned the honorary nickname of Roland of the French army.

Starting the Italian campaign, Bonaparte invited General Berthier as chief of staff of the army. Alexander Berthier had extensive experience - he served in the old army, fought in the War for American Independence, but by his vocation he was a staff worker. It was not easy to understand his views and preferences. During the revolution he got along with Lafayette and Custine, but also with Ronsin and Rossignol. What was he aiming for? Nobody knew this. He had an amazing capacity for work, an almost unbelievable professional staff memory, and a special talent for turning general directives from the commander into precise paragraphs of order. He was not suitable for first or independent roles, but no one could replace him with equal success as chief of staff. Bonaparte immediately appreciated Berthier's special talent and did not part with him until the collapse of the empire in 1814.

Then, in 1796, Bonaparte noticed and brought the young Polish officer Joseph Sulkowski closer to him. Sulkowski was born in 1770. An aristocrat who received an excellent education, fluent in all European languages, an admirer of Rousseau and French educational philosophy, he fought in his youth for the independence of Poland, and then, as a true “lover of Liberty,” as they said in the 18th century, gave his sword to the defense of the French Republic.

Since the Italian campaign, Antoine-Marie Lavalette also became close to Bonaparte. Formally, he was only one of the commander-in-chief's aides-de-camp, but his real significance was great: Lavalette enjoyed Bonaparte's trust and, moreover, may have had some influence over him.

The name Lavalette is usually associated with the sensational story throughout Europe of his unrealized execution in 1815. For going over to Napoleon's side during the Hundred Days, Count Lavalette was sentenced to death. All efforts of his wife Emilia Beauharnais, niece Josephine, and friends to save his life were in vain. In the last hours before his execution, his wife was allowed to visit him. She didn't stay on death row long; she left him with her head bowed low, covering her face, bending under the weight of inconsolable grief, and walked past the sentries with a staggering gait...

When the guards came in the morning to take the condemned man to the place of execution, Lavalette was not in the cell. His wife was there. The day before, having exchanged clothes with his wife, Lavalette left prison in her dress.

This unusual story so amazed his contemporaries at the time that Lavalette remained in the memory of generations only as the successful hero of a dramatic incident in the style of the novels of Eugene Sue or Alexandre Dumas. They began to forget that he was one of the most capable figures of the Napoleonic era. He never came to the forefront, but, while remaining in the shadows, Lavalette was in fact an influential participant in the complex political struggle of those years.

Such was the “Bonaparte cohort” - eight or nine people grouped around him during the Italian campaign. It was a peculiar combination of different human qualities - courage, talent, intelligence, firmness, initiative, and they made the small “Bonaparte cohort” an irresistible force. These different people were united by a feeling of friendship and camaraderie; they were born of the revolution and linked their future with the Republic; they believed in their commander. Bonaparte was for them first among equals, and the Republic and France could not be better served than by fighting under his command against the armies of tyrants. Finally, they were all united and carried on its waves by irrepressible youth. They alternated the dangers and mental stress of fierce battles, always with an unknown outcome, with excitement born of the “whirling heart.” And in this, the commander-in-chief was the first to set an example. He completed the entire Italian campaign without parting mentally with Josephine. He wrote her several letters a day; they were all about the same thing - how he loves her immensely; he kept letters that rarely came from her in his pockets; he re-read them several times, he knew them by heart, and it seemed to him, perhaps not without reason, that she did not love him enough. He was so obsessed with his all-consuming passion that he could not remain silent about it; he talked about her to his friends in the army, even in letters to Carnot, to the distant, dry, tough Carnot, he could not resist admitting: “I love her to madness.”

Following the commander-in-chief, his first deputy suffered the same fate. General Berthier, who appeared to the young people around Bonaparte as a man of the prehistoric past - he was sixteen to seventeen years older than them! - Berthier, who seemed to see nothing but geographical maps and reports of regimental personnel, also found himself overcome by the same powerful feeling. Stendhal wrote about this in elegant and precise words: “The beautiful Princess Visconti first tried - so they said - to turn the head of the commander-in-chief himself; but, having realized in time that this was not an easy matter, she was content with the next person in the army after him, and, I must admit, her success was undivided. This affection completely filled the life of General Berthier until his death, which followed nineteen years later, in 1815.”

What can we say about the young? About Junot - the “storm”, as he was nicknamed, famous for his daring and often risky romantic adventures, about the frantic Murat, about Muiron, tenderly devoted to his wife? They all lived a full-blooded life, today, filled to the brim with everything - grueling treks through the mountains, the excitement of the art of outpacing the enemy, the thunder of bloody battles, devotion to the homeland, military glory, love. Death stood behind them; she lay in wait for each of them; she tore out one or the other from their ranks: the first was Muiron, followed by Sulkowski. The rest bowed their heads and banners, saying goodbye to their comrades who had departed forever. But they were young, and death could not frighten them. Every day they put their lives on the line against her - and won. And they moved forward without looking back.

Bonaparte was still a Republican during the Italian campaign. The orders of the commander-in-chief, his appeals to the Italians, his correspondence, official and private, and finally, his practical activities in Italy - all confirm this. However, it could not have been otherwise. Yesterday's follower of Jean-Jacques Rousseau, the Jacobin, author of "Dinner at Beaucaire" could not immediately become completely different.

Of course, over the past years, Bonaparte, like all other Republicans, has changed in no small measure. The Republic itself had changed: in 1796 it was already in many ways different than in 1793–1794. The evolution of the bourgeois republic, which became especially noticeable during the years of the Directory, could not pass without leaving a trace. But in the army, especially in the Italian army, which had long been cut off from the capital, they did not go into the subtleties of the evolution of the Republic. The general meaning of the policy was determined in the army by the previous slogans: “The Republic is waging a just war! She is defending herself from the monarchy! Death to tyrants! Freedom for the peoples!

In the eyes of the soldiers and officers of the Italian army, the campaign of 1796 was just as just a war in defense of the Republic as the campaign of 1793-1794. The only difference was that the Republic had become stronger and was now fighting against the same Austrians and British not on its own soil , but to someone else's.

General Victor, sent by the command of the Italian army to Rome, first of all laid wreaths at the foot of the statue of Brutus. Lannes, in his proclamations, called for the complete extermination of royalists, emigrants and rebel priests. The Italian army advertised its republicanism.

The victories of 1796 would have been impossible if the Republican army had not been morally superior to the Austrian army, if it had not been surrounded by an atmosphere of sympathy and support from the Italian population, freed from Austrian oppression thanks to the French.

But due to his position as commander of the army, who maintained direct relations with the government, Bonaparte, of course, was much better informed than others about the political situation of the Republic and was well versed in the significance of the changes taking place in the country.

His relationship with the Directory became more difficult day by day. Outwardly, both sides tried to maintain the established formal norms: the Directory prescribed, the general reported; all hierarchical distances were respected. But essentially, after the first victories, after Montenotte, Millesimo, Lodi, after Bonaparte was convinced that the campaign was unfolding successfully, he began to pursue his own line, despite all the assurances of his readiness to carry out the orders of the Directory.

On May 20, 1796, the commander of the Italian army announced to his subordinates that they would receive half their pay in specie. None of the armies of the Republic paid like that. He decided this alone, without asking anyone's permission. In Paris, this excessive independence caused discontent, but in the Italian army, naturally, the commander’s decision was met with approval.

Even earlier, on May 13, Bonaparte received an order from the Directory, prepared by Carnot, announcing that the army operating in Italy would be divided into two independent armies. One, operating in the north, will be led by General Kellerman, the second, under the command of General Bonaparte, numbering twenty-five thousand soldiers, should go to Rome and Naples.

Bonaparte received this order when the thunder of victory at Lodi had just died down. Amid the general rejoicing that reigned in the army after the brilliant victory, this order was stunning. Bonaparte immediately wrote a response. He declared that dividing the army operating in Italy was contrary to the interests of the Republic. Bonaparte justified his objections with a precisely and clearly formulated argument: “Better one bad general than two good ones.” And in his characteristic style, he aggravated the situation: “The position of the Army of the Republic in Italy is such that you need to have a commander who enjoys your complete confidence; if it’s not me, you won’t hear any complaints from me... Everyone wages war as best they can. General Kellerman is more experienced than I: he will lead it better; together we will lead her badly.” The threat of resignation sent from Lodi was a strong move!

Could the Directory accept Bonaparte's resignation? The armies of Jourdan and Moreau, to which the government entrusted the main tasks in the defeat of Austria, suffered failures. The only army that marched forward and sent couriers to the capital every three days with news of new victories was this seedy Italian army, which yesterday was considered almost hopeless, but now attracted the attention of all of Europe with its victorious march. The name of Bonaparte, until recently few people knew, was now on everyone’s lips. Bonaparte's victories strengthened the position of the Directory and supported its prestige, which had been significantly undermined by many failures. The Directory government could not accept the resignation of General Bonaparte.

There was another significant reason that gave Bonaparte such confidence. The army he led was the only one that sent the Directory not only victory reports and enemy banners, but also money in the precious metal - gold. With the financial crisis of the Republic, which had turned into a stagnant disease, with the wolfish greed of the members of the Directory and the government apparatus, through whose hands gold passed, sticking to their fingers, this circumstance was of utmost importance. It was not customary to talk about him out loud; in official speeches about such “details”, it goes without saying that Bonaparte knew better than anyone how much they meant. A few days after entering Milan, Salicetti reported to the Directory that the conquered regions, not counting Modena and Parma, had already paid thirty-five and a half million.

Could the Directory refuse such an important source of replenishing the always empty treasury, and at the same time, perhaps, its own pockets? Will another general provide this continuous flow of gold from Italy? This was doubtful. Jourdan and Moreau not only did not send gold, but their armies required great expenses.

Bonaparte correctly calculated his moves: the Directory had to agree to the conditions set to it. The order to divide the army in Italy was forgotten. Bonaparte won, the Directory retreated. But disagreements between the general and the Directory continued. They now touched on an essential issue - about the future of the conquered regions of Italy, about tomorrow.

The orders of the Directory boiled down to two main demands: to pump out more gold and any other valuables from Italy - from works of art to bread - and not to promise the Italians any benefits or freedoms. According to the Directory, the Italian lands were to remain occupied territories, which later, during peace negotiations with Austria, should be used as bargaining chips, for example, they could be given to Austria in exchange for Belgium or territory along the Rhine, etc., or to Piedmont as payment for an alliance with France.

This cynical position of the Directory clearly revealed the evolution of the foreign policy of the French Republic. After Thermidor a new period began. The Directory represented a large, predominantly new, speculative bourgeoisie and was guided in foreign policy by the same thing as in domestic policy: it sought to enrich itself either in the form of territorial seizures, or in the form of indemnities or direct robbery. In the foreign policy of the Directory, predatory and predatory goals increasingly took first place. The war changed its content. V.I. Lenin wrote: “A national war can turn into an imperialist one and back.” In 1796, this process had already begun.

The Italian army was inherent to the extent that it was one of the instruments of the foreign policy of the Directory, and the features inherent in this policy as a whole. However, disagreements between the commander and the government of the Directory were primarily on such fundamental issues. Bonaparte did not agree with the policies imposed on him by the Directory. In 1796, of course, he had already freed himself from the egalitarian-democratic illusions inspired by the ideas of Rousseau and Raynal, which had possessed him ten years earlier. He was no longer essentially embarrassed by the need to impose indemnity on the defeated country; he already considered it possible, where it was profitable or expedient, to preserve monarchies for some time (as was the case in Piedmont or Tuscany), whereas previously he believed that all monarchies should be destroyed. For all that, his policy in Italy was to a large extent contrary to the directives received from Paris.

Speaking for the first time in Milan on May 15 and addressing the people, Bonaparte said: “The French Republic will make every effort to make you happy and remove all obstacles to this. Only merit will distinguish people united by a single spirit of fraternal equality and freedom." In the aforementioned appeal “To the People of Lombardy” dated 30 Floreal, the commander again promised freedom to the people, which could practically mean the future constitution of Lombardy statehood, the formation of a Lombardy republic under one name or another.

Bonaparte's efforts were directed towards this. In obvious contradiction with the instructions of the Directory, which he practically sabotaged, hiding behind various excuses, he worked towards the rapid creation of several Italian republics. Later he came to the idea of ​​the need to create a system of republics friendly to France and dependent on it. As Dumouriez wrote to Paul I, in 1797 Bonaparte, speaking in Geneva, in the Senate, said: “It would be desirable for France to be surrounded by a belt of small republics, such as yours; if it does not exist, it must be created."

In an appeal to the Italians on the 5th of Vendémière (September 26, 1796), the commander of the French army called on the Italian people to awaken Italy: “The time has come when Italy will stand with honor among the powerful nations ... Lombardy, Bologna, Modena, Reggio, Ferrara and, perhaps, Romagna, if she shows herself worthy of this, one day they will surprise Europe, and we will see the most beautiful days of Italy! Hurry to arms! Free Italy is populous and rich. Make your enemies and your freedom tremble!”

Was this fulfilling the requirements of the Directory? It was a bold program of the bourgeois-democratic

revolution, to which Bonaparte persistently called the Italians in many appeals and appeals.

And if the call for the creation of a free Italy was not put into practice, then the reason for this lies mainly in the particularism of the Italian small states, in the immaturity of the movement of national unity at that time, in the inability to overcome the desire for local and religious isolation.

Bonaparte was able to realistically assess the uniqueness of the country in which he acted. We must implement what is practically possible today. In October 1796, the creation of the Transpadan Republic was officially proclaimed in Milan, and the Congress of Deputies of Ferrara, Bologna, Reggio and Modena, held in Bologna the same month, announced the creation of the Cispadan Republic. The Commander-in-Chief of the French Army in Italy welcomed the formation of republics in Italy with a special message.

In Paris, in the circles of the Directory, they were enraged by the disobedience and self-will of the general. The instructions given to him ordered to “keep the peoples in direct dependence” on France. Bonaparte acted as if these directives did not exist; he contributed to the creation of independent Italian republics linked to France by a community of interests.

The conflicts between Bonaparte and the government of the Directory are often portrayed as clashes of rival ambitions, and they are seen as the beginning of the general's subsequent struggle for power. This interpretation does not exhaust the issue. Bonaparte in 1796 pursued a historically more progressive policy. He sought to fully exploit the not yet exhausted revolutionary-democratic potential of the French Republic. Unlike the Directory, blinded by greed, which did not think about the future, Bonaparte set other goals. In the war against powerful Austria, he considered it necessary to raise anti-feudal forces against it and acquire an ally for France in the person of the Italian national liberation movement.

To avoid ambiguity, let us say once again that, of course, Bonaparte of 1796, while carrying out historically progressive work in Italy, was very far from the Hebertist concepts of revolutionary war. In an appeal to the people of Bologna on October 19, 1796, he declared: “I am an enemy of tyrants, but above all an enemy of villains, robbers, anarchists.” He constantly emphasized his respect for property and the right of everyone to enjoy all benefits. He remained a champion of bourgeois property and bourgeois democracy. And in the war against the feudal Austrian monarchy, Bonaparte’s bourgeois revolutionary program was undoubtedly a powerful weapon, shaking the supports of the old world and attracting allies in the people oppressed by the despotism of the Habsburgs.

On November 29, 1796, General Clark arrived in Milan at the headquarters of the Italian army. He left the capital on the 25th and, not sparing his horses, covered the enormous distance from Paris to Milan in four days. Clark was in a hurry, but where? To Vienna. Bonaparte Clarke briefly, without going into detail, notified that he had the authority to negotiate with the Austrian government to conclude an armistice, and perhaps peace.

It was not difficult for the commander of the Italian army to understand that the Directory was in a hurry to appropriate the fruits of his victories, through Clark to conclude a victorious peace that would be applauded by the whole country, and leave him, Bonaparte, at the door. The Moor has done his job, the Moor can leave.

Bonaparte's correspondence of December 1796 does not contain direct evidence of his mood at that time. One can only guess about them. He was aware that in the current situation, the outcome of his struggle with the Directory could not be decided with the help of ink. Here we need other, more effective means. It was also obvious to him that, by sending Clark to Vienna, the Directory sought not only to steal his laurels, but also to take control of Italian affairs and, by agreement with Austria, to undo everything that had been created with such difficulty in Italy.

The Directory's determination to remove the victorious general was explained by the fact that by the fall of 1796, Barras, Carnot, Larevelier-Lepo - the leaders of the Directory - considered their position to be strengthened. This calculation, as subsequent events showed, was erroneous, nevertheless they proceeded from it. In May - June 1796, the Directory regime experienced another crisis. The “Conspiracy for Equality” was exposed, and its main leaders - Gracchus Babeuf, Darte, Buonarroti - were arrested. But the matter did not end there. In Fructidor, the revolutionary democratic movement in the Grenelle camp, closely associated with the Babouvists, was defeated; Numerous new arrests followed. The blow expanded: it was directed not only against the Babouvistists, but also against left-wing, pro-Jacobin circles in general.

By the autumn of 1796, the leaders of the Directory could consider the crisis to be largely overcome. The swing policy continued. After the blow to the right in October 1795, in May - July 1796 the blow was struck to the left. Equilibrium was restored; the directors considered their position to be newly strengthened; The time had come, the directors believed, to deal with the wayward general in Italy.

The operation with Clark's mission (its authorship is usually attributed to Carnot) fit well into the general course of the Directory's policy of that time - a strike to the left. Clark was entrusted not only with diplomatic tasks, but also with more special ones - monitoring Bonaparte. He had direct instructions on this matter from Carnot and Larevelier. Of course, Bonaparte, the former commander of the internal army, who at one time closed the Pantheon Club, could not be accused of having connections with the Babouvistists. He could not be blamed for his connection with Salichetti, who was close to Buonarroti, if only because Salichetti was under Bonaparte as a commissar of the Directory and the Directory was supposed to protect him. But they wanted to ask Bonaparte for his unauthorized actions, and ask him strictly. By transferring negotiations with Austria into the hands of General Clark, the Directory thereby deprived Bonaparte of the opportunity to influence the course of events in Italy. But it was not easy to get around Bonaparte. He once again soberly examined the situation and weighed all the chances. An analysis of the situation showed that it was not hopeless.

The Directory chose the wrong time to negotiate with Austria. In Vienna in November - December 1796, the campaign was by no means considered lost. On the contrary, it was then that hopes of achieving a decisive turning point in the course of the war revived. The armies of Jourdan and Moreau were driven back beyond the Rhine by Archduke Charles; they had to go on the defensive. New reserves were prepared against Bonaparte's army, with them Alvintzi's army reached approximately eighty thousand people. The old Hungarian field marshal was determined to take revenge for Arcole. Alvintsi went to liberate Wurmser's army, locked in besieged Mantua. Eighty thousand Alvinzi plus twenty or thirty thousand Wurmser - that was an impressive force. With such overwhelming superiority, could there be any doubt that Bonaparte's forty thousand tired soldiers would not be crushed?

Clark urged his horses in vain. Alvintsi refused to let him into Vienna. What was the point of Austria entering into negotiations at a time when it was preparing to deal a crushing blow to the French army? Bonaparte, who initially received Clark very coldly, now became infinitely kind to the general diplomat. Clark, a general from the nobility, also of Irish origin and therefore suffered in 1793, who had experienced a lot in his short life, was smart and quick-witted, every day more and more succumbed to the charm of the commander of the Italian army, who was so friendly to him.

But Bonaparte understood that the outcome of the struggle with the Directory was not decided by the fact that Clark would be “conquered,” that is, from an enemy to an ally. Bonaparte quickly succeeded in this: with his gift of seduction, it was not difficult for him to win Clark over to his side. But the “conquest” of Clark did not solve anything. Everything depended on the outcome of the fight with Alvintsi.

Bonaparte was ill in December 1796 and early 1797: he was shaking with a fever. He was yellow in color, became even thinner, and dried out; In royalist circles, rumors spread that his days were numbered, that in a week, at most two, he could be “written off” from among the opponents. But two weeks passed, and this “living dead” showed once again what he was capable of. In the famous Battle of Rivoli on January 14–15, 1797, a battle that remains one of the most brilliant achievements of military art, Bonaparte routed his opponent. Alvintsi's army fled from the battlefield, leaving more than twenty thousand prisoners in the hands of the French. In an effort to consolidate success and finish off the enemy, Bonaparte, having received information that part of the Austrian army under the command of General Provera was moving towards Mantua, ordered Massena to block his path. Despite the extreme fatigue of the soldiers, Massena overtook a group of Provera troops at Favorite on January 16 and defeated it.

Rivoli's triumph, doubled by the victory at Favorite, raised Bonaparte's prestige to unattainable heights. Count Mozenigo reported from Florence to St. Petersburg: “The French army in a fierce battle almost completely crushed the Austrians... and as a result, Buonaparte, who within four days had almost destroyed the imperial troops in Italy, entered Verona triumphantly, surrounded by all the trappings of victory.”

Now all attention was focused on the battle for Mantua, which Simolin called “the key to all Lombardy.” Mocenigo predicted that Mantua would not last long and that “the whole of Italy would immediately feel its fall!” . Indeed, two weeks after Rivoli, Wurmser's army in Mantua, having lost all hope of liberation, capitulated. From now on, all of Italy lay at the feet of the victors.

Starting the decisive battle at Rivoli on the morning of January 14, Bonaparte was aware that the upcoming battle would determine not only the outcome of the entire Italian campaign - thereby his long dispute with the Directory would also be resolved. Bonaparte's calculations were confirmed by the victories of French arms. He defeated not only Alvinzi and Wurmser. The Directory was also defeated. She congratulated the triumphant general in flattering terms. And although Bonaparte's successes caused increasing concern among the members of the Directory, she could now only modestly express her wishes to the victorious general. Previous intentions to “teach a lesson” or even remove the headstrong commander turned out to be, to say the least, inappropriate.

Bonaparte had to realize the fruits of his victories.

Rivoli and Mantua caused the greatest panic in all the palaces of large and small Italian states. A report from Florence to St. Petersburg in mid-February 1797 reported that “the anxiety and fear that gripped Rome reached their highest limit.” French troops moved towards the capital of the Papal States without encountering any resistance, and in Rome they were primarily concerned with where the “holy father” could hide. Naples was gripped by the same anxiety; the main efforts of the Neapolitan court were aimed at achieving peace with Bonaparte. The Grand Duke of Tuscany hastened to deposit a million crowns into the treasury of the victorious army and, as Mozenigo wrote, not noticing the hidden humor of his message, “must have felt very happy to have had the opportunity to pay such a price at the moment when the fall of Mantua gave the whole of Italy to the French.”

On February 19, in Tolentino, Bonaparte dictated peace terms to the representative of the Pope, Cardinal Mattei and his colleagues. They differed sharply from the program that the Directory defined in a number of documents. With the Treaty of Tolentino, Bonaparte wanted to show the members of the Directory that from now on he himself would decide Italian affairs: he understood them better than the high-ranking gentlemen in Paris.

However, he knew who he was dealing with and what could make the greatest impression in Paris. In a letter to the Directory on February 19, 1797, reporting the terms of peace, which provided for an indemnity of thirty million livres, Bonaparte casually remarked: “Thirty millions are worth ten times more than Rome, from which we could not extract even five million.” The Directory had to accept the terms of peace with the pope, worked out contrary to its directives. In Paris, apparently, they were glad that the general kept sending gold - many tens of millions. What if something else comes to his mind?

Bonaparte also kept a keen eye on what was happening in his native Corsica. The power of the British was not strong. The victories of French arms in Italy created favorable conditions for the resumption of the struggle. In 1796, he sent his emissary Bonelli to the island, who managed to raise a strong partisan movement in the western regions of Corsica. Following this, General Gentilly was transferred there at the head of a detachment of two to three hundred people. The British, who found themselves completely isolated on the island, had to leave it in October 1796.

Salicetti, and then Mio de Melito and Joseph Bonaparte, who replaced him, relatively quickly restored French power in Corsica. But it was not easy to pacify passions. Modern scholars accept that supporters of Paoli or the monarchy offered secret resistance to the French republican regime.

Neither the participants in the struggle of those years, nor the researchers of the history of Corsica knew, and could not know, that in the fall of 1797 the Corsican separatists, led by Colonna de Cesari, decided on a new major action. As evidenced by the archival documents of the Russian College of Foreign Affairs, and in particular the reports to Emperor Paul I from Florence, in mid-December 1797, Colonna de Cesari, who had arrived from Corsica, came to see Mozenigo. In a confidential conversation, he stated that “the island of Corsica is just as dissatisfied with the French as with the British ...” and that, in the opinion of all “the most noticeable and active forces of the country,” the fate of the island can be properly decided only by establishing the supreme power of the Russian emperor over it . Colonna de Cesari argued that the conquest of the island, important for Russia as a stronghold in the Mediterranean, would not present great difficulties: the Corsicans had guns.

Motsenigo promised to report what he heard to St. Petersburg. Without making any commitments, he did not close the door to further negotiations. Secret meetings and negotiations continued throughout the year. In November 1798, Mocenigo took part in a “secret meeting” of the Corsicans, during which they presented him with “a lengthy report and plan on the convenience and benefits of the enterprise in Corsica and on the means of attack, demanding 6 thousand guns, 2 thousand sabers, 100 kegs of gunpowder and 3 thousand regular troops." Mocenigo, perhaps in order to avoid a definite answer, pointed out that “if the gene does not pester him. Paoli or will not be carried out with the consent of the English court…”, then the enterprise will encounter great difficulties. Negotiations dragged on...

Did Bonaparte know about them? Apparently not. There is nothing to support his concern about the progress of affairs in Corsica in 1798. His attention was focused on other important problems - Bonaparte was in a hurry to make peace with the Austrian monarchy.

A year of victories crushed the Austrian army. Simolin wrote in April 1797 from Frankfurt that public opinion was already talking “about the crisis of the House of Austria” and that the army considered the conclusion of peace with Republican France inevitable. But Bonaparte’s army was also extremely tired. It was necessary to quickly end the war, while the wings of victory were spreading behind us. Bonaparte was also in a hurry because he feared that Gauche, who had replaced Jourdan as commander of the army, would launch an offensive with fresh forces and get ahead of the Italian army in Vienna. But the initiative for peace negotiations should not have come from Bonaparte. He was sure that the Austrians would be the first to ask for peace negotiations. And in order to hurry them up (Bonaparte himself could not wait long), he moved his army, exhausted from fatigue, to the north. The troops of Joubert, Massena, Serurier and Bernadotte's fresh division invaded Austria.

After the defeat of Alvinzi, Archduke Charles was appointed commander of the Austrian army operating against Bonaparte. He had a reputation as the best commander of the Austrian army: he dealt heavy blows to Jourdan and forced Moreau to retreat. Beaulieu, Argento, Alvintsi, Davidovich, Kvazdanovich, Wurmser, Provera - the best generals of the Austrian army - lost their glory in battles with this young Corsican, who was already surrounded by an aura of invincibility. Should I tempt fate? Archduke Charles tried to stop the French advance. But the battles of Tagliamento and Gradisca, although they were not general battles, again undeniably showed the superiority of French weapons. We shouldn't have expected the worst. The vanguard of the French troops was one hundred and fifty kilometers from Vienna. Panic began in the Habsburg capital.

On April 7, in Leoben, representatives of the Austrian side came to Bonaparte - they were generals Bellegarde and Merveldt. They stated that they were authorized by the emperor to negotiate preliminaries for peace. Bonaparte's dreams came true! The Emperor himself, the head of the “Holy Roman Empire of the German Nation,” sent his representatives to negotiate peace. Everything favored Bonaparte in this amazing spring of 1797. He did not allow the Directory to snatch the fruits of his victories from him, he himself bypassed the gentlemen directors who decided to rule him like a puppet. Clark is completely neutralized. Ghosh and Moreau did not have time to arrive in Vienna. Bonaparte will now alone, without mentors or advisers, negotiate with the emperor’s representatives and conclude peace on the terms that he finds most appropriate.

The negotiations, which began on April 7, were successfully completed ten days later. On April 18, at Eggenwald Castle, near Leoben, preliminary peace terms were signed by General Bonaparte on behalf of the Republic and Count Merveldt and Marquis Gallo on behalf of the Austrian Emperor. Bonaparte was accommodating during the negotiations. He first asked for more, saw what the other side was most interested in, and quickly found a way to an agreement with her. Austria renounced Belgium and came to terms with the loss of possessions in Northern Italy, but Bonaparte did not insist on seizing the Rhine lands. In a secret agreement, Austria was promised part of the Venetian region as compensation.

The Leoben agreements were concluded in contradiction with the demands of the Directory, which insisted on annexing the Rhineland to France and compensating Austria by returning Lombardy to it. Bonaparte foresaw that the agreement would be met with displeasure by the directors. In a letter to the Directory on April 19, Bonaparte, reviewing all his actions since the beginning of the campaign, proved their correctness and insisted on the approval of the preliminaries. He reinforced his desire with a threat: he asked, in case of disagreement with his actions, to accept his resignation as commander and give him the opportunity to engage in civilian activities.

The calculation was accurate. The members of the Directory could not, at the moment of the highest popularity of the general, who had won an honorable and profitable peace, dismiss him from his resignation. As Simolin reported, in Paris the news of Bonaparte’s signing of the peace agreement “was greeted by the people with enthusiasm.” Even less did the members of the Directory want to see this restless and headstrong man in Paris as their work colleague. Barras already understood well that all sorts of surprises could be expected from this “simpleton,” as he had recently and so erroneously and so myopically called Bonaparte. Reluctantly, the Directory had to approve the Leoben agreements. Bonaparte achieved his goal: he won the war, he was on the way to winning the world, the most important step had been taken. His hands were untied - he took up Italian affairs.

In May, using the murder of several French soldiers on Venetian territory as a pretext, the French army entered and occupied the Venetian Republic. The government of the Doge's Republic was overthrown. A provisional government was created in Venice, but Bonaparte did not at all contribute to its strengthening. He did not forget about the secret articles of the Leoben Agreements.

In June, French troops entered the territory of the Genoese Republic; there was also an excuse for this. But there was no mention of Genoa in the Leoben conversations; here nothing prevented the proper state forms from being immediately found. On June 6, the formation of the Ligurian Republic was proclaimed in Genoa. The model for it was the constitution of the third year of the French Republic. The Ligurian Republic was created along the same lines, with two Councils and a Directory.

In June, the Transpadan and Cispadan Republics were transformed into a single Cisalpine Republic. Bonaparte saw in it the basis of a future united Italy. Italy was supposed to become a loyal support for France. A number of socio-political measures of an anti-feudal, bourgeois nature were carried out in the republic: feudal duties and taxes were abolished, church lands were secularized, new legislation was introduced establishing the equality of all citizens before the law with all the ensuing consequences. The political system of the republic was close to the French model: Directory, two legislative councils, a similar system of local government. The Cisalpine Republic had close relations with France. However, it could not have been otherwise. Would a newly born, weak republic, surrounded on all sides by monarchies hostile to it, be able to resist them without the support of republican France?

Tsarist diplomats expressed fears (admittedly, quite well-founded) that the new republics would become a tool in the hands of France and would contribute to the revolutionization of the country. And so it was.

It seemed to many Italian contemporaries of those events that Bonaparte acted primarily as an Italian patriot, for whom his native country was dearer than anything else. The famous mathematician of that time, Mascheroni, presenting his book “Geometry” to the army commander, recalled in his dedicatory inscription the significant day when “you overcame the Alps... to liberate your dear Italy.” This appeal indicated that in the eyes of the Italian scientist, the victorious general remained a faithful son of Italy - for him he was Napolione di Buonaparte. But was it really so?

“The French Republic regards the Mediterranean as its sea and intends to dominate it,” Bonaparte firmly declared to the puzzled Count Cobenzl, Austria’s representative at the negotiations that ended with the Peace of Campoformia. But the Italians also declared that the Mediterranean Sea is mare nostra - “our sea.” Therefore, Bonaparte put the interests of France above Italian interests? There can be no doubt about that.

Bonaparte's Italian policy was determined by the interests of France - this is undeniable. But the interests of France can be understood in different ways. The differences between Bonaparte and the Directory in matters of Italian politics serve as a clear example of this different understanding of interests. When the Directory objected to the formation of independent Italian republics and demanded from Bonaparte only gold and more gold, citing the “interests of France,” this only proved how narrowly it understood them. It was an openly predatory policy, fully consistent with the wolfish greed of the new, speculative bourgeoisie, seeking to snatch more loot. Bonaparte understood the interests of France more broadly and deeply. He went through the school of revolution and saw what enormous advantages France acquires by contrasting the advanced, bourgeois system of relations with the reactionary, feudal system, attracting to its side numerous forces of the oppressed and dissatisfied. His policy in Italy was mainly in line with historical progress, and this was the source of its strength.

Contemporaries felt and understood this, although they expressed their opinions differently. Stendhal called 1796 the heroic time of Napoleon, the poetic and noble period of his life: “I perfectly remember the delight that his youthful glory aroused in all noble hearts.” Gro, Berne, David captured the image of a young, very thin warrior rushing forward, with an inspired pale face, long hair fluttering in the wind, with a tricolor banner in his hands, rushing ahead of the soldiers towards the enemy. Beethoven later, shocked by the thunder of great victories and unparalleled feats, created his immortal “Eroic Symphony”.

All this is true. And yet, even in that initial, best time of Bonaparte’s activity on the big stage of European politics, sometimes some features, some individual touches appeared in his image, his actions, which confused even his most ardent admirers from among the Republicans.

Huge indemnities imposed on the defeated Italian states...

Bonaparte's supporters, even among Italian patriots, justified him by saying that these were the “laws of war”, as they were understood in the 18th century, that the commander fulfilled only the requirements of the Directory, that indemnities were also collected by other republican armies, and that Bonaparte forced monarchs and the church to pay , rich.

In general, all this was true. But others, although not quite confidently, still objected: do the “laws of war” also apply to the republic? Did General Bonaparte always comply with the demands of the Directory? Finally, still others were quite timidly perplexed: have indemnities ever been collected in such huge amounts?

It was impossible not to notice that something had changed in the behavior and lifestyle of the Republican general. While the army fought forward, Bonaparte and the soldiers walked mostly on foot and, appearing at the moment of battle in the most dangerous places, shared all the hardships of the campaign. But the shots stopped, a truce was signed, peace was expected, and Bonaparte returned to Milan.

He settled in the magnificent castle of Montbello, near Milan, where he created a kind of small courtyard that amazed visitors with the splendor of its decoration. Here, at large receptions, at dinner parties, at evenings, Josephine reigned. She seemed to be beginning to appreciate her husband for the first time—she seemed to be recognizing him again. Could this quick-decision-making, self-confident, universally admired army commander really be the same angular, passionate Corsican at whom she and that stupid Charles secretly laughed? She reproached herself: how could she not immediately see “her Bonaparte”? Every day her affection for him became stronger. In addition, he finally gave her the opportunity to satisfy her innate passion for wasting money, which had remained unsatisfied for so many years. However, this talent of the general’s wife was disputed by his sisters, and above all by the beautiful Paoletta, who finally became Polina, but still turned the heads of all the young army officers. It was a cheerful, brilliant courtyard, sparkling with youth, laughter, jokes, wine in crystal glasses, smiles of women - the courtyard of the general of the victorious army.

But who paid for these carefree, noisy evenings in the magnificent halls of the ancient Montbello Palace, where wine flowed like a river and money flowed without counting? Count Melzi and other Italian ministers raised their glasses to the health of the commander and officers of the liberating army. Perhaps they were quite sincere. But in the end it was gold created by the people of Italy.

It became a little quieter at Montbello Castle after Pauline Bonaparte, who had attracted so many admirers, finally chose General Leclerc. The elder brother duly celebrated her wedding and gave her forty thousand livres as a dowry. Admirers of the general and admirers of Polina said: isn’t a woman who outshines all the beauties of Italy with her beauty worthy of this? Who would dare to object? But people who knew the Bonaparte family closer recalled to themselves that three years ago, barefoot Paoletta was rinsing clothes in the chilly water of the river. When Bonaparte left Italy in 1797, the Directory of the Cisalpine Republic presented him with his beloved Montbello Palace as a token of gratitude; she paid the previous owner a million livres for it.

Napoleon on the island of St. Helena found it necessary to return - for future generations - to the question of his expenses in Italy. He told how the Duke of Modena had offered him, through Salicetti, four million in gold and how he had rejected them. There is no doubt that what he said is true. He also indicated that the total amount he received in Italy did not exceed 300,000 francs. Fr. Massoy, who devoted his entire life to researching the details of the biography of a famous person, modestly remarked on this occasion that, most likely, the emperor missed one zero. It is difficult to say with certainty whether Bonaparte already had a million-dollar fortune by the time of the happy evenings in Montbello; perhaps not. He was more greedy for fame than for money. But in the smiling, brilliant owner of the Montbello castle, who captivated the Italian guests with his wit, it was no longer easy to recognize the gloomy officer from the topographical bureau, who looked like a hunted wolf, hiding in the shadows to hide his frayed uniform and worn-out boots.

Of course, Bonaparte of 1797, who had the glory of Montenotte, Lodi, and Rivoli behind him, was already different than two years ago.

During this time, everything changed dramatically in his life, everything became different. It is also important to understand the psychological change that occurred in him during the months of the war in Italy.

All the first years of Bonaparte’s conscious life, moreover, a whole decade - from 1786 to 1796 - suffered one failure after another, he moved from defeat to defeat. With his Corsican penchant for superstition, he was ready to admit that he was "out of luck." Maybe he was born a loser? Maybe evil fate will haunt him all his life? And now, after ten years of failures since 1796, everything changed in his fate. The wind blew into his sails. He went from victory to victory, from success to success.

Bonaparte was one of the educated people of his time. He invited famous scientists to Montbello - the mathematician Monge, the chemist Berthollet, and they were amazed at his knowledge of special branches of science. Italian musicians and artists were amazed at how subtly he understood music. But all this was combined with some kind of atavistic, cave-like Corsican superstition. In moments of excitement, he often and quickly crossed himself; he believed in omens, in premonitions. During the days of the Italian campaign, he finally believed in his star. He got rid of the oppressive, perhaps even subconscious, fear: what if he was unlucky again? He came to life, perked up, he believed that from now on happiness and good luck would accompany him. He was seen smiling, joyful, happy, primarily because all these fourteen months of the war in Italy a lucky star was shining for him and he felt how much he could accomplish.

Some of Napoleon's biographers, who have been inclined almost since 1796 to see plans for seizing the throne in his actions and thoughts, shift, in my opinion, his evolution. A significant role here was played by the testimony of Mio de Melito, introduced into historical science at one time by the brilliant pen of Albert Sorel, which oriented readers in precisely this spirit. Sorel trusted them, and his literary talent gave the credibility that such statements lacked. Meanwhile, a careful study of the memoirs of Mio de Melito, published by the Württemberg General Fleischmann, shows that they are not trustworthy as a source. However, regardless of Mio’s apocryphal memories, it is quite obvious that Bonaparte’s path from Jacobin to all-powerful emperor could not have been so straightforward.

Bonaparte's real power in Italy in 1797 became enormous. Count Stackelberg, the royal envoy in Turin, wrote in August 1797: “There is no doubt that in all Italy all French agents, without any exception, are completely dependent on the commander-in-chief.” It was true. Of course, Bonaparte, and most people of his time, went through a series of disappointments generated by the tragic course of the bourgeois revolution. But he, like most of his associates with a similar political biography, that is, in the past Jacobins, remained a Republican. There is no reason to question his republicanism of that time. When the Austrian commissioners, during the Leoben negotiations, proposed officially recognizing the republic as a concession for which something had to be paid, Bonaparte contemptuously rejected this. The republic did not need anyone’s recognition... “The republic is like the sun! So much the worse for those who don’t see it,” he replied arrogantly.

And yet, Stendhal, with his amazing gift of historical insight, did not accidentally point to the spring of 1797, to the entry of the French into Venice, as the brink ending the heroic time of Bonaparte’s life.

The entry of the French into Venice was predetermined by the Leoben agreements. On both sides they were a compromise, and the very idea of ​​a compromise was not objected to by anyone. But in the Leoben agreements, for the first time, a direct deviation from the principles of republican foreign policy was allowed. The secret agreement on the transfer of Austria to the Venetian Republic meant a violation of all the principles proclaimed by the republic. Bonaparte tried to justify his actions by saying that the cession of Venice to Austria was only a temporary measure forced by circumstances, and that in 1805 he corrected this. These arguments, of course, could not change the fundamental significance of the Leoben deal. In essence, the transfer of Venice to Austria was no better than the return of Austria to Lombardy, which the Directory insisted on and which Bonaparte objected to.

Since the time of the Leoben agreements, significantly new elements have been introduced into Bonaparte's Italian policy. It would be wrong to believe that after April - May 1797, after Leoben and the occupation of Venice, Bonaparte’s entire policy changed radically, from progressive to aggressive, aggressive. But it would also be wrong not to notice those changes in the policy pursued by Bonaparte, which were quite clearly revealed since the spring of 1797 - a manifestation of aggressive tendencies.

The Directory, although almost everything Bonaparte did in Italy (except for the millions that came in) caused its discontent, had to put up with the general’s willfulness due to the precariousness of its own positions. Having barely managed to defeat the danger on the left - the Babuvist movement - she found herself faced with an even more formidable danger - this time on the right. Elections in the Germinal of the 5th year (May 1797) gave a majority in both Councils to the opponents of the Directory - royalist and pro-royalist elements, the so-called Clichy party. The election of Pichegru as chairman of the Council of Five Hundred and Barbey-Marbois as chairman of the Council of Elders was an open challenge to the Directory - both were its enemies. The right-wing majority in the Legislative Councils immediately discovered the most vulnerable spot: it demanded that the Directory account for its expenses. Where did the gold that came from Italy go? Why is the treasury always empty? These were questions that the Directory, even with all the diabolical ingenuity of Barras, could not answer. But that was only the beginning. The legislature made no secret of its intention to throw Barras and other “regicides” out of the government. What happens next? This was not yet entirely clear, apparently some kind of transitional form to the monarchy. Opinions differed. The “salon opposition”, grouped around Madame de Staël, also criticized the government from the right. Defining Madame de Staël's political program was not easy. According to Thibodeau's witty remark, “Madame de Stael received the Jacobins in the morning, the royalists in the evening, and the rest of the world at dinner.” But what everyone agreed on was a critical attitude towards the “triumvirs”. Everyone was united by a common conviction: it is necessary to drive out the “triumvirs” who clung to the director’s chairs.

For Barras, in essence, only this was important; everything that followed did not interest him. The director's post was power, honor, magnificent apartments in the Luxembourg Palace, receptions, revelries, night orgies and money, money, money without counting, floating into his hands from all sides. Could he part with all this? A man who had gone through all the circles of hell, emerged from the bottom, slid along the edge of a knife, insidious and daring, Barras was feverishly looking for a way to outplay his enemies. During the years of the revolution, when danger from the right was outlined, the people entered the political scene and their active actions swept away all enemies. But after Germinal and Prairial, the defeat of the Babouvist, there was nothing to think about the people. The army remained. Bayonets are stronger than any constitutional law. They can do anything. The only important thing is that they do not turn against Barras himself...

Barras hesitated: who to turn to - Gauche, Moreau, Bonaparte? More than anyone else, he feared Bonaparte. Therefore, he initially turned to Gauche, but, failing or not having time to prepare everything, he only compromised him.

And time passed, there was no time to hesitate. As an experienced player, Barras calmly stated that if the matter did not work out, he would have to hang on the crossbar.

In the middle of Thermidor (the same fateful month of Thermidor!) the “triumvirs” came to the conclusion that only Bonaparte could get them out of trouble. As Barras wrote, he and his colleagues “would be happy to see again in their midst the general who acted so well on the 13th Vendemier.”

By this time, Barras had thought through the question to the end: Bonaparte is better than anyone, he is a man of action, and dispersing with bayonets the constitutionally sanctioned Legislative Councils will in no way serve the popularity of the winner at Rivoli. Barras's gain will be Bonaparte's loss. Although Barras had long ago ceased to consider Bonaparte a “simpleton,” he again underestimated him. Barras's hidden thoughts were unraveled by Napoleon. It is necessary to fight against the monarchical danger - Bonaparte had no doubt about this. He appealed to the army in support of the Republic, sharply condemning royalist intrigues, and agreed to provide armed assistance to the Directory. But Bonaparte least of all intended to act in accordance with the plans of Barras, to compromise himself, to compromise the glory of Rivoli and Leoben with operations in the spirit of Vendémière. There will be others for such things. And he sent Augereau to Paris with a detachment of soldiers. Augereau, a brawler, a sneerer, a martinet, a man ready to do anything, but unable to extract benefits for himself - he thought too slowly, he was best suited for such a role.

Augereau arrived in Paris when the position of the directors, in their own judgment, became critical. A phrase spoken by Pichegru in a conversation with Carnot, who complained about the “triumvirs”, was passed down from mouth to mouth: “Your Luxembourg Palace is not the Bastille; I’ll get on the horse, and in a quarter of an hour it will all be over.”

Barras, Rebel, Larevelier-Lepo were waiting in horror for these last “quarter of an hour” to come.

Augereau, having arrived in Paris, calmly reported to the “triumvirs”: “I have arrived to kill the royalists.” Carnot, who could not overcome his disgust for Augereau, said: “What a notorious robber!”

But Bonaparte gave the Directory not only penetrating force in the person of the ferocious Augereau, he also armed it politically. Even earlier, in Verona, the briefcase of the royalist agent Count d'Entregues was captured, which contained, among other papers, irrefutable evidence of Pichegru's betrayal, his secret connections with emissaries of the pretender to the throne. Bonaparte handed these documents over to the members of the Directory.

From the moment these documents, murderous for Pichegru, came into the hands of Barras and his accomplices, which unexpectedly gave the entire violent operation an almost noble tone of saving measures in defense of the Republic, they decided to act

On the 18th of Fructidor (September 4, 1797), ten thousand soldiers under the command of Augereau surrounded the Tuileries Palace, where both Councils met, and, without encountering any resistance, except for timid cries of “the rule of law,” they “purged” their composition. It was then that one of Augereau’s officers, whose name was not preserved in history, uttered the famous phrase: “Law? This is a saber!

Most of the objectionable deputies, led by Pichegru, were arrested. Carnot, warned that he would be arrested, managed to escape. In forty-nine departments, the elections held in the Germinal of the year V were annulled, and new ones were called, providing for all the necessary measures to ensure that suitable candidates were elected. Senior officials, officials, judges were removed, newspapers were closed - in a word, everything that at that moment posed a direct or potential threat to the power of the “triumvirs” was removed from the path...

The coup d'etat of the 18th Fructidor had considerable consequences for the domestic and foreign policy of the Republic. Without going into consideration of them, we still note the most important thing: the events of the 18th Fructidor greatly contributed to the further discrediting of the Directory regime. If the legal basis of this power had previously seemed extremely shaky, then after the 18th Fructidor it became obvious to everyone - both enemies and supporters of the regime - that it could only be maintained by relying on the army. The random formula “Law? This is a saber! was confirmed and shown in practical action on the stage of the highest national forum.

Bonaparte, who closely followed the course of events in distant Paris, drew practical conclusions from them: the Directory would now not be able to prevent him from making peace with Austria. In general, this calculation turned out to be correct, but in particular Bonaparte was wrong.

Barras was one of those greedy wasters who live for today. A man of no timid nature, he was aware that the recent operation had not brought him any more friends. But during his stormy life, he accumulated so many enemies from among the people loyal to him, sold or robbed by him, that he had long lost count. He didn’t count them - you can’t count them all! After Fructidor, he again felt like a master in the Luxembourg Palace and, with an impudence that forced even experienced people to fold, he was now ready to “put in their place” those whom he had fawned over yesterday in fear.

Barras was rescued by Augereau's soldiers sent by Bonaparte. But it was Bonaparte and Augereau, the day after Fructidor, who caused his greatest irritation.

On September 17, War Minister Scherer wrote to Lazar Gosch: “The Directory wants both Rhine armies to be united under one command and to set out on the campaign by the 20th of Vendemier at the latest. The Directory has chosen you, General, to lead our victorious phalanxes to the gates of Vienna." Bonaparte was asked to interrupt negotiations with the Viennese cabinet and prepare the army for the start of a new campaign.

Barras decided to fully settle accounts with the unauthorized general. In addition, Bonaparte provided too many services both to the Republic and to him personally, Barras. Feeling powerful again, the director sought first of all to get rid of those to whom he owed money. It is necessary to place Gauche over Bonaparte, pit the two famous commanders against each other - let them bicker and squabble, and then he, Barras, as an arbiter, will intervene and show Bonaparte his place.

Bonaparte was furious. He did not fall into the trap set for him - he did not argue either with Gauche or about Gauche. In a letter dated September 23, he again insisted on his resignation. “If they don’t trust me, I have nothing to do... I ask to be relieved of my position.” The directory did not accept his resignation, but on the issue of peace it remained at its previous positions.

But the coup of the 18th Fructidor had political consequences outside France. In Austria, after Leoben, hesitation on the issue of concluding peace began to be clearly visible. By many signs, Bonaparte could be convinced that Vienna was in no hurry to sign a peace treaty. Unraveling the source of these fluctuations was not difficult. After the elections in the Germinal and the formation of a pro-royalist majority in the French legislative bodies, Vienna hoped for the fall of the Directory and dramatic political changes in France. Why rush to peace?

Bonaparte, for his part, tried to influence the Habsburg government. In August 1797, he demanded that the Piedmontese king place ten thousand soldiers at the disposal of the command of the Italian army, citing “the likelihood of renewed hostilities against Austria.” As he had hoped, this demand caused a stir in Turin and immediately became known in all the embassies, and then in all the capitals of Europe.

In Vienna this demarche was duly appreciated. The coup of the 18th Fructidor dispelled the last illusions. Two weeks after the coup, on September 20, Emperor Franz sent a letter directly to Bonaparte, offering to begin negotiations without delay. Without waiting for the sanction of the Directory, Bonaparte agreed. Negotiations began in Udine (in Italy) on September 27 and continued until October 17. The Vienna Cabinet sent the best diplomat of the empire, the highly experienced Count Ludwig Kobenzl, to negotiate with Bonaparte. For the last eight years he was ambassador in St. Petersburg, and managed to gain the trust of Empress Catherine II. Unusually plump, ugly, “the northern polar bear,” as Napoleon called him, Cobenzl, for all his massiveness, showed exceptional liveliness and dexterity in diplomatic negotiations. He was persistent, assertive, and spoke with aplomb. By sending Cobenzl to Italy, the Austrian government was showing the importance it attached to the upcoming negotiations.

The agreements in Cherasco, Tolentino, Leoben showed that the young general was not only an outstanding commander, but also a diplomat of first-class talent. Campoformio fully confirmed this.

Bonaparte forced the Austrian diplomat to travel a long way and come to him in Italy. Although Bonaparte was within easy reach of Udine from Milan, he was a day late, forcing the emperor's representative to wait patiently for his arrival. He came to the first meeting accompanied by a huge retinue of generals and officers rattling sabers. He wanted to make it clear to his interlocutor from the very first meeting that in negotiations between two equal parties there are losers and winners.

The negotiations were difficult. For Bonaparte, they turned out to be especially difficult because he received directives from Paris ordering him to impose obviously unacceptable conditions on Austria, and Cobenzl, for his part, evaded direct obligations, trying to make the agreement between France and Austria dependent on its subsequent approval by the Congress of representatives of the German Empire . Bonaparte found himself caught between two fires. And he was in a hurry: he wanted to make peace with Austria as soon as possible, the only way he could finish his campaign.

Cobenzl was intractable. Bonaparte tried to intimidate the Austrian by threatening to break off the negotiations. Cobenzl coolly objected: “The Emperor wants peace, but is not afraid of war, and I will find satisfaction in having met a man as famous as he is interesting.” Bonaparte had to look for other ways.

Historical literature usually indicates that the key to the agreement with Austria at Udine and Passariano was the problem of Prussia. The AVPR documents introduce some amendment to this generally correct statement. This key was found by Bonaparte not in Udine and Passariano, but earlier, in the period of Leoben. In a deciphered report from Mozenigo to St. Petersburg on April 27 (May 8), 1797, it was reported: “Bonaparte’s brother, who is the minister in Parma, writes that this treaty (the preliminaries in Leoben - A.M.) is based on an alliance between France and emperor in order to jointly counteract the aspirations for the rise of the Prussian king."

Already during the Leoben negotiations, Bonaparte found the most sensitive place in the positions of the Austrian side. He decided to touch on it again in negotiations with Kobenzl. He talked to him about the Basel Peace, about the ties maintained with the Prussian king... After all, it could have been different?

Kobenzl was an understanding man. He didn't have to repeat what he heard twice. He cautiously inquired: was France ready to support Austria with a secret agreement against the excessive claims of the Prussian king? “Why not,” Bonaparte replied calmly, “I don’t see any obstacles to this if we come to an agreement with you on everything else.” The conversation took on a purely business character. Both interlocutors understood each other well, and yet the negotiations progressed slowly, since in specific issues each side sought to negotiate the most favorable solution for it.

Bonaparte received new government directives from Paris - the “September 29 ultimatum”, proposing to interrupt negotiations and resolve issues by force of arms - to go on the offensive against Vienna. Responding to the Directory with repeated requests for resignation, he decided to conduct the business “in his own way.” And Kobenzl continued to bargain on every point, the negotiations did not move forward. Bonaparte could not remain any longer in such an uncertain position. He decided on a bold move: he showed Kobenzl the directives received from Paris. He explained that he could break off the negotiations at any second and his government would only be content.

Cobenzl was mortally frightened. He agreed to all Bonaparte's demands. It was a frank division of spoils. The Venetian Republic, like Poland recently, was divided between Austria, France and the Cisalpine Republic, Mainz and the entire left bank of the Rhine went to France. Austria recognized the independence of the northern Italian republics. In return, according to secret articles, she was supposed to receive Bavaria and Salzburg.

By October 9, all controversial issues were resolved and the text of the agreement was drafted. But on the 11th, when Bonaparte and Cobenzl gathered to sign it, new difficulties unexpectedly arose.

Bonaparte did not like the wording of the clause on Mainz and the Rhine border, he proposed to correct it. Cobenzl objected, Bonaparte insisted. Cobenzl argued that the borders of the Rhine were the responsibility of the empire. An enraged Bonaparte interrupted him: “Your empire is an old servant, accustomed to being raped by everyone... You bargain here with me, but forget that you are surrounded by my grenadiers!” He yelled at the confused Kobenzl, threw a magnificent service, a gift from Catherine II, onto the floor, breaking into pieces. “I will smash your entire empire like this!” he shouted in rage. Cobenzl was shocked. When Bonaparte, continuing to shout something inaudible and abusive, noisily left the room, the Austrian diplomat immediately made all the corrections that Bonaparte demanded into the documents. “He went crazy, he was drunk,” Kobenzl later justified himself. He later began to say that during the negotiations the general drank punch, glass after glass, and this apparently had an effect on him.

This is unlikely to be the case. The Austrian diplomat wanted to justify himself, to explain how he allowed such a scene to happen. Bonaparte did not go crazy and was not drunk. He hardly got drunk at all. In his furious outburst one must most likely see the amazing art of getting into the role so completely that it is impossible to distinguish whether it is a game or genuine feelings.

Two days later, the text was finally agreed upon in the edition proposed by Bonaparte. The Austrian diplomat sent the draft treaty to Vienna for approval, received approval, and now all that remained was to sign the treaty.

It was agreed that the exchange of signatures would take place in the small village of Campoformio, halfway between the residences of both parties. But when the document was completely ready on October 17, Count Cobenzl, so frightened by Bonaparte, fearing any other surprise on his part, without waiting for Bonaparte’s arrival in Campoformio, went to his residence in Passariano. The general had his own reasons for not delaying the completion of the matter. Here, in Passariano, on the night of October 17-18, the treaty was signed.

And although neither Bonaparte nor Cobenzl were ever in Campoformio, the treaty that ended the five-year war between Austria and the French Republic went down in history under the name of the Peace of Campoformio.

Bonaparte's Italian campaign of 1796-1797 was a military campaign of the Italian Army of France against Austria and Piedmont (Sardinia) during the War of the First Anti-French Coalition.

Throughout the war, starting in 1792, Italy was a minor theater of war. The plan for the military campaign of 1796, developed by L., also assigned the main role to the Sambro-Meuse Army and the Rhine-Moselle Army of Moreau, which were supposed to cross the Rhine and advance on Vienna, while the Italian Army, which was commanded by General Bonaparte from March 1796 (see) , again only an auxiliary function was intended. Bonaparte had about 45 thousand people at his disposal. They were opposed by up to 70 thousand Austro-Sardinian troops of General Beaulieu, divided, however, into several corps, which were located at a considerable distance from each other. Having entered Italy on April 9, 1796, Bonaparte defeated the Austrian and Sardinian troops piecemeal in the battles of Montenotte (April 12), Millesimo (April 13), Dego (April 13-14), Cheve (April 16), Mondovi (April 21) and forced Piedmont to withdraw from the war, signing a truce (April 28) and then peace (May 15). Building on his success, Bonaparte defeated the Austrians at Fombio (May 7-9), Lodi (May 10) and Borghetto (May 30), drove them back to Tyrol and besieged the fortress of Mantua. Having received reinforcements, the Austrian army under the command of General Wurmser on July 29 moved to the rescue of the garrison of Mantua. Having won victories at Lonato (August 3-4) and Castiglione (August 5), Bonaparte again forced her to retreat to the Tyrol.

At the beginning of September, Wurmser again moved to Mantua, leaving General Davidovich's detachment to cover the Tyrol. Bonaparte defeated Davidovich at Roverto (September 4) and occupied the Tyrol, after which he turned against Wurmser and defeated his army at Bassano (September 8), forcing its remnants to take refuge in Mantua, which only complicated the position of the besieged. In October, Austria sent to the North. Italy a new army under the command of Field Marshal Alvinzi. Taking advantage of the slowness and lack of coordination of the enemy's actions, Bonaparte defeated Alvintsi at (November 15-17) and forced him to retreat. On January 7, 1797, Alvinzi's troops again moved to the rescue of Mantua. However, Bonaparte received reinforcements from France and defeated the Austrians at Rivoli (January 14-15), after which Mantua capitulated (February 2). Having entered the Papal States, the French also forced the Pope to peace (February 19), who renounced part of his possessions and paid France 30 million francs in indemnity. On March 10, Bonaparte launched an attack on Austria. He defeated the troops of Archduke Charles on the river. Tagliamento (March 16) and under Tarvisio (March 21-23), forcing Austria to sign a preliminary peace treaty in Leoben on April 17, the terms of which were consolidated on October 17.

Lit.: Chandler D. Military campaigns of Napoleon. The triumph and tragedy of the conqueror. M., 2011; . Sokolov O. V. Bonaparte’s first Italian campaign 1796-1797. Part 1. St. Petersburg, 2016. Montarras. A. Legénéral Bonaparteetle renseignement: la période révolutionnaire et la première campagne d’Italie. Paris, 2014. Ferrero G. Bonaparte en Italie: 1796—1797. Paris, 1994. Tranié J., Carmignani J.-C. Napoleon Bonaparte: la première campagne d’Italie 1796-1797. Paris, 1990.

Napoleon's Italian campaign of 1796 -1797. interesting because it was he who allowed Bonaparte to express himself for the first time. This was the first, but not the last military campaign of the future French emperor. He was admired, he was hated. Even today, his personality leaves few people indifferent. The commander left many secrets behind. The significant date of Napoleon Bonaparte's Italian campaign is considered to be April 12, 1796. On this day the Battle of Montenota took place. As the great conqueror himself later admitted: “My nobility begins from Montenota.” However, first things first.

Napoleon Bonaparte's family

Napoleon Bonaparte was born on the island of Corsica on August 15, 1769. His father Carlo Maria Buonaparte came from a seedy aristocratic family. Nevertheless, Carlo was educated as a lawyer at the University of Pisa. When his family considered that the young man was ripe to start a family, they fussed and arranged his marriage to Litizia Romolino, who had a good dowry.

Letitia was a brave, determined woman. She even had the opportunity to take part in hostilities, fighting for the independence of Corsica and seeing the horrors of war, caring for the wounded. She and her husband were real Corsicans. They valued honor and independence above all else.

The biography of Napoleon Bonaparte's parents is not distinguished by particularly striking events during the period of their residence in Corsica. The father of the family did not deny himself anything: huge gambling debts, dubious transactions, deals, banquets and many other things of this kind that destroyed the family budget. True, he made sure that his sons Napoleon and Joseph received a scholarship from the French government during their studies.

The Buonaparte family was large: 12 children, of which 8 lived to maturity. His father died, leaving the large family penniless. Only the mother’s courage, her drive and energy did not allow them all to die.

In his home circle, Napoleon was called Nabulio. He was a very impulsive child who became angry easily. There were no authorities for him. He endured any punishment steadfastly. Once he even bit his teacher, who decided to call the boy to order.

There is no photo of Napoleon Bonaparte's family, but many paintings have survived where he, surrounded by family and friends, is depicted as loving and caring. He cannot be called an open person. Since childhood, he has become accustomed to proud loneliness. It didn’t bother him, but he had books. The young man loved to read, being fascinated by the exact sciences, but had a strong aversion to the humanities. All his life he wrote with grammatical errors, which did not prevent him from doing great things.

On the eve of Napoleon's first Italian campaign

French society became increasingly radical. Any attacks from European states that condemned the revolution infuriated the National Convention. It was for France that the question of future military confrontation no longer existed. Her opponents did not want to go that far, but the spark that they caused with their assessments and judgments was able to ignite the fire of war.

Everyone in France wanted this war. Political parties only carried out the will of the people. Thousands and thousands of volunteers joined the army with the desire to get even with the offenders of their fatherland as quickly as possible and liberate all the other peoples of Europe. The diplomat Caulaincourt, who left priceless memoirs about Napoleon’s campaign in Russia, saw in him a liberator and destroyer of the existing system of oppression of the common man. The French emperor, in his opinion, brought progress and freedom to all of Europe, thereby expressing the will of his people.

The attempt of the Prussian-Austrian interventionists to nip the revolution in the bud failed thanks to the competent, coordinated actions of the French artillerymen in the Battle of Valmy in 1792. This slap in the face so stunned the occupiers that they had no choice but to retreat. But there was another important event that predetermined the further course of historical events. The governments of many states began to take France more seriously and unite, seeing it as the main threat to their power.

A few years later, many military theorists believed that the main front should take place in western and southwestern Germany. Only Napoleon Bonaparte considered the Italian campaign as the main direction that would turn the tide of the war.

Appointment to the post of Commander-in-Chief

For the most part, few people were interested in the invasion of Northern Italy. By that time, the ambitious French officer of Corsican origin had been noticed. Viscount de Barras entrusted him with suppressing the rebellion of supporters of the monarchy, which they staged on October 3-5, 1795 against the National Convention. The Corsican did not stand on ceremony: volleys of buckshot swept away the rebels. The ambitious upstart proved that he is ready to do anything for the sake of power.

Viscount de Barras made a gift for his protégé, which can be assessed very ambiguously. If we briefly characterize the resources and capabilities for Napoleon Bonaparte’s Italian campaign, it turns out that it was a double-edged sword. On the one hand, despite the fact that this 106,000-strong group was assigned a secondary role to distract the Coalition, and the main blow was to be carried out by the brilliant French general Moreau, Napoleon was given a chance. Inspired, he arrived in Nice on March 27, 1796. An unpleasant surprise awaited him there.

"Dead Souls"

It would seem that fate favors the ambitious commander. Napoleon's grandiose Italian campaign - a project that he has been preparing for the last two years - is about to become a reality. Moreover, Bonaparte had been to Italy and knew this area. Only the commander-in-chief of the French troops in Italy, Scherer, who was supposed to be replaced by the protégé of the Viscount de Barras, brought down his replacement.

The first unpleasant surprise was that only according to the papers there were over a hundred thousand personnel, but in fact there were not even forty, and eight thousand of them were the garrison of Nice. You cannot take it off for a hike. Taking into account the sick, dead, deserters, and prisoners, no more than 30,000 people can be taken on a campaign.

The second problem: the personnel are on the verge. The supply does not spoil them. These hungry ragamuffins are the “indestructible fist” of the strike force allocated by the Directory for the attack on Italy. From such news, anyone could fall into despair and fold their hands.

Putting things in order

If we briefly describe the preparations for Napoleon Bonaparte’s Italian campaign, the new commander-in-chief did not stand on ceremony. To begin with, to the delight of many soldiers, he shot several quartermasters who were stealing. This strengthened discipline, but did not solve supply issues. The young 27-year-old general solved it according to the principle: “The Motherland gave you a rifle. And then be smart, just don’t overdo it.” The experienced front-line soldiers really liked this initiative - the general won their hearts.

But there was another problem, much more significant. His senior officers did not take him seriously. Here he showed will, inflexibility, and toughness. He forced himself to be taken into account. Order was restored. Now the hike could begin.

Start of the company

French success could only be achieved if they could defeat the Austrians and the Piedmontese army separately. And for this it was necessary to have good maneuverability. Appear where the enemy probably does not expect them. Therefore, the French command relied on the route along the coastal edge of the Alps because of the audacity of the plan. They could well have come under fire from the English fleet.

The date of Napoleon's Italian campaign, its beginning is April 5, 1796. In a few days a dangerous section of the Alps was passed. The French army successfully invaded Italy.

Bonaparte strictly followed the strategy. These are a few moments that allowed him to win brilliant victories:

• the defeat of the enemy took place in parts;
• the concentration of forces for the main attack was carried out quickly and secretly;
• war is a continuation of state policy.

In short: Napoleon's Italian campaigns demonstrated his skill as a commander, who could secretly concentrate troops, misleading the enemy, and then, with a small group, break into his rear, sowing horror and panic.

Battle of Montenot

On April 12, 1796, the Battle of Montenot takes place, which became Napoleon's first major victory as commander in chief. Initially, he decided to take Sardinia out of the game as quickly as possible. For this purpose, he needed to capture Turin and Milan. A French brigade of 2,000 men under the command of Cervoni advanced to Genoa.

In order to push back the attackers, the Austrians allocated 4.5 thousand people. They were supposed to deal with the Chervoni brigade, and then, regrouping, strike at the main forces of the French. The fighting began on April 11. Being outnumbered, the French managed to repel three powerful enemy attacks, and then retreat and link up with La Harpe's division.

But that was not all. At night, 2 more additional divisions of Napoleon were transferred through the Cadibon Pass. In the morning the Austrians were already in the minority. They did not have time to react in any way to the changed conditions. The French lost only 500 men, and the enemy division under Argento was destroyed.

Battle of Arcola November 15 - 17, 1796

A situation arose when active offensive actions were necessary to maintain the initiative. Delay, on the contrary, could negate all the successes that were achieved during Napoleon's Italian campaign. The problem was that Bonaparte clearly did not have enough strength. He was outnumbered: 13,000 of his men against 40,000 enemy troops. And they had to fight on the plain with a well-prepared enemy, whose fighting spirit was very high.

Therefore, attacking Coldiero, where the main forces of the Austrians were located, was a futile idea. But Napoleon could try to bypass it through Arcole, finding himself in the rear of Alvitzi’s troops. This area was surrounded by swamps, which made it difficult to deploy battle formations. The Austrians did not believe that the main forces of the French would climb into these impassable swamps, expecting that their path would lie through Verona. Nevertheless, 2 divisions were allocated to disperse this “small” French detachment with a counterattack.

This was a big mistake. As soon as Alvitsi’s soldiers crossed the bridge, deprived of the fire support of their comrades from the other side, they were immediately met by soldiers of the Napoleonic army. With a bayonet attack they threw the enemy into the swamps. Even despite huge losses, the Austrians continued to remain a formidable force.

The only bridge was guarded by their 2 battalions. One of the attacks on him was led by Napoleon Bonaparte personally.

Battle for the bridge over the Alpone river

To develop decisive success it was necessary to capture the bridge. Alvitzi, realizing its importance, sent additional forces to guard the important site. All French attacks were repulsed. Throughout the history of Napoleon's Italian campaign, maneuver was of exceptional importance; marking time meant losing the initiative. Understanding this forced Bonaparte to grab the banner and personally lead the assault.

This desperate attempt ended in the death of many glorious soldiers of France. Hoarse with rage, Napoleon did not want to give up. His fighters had to forcefully pull out their restless commander, moving him away from this dangerous place.

Defeat of the Austrians at Arcola

At this time, Alvitzi realized the danger of his presence in Coldiero. He hastily left it, transporting the convoy and reserves across the bridge. Meanwhile, Augereau's division, having moved to the left bank of the Alpone River, was in a hurry with all its might to Arcola. A threat arose to the communications of the Austrian troops. Without tempting fate, they retreated behind Vincenza. Victory went to the French, who lost approximately 4-4.5 thousand people. For the Austrians it was a defeat. In stubborn bloody battles they lost about 18,000 soldiers. This became possible thanks to the weak interaction of their troops. While Napoleon, not afraid of risk, transferred his troops to the point of the main attack, leaving weak barriers as security, his opponents were inactive, which he took advantage of.

Battle of Rivoli 14 - 15 January 1797

On the eve of this significant battle, Napoleon Bonaparte found himself in a very difficult situation. Despite the fact that the course of the 1796 campaign was going well for him, Piedmont capitulated. The Austrians were left alone, but they posed a serious threat. The fortress of Mantua, considered impregnable, was in their hands, and Napoleon controlled most of Northern Italy. The reinforcements that the French so desperately needed could not appear before spring. The robberies of the local population turned him against the French occupiers.

And most importantly, the famous Austrian commander Alvinzi was going to release Mantua. The main attack of his troops will be carried out in the Rivoli area. The first to engage with the Austrians was the French commander Joubert. On January 13, 1797, he almost gave the order to retreat; the fate of Napoleon’s Italian campaign was being decided in those days. The commander-in-chief who arrived at the position forbade retreat. Bonaparte, on the contrary, ordered Joubert's troops to attack the Austrians early in the morning.

The bloodshed resumed. It would have been very difficult for the French troops if General Massena had not come to their aid. A radical turning point occurred in the battle. Napoleon took advantage of this and inflicted a crushing defeat on the Austrians. Having 28,000 bayonets at his command, he held out and defeated the 42,000-strong enemy group.

With this decisive victory, he did not simply crush the Austrians. The Pope soon begged for mercy and capitulated. Napoleon's most dangerous enemies - the French government (Directory) - powerlessly watched the rise of the national hero, but could not do anything.

Egypt

There was also the inglorious Egyptian campaign of Napoleon Bonaparte, which belongs to the adventurous undertakings. It was undertaken by Napoleon in order to rise even more in the eyes of his own nation. The Directory supported the campaign and reluctantly sent the Italian army and navy to the country of the pyramids only because, thanks to its victory in the First Italian Company of 1796 - 1797. this commander has already set many people on edge.

Egypt did not submit, and France lost its fleet and many killed. Kleber was left to disentangle the results of his adventure, which was started mainly out of vanity. The commander-in-chief himself, accompanied by his most devoted officers, left. He understood the gravity of the army's situation. Not wanting to participate in this anymore, he simply ran away.

Second Italian company

Another touch to the portrait of the “virtuoso of war” is Napoleon’s Second Italian Campaign of 1800. It was undertaken to prevent intervention by the Austrians, who had significant forces. The 230 thousand people who joined the ranks of the French army improved the situation, but Napoleon waited. He needed to decide where to send this army.

The position of the French in Italy was much more dangerous, so another crossing of the Alps was ahead. Skillfully maneuvering, he, using his knowledge of the terrain, was able to go to the rear of the Austrians and take the famous position at Stradella. Thus, he cut off their escape routes. They had excellent cavalry and artillery, but it was not possible to use this advantage against the French, who were entrenched and holding Stradella.

Battle of Marengo June 14, 1800

On June 12 he leaves his excellent positions in Stradella, going in search of the enemy. There are two main versions of why he did this:

• succumbed to impatience, wanting to defeat the enemy as quickly as possible;
• his rivalry with another great French commander, General Moreau, spurred Bonaparte to prove to everyone that only he was the greatest strategist.

Nevertheless, this happened: advantageous positions were abandoned, and the enemy’s locations were not discovered due to poorly conducted reconnaissance. The Austrian army, which had superior forces (40,000 people), decided to fight at Marengo, where there were no more than 15,000 French. Having hastily crossed the Bramida, the Austrians attacked. The French stood openly. They had some fortifications only on the left flank.

A fierce battle broke out. When Napoleon learned that the enemy had unexpectedly appeared near Marengo and was now pushing back his few troops, he hurried to the battlefield. He had nothing except a small reserve. Despite heroic resistance, the French were forced to retreat. Their opponent believed that victory was already in their pocket.

The general's feat

The situation was saved by General Dese, who took the initiative. Hearing the sound of gunfire, he directed his troops toward the noise, finding the Austrians in pursuit of the retreating forces. The position of the French units was critical. Dese ordered to hit the enemy with grapeshot and rushed into a bayonet attack. Confident of their victory, the enemies were taken aback. The furious pressure of Dese, who arrived in time, and the competent actions of Kalerman’s cavalry sowed panic in the ranks of the pursuers. The hunters themselves had become victims and were now fleeing. The Austrian general Zach, who was entrusted with the pursuit of Napoleon's defeated troops, surrendered.

As for the main hero of that battle, General Dese died.

The Battle of Marengo, won by the French, did not decide the outcome of the war. An armistice was signed and Napoleon returned to Paris. Only the Battle of Hohenlinden on December 3 under the leadership of the great General Moreau granted the long-awaited victory in Napoleon's Second Italian Campaign of 1800 and the signing of the Peace of Luneville.

On April 12, 1796, Napoleon Bonaparte won his first major victory at the Battle of Montenotte. The Battle of Montenotte was Bonaparte's first important victory during his first military campaign (the Italian Campaign) as commander-in-chief in his own right. It was the Italian campaign that made Napoleon's name known throughout Europe, and then for the first time his military leadership talent appeared in all its splendor. It was at the height of the Italian campaign that the great Russian commander Alexander Suvorov would say: “He’s walking far, it’s time to calm down the fellow!” The young general dreamed of the Italian campaign. While still the head of the garrison of Paris, he, together with a member of the Directory, Lazare Carnot, prepared a plan for a campaign in Italy. Bonaparte was a supporter of an offensive war and convinced dignitaries of the need to forestall the enemy and the anti-French alliance. The anti-French coalition then included England, Austria, Russia, the Sardinian Kingdom (Piedmont), the Kingdom of the Two Sicilies and several German states - Bavaria, Württemberg, Baden, etc.

The Directory (then French government), like all of Europe, believed that the main front in 1796 would take place in western and southwestern Germany. The French were to invade Germany through Austrian lands. For this campaign, the best French units and generals, led by Moreau, were assembled. No funds and resources were spared for this army.

The Directory was not particularly interested in the plan for the invasion of Northern Italy through the south of France. The Italian front was considered secondary. It was taken into account that it would be useful to hold a demonstration in this direction in order to force Vienna to fragment its forces, nothing more. Therefore, it was decided to send the southern army against the Austrians and the Sardinian king. The troops were to be led by Napoleon, who replaced Scherer. On March 2, 1796, at the suggestion of Carnot, Napoleon Bonaparte was appointed commander-in-chief of the Italian army. The young general's dream came true, Bonaparte got his star chance, and he did not miss it.

On March 11, Napoleon left for the troops and on March 27 he arrived in Nice, where the main headquarters of the Italian army was located. Scherer handed over the army to him and brought him up to date: formally there were 106 thousand soldiers in the army, but in reality there were 38 thousand people. In addition, 8 thousand of them formed the garrison of Nice and the coastal zone; these troops could not be led on the offensive. As a result, no more than 25-30 thousand soldiers could be taken to Italy. The rest of the army were “dead souls” - they died, were sick, were captured or fled. In particular, the southern army officially included two cavalry divisions, but both of them had only 2.5 thousand sabers. And the remaining troops looked not like an army, but like a crowd of ragamuffins. It was during this period that the French commissariat department reached an extreme degree of predation and theft. The army was already considered to be of secondary importance, so it was supplied on a residual basis, but what was released was quickly and brazenly stolen. Some units were on the verge of revolt due to poverty. So Bonaparte had just arrived when he was informed that one battalion had refused to carry out the order to relocate, since none of the soldiers had boots. The collapse in the field of material supply was accompanied by a general decline in discipline.

The army lacked ammunition, supplies, and supplies; money had not been paid for a long time. The artillery park consisted of only 30 guns. Napoleon had to solve the most difficult task: to feed, clothe, put the army in order and do this during the campaign, since he was not going to hesitate. The situation could have been complicated by friction with other generals. Augereau and Massena, like others, would willingly submit to a senior or more distinguished commander rather than a 27-year-old general. In their eyes, he was only a capable artilleryman, a commander who served well at Toulon and was noted for the execution of rebels. He was even given several offensive nicknames, such as “little bastard”, “General Vandemiere”, etc. However, Bonaparte was able to position himself in such a way that he soon broke the will of everyone, regardless of rank and title.

Bonaparte immediately and harshly began the fight against theft. He reported to the Directory: “We have to shoot often.” But it was not the executions that brought a much greater effect, but Bonaparte’s desire to restore order. The soldiers immediately noticed this, and discipline was restored. He also solved the problem of supplying the army. From the very beginning, the general believed that the war should feed itself. Therefore, it is necessary to interest the soldier in the campaign: “Soldiers, you are not dressed, you are poorly fed... I want to lead you to the most fertile countries in the world.” Napoleon was able to explain to the soldiers, and he knew how to create and maintain his personal charm and power over the soldier’s soul, that their provision in this war depended on them.