Almost 100 years ago, in early August, one of the most famous land operations of the First World War under the authorship of Russian General Alexei Brusilov ended. The general's troops broke through the Austro-German front thanks to an original tactical innovation: for the first time in the history of wars, the commander concentrated his forces and delivered powerful blows to the enemy in several directions at once. However, the offensive, which offered a chance to quickly end the war, was not brought to its logical conclusion.

In May 1916, hostilities in Europe became protracted. In military affairs, this is called the plausible term “positional warfare,” but in fact it is an endless sitting in the trenches with unsuccessful attempts to go on a decisive offensive, and each attempt results in huge casualties. Such, for example, are the famous battles on the Marne River in the autumn of 1914 and on the Somme in the winter and spring of 1916, which did not produce tangible results (if you do not take hundreds of thousands of dead and wounded on all sides as a “result”) neither to Russia’s allies in the Entente bloc - England and France, nor their opponents - Germany and Austria-Hungary.

General A. A. Brusilov (life: 1853-1926).

The Russian commander, Adjutant General Alexey Alekseevich Brusilov, studied the experience of these battles and came to interesting conclusions. The main mistake of both the Germans and the Allies was that they acted according to outdated tactics, known since the Napoleonic Wars. It was assumed that the enemy’s front needed to be broken through with one powerful blow in a narrow area (as an example from the biography of Napoleon Bonaparte, let us remember Borodino and the persistent attempts of the French to crush Kutuzov’s left flank - Bagration’s flushes). Brusilov believed that at the beginning of the 20th century, with the development of the fortification system, the advent of mechanized equipment and aviation, holding the attacked area and quickly delivering reinforcements to it was no longer an insurmountable task. The general developed a new offensive concept: several strong attacks in different directions.

Initially, the offensive of Russian troops in 1916 was scheduled for mid-summer, and the Southwestern Front, commanded by Brusilov (he was opposed mainly by the troops of Austria-Hungary), was assigned a secondary role. The main goal was to contain Germany in the eastern theater of operations, so that almost all reserves were at their disposal on the Northern and Western fronts. But Brusilov managed to defend his ideas before Headquarters, headed by Emperor Nicholas II. This was partly facilitated by a change in the operational situation: in early to mid-May, the troops of Italy - another ally of England, France and Russia - suffered a major defeat from the Austrians near Trentino. To prevent the transfer of additional Austrian and German divisions to the west and the final defeat of the Italians, the Allies asked Russia to launch an offensive ahead of schedule. Now Brusilov’s Southwestern Front was supposed to participate in it.

"Brusilovsky" infantry on the Southwestern Front in 1916.

The general had four Russian armies at his disposal - the 7th, 8th, 9th and 11th. The front troops at the start of the operation numbered more than 630 thousand people (of which 60 thousand were cavalry), 1,770 light guns and 168 heavy guns. In manpower and light artillery, the Russians were slightly - about 1.3 times - superior to the Austrian and German armies opposing them. But in heavy artillery the enemy had an overwhelming, more than threefold advantage. This balance of power gave the Austro-German bloc an excellent opportunity for defensive battles. Brusilov, however, even managed to take advantage of this fact: he correctly calculated that in the event of a successful Russian breakthrough, it would be extremely difficult for the “heavy” enemy troops to organize quick counterattacks.

Russian gun crew from the First World War.

The simultaneous offensive of four Russian armies, which received the name “Brusilovsky breakthrough” in history, began on May 22 (June 4 in modern style) along a front with a total length of about 500 km. Brusilov - and this was also a tactical innovation - paid great attention to artillery preparation: for almost a day, Russian artillery continuously hit the Austro-Hungarian and German positions. The southernmost of the Russian armies, the ninth, was the first to go on the offensive, inflicting a crushing blow on the Austrians in the direction of the city of Chernivtsi. The army commander, General A. Krylov, also used an original initiative: his artillery batteries constantly misled the enemy, transferring fire from one area to another. The subsequent infantry attack was a complete success: the Austrians did not understand until the very end which side to expect it from.

A day later, the Russian 8th Army went on the offensive, striking Lutsk. The deliberate delay was explained very simply: Brusilov understood that the Germans and Austrians, in accordance with the prevailing concepts of tactics and strategy, would decide that Krylov’s 9th Army was delivering the main blow, and would transfer reserves there, weakening the front line in other sectors. The general's calculations were brilliantly justified. If the pace of advance of the 9th Army slowed down slightly due to counterattacks, the 8th Army (with the support of the Seventh, which delivered an auxiliary attack from the left flank) literally swept away the weakened enemy defenses. Already on May 25, Brusilov’s troops took Lutsk, and in general, in the first days they advanced to a depth of 35 km. The 11th Army also went on the offensive in the Ternopil and Kremenets area, but here the successes of the Russian troops were somewhat more modest.

Brusilovsky breakthrough. Stages of the operation and directions of the main attacks. The dates in the title and legend of the map are given in the new style.

General Brusilov designated the city of Kovel, northwest of Lutsk, as the main goal of his breakthrough. The calculation was that a week later the troops of the Russian Western Front would begin to attack, and the southern German divisions in this sector would find themselves in a huge “pincer.” Alas, the plan never came to fruition. The commander of the Western Front, General A. Evert, delayed the offensive, citing rainy weather and the fact that his troops did not have time to complete their concentration. He was supported by the Chief of Staff of the Headquarters M. Alekseev, a long-time ill-wisher of Brusilov. Meanwhile, the Germans, as expected, transferred additional reserves to the Lutsk area, and Brusilov was forced to temporarily stop the attacks. By June 12 (25), Russian troops moved to the defense of the occupied territories. Subsequently, in his memoirs, Alexei Alekseevich wrote with bitterness about the inaction of the Western and Northern fronts and, perhaps, these accusations have grounds - after all, both fronts, unlike Brusilov, received reserves for a decisive attack!

The offensive of Brusilov's army. Modern illustration, stylized as a black and white photo.

As a result, the main actions in the summer of 1916 took place exclusively on the Southwestern Front. At the end of June and beginning of July, Brusilov's troops tried to advance again: this time the fighting took place on the northern sector of the front, in the area of ​​the Stokhod River, a tributary of the Pripyat. Apparently, the general had not yet lost hope for active support from the Western Front - the strike through Stokhod almost repeated the idea of ​​​​the failed “Kovel pincers”. Brusilov's troops again broke through the enemy's defenses, but were unable to cross the water barrier on the move. The general made his last attempt at the end of July and beginning of August 1916, but the Western Front did not help the Russians, and the Germans and Austrians, having thrown fresh units into battle, offered fierce resistance. The “Brusilov breakthrough” has fizzled out.

And this is a documentary photograph of the consequences of the breakthrough. The photo shows apparently destroyed Austro-Hungarian positions.

The results of the offensive can be assessed in different ways. From a tactical point of view, it was undoubtedly successful: the Austro-German troops lost up to one and a half million people killed, wounded and prisoners (versus 500 thousand for the Russians), the Russian Empire occupied a territory with a total area of ​​25 thousand sq. km. A by-product was that soon after Brusilov’s success, Romania entered the war on the side of the Entente, significantly complicating the situation for Germany and Austria-Hungary.

On the other hand, Russia did not take advantage of the opportunity to quickly end the hostilities in its favor. In addition, Russian troops received an additional 400 km of front line, which needed to be controlled and protected. After the Brusilov breakthrough, Russia again got involved in a war of attrition, in which it had no chance. The war was rapidly losing popularity among the people, mass protests intensified, and the morale of the army was undermined. The very next year, 1917, this led to devastating consequences within the country.

An ironic depiction of German soldiers surrendering to Brusilov. The author, oddly enough, is also a German - a contemporary of the events, the artist Hermann-Paul.

Interesting fact. German strategists learned “Brusilov’s lesson” very well. Confirmation of this is the military operations of Germany a little over 20 years later, at the beginning of the Second World War. Both the “Manstein plan” to defeat France and the infamous “Barbarossa” plan to attack the USSR were actually built on the ideas of the Russian general: concentration of forces and breakthrough of the front in several directions at the same time.

The plan of Hitler's general (future field marshal) Erich von Manstein to defeat France. Compare with the map of the Brusilov breakthrough: doesn’t it look similar?

One of the largest and most successful offensive operations of the Russian army during the First World War. It took place from May 22 (June 4, new style) to September 7 (20), 1916 on the Southwestern Front under the command of General A.A. Brusilova. The offensive covered the territories of Volhynia, Galicia and Bukovina (present-day Western Ukraine), as a result of which the armies of Austria-Hungary and Germany suffered heavy defeats.

The operation was part of the Entente's overall strategic plan for the interaction of the allied armies on the western and eastern fronts. According to the decision of the conference of the Allied powers in Chantilly in March 1916, a simultaneous offensive of the Allied armies was envisaged in the summer of 1916 against Germany and its allies. An Anglo-French offensive on the Somme River was planned for July 1916, and an offensive on the Russian front for June.

Based on the decisions of this conference, a general plan of action for the Russian army in the summer campaign of 1916 was developed. At the Military Council in April 1916 in Mogilev, chaired by Supreme Commander-in-Chief Nicholas II, a fundamental decision was made to prepare Russian troops for the offensive, which was to unfold in mid-June on all three fronts simultaneously - the Northern (commander General A.N. Kuropatkin), Western (commander General A.E. Evert) and Southwestern (commander Adjutant General A.A. Brusilov). Moreover, the main blow was supposed to be delivered by the forces of the Western Front. The balance of forces was in favor of the Russian army, especially since in the summer of 1916 the armies of the Central Powers were not preparing for large-scale offensive operations on the eastern front.

However, in May 1916 the situation changed. Due to the successful offensive of Austrian troops in the Trentino region, Italy was on the verge of defeat. The Italian king Victor Emmanuel III turned to Nicholas II asking for help. France supported the request. Russia was, as always, faithful to its allied obligations. The headquarters of the Supreme Commander-in-Chief scheduled the offensive of the Southwestern Front for June 4, and the Western Front for June 10-11. Thus, the immediate goal of the offensive operation was to distract Austrian troops from the western front and save Italy. Under such circumstances, the role of the main striking force was assigned to the Southwestern Front, which stood directly against the Austro-Hungarian troops.

Front commander A.A. Brusilov decided to carry out an offensive not in any one direction, but simultaneously along the entire front line. This scattered the enemy's forces and did not give him the opportunity to concentrate his forces to repel the main attack.

By the beginning of the offensive, the armies of the Southwestern Front numbered 40, 5 infantry divisions (573 thousand bayonets) and 15 cavalry divisions (60,000 sabers). There were 1,770 light and 168 heavy guns in service. At the same time, the strength of the armies of Austria-Hungary and Germany was 39 infantry divisions (437,000 bayonets) and 10 cavalry divisions (30,000 sabers), there were 1,301 light and 545 heavy guns. Thus, the superiority of Russian troops over the enemy in manpower and artillery was very insignificant, and therefore the concentration of Russian troops in the areas of the future offensive was of great importance. There were 11 such sectors, and there it was already possible to achieve significant superiority over the enemy - in infantry by 2 - 2.5 times, in artillery by 1.5 - 1.7 times, and in heavy artillery - by 2.5 times.

The plan of action for the armies of the Southwestern Front was as follows. The 8th Army (commanded by General A.M. Kaledin) delivered the main blow on the right flank in the direction of Lutsk, and later - Kovel. The remaining three armies carried out auxiliary attacks: the 11th Army (commander General V.V. Sakharov) - on Brody, the 7th Army (commander General D.G. Shcherbachev) - on Galich, the 9th Army (commander General P. A. Lechitsky) - to Chernivtsi (current Chernivtsi). Major General M.V. played a major role in organizing the offensive. Khanzhin. Careful work was carried out to prepare the offensive.

The Russian troops were opposed from the German side by the army group of A. von Linsingen, from the Austrian side by the army group of E. von Böhm-Ermoli, the Southern Army and the 7th Army of Planzer-Baltin.

The enemy, although he did not plan an attack, was extremely well prepared for defense. A powerful, deeply echeloned defensive system consisted of 2, and in some places 3 stripes, spaced from each other at a distance of 3 to 5 kilometers, with trenches, support units, pillboxes, concrete dugouts and various kinds of obstacles and traps - from wire fences and mines fields to abatis, wolf pits and flamethrowers. The Austro-German command had intelligence data about the impending attack, but believed that without significant reinforcements, Russian troops would not be able to break through such a powerful line of defense, especially after the defeats of 1915.

In this regard, for the success of the offensive of the armies of the Southwestern Front, not only a significant concentration of forces in the directions of the future breakthrough, but also coordinated joint actions of various types of troops - primarily infantry and artillery - were of great importance. Therefore, the offensive began on the night of May 22 (June 4) with a powerful artillery preparation, which lasted in different sectors of the front from 6 to 45 hours. Under the cover of artillery fire, the Russian infantry went on the offensive. The troops moved in waves, 3-4 chains in each, following one after another every 150-200 steps. The first wave, without stopping on the first line of defense, immediately attacked the second. The advanced units were followed by regimental reserves, which, forming the third and fourth waves, attacked the third line of defense, passing by the first two (the so-called “roll attack”). The breakthrough was carried out immediately on 13 sectors of the front, followed by advancement towards the flanks and in depth.

The greatest success of the offensive was achieved on the right flank, where the 8th Army of General A.M. operated. Kaledina. Already on the third day Lutsk was captured. By June 15, the army's troops advanced 60 kilometers deep into the enemy's positions, defeating the 4th Austro-Hungarian Army of Archduke Joseph Ferdinand and reaching the Stokhod River. The capture of Kovel, the most important center of communications for the Austro-German troops, became quite realistic in this direction. On the left flank are the troops of the 9th Army of General P.A. Lechitsky broke through the defenses of the 7th Austro-Hungarian Army, breaking it in a fierce battle, and, having advanced 120 kilometers inland, on June 18 they took the well-fortified city of Chernovtsy - the “second Verdun,” as the Austrians called it. The 11th and 7th armies also broke through the front, but, encountering fierce resistance from the Austro-Hungarians, they were forced to suspend the offensive.

Nevertheless, the success of the offensive was obvious and stunning. In the first days of the breakthrough, about 136,000 enemy soldiers and officers were captured, more than 550 guns and machine guns were captured, not counting other trophies. The entire southern flank of the Austrian front was breached, and Russian units entered operational space. The situation of the Austro-Hungarian troops (Chief of the General Staff K. von Goetzendorf) turned out to be catastrophic. 2 German divisions were immediately transferred from the Western Front, 2 Austrian divisions from the Italian Front (which, in fact, was what the Allies wanted from Russia), and a large number of units were also transferred from other sections of the Eastern Front. On June 16, Austro-German troops launched a counteroffensive against the 8th Army, but were defeated and driven back across the Styr River.

The success achieved had to be developed. This required a joint action with the Southwestern Front and other fronts, especially the Western. However, the commander of the latter A.E. Evert believed that his troops were not yet ready for a large-scale offensive. Meanwhile, the brilliantly started performance of the Russian troops threatened to lose one of its main qualities - lightning speed. In addition, the Allied offensive on the Somme began at the end of June, which made it possible to build on further success in the east. Under these conditions, the Headquarters of the Supreme Commander-in-Chief (Chief of Staff M.V. Alekseev) agreed at the beginning of July on a joint offensive by the troops of the Southwestern Front on Kovel, and the Western Front on Baranovichi. But the attack on Baranovichi was repulsed, resulting in huge losses for the Russian troops. The offensive actions of the Northern Front were equally unsuccessful.

As a result, on June 26 (July 9), the Headquarters made a belated decision - to entrust the conduct of the main attack to the Southwestern Front. He received reinforcements - the Special Army of General V.M. Bezobrazov, formed from the guard and Transbaikal Cossacks (strategic reserve). The front troops were tasked with taking Kovel. On July 28 they launched a new offensive. And although it was not possible to take Kovel and the fortified bridgehead around it, significant successes were again achieved in other directions: the 11th Army took Brody, the 7th Army took Galich, the 9th Army occupied Bukovina and captured Stanislav (now Ivano-Frankivsk) . At the end of August the offensive stopped.

Sources

Brusilov A.A. My memories. M.-L., 1929

Brusilov A.A. My memories. M., 1963

On this day in 1916, during the First World War, the offensive of Russian troops began under the command of Alexei Alekseevich Brusilov. This offensive operation against Austro-Hungarian and German troops in Galicia and Bukovina was recognized as the most successful operation of the First World War...

In the summer of 1916, many battles took place in the theaters of combat of the World War, but the main one, in my opinion, was undoubtedly the victorious offensive operation of the troops of the Southwestern Front under the command of the cavalry general A.A. Brusilova. And this despite the fact that the bloody battles near Verdun continued, drawing hundreds of thousands of soldiers from the opposing sides into their orbit. Despite the full-scale offensive of the Anglo-French troops on the Somme River. The operation of the Russian Southwestern Front turned out to be so unexpectedly successful that it rightfully earned the name of the main operation of the summer of 1916. This was recognized by both Russia and its allies in the Entente bloc. And yet, according to tradition, we will begin the analysis of the summer campaigns with the Western theater of operations. Moreover, it was these events that pushed the Russian command to launch the famous offensive and largely determined the very nature and course of the operation.

As we have already noted, the Entente allies carefully prepared for joint offensive operations, according to the plan adopted at the meeting in Chantilly. The Anglo-French command placed its main hope in the operation in the Somme River valley, preparations for which took an unprecedentedly long time - in fact, six months. This did not exclude the conduct of combat operations in other sectors of the front and theaters of military operations. In particular, the massacre at Verdun continued. The warring sides used the short break in the fighting in the West, associated with the unsuccessful Russian offensive, to bring new reinforcements to Verdun. The French brought up the remnants of the 10th Army replaced by the British, and the Germans brought up 4 fresh, newly formed divisions from central Germany. General Pétain, who successfully stopped the enemy at Verdun, is appointed commander-in-chief of the entire central group of French armies. General Nivelle, who replaced him, like Pétain, considered the main task to be active defense with the retention of the Verdun fortified area. And the Germans resumed attacks using increasing forces of infantry and artillery.

The summer battles near Verdun were primarily characterized by the use of a huge mass of artillery in attacks on even minor enemy strongholds. In the history of military art, this innovation is striking in its senselessness rather than in its combat effectiveness. Judge for yourself. From May 4 to 7, fresh German divisions attacked the same heights of Mort-Homme and No. 304 along the left bank of the Meuse with the support of 100 heavy batteries. Something incredible! But an avalanche of sweeping fire allowed the Germans to capture only the northern part of the heights. Only by the end of May the heights of Mort-Homme, No. 304 and Cuillères were taken, but was it worth the tens of thousands killed on both sides? On the right bank of the Meuse, the Germans continued to fight for Fort Vaux, which became the central point of French defense, and only after three months of bloody mutual extermination on June 7, Fort Vaux fell. And here are hectacombs of killed, wounded, maimed soldiers. In the last week of the assault, the Germans fired 150 thousand shells a day at the enemy in a negligibly small area. Horror! It's hard to even imagine. But that's how it was. To the credit of the French, they did not sit stupidly on the defensive, but continuously counterattacked, also using a huge mass of artillery. On 22 May, supported by 51 heavy batteries, they recaptured the long-destroyed Fort Doumen. 51 French batteries are still not 100 German ones. This is probably why, already on May 24, the Germans regained the long-suffering remains of the fort and began to attack the line of Tiomon, Fleury, Suoval. The fight flares up with renewed vigor. German attacks follow one after another. They are replaced by French counterattacks. 200 thousand chemical shells mercilessly choked both of them. On June 24, forts Thiomon and Fleury fell, but at Fort Fleury the Germans were unable to break the French defense either in July or in August. By September the fighting gradually died down. The “Verdun meat grinder” with its hundreds of thousands of victims exhausted its strength for some time.

Against this background, just two hundred kilometers from Verdun, a new bloodshed was being prepared surprisingly calmly and persistently near the Somme River. Both the French and Germans acted calmly. Their near and deep rear, already accustomed to war, remained calm. The inhabitants were interested exclusively in military news. They did not notice the theory of relativity presented to their court on May 11 by Einstein, with which a new scientific breakthrough would begin that promised the world unprecedented benefits and unprecedented suffering. But they discussed in every possible way the absurd death at sea of ​​the first commander of Britain, Lord Kitchener. In a word, the war continued. Falkenhayn watched with sadness as his plan to crush France at the walls of Verdun was crumbling, as the hour of the general offensive of the Entente armies inevitably approached. And here, perhaps for the only time during the war, the Austrians pleased him by launching an offensive in the Alps. And this foreshadowed the possible disruption of the Entente’s simultaneous offensive on all fronts. And so it happened

As we remember, the Italians have been continuously and unsuccessfully attacking Austrian positions in the Isonzo area since the beginning of the year. Their commander-in-chief, General Codorna, after the March failure, was preparing to attack for the sixth time. But the Austrians were also affected by this fuss in the Isonzo River valley. Austrian Field Marshal Conrad decided to strike the Italians himself, but in a different place, where Austrian troops could quickly break through to the vital centers of northern Italy. Namely in the mountainous region of Trentino. For the first time since the beginning of the war, the Austrians envisaged the main military operations not on the Russian front. There they hoped for a strong defense and the weakness of the Russian armies after the defeats of the previous year and the winter setbacks. We will talk about what such self-confidence will lead to later. In the meantime, let us briefly dwell on this very unexpected operation in the Alps. Unexpected, first of all, for the Italians, who were fully confident that the strategic initiative was in their hands and were themselves preparing for the next offensive. They did not expect such agility from the allies in Berlin either. At the beginning of the year, the Austrians were clearly told that material assistance to their troops on the Italian front would be very limited, and the transfer of German troops, artillery and aviation there was completely excluded. By spring, when the Germans were bogged down at Verdun and were expecting a powerful enemy offensive in France, no one in Berlin even thought about helping the allies, especially in Italy. And, nevertheless, Conrad persuaded the emperor and headquarters to deliver a decisive blow to the Italians. In fairness, it should be noted that Conrad’s plan was realistic and feasible. The Austrian commander-in-chief quite rightly considered his troops more experienced and combat-ready compared to the Italian ones. In addition, Conrad prepared a large Austrian army of 18 divisions for the offensive, which is almost 400 thousand people. All the heavy artillery from the Serbian front, part of the heavy artillery and the best Honved Hungarian regiments from Russia were also brought here. According to the plan, Conrad wanted to break through the left flank of the Italian front.

You cannot say more briefly and clearly about this operation than A. Zayonchkovsky: “On May 15, Austrian columns quickly began to advance between Adizhey and Brenta, with the immediate goal of occupying the hill of the Seven Communes, which dominated the valley of the Brenta River. The Italian army, under strong pressure, was forced to begin a hasty retreat on a 60 km front, and General Codorna, concerned about preserving the communications of his remaining armies operating in the Isonzo area, asked Joffre to insist on the immediate transition of the Russian armies to the offensive. The developing energetic offensive of the Austrians could soon put the Italian army in a critical situation, and its command began to repeatedly appeal for immediate Russian help, demanding the speedy departure of the Russian army in almost 24 hours. This demand, to which the Russian command hastily responded, led, as we will see below, to the premature start of the Brusilov offensive.”

Finally, the main operation, according to Western historiographers, of 1916 in the western theater of operations was the offensive on the Somme. First of all, I want to note that the preparation time for the operation, which is more than four months, has not been reduced by an hour, despite the difficulties of the fight at Verdun, the defeat of the Italians in the Alps and the premature offensive of the Russian Southwestern Front. The Allies began to attack only 26 days after the Russians. What kind of coordination of common actions can we talk about here? The simultaneous transition of the Allied forces to the offensive on the Western and Eastern fronts, without any doubt, would have put the Germans in a more difficult situation, and it is unknown how the entire summer campaign of 1916 would have ended. Why the French needed this month-long delay is still not clear to me. Maybe so that the Germans would understand the futility of their offensive strategy. But why give them time to organize a deeply layered strategic defense?

However, in Berlin they knew about all the enemy’s plans, including the upcoming offensive, the place and time of its start. The reconnaissance worked brilliantly. But even without her, they understood the main thing. Having thrown their 46 divisions at Verdun, and drawing 70 French divisions there, they sharply reduced the offensive potential of the French army. But the incredibly expanded English army remained. It was there, on the Somme, where the British were concentrating and where the French could bring up their reinforcements, that an attack could be expected. It was there that they built an insurmountable defense with German pedantry and thoroughness. A. Zayonchkovsky writes: “German positions were equipped here within 2 years and represented a high example of the use of technology and military engineering art. Barbed wire, concrete, safe rooms for garrisons. Hidden flank defense with machine guns, villages and forests turned into a kind of small fortresses - this is the general nature of the fortified positions of the Germans, of which they had 2 stripes of 2-3 km. one from the other and began to build the 3rd. By the end of June, the Germans had 8 divisions in the sector of the future attack on both sides of the Somme, of which 5 were to the north of it against the British and 3 to the south against the French. In addition, they had 12 - 13 divisions in reserve."

What about the allies? As we know, the offensive plan was ready even before the start of the German attacks on Verdun and boiled down to a strike by the Anglo-French armies on a front of 70 km. on both banks of the Somme River. The main blow was to be delivered by the French. However, by the summer, the Battle of Verdun had significantly reduced the combat potential of the French army and the Allies had to make some adjustments to the plan. First of all, we had to narrow the offensive front from 70 to 40 km. And now the main blow was entrusted to the 3rd and 4th British armies (English group) of General Haig on a front of 25 km. in the direction of Bapaume. To the south on a section of 16 km. On both banks of the Somme River, the 6th French Army of General Fayol was preparing to attack in the direction of Cambrai. Even further south, the 10th French Army was concentrated in case of a successful offensive. The main blow was delivered by the British, the auxiliary by the French, but overall leadership was still entrusted to the best French commander at that time, General Foch. The battle formation of the English and French troops consisted of one echelon and a reserve. But what kind of echelon was it? The British built all 5 army corps (16 divisions) of the 4th Army in it, having 2 infantry and 3 cavalry divisions in reserve. On the extreme left flank, the 7th Corps of the 3rd British Army was involved in the attack. The French 6th Army deployed 14 divisions in the first echelon. This entire huge mass of troops was supported by truly colossal artillery forces. The artillery of the British army consisted of 444 75-mm cannons and 528 heavy artillery pieces. 111 especially high-power guns. 360 trench guns. On 28 meters of the front there was 1 heavy gun and 1 75-mm cannon. At 120 meters of the front - 1 gun of particularly high power. The French were supported by 216 guns with a caliber of up to 100 mm, 516 guns from 120 to 280 mm and 122 guns of particularly high power. Yes, and 1,100 trench mortars. That is, 75 batteries per 1 km of front. They accumulated an incredible amount of shells - up to 6 million. In addition, the infantry began to have 4 - 8 light machine guns and 12 grenade launchers per company, a large number of 37-mm cannons and mortars. Each battalion now had a machine gun company with 8 heavy machine guns.

This force is in 32 divisions on a front of 40 km. The Germans could oppose only 8 divisions. True, they were sitting in insurmountable positions and with impressive artillery of 400 medium and 158 heavy guns. On average per 1 km. front has 20 guns, of which 7 are heavy. Impressive too.

The British prepared the operation with special care. Huge reserves of material resources and food were concentrated in the near and far rear areas. Railway lines, narrow-gauge highways and even trams were connected to the warehouses. All this was entangled in a system of safe shelters and communication passages. The French were not lagging behind in any way. It is also worth noting the long, persistent preparation of troops for combat against a fortified enemy; the “movement of fire” ahead of the advancing infantry, the “barrage of fire” technique, were practiced. Unfortunately, all preparations were made without observing the strict camouflage that the Germans carried out before the attack on Verdun. You will have to pay dearly for this. How, and because, in my opinion, the Allies chose the wrong method for breaking through the German defense with such a clear advantage over the enemy. It is not difficult for the attentive reader to notice that the Allied offensive operation is very reminiscent of the German offensive at Verdun. A similar theater of operations on both sides of the river: the Meuse there, the Somme here. The attackers have the same overwhelming advantage in manpower and artillery in the direction of the main attack. But there is a difference, and a very significant one. The Germans intended to break through the front with one powerful, short blow. The Allies decided to break through the German defenses methodically with a series of successive attacks in one direction from line to line over a long period of time. The author of the idea was none other than the commander of the allied forces here, General Foch. His note directly states: “The operation will be long. It must be conducted methodically and continue until the enemy’s defenses are broken through moral, material and physical disruption without depleting our offensive capabilities.” The maneuver was not envisaged “due to the busy area.” In this case, the best French commander was very mistaken, but he was supported by Joffre himself, who directly indicated that “the attack must be carried out methodically in order to maintain communication... Order is more important than speed.” Allied military leaders could evaluate what such attacks lead to using the example of protracted battles near Verlaine. But they didn't appreciate it. The preparations for the offensive dragged on so long that both the attackers and the defenders began to get tired of waiting for it.

Finally, on June 24, an artillery preparation of unprecedented duration and power began, which did not stop for an hour. The artillery also fired chemical shells. Allied aviation, which immediately seized air superiority, bombarded the German trenches with bombs and poured machine-gun fire on them. A whole week of absolute hell. Even the initiator of a similar fire attack near Verdun, Field Marshal Falkenhayn, writes: “All obstacles ahead disappeared completely, the trenches in most cases were razed to the ground. Only a few, particularly strong buildings withstood the furious hail of shells. Even more difficult was the fact that people’s nerves had to suffer greatly under seven days of fire.” However, this fire chaos did not prevent the Germans from strengthening their defenses, bringing up reserves and military equipment.

On July 1, the infantry rose under the cover of a barrage of fire, and “the usual initial successes” were immediately achieved. Unfortunately, the successes are not equal. The French captured the first German position and in some places broke into the second. But the British were unable to break through even the first position. The successfully advancing French could have advanced deeper into the German defense, but, having reached the line indicated by the technique, they stopped. The Germans could not even imagine such a gift; they withdrew their troops from the second position. With its occupation, the entire southern coast of the Somme would pass to the French, which would allow them to conduct destructive fire on the entire German group opposing the British on the northern bank of the Somme and its rear. The right path to victory. But the gaps created along the offensive path were not filled. It is sad to say, but what was in the foreground for the allied command was not the actual situation, but a template. The tactical success achieved by the French rested on the notorious methodology and in subsequent bloody battles did not develop into operational success. The strategic operation on the Somme was closed, as at Verdun, in a tactical circle, and, despite all subsequent attempts, it was not possible to break through the fortified German defenses. Time after time, under the cover of a barrage of fire, the infantry moved forward in waves, but advanced no more than a hundred or two steps . The Allies attacked with waves of chains. The Germans repelled attacks using group tactics. Small groups of soldiers with machine guns occupied shell craters, the fortifications that remained intact and literally swept away the attacking chains with destructive machine gun fire. After the first stormy days, the offensive impulse and offensive capabilities dried up. Further, on both sides there was a build-up of forces due to fresh troops, who continued the senseless slaughter.

The result of the summer battles on the Somme, in my opinion, was best summed up by A. Zayonchkovsky: “What are the first two months of the battles on the Somme like? A failure, taking into account the forces assembled here, and especially the powerful technical means and the length of preparation. Under such conditions, deepening into the enemy front by 3-8 km. There is no other way to call it a failure. The Somme became a victim of dual control, a victim of leveling the front along the lines, as a result of which the French missed the opportunity to use their success of the first day south of the river and froze here on these first achievements.” In a word, the battle of the Somme turned into a second Verdun, only with the opposite sign. The Allies attacked uncontrollably and the Germans successfully defended. Now, in two strategic directions of the Western Front, there was a continuous and senseless mutual destruction of manpower. They described all this in detail, convincingly, and most importantly, highly artistically in their now forgotten novels by Rolland, Barbusse, and Remarque.

The struggle continued in other theaters of war. Despite the onset of the Russian Southwestern Front, the Austrians did not immediately stop their offensive in the Alps and continued to push back the demoralized enemy throughout the first half of July. Only on June 21 did they stop attacks and retreat in an organized manner across the entire front to pre-prepared, well-fortified positions near Mount Pazubio. At the same time, the complete lack of will of the Italians, who calmly watched this retreat, is surprising. They did not even interfere with the march of the Austrian heavy artillery, which before their eyes crossed the passes along mountain paths at a snail's pace. Only after the Austrians had successfully taken up their defensive positions did the Italians launch some kind of timid attack, which, of course, ended in vain. In fairness, the successes of the Italians should also be noted. Having switched to positional defense in the Alps, he again focused all his attention on the Isonzo River valley. In the battles from August 4 to 10, they not only completely fortified themselves on the left bank of the river, but took two of the most important strongholds of the Austrian defense on the way to Trieste, Goritsa and Doberdo.

The Balkan theater of operations arrived in relative calm all summer. Here it was not the guns that spoke more insistently, but the diplomats. The Allies gradually won over Romania to their side, but Greece was more drawn to the Triple Alliance. Diplomacy is diplomacy, and war is war. Moreover, the Allies concentrated large forces in the Balkans. Under the command of General Sarrail, French, English, Serbian and even Russian troops with a total number of more than 300 thousand bayonets and sabers deployed on the Thessaloniki front. There were more than enough forces to start active hostilities, but the front was silent. Later, Western historians will justify this by the presence in the rear of a mobilized Greek army, capable of supposedly going over to the enemy’s side at any moment, by raging epidemics and disagreements between Sarrail and Joffre. But only the Greek problem can be taken as a serious argument. And even that was resolved very quickly through military-political measures and an economic blockade. The Greek king immediately ordered the demobilization of the army. The enemy also behaved passively. True, in August the Bulgarians, without coordination with Berlin and Vienna, attacked the Allied positions. But it would be better if they didn't do this. Having captured the city of Kaval with a cavalry attack, they were immediately covered with fire from the allied fleet, which almost completely destroyed the attackers in half an hour. The attack on the Serbian division on the left flank at Florina also failed with heavy losses. Ludendorff will note with bitterness and annoyance that in these unnecessary battles “the little Bulgarian courage was broken.”

In Mesopotamia, after the latest failures, the allies somewhat intensified their actions at Suez and in Syria and immediately reflected this on paper. In the Anglo-French agreement of May 16, 1916, the division of spheres of influence in Asian Turkey. England laid claim to Iraq, France to Syria. A new state, Transjordan, was created. Constantinople was to be "internationalized". They shared the skin of a bear that had not yet been killed, because the expeditionary force of General Tonshed, besieged in Kut el-Amir, had capitulated. More than 10 thousand people were captured and the British began preparing a new expedition under the command of General Maude. This preparation will last until the end of the year. In Arabia, the Mecca sheriff rebelled against the Turks and captured Mecca on June 5. He failed to take Medina. The Turkish general Jemal Pasha went to the Suez Canal a second time, but 8 British divisions stopped him. The world first heard about the later legendary English intelligence officer, politician and adventurer Lawrence of Arabia.

The summer of 1916 was marked by the most significant naval battle of the First World War, called the Battle of Jutland or the Skagerrak. This battle, in my opinion, was somehow forced in order to somehow justify the inaction of the huge armored surface fleets of Germany and Britain, which from the beginning of the war continued to cluster near their shores. By the summer of 1916, it became absolutely clear that fleets could and did bring significant benefits only in the fight against communications, organizing and supporting landings, as well as attacks on enemy coastal targets, and even then not so much with artillery as with naval aviation. The submarine forces of the German fleet operated most effectively. The US ultimatum on submarine warfare, which we have already mentioned, somewhat cooled the hotheads in Berlin, and the German naval commanders decided to defeat the more powerful English surface fleet in one battle. This action, I repeat, in my opinion, provided for a political, intimidating, psychological effect rather than a practical military effect influencing the course and outcome of the war. A mountain of papers has been written about the Battle of Jutland, films have been made, which are not difficult to get acquainted with. Therefore, we will limit ourselves to only a brief overview

The Germans decided to withdraw their fleet from the base in two echelons. The first, weaker cruiser detachment served as bait, which would start a battle with part of the English forces. Literally on the heels of the main German squadron, the High Seas Fleet, came to attack the British and defeat this part of the English fleet. And then, with all the combined forces, destroy the rest of the fleet. Actually, a good plan, as often happens, was disrupted by unforeseen circumstances, life itself. On May 31, at 4 o'clock in the morning, the cruising detachment of the German Admiral Hipper, consisting of 5 battle cruisers with light cruisers and destroyers, approached the Skagerrak. Half an hour later, the High Seas Fleet followed the cruising squadron. It was led by the German flagship Admiral Scheer. But the British intercepted a German radiogram revealing the enemy’s entire plan. Almost simultaneously, two English squadrons came out to meet the two German squadrons. The first, advanced line of the already familiar Admiral Beatty (6 battle cruisers, with light cruisers, destroyers and 4 dreadnoughts from the 5th squadron of Admiral Thomas) from Firth-o-Forth went to cross Hipper. The rest of the British Grand Fleet, under the command of the flagship Admiral Jellicoe, launched from Scopa Flow. As a result, what should have happened happened - first the battle of the advanced detachments, and then the battle of the main forces. At about 15 o'clock the squadrons of Hipper and Beatty began a battle west of Jutland at a distance of 12 km. Despite the numerical advantage of the British, the skill of shooting and the destructive power of shells turned out to be stronger than the Germans, who sank 2 English light cruisers. The main enemy forces arrived, and at about 20 o'clock the main battle began, in which the German fleet had no chance of success. However, the quickly falling twilight allowed Admiral Scheer to leave the battle and hide from the British. They rushed south to cut off the Germans from their shores, but Scheer himself joined them in a wake column and, in fact, broke through to his harbor under enemy cover. In my opinion, the infantry general and historian A. Zayonchkovsky commented on this best of all the sailors: “The Battle of Jutland, in terms of the strength of the fleets participating in it, was the largest naval battle in world history; On the British side, 28 dreadnoughts, 9 battlecruisers, 30 light cruisers and 72 destroyers took part in it, and on the German side, 16 dreadnoughts. 5 battleships (dreadnoughts), 5 battlecruisers, 11 light cruisers and 72 destroyers. Outnumbering the German fleet in number of ships, the British were superior in speed and artillery; So the fastest English ships had a speed of 24 - 25 knots, and the slowest ones 20 knots, and among the Germans, the fastest ships had a speed of 21 knots, and the slow ones reduced the speed of the squadron to 16 knots. The British advantage in artillery was even more significant: for example, the dreadnoughts and battlecruisers of the Great Fleet had 344 large guns against 244 German ones, surpassing them in caliber. In the battle, the British lost 3 battleships and 3 armored cruisers, and the Germans lost 1 battleship, 1 battleship and 4 light cruisers. In addition, both sides lost several destroyers; in general, the losses of the British were greater than the losses of the Germans (twice in tonnage). The battle, as we see, did not have a decisive result, and both sides ascribed victory to themselves, but after this battle the German fleet completely stopped going to sea.”

It is most likely difficult to compare the battles of the summer of 1916 and 1943 in the Western theater of operations. Still, the battles of Verdun, the Somme, the Battle of Jutland, and the same battles on the Italian front cannot be compared with the Allied operations in the summer of 1943. Even their simple enumeration allows one to draw such a conclusion. Judge for yourself. May 7 - Anglo-American troops occupied the cities of Tunis and Bizerte. On May 13, Italian-German troops in Tunisia capitulated and military operations in northern Africa ended. But these troops were almost a hundred times smaller than, for example, near Verdun. Then, until mid-July, only American troops landed on some of the Aleutian and Solomon Islands. Even the landing of Allied troops in Italy on July 10 and their advance north, which led to the fall of Mussolini's regime, is difficult to compare with the Battle of the Somme in military terms. Politically, the collapse of Mussolini and Italy's exit from the war surpasses all the political results of the summer campaign of 1916. And yet, in the summer of 1943, the Allies were still not really fighting.

I want to begin my analysis of events on the Russian front with the battles in the Caucasus. In the spring, after unsuccessful operations of the Russian fronts in the west, there was a relative calm there, and in the Caucasus they continued to fight without any pause. Immediately after the victory at Erzurum, the no less victorious Trebizond operation began. Actually, the question of taking Trebizond was raised during the Battle of Erzurum. The landing of the Black Sea Fleet in the rear of Erzurum was most possible and necessary precisely at Trebizond, since the only decent road through the Pontic Taurus led from it. After the capture of Erzurum, our troops went more than 140 miles into the desert regions. Once in biblical times, flourishing Cappadocia became, and remains to this day, the most unsettled province of Turkey. Therefore, Trebizond with its only road had to be taken as soon as possible. Firstly, it was easiest from here to supply the troops of the Caucasian Army with everything they needed by sea. Secondly, it was there that the Turks hastily sent their reinforcements.

In winter, the Black Sea Fleet demanded at least a corps of troops for the landing on Trebizond. Headquarters simply did not have any free corps at that time, and the issue of landing troops disappeared by itself. The fleet slowly took up its main task - the fight against communications and “depriving Turkey of coal supplies.” It is generally surprising that such tasks are set with the complete advantage of our forces in the Black Sea. The Turks had only one armored cruiser in service, the Yavuz-Sultan-Selim (formerly the German Goeben - S.K.). We had such naval commanders who were unable to prevent the Turks from bringing in reinforcements by sea. In fairness, we note that there was no interaction between the army and navy. For this purpose, the so-called “Batumi detachment of ships” was allocated, which provided significant support to the troops of the Primorsky detachment of General Lyakhov, shelling Turkish positions from the sea, supplying supplies and transporting troops. It was by landing that the Primorsky detachment took the first port of Rize on the way to Trebizond on March 7, capturing 4 guns and a banner. By this time, Erzurum had fallen, the fighting on the western fronts had died down, and Headquarters hastily transferred 2 Plastun brigades to the Caucasus. Yudenich began planning an operation to capture Trebizond. His plan involved, as troops arrived from the West, the Primorsky detachment would attack the Turks frontally along the Kara Dere River valley. In the rear of the Turkish troops near Surmene, land troops to strike towards the Primorsky detachment.

On April 7 and 8, the same Plastun brigades that came from Novorossiysk landed in Rize and Hamurkan, and the operation began on April 14. The Primorsky detachment, increased to 20 battalions, was twice as large as the Turks dug in on the other side. With the support of the fire of two ships, on April 14, troops landed at Surmene and captured it with one blow. It is curious that Yudenich personally led the landing. He seemed to have foreseen possible friction with the sailors. And Kersnovsky writes: “The landing at Sirmene led to a conflict between the headquarters of the Caucasian Army and the Black Sea Fleet. Admiral Eberhard considered it too risky. The sailors abandoned the transports with troops and the headquarters of General Yudenich to the mercy of fate, and they themselves retired to safe areas. If “Goeben” had approached, the 2nd Kuban Plastun Brigade would have died, and General Yudenich would have died.” Yudenich was not embarrassed by the sailors’ affront and maneuver. He thanked them for the excellent work of the ship's firemen and gave the order to disembark. The Turks surrendered with virtually no resistance. The next day, the Primorsky detachment of General Lyakhov attacked. As always, A. Kresnovsky is emotional: “The honor of crossing Kara Dere and the conquest of Trebizond belongs to Colonel Litvinov with his 19th Turkestan Rifle Regiment, which defeated the Turks at Ofa. Following the heroic initiative of their officers, the riflemen rushed into the stormy Kara Dere and crossed it under hurricane fire from the enemy. The stone bridge was blown up at the moment when the 6th company was running across it. The surviving riflemen, stunned by the explosion and falling into the water, somehow made it to the enemy shore, rushed at the stricken Turks and knocked them out of the trenches. Our trophies in the Battles of Trebizond amounted to 2,000 prisoners. General Schwartz was appointed Governor-General of Trebizond as the defender of Ivangorod.” However, the crossing ended the fighting of our plastuns. They did not reach Trebizond only 15 kilometers. Lyakhov stopped the troops to bring up reserves and artillery. He scheduled the assault for April 19. But the Turks took advantage of this pause in their own way. On the night of April 16, they cleared the city and retreated south. On April 18, the Orthodox Greek population of Trebizond greeted Russian soldiers with icons and banners. Nice job! Trebizond quickly turned into the main supply base for Russian troops. There was an urgent need to create a powerful defensive line around it. The forces of the Primorsky detachment were clearly not enough for this. Yudenich already enjoyed such authority in the Russian army that he demanded that Headquarters immediately send here at least two infantry divisions and one cavalry brigade. Headquarters reacted quickly, transferring even third-rate divisions to the hero of the Caucasus. At the end of May, they arrived from Mariupol directly to Trebizond and, together with the Primorsky detachment, deployed to the 5th Caucasian Corps under the command of General Yablochkin. The corps provided the entire right, coastal wing of the Caucasian army.

And the fighting, albeit private, continued along the entire Caucasian front. In April, the Turks unsuccessfully tried to attack our troops in the direction of Bayburt - Erzurum. We advanced successfully in the area of ​​Lake Uiral, entered Turkey and by mid-May occupied the city of Revanduz - an important junction on the way to southern Persia. In Persia itself, General Baratov’s corps continued to operate actively. The British, having lost General Townsend's expeditionary force blocked in Kut El-Amar, assembled more than four divisions on Titra, but demanded help from Baratov. And this corps, rather by name, which had only 7,000 bayonets and sabers with 22 guns, had to cover 800 miles and solve a problem that was beyond the reach of four full-blooded English divisions. And the corps went forward. In April it occupies Kerind, in May - Kasrishirin and in the Baghdad direction it goes to the Iraqi border. The British are all silent. Baratov sends a hundred Cossacks to the English headquarters and calls for joint action, but in vain. And the Turks throw against Baratov the full-blooded corps of General Khalil Pasha, 25 thousand askers with 80 guns. Baratov very slowly, with fighting, begins to withdraw his detachment, exhausted from the campaign and fever, to the Kozvin area. It is curious that during the entire operation in Persia, Baratov lost only 460 people in battles, and more than 2 thousand from disease.

In May, the German-Turkish command planned to return Erzerum and Trebizond and take revenge on the Caucasian army. For this purpose, two armies were appointed at once. The 3rd, under the command of General Wahib Pasha, reinforced by the 5th and 12th corps transported by sea, with a total of 15 divisions, was supposed to advance on the broad Trebizond-Erzurum front in mid-June. At the same time, on the right flank, the 2nd Army of the Dardanelles winner, General Ahmet Izet Pasha, was transported to the Euphrates Valley via the Baghdad Railway. And these are four corps of the best Turkish troops, inspired by recent victories. It was they who were supposed to deliver the main cutting blow to the junction between the 1st and 4th Caucasian Corps on Hasan-Kala, go to the rear of Erzurum and destroy the main forces of the Caucasian army. The Turkish forces reached 200 battalions. We had 180, but bigger and better artillery. Did Yudenich know the Turkish plans? Rather, he guessed after Wahib Pasha tried to eliminate the Mamakhatun ledge at the end of May. The 9th and 11th Turkish corps attacked the 4th Caucasian Rifle Division, occupied Mamakhatun and moved on to Erzurum. Yudenich sent the 39th Infantry Division against the Turks, which repelled five Turkish attacks and survived. In the battle report we read: “In the case near Mamakhatun, we lost 2 guns. In the battles of May 21-23, the 153rd Baku Infantry Regiment of Colonel Maslovsky overthrew the 17th and 28th Turkish infantry divisions and repelled two enemy cavalry divisions, shooting while standing and kneeling, as in a training exercise. The enemy was defeated without counting, but the Baku residents also lost 21 officers and 900 lower ranks.” At this time, a major of the Turkish general staff ran to the location of the 4th Caucasian Corps. A Circassian by nationality, he was deeply offended by the contemptuous attitude of the German and Turkish General Staff towards him. The documents and testimony presented to him completely revealed the plans of the Turks, the grouping of their troops and the rear of the armies.

On June 25, the 3rd Turkish Army launched a decisive offensive, striking the 5th and 12th infantry corps, fresh from Istanbul and Mesopotamia, which had not known defeat, in the direction of Of, at the junction of our 5th Caucasian and 4th Turkestan corps. Yudenich was ready for this attack. His order to stand to the death was carried out literally. This was especially true of the 19th Turkestan Regiment, which for two days held back the onslaught of the two best Turkish divisions that became famous in Gallipoli. And he survived. Two days were enough for Yudenich to pull up the 123rd Infantry Division on one side and the 3rd Plastun Brigade on the other, which struck towards each other, stopped, and then scattered the “heroes of Gallipoli” rushing forward. In the report we read: “Out of 60 officers and 3,200 lower ranks, Colonel Litvinov was missing 43 officers and 2,069 lower ranks. The 19th Turkestan Rifle Regiment saved the situation of the entire Caucasian Front with its blood, killing 6,000 Turks on the spot. In hand-to-hand combat, the riflemen raised the head of the 10th Turkish division, the son of Sultan Abdul Hamid, to bayonets. In further battles, the 490th Rzhevsky Infantry Regiment captured the banner of the Turkish Combined Guards Regiment.”

Having contained the 5th and 12th Turkish corps in the Trebizond direction, a day later Yudenich himself attacked the 3rd Turkish Army with the 1st Caucasian Corps, all at the same Mamakhatun. The 39th Infantry Division again fought with five Turkish divisions and won again. The Baku regiment alone captured 63 officers, 1,500 askers and 2 guns. In total, 4,000 prisoners were captured here. Without slowing down the tempo of the offensive, Yudenich attacked Erzidincan, the most important communications hub for the Turks. The 1st Caucasian Corps advances frontally, the 2nd Turkestan Corps bypasses the Turkish positions from the left flank. The 5th Caucasian Corps supported the entire operation on the extreme right flank, pursued the defeated 5th Turkish Corps and had already crossed the Pontic Taurus. The vaunted Turkish heroes could not withstand the coordinated blow of our corps. On July 15, the Turkestans and Plastuns took Bayburt, covering the entire left flank of the 3rd Turkish Army. In these battles, 138 officers were captured, including 4 regiment commanders, 2,100 askers, 6 guns, 8 machine guns and the banner of one of the regiments. On the same day, the troops of the 1st Caucasian Corps, advancing frontally, crossed the stormy Kara-su River, and a week later the familiar 39th Infantry Division broke into Erzincan. A. Kersnovsky clarifies: “The Derbent people were the first to break into Erzincan, crossing Murad-Chay in chest-deep water.”

And yet, no matter how impressive our victories were on the Caucasian front, the fate of the war was decided in the west. The main success of the summer campaign, and indeed of the entire 1916, of course, was brought by the Brusilov breakthrough. Let me note right away that this was recognized both in Russia and in the West. The battle, which literally shook up the tedious positional war with its energy, was analyzed and sorted out in the most thorough and detailed way. In general, the reaction is positive, but there are a lot of disputes and disagreements on certain issues. If you look closely at the disagreements, it is not difficult to notice that all opponents feel some kind of incompleteness, less than perfection of such a brilliantly prepared and brilliantly started operation. So I will allow myself to express my point of view on the vicissitudes of the main battle of the summer campaign, without going into already known details.

Let's start with the fact that the operation was initially part of the overall strategic plan for the Allied summer offensive on the Western and Eastern fronts. The plan, as we have already said, provided for an almost simultaneous offensive of Anglo-French troops on the Somme River and Russian troops in Belarus, Lithuania and Galicia. Preparations for the implementation of the plan began in winter and continued for several months. As often happens, during this time life made significant changes to the original plans. Here is the battle for Verdun, and the offensive of the Austrians in the Alps. There were thousands of other seemingly unnoticed moments that changed the entire picture of the summer campaign. I want to draw attention to one of them, seemingly insignificant, but, in my opinion, the most important. Change of command of the Russian Southwestern Front. It was the appointment of Brusilov as commander-in-chief that was the starting point at which the Brusilov breakthrough began. What did we have before this? Former commander-in-chief of the Southwestern Front, artillery general N.I. Ivanov fully fit into the concept prepared by Headquarters for the Southwestern Front, in which the front was assigned a secondary role in supporting the main attack of the Western and Northern fronts. Ivanov, as we remember, a year ago was ready to retreat all the way to Kyiv; unsuccessful front operations in the winter of 1916 completely undermined his faith in his own troops. He considered even the planned auxiliary attacks of his front unnecessary and impracticable. Brusilov is another matter. This one knew the strength and weakness, first of all, of his 8th Army and noted with satisfaction that by spring the troops had fully recovered from previous failures, were well equipped, armed, and received a full set of artillery, including heavy artillery, and ammunition for it. People were well rested and had high morale. After his appointment as commander-in-chief, he personally inspected some units of the 7th, 9th and 11th armies and became convinced of their sufficient combat readiness and high morale, and decided to seek more decisive tasks for his front. Historians and memoirists, including Brusilov himself, most often discuss the transfer of affairs from one commander in chief to another against the backdrop of palace intrigue, although it would be more important to pay attention to the personalities on whom the course and outcome of the Brusilov breakthrough will largely depend. At the head of the 8th Army, which carried out the main Lutsk breakthrough, against the will of Brusilov, General Kaledin was placed, essentially not ready to command an army, and even in such a responsible operation. If at the head of the 8th Army there had been a person of the level of Brusilov, or the commander of the 9th Army, General Lechitsky, without any doubt, the Brusilov breakthrough would have received a different color. It would seem like a small thing, but there is so much meaning in it.

So, Brusilov, having received command of the front, immediately begins to prepare it for decisive battles, takes energetic measures to equip the troops with everything necessary, thinks through and develops his own new plan for the offensive of the Southwestern Front. The novelty was that, in his opinion, the front should, is capable of and will advance with all its might and with the most decisive goals.

On April 14, at 10 a.m., a meeting began at Headquarters, which was supposed to discuss and adopt the final plan of operations for the Russian army in the summer campaign of 1916. Present at the meeting were: the Emperor; Commander-in-Chief of the Northern Front A.N. Kuropatkin and his chief of staff F.V. Sievers; Commander-in-Chief of the Western Front A.E. Evert and his chief of staff M.F. Kvitsinsky; Commander-in-Chief of the Southwestern Front A.A. Brusilov and his chief of staff V.N. Klembovsky; former commander-in-chief of the Southwestern Front N.I. Ivanov; Minister of War D.S. Shuvaev; Field Inspector General of Artillery Grand Duke Sergei Mikhailovich; Chief of Staff of the Supreme Commander-in-Chief M.V. Alekseev; Chief of the Naval Staff of the Supreme Commander-in-Chief, Admiral A.I. Rusin; Quartermaster General M.S. Pustovoitenko. The recording was kept by duty officers of the Quartermaster General's Department N.E. Shchepetov and D.N. Tikhobrazov. The sovereign opened the meeting, but did not preside over the debate and was silent the entire time. In fact, the meeting was chaired by the practical commander-in-chief, Infantry General Aleksev. Since his report was well known to those present, he only briefly described the plan and reported on his decision to transfer all the heavy artillery in reserve to the Western Front, which would deliver the main blow in the direction of Vilna. Part of the heavy artillery and reserve troops was given to the Northern Front, which should also attack Vilna, but from the north-west. The Southwestern Front was asked to stick to the defense and intensify actions only after the success of its neighbors. Then an amazing debate began.

The plan of attack was nevertheless discussed, but the first speaker, Kuropatkin, directly said that he did not count on the success of his front, and predicted huge and ineffective losses, based on the unsuccessful experience of winter operations. He was immediately joined by Evert, who declared that one could not believe in the success of the offensive and it would be better to continue the defense, and until the troops were supplied with heavy artillery and shells in abundance. The statements of the military leaders assigned to lead and solve the main offensive task of the campaign can be assessed, at least, as strange. They did not want and, by and large, did not intend to attack, which means they did not prepare troops for this. Alekseev tried in every possible way to reason with the overly cautious commanders, and the difficult atmosphere that had been created was disrupted by Brusilov. In his memoirs he will write: “I stated that it is undoubtedly desirable to have a larger amount of heavy artillery and heavy shells, it is also necessary to increase the number of air vehicles, turning off the outdated and worn-out ones. But even with the current state of affairs in our army, I am firmly convinced that we can advance. I don’t presume to talk about other fronts, because I don’t know them, but the Southwestern Front, in my opinion, not only can, but must attack and I believe that it has every chance of success, of which I am personally convinced. On this basis, I see no reason for me to stand still and watch my comrades fight. I believe that the disadvantage that we have suffered until now is that we do not attack the enemy on all fronts at once, in order to prevent the enemy from enjoying the benefits of actions along internal lines of operations, and therefore, being significantly weaker than us in the number of troops, he , taking advantage of its developed network of railways, transfers its troops to one place or another at will. As a result, it always turns out that in the area that is being attacked, at the appointed time he is always stronger than us, both technically and quantitatively. Therefore, I urgently ask permission for my fronts to act offensively simultaneously with my neighbors; even if, beyond hope, I had not even had any success, then at least I would not only have delayed the enemy’s troops, but would have attracted part of his reserves to myself and in this powerful way would have facilitated the task of Evert and Kuropatkin.”

Alekseev sighed freely, and the Emperor began to smile. They agreed with Brusilov. True, without promising him any additional help. He didn't ask her. I want to draw your attention to the fact that Brusilov does not demand that the main attack be transferred to his front. He is simply preparing to provide effective assistance to his neighbors. The main thing here is a confident readiness to attack and win. At that time he had no idea that he would soon play the first violin.

In my opinion, the Russian Headquarters (Alekseev - S.K.) initially incorrectly determined the direction of the main attack. Of course, it was very tempting to defeat the German group and again enter the borders of Germany. But objectively it was not possible to complete such a task. Judge for yourself. All the battles of the winter campaign of 1916, including the massacre at Verdun, did not weaken the defensive potential of the German group on the Eastern Front one iota. Not a single connection, not a single part left there. Against the armies of Kuropatkin and Evert were still battle-hardened divisions of the 8th Army of Otto von Belov, the Army Group of Scholz, the 10th Army of Eichhorn and the 12th Army of Gelwitz, united in the “Hindenburg Force Group”. Moreover, a group of troops of Prince Leopold of Bavaria and an army group of Woirish were concentrated near Baranovichi. Against Brusilov - a group of German troops of Linsingen, the South German group of Bothmer. Austro-Hungarian armies - 4th Archduke Joseph Ferdinand, 1st Puhallo, 11th Bem-Eromolli. 7th Pflanzer-Baltina. A total of 87 infantry and 21 cavalry divisions, of which two thirds were located north of Polesie. This entire force managed to repel all our attacks in the winter and by the summer doubled its defensive potential due to the huge amount of heavy artillery of the multi-lane, concrete defense line. We assembled almost 140 infantry and 36 cavalry divisions for the offensive, but this was only a superiority in manpower. How can one disagree with A. Zayonchkovsky: “Numerical superiority was certainly on the side of the Russians, but not to the same extent as depicted by Russian sources. And the more objective German General Moser only says that “there was still superiority in forces on the Russian side.” Falkenhayn estimates the size of the German front north of Pripyat at 600,000 people. If we add to this the Russians’ great lack of heavy artillery and the well-arranged concrete positions of the armies of the Central Powers, then we should discard the opinion that the Russian offensive was carried out almost into empty space.”

It would be a different matter if they had prepared the main attack south of Polesie. Firstly, there were fewer Austrian and German troops opposing there. Secondly, and in my opinion, the most important thing, the opposition there was mainly not the Germans, but the troops of the patchwork Austria-Hungary, whose combat potential could not be compared with the German troops. Planning the main attack by the Southwestern Front and auxiliary attacks by the Western and Northern Fronts would have brought us an incomparably greater effect, both tactically and strategically. Of course, Galicia, which was recaptured, cannot be compared with East Prussia, or the access to the Oder. But as a result, we did not receive either a German border or Galicia. And what could the Brusilov breakthrough be like!?

But let's return from hypothetical thoughts to real events. Returning from the meeting, Brusilov immediately began direct preparations for the operation. Let’s give him the floor again: “I ordered not just one, but all the armies of the front entrusted to me to prepare one strike site, and in addition, in some corps, select each of their own strike site and immediately begin excavation work in all these areas in 20 - 30 places, and even defectors will not be able to tell the enemy anything other than that an attack is being prepared in this area. Thus, the enemy is deprived of the opportunity to concentrate all his forces to this place and cannot know where the main blow will be delivered to him. I decided to deliver the main blow in the 8th Army, in the direction of Lutsk, where I sent my main reserves and artillery, but the remaining armies were also supposed to deliver, although secondary, strong blows, and, finally, each corps on concentrated as much of his artillery and reserves as possible in any part of his combat sector in order to strongly attract the attention of the troops opposing him and attach them to his sector of the front.” In total, Brusilov had 512 thousand people at his disposal. 1815 guns, including 145 heavy and 2176 machine guns. The enemy had 441 thousand soldiers. 1600 guns, including 300 heavy and 2000 machine guns. The forces are approximately equal, if you do not take into account the positions in which the Austrians were sitting. “The Austrian positions consisted of 2, and in some places 3 lines of fortified strips. The first fortified line usually consisted of 3 lines of trenches, in front of which there were up to 16 rows of wire fences. The latter were provided with longitudinal machine-gun fire from flanking concrete and armored dugouts. The second fortified strip was 5-7 km from the first, and the third was 8-11 km away. The grouping of Austrian troops was uniform along the entire front.” There was a lot to scratch my head about. And not all army commanders accepted Brusilov’s plan with enthusiasm. Especially Kaledin. But he was given the main role. For a long time afterwards, Brusilov will remember him with an unkind word, sometimes betraying his objectivity. But it is a fact that Kaledin will not be up to the task. I have already said that objectively, Kaledin’s capabilities did not exceed the level of the head of a cavalry division. And he was consistently trusted by the corps and the army. Unfortunately, this is not uncommon in military practice.

But Brusilov had a good army commander, Shcherbachev, and a wonderful Lechitsky. And he trained the troops stubbornly, confidently and unusually, which he himself spoke about in detail: “Already in advance, with the help of military agents and aerial reconnaissance, we became familiar with the location of the enemy and the fortified positions he had built. Military reconnaissance and the continuous capture of prisoners along the entire front made it possible to accurately establish which enemy units were in front of us in the battle line... I ordered all armies to have plans of 250 fathoms per inch with the exact marking of all enemy positions on them. All officers and commanders from the lower ranks were supplied with detailed plans of their sector... I spoke about one of the main conditions for the success of an attack - the element of surprise, and for this, I was ordered to prepare bridgeheads for the attack not in one particular sector, but along the entire front of all the armies entrusted to me, so that the enemy could not guess where he would be attacked, and could not assemble a strong military group to counteract. The troops were located in the rear behind the battle line, but their commanders of various degrees, having plans with a detailed location of the enemy, were always in front and carefully studied the areas where they were to operate. Only a few days before the start of the offensive, the troops intended for the initial attack were quietly withdrawn into the battle line at night. And artillery was placed, well camouflaged, in selected positions, from which it fired at the intended targets. Much attention was paid to the close and continuous connection of the infantry with the artillery.” As it turned out, Brusilov finally found a way out of the vicious circle of trench warfare. He had to launch the offensive, as happened most often in that war, unexpectedly and prematurely. The Italians, defeated in the Alps, requested urgent help. Their commander-in-chief, General Codorna, appealed to Aleksev, King Victor Emmanuel telegraphed a request to the All-Russian Emperor. He was echoed by Marshal Joffre from Chantilly. Well, how could we refuse our beloved allies. And the car started spinning!

The entire operation can be divided into three periods - a breakthrough of the Austrian front; developing a breakthrough and repelling counterattacks; battles on Stokhod. We will give literally fragmentary excerpts from these heroic, victorious and tragic events for the Russian army.

The breakthrough was carried out successfully in the 7th, 8th and 9th armies and less successfully in the 11th army in the Lvov direction. On June 4, between 4 and 5 o'clock, artillery preparation began in all armies, which lasted 29 hours in the 8th Army, 6 hours in the 11th Army, 46 hours in the 7th Army, and 8 hours in the 9th Army. Amazing dispersion, and surprising, in connection with this, the results of the attack that followed the artillery preparation.

In the main direction of the 8th Army, artillery destroyed the entire first line and part of the second line of defense. The infantry that rose to attack literally swept the stunned enemy out of their path. Within three days, formations of the 8th Army broke through the Austrian positions on a front of 70-80 km and wedged themselves into the enemy's position at 25-35 km. On June 7, Lutsk was occupied. The 4th Austrian Army of Archduke Joseph Ferdinand, located in front of the army front, was defeated and retreated in disorder. Let's give the floor to the emotional A. Kersnovsky, who mentions many famous names: “In the 39th Corps, the 407th Saransk Infantry Regiment especially distinguished itself, taking 3,000 prisoners, including 1,000 Germans and 8 machine guns.... In the 2nd Infantry Division General Belozor, the 5th and 6th regiments had particular success, opening the way to Olyka and Lutsk for the 40th Corps. In the 4th division of General Denikin, the first to break through all six lines of enemy positions was the 3rd battalion of the 13th rifle regiment of Captain Timanovsky, the future colonel of the Markov division. Of the 8th Infantry Regiment, Ensign Egorov with ten scouts, secretly sneaking behind the enemy's rear, forced the stubbornly fighting Hungarian battalion to lay down their arms and captured 23 officers of 804 lower ranks and 4 machine guns, while also repelling a cavalry attack by the enemy squadron. On the left flank of the army, a united attack from the 2nd Finnish and 101st Infantry Divisions destroyed the 18th Austro-Hungarian Corps and captured Dubno. During the capture of Dubno, the 401st Kornevsky Infantry Regiment distinguished itself.” In total, the 8th Army captured 992 officers and 43,625 soldiers, 66 guns, 150 machine guns, 50 bomb throwers, and 21 mortars were captured.

I cannot help but disturb this victorious picture with very significant and annoying blunders on the part of Headquarters and other responsible persons. Headquarters allowed the commander of the Western Front, Evert, to postpone the much-needed offensive right now - the main blow of the campaign until June 17. Brusilov, focusing primarily on helping Evert, continued to look at the right flank towards Kovel, pointlessly trying to cover it with the forces of two cavalry corps. The corps were simply stuck in the Pinsk swamps. And Kaledin, who had such a colossal success, “did not feel the pulse of the battle, held back the troops rushing forward, sensing a quick and complete victory, trimmed them, did not dare to pursue, all the time looking back at the front headquarters and ineptly wasting reserves. He held the 12th Cavalry Division behind the 8th Army Corps, when the main success and the possibility of a cavalry attack appeared in the 39th Corps. The head of the 12th Cavalry Division, Baron Mannerheim, asked for permission to pursue the defeated and fled enemy, lost time and was refused. If Count Keller had been in his place, he would have long been in Vladimir-Volynsky without any request, and Archduke Joseph Ferdinand would have been at Kaledin’s headquarters.”

The actions of General Sakharov's 11th Army south of the 8th Army were less successful and amounted to a breakthrough at Sokolov on June 5. But here, too, Russian troops showed miracles of heroism. “The 10th New Ingermanland and 12th Velikolutsky regiments especially distinguished themselves. The trophies on May 22 and 23 (old style - S.K.) were 190 officers, 7,600 lower ranks, 5 guns, 58 mortars and bomb launchers and 38 machine guns. In a heavy battle, our 9th Ingria Infantry Regiment, Colonel Sapphirsky, grappled with five Austro-Hungarian regiments and repelled them. The enemy artillery - 80 guns - picked up the limbers and fled in all directions, pursued by the hysterical cry of the victors: “Cavalry here! Cavalry forward! Sakharov, like Kaledin, also did not realize the extent of the victory his troops had won, was nervous and complained to Brusilov about the “too rapid advance of the 8th Army.”

The breakthrough of the 7th Army of General Shcherbachev or the Yalovetsky operation is an example of decisive actions by an army delivering an auxiliary strike. After, as we remember, the longest artillery preparation, Shcherbachev hits the South German Army and breaks through the positions of General Flug’s 2nd German Army Corps, which were considered impregnable. Their model, as an example of inaccessibility, was exhibited in Berlin and Vienna. The riflemen of the 3rd Turkestan Division, Finnish riflemen and infantrymen of the 26th and 43rd divisions dealt with Hoffmann's corps. The 7th Army crossed Strypa with all its three corps. The 2nd Cavalry Corps went in pursuit, and its 9th Cavalry Division became famous for its attack at Porkhov. “This attack - on a powerful position and 15 rows of barbed wire - completed the defeat of the 13th Corps. The 2nd Austro-Hungarian Cavalry Division, fighting on foot, was cut down by the Russian cavalry, which did not change its horse. Kyiv hussars captured 2 guns. For the Porkhov affair, the commander of the 9th Bug Uhlan Regiment, Colonel Savelyev, was awarded the Order of St. George, 3rd degree, and the commander of the 9th Kazan Dragoon Regiment, Colonel Losyev, in addition to the Order of St. George, 4th degree, received an award unprecedented for a staff officer - a French military medal, which according to the statute is awarded only to army commanders.”

The Chernivtsi operation of the 9th Army of General Lechitsky, in my opinion, is not much inferior to the Lutsk breakthrough in terms of power, organization and final results. In the Battle of Dobronotsky, Lechitsky simply tore to pieces one of the best Austrians, Pflanzer-Baltin, tearing his army in half. A few examples from the chronicles of these battles: “The main attack on height 458 was led by the 32nd Infantry Division of General Lukomsky. The very height and Dobronows were taken by the 126th Rylsky Infantry Regiment of Colonel Rafalski. Brief reports on statutory awards paint us pictures of the battles on that glorious day - May 28. The wounded officers of the 9th and 10th Zaamur Infantry Regiments ordered themselves to be carried in front of the attacking chains and breathed their last on the enemy guns. In the 11th Infantry Division, Colonel Batranets with the Okhotsk Regiment rushed at two Hungarian regiments, scattered them and took 100 officers and 3,800 lower ranks prisoner with one blow. The head of the 11th Infantry Division, General Bachinsky, walked ahead of the Kamchatka Regiment. In the 12th Infantry Division, the wounded officers of the Dnieper Regiment refused to bandage “until victory” - others, having received three or four wounds, continued to move forward. The commander of the Odessa Infantry Regiment, Colonel Korolkov, led his regiment to the wire on horseback. Odessans captured the 26th Austro-Hungarian regiment. The fire of 500 guns that prepared the decisive attack was led by Colonel Kirei.” Another example: “The Bukovina hills witnessed the immortal feat of Captain Nasonov, who, with a handful of horse artillerymen, attacked and captured the enemy battery at Zastavna. Seeing the retreating enemy battery, the commander of the 2nd battery of the 1st Mounted Division, Colonel Shirinkin, put all the servants and riders of his battery on horses and rushed to pursue the enemy. He himself and 60 horse artillerymen cut down the remnants of the enemy battalion, which was trying to save their battery, and his senior officer, Captain Nasonov, with 20 others, took the line, caught up with the enemy, chopped up and shot those who resisted and took all the rest - 3 officers, 83 lower ranks, 4 guns.” During the ten days of the operation from June 4 to June 13, the troops of the 9th Army advanced 50 km. in the center and 15 - on the right flank. They captured 1 general, 758 officers and 37,832 soldiers, 49 guns, 21 bomb launchers, 11 mortars and 120 machine guns.

Thus ended the first stage of the operation - the breakthrough. I just want to focus on two, in my opinion, important points. The first is the surprise of such a major success, which led to some confusion both at Headquarters and at the headquarters of the front, armies and corps. Brusilov rightly complained about the delay in Evert's main offensive and did not know where to move next - southwest to Lvov or northwest to Kovel. Headquarters had already begun to supply Brusilov with reserves from the Western Front, and this depressed the already dispirited Evert. In a word, Evert, albeit not significantly, was weakened before the start of the main operation, and Brusilov did not really strengthen. The second point is related to the fact that behind the brilliant results of the Lutsk breakthrough, the almost equal success of the 9th Army of General Lechitsky somehow faded. As further events will show, it is Lechitsky who will ultimately achieve the greatest victories following the results of the entire Brusilov breakthrough

Before the start of the second stage of the operation, the Southwestern Front, as A. Zainchkovsky put it, “found itself in an original position.” The reserves were used up and the troops suffered losses. The command did not know where to move next. Headquarters finally burst out with a directive ordering Brusilov to advance from Lutsk to Rava-Russkaya, which made the Kovel direction secondary, and therefore reserves for the 8th Army were sent to its left, and not to its right flank. What complaints could there be if, with the continuation of Brusilov’s offensive, Evert’s front went on the attack. The whole sad thing was that by this time the enemy had come to his senses from the impudence of the Russians and pulled reserves to the Russian front. 24 divisions were withdrawn from the French front, and the Austrians hastily began transferring troops from Italy. Very quickly, 5 German divisions were assembled with the best Austrian troops united in the Linsingen group. With unusual speed, the 10th German Corps of General Luttwitz and the von der Marwitz group appeared in Volyn. The special group was led by the brother of the German commander-in-chief, General Falkenhayn 2nd. So, before starting the offensive, Brusilov had to repel the heaviest counterattack of the German-Austrian troops, and until June 30 the front held counterattacks. “The fighting took on the most intense character at the junction of the 8th and 11th armies, where the 8th left-flank corps of Kaledin’s army and the 45th right-flank corps of Sakharov’s army could hardly restrain the group of General Falkenhayn, furiously rushing forward. General Kaledin lost heart. He imagined a catastrophe, he saw himself overturned, cut off from the rear. General Brusilov had to encourage him all the time.”

While the troops on the right flank of the front repelled the enemy's counterattack, the movement on the left flank continued forward. The 11th army of General Sakharov struck at the junction between the armies of Puhallo and Bem-Ermolli, captured Pochaev, the Pochaev Lavra and, with a victory at Berestechko, pushed the Austrians beyond the border line. “The blow was delivered by the 101st Infantry Division of General Gilchevsky. The 401st Kamyshensky Infantry Regiment, under hurricane fire, rushed into Plyashevka and crossed it up to its neck in water. His 6th company, having fallen into a deep place, all drowned. The regiment commander, Shipka veteran Colonel Tatarov, was struck by a bullet in the heart, having managed to shout: “I’m dying! Kamyshin residents forward! With a furious blow, the Kamyshinsky regiment overthrew three enemy regiments, took Berestechko in pieces and captured 75 officers, 3,164 lower ranks, 3 guns and 8 machine guns. The 17th Corps captured 6,000 prisoners and 4 guns in the Pochaev battles. In total, in the battle of Berestechko we captured up to 12,000 prisoners and 11 guns.” And finally, the 9th Army, building on its brilliant success at Dubronouc, finishing off Pflanzer’s troops, occupied Chernovitsy and reached the Prut River.

This is something that should not be forgotten, but Headquarters was more happy about stopping the German-Austrian counter-offensive. The joint offensive of Brusilov and Evert began. Brusilov, despite the meager funds and reserves lost in the battles, with the forces of the 8th and 3rd armies, still went forward to Kovel, supporting Evert. He led the troops of the right flank of the front to the Stokhod River from Lyubeshev to the Kovel-Lutsk railway, but was unable to capture Stokhod on the shoulders of the retreating enemy, although in some places some units crossed the river and clung to its left bank. According to Ludendorff, it was "one of the most serious crises on the Eastern Front." And according to our reports, the heroism of the troops is extraordinary: “At Volchetsk, the 16th Uhlan Novoarkhangelsk Regiment took 13 guns. In total, in the battle of June 22 - 26 on Stokhod, the troops of the 3rd and 8th armies captured 671 officers, 21,145 lower ranks, 55 guns, 16 mortars and 93 machine guns. Of this number, up to 12,000 prisoners and 8 guns were captured by the 1st Turkestan Corps, where the 7th and 8th Turkestan Rifle Regiments forded seven swampy branches of the Stokhod under deadly fire in chest-deep water. In the 30th Corps, Colonel Kantserov performed a heroic feat, the first, at the head of his 283rd Pvlograd Infantry Regiment, to run across the burning bridge to the left bank of the Stokhod. This matter was noted by Headquarters. The Austro-German casualties exceeded 40,000. Fata's corps, especially affected, lost 18,400 people out of 34,400. In addition to the Novoarkhangelsk lancers, who took 13 guns (and lost them to the 7,397th Zaporozhye regiment), the Chernigov hussars took 3 heavy guns. At the same time, the Transbaikal Cossack Division famously attacked Manevichi on the evening of June 23. Its trophies were the regiment commander, 26 officers, 1399 lower ranks, 2 guns (taken by the 1st Verkhneudinsky Regiment), 2 bomb throwers, 9 machine guns.”

The long-awaited offensive of the Western Front brought nothing but disappointment and sharp criticism from participants in the events, commentators, and historians. The front's offensive began in the early morning of July 3, a day earlier than the Southwestern Front, with an attack by the 4th Army in the Baranovichi direction. The remaining armies of the front took demonstrative actions. On the first day, the troops of the 4th Army captured the first and second lines of trenches. However, by evening the Germans stopped the attackers with machine-gun fire and restored the situation. The fighting continued for another 10 days, and we did not advance a single step, but Evert had already carried out three artillery preparations during the offensive. The second is on July 4, the third is on July 7. In fact, there were three offensive strikes, all to no avail. Does this remind you of anything? Of course, the situation is exactly reminiscent of the ongoing Allied operation on the Somme. Evert was rightly criticized in many ways, but he attacked the German defense no less strong than in France, with forces and capabilities simply incomparable to those of the Anglo-French. So his offensive was initially doomed to failure. True, Russian heroes fought under his command, and with proper leadership they could create a miracle. Here is an example of this: “The most difficult part of the enemy position fell to the lot of the 42nd Infantry Division, which lost all four regimental commanders. The commander of the 166th Rivne Infantry Regiment, Colonel Syrtlanov, with a banner in his hand, was the first to jump onto the parapet of the enemy trench ahead of everyone, where he died a hero’s death. To see the conditions under which the Skrobov assault was carried out, it is enough to point out that the 3rd battalion of the Mirgorod regiment of Colonel Savishchev had to overcome 50 rows of electrified wire.”

For some reason, many commentators on the Brusilov breakthrough experience the same disappointment when assessing the third and final period of the operation. It is, first of all, characterized by the transfer from mid-July, at the direction of Headquarters, of the main efforts to the Southwestern Front. By the Headquarters directive of July 9, the Western Front received the task of holding enemy forces in front of it. The Northern Front went on the offensive from the Riga bridgehead, fortunately its indecisive commander-in-chief Kuropatkin was sent to his beloved Turkestan. But Ruzsky, who replaced him, was also very eager to advance, and the task of a small distracting blow suited him quite well. The Guard, the strategic reserve of Headquarters, two army and one cavalry corps from the Western Front were sent to the Southwestern Front. In mid-July, from these troops and two corps of the 8th Army, a Special Army was formed under the command of General Bezobrazov, which was located between the 3rd and 8th armies. The front had to break through to Kovel with concentric attacks from the 3rd and Special armies. The 8th Army was supposed to capture Vladimir-Volynsky, the 11th Army was to attack Brody, Lvov, the 7th and 9th were to advance to the Carpathians.

The offensive began on July 28 along the entire front. The series of battles on the same Stokhod attracted the most attention. Unsuccessful battles. Whatever they were called - “Tragedy on Stokhod”, “Beating of the Guard”, “Kovel Massacre”. What kind of “dogs have not been hung” on the commander of the Guards Corps, cavalry general V.M. Bezobrazov, accusing him of lack of will and complete professional unsuitability. He, of course, was not Brusilov or Lechitsky, but he fully corresponded to the bulk of Russian front-line military leaders. His guard was inferior to its predecessors in 1914, but these were still the best troops of the imperial army. It’s not about Bezobrazov, it’s not about the polished guards officers, it’s not about the quality of troop training. I will give just one example: “The initiative in this glorious undertaking belongs to the Life Guards Keksgol regiment of Baron Stackelberg, which was the first to break through the enemy front and take 12 guns. The Lithuanians, who developed this success, captured 13 guns and the headquarters of the 19th German division. The Leb Guards 2nd Rifle Regiment of Tsarskoye Selo took 12 guns, the 4th Imperial Family - 13, and the 3rd took a cannon, two German generals and one raised on bayonets. In total, Bezobrazov’s group captured 2 generals, 400 officers, 20,000 lower ranks, 56 guns and huge booty on this day.” It was simply impossible to successfully advance along the swampy defile of the Stokhod positions with the forces that remained with the Russian command after almost two months of protracted battles of the summer campaign. I have to repeat myself, but I’ll remind you again. We had in front of us super fortified German positions, saturated with troops, which the commander of the entire German group of the Eastern Front, Hindenburg, removed from wherever he could. We did not have enough heavy artillery and ammunition for it. We did not have proper ways to maneuver troops and transport military equipment. We're just tired. This offensive is far from equal to the Battle of the Somme. How can one not agree with a participant in those battles, a military theorist and historian, general of the imperial army and red commander A. Zayonchkovsky: “And if we compare what was happening simultaneously in the west of Europe and in the east, where Russian corps were launched at Riga, Baranovichi and on Stokhod Without the help of heavy artillery and with a lack of shells for the Germans armed from head to toe, the failures of the Russian army will take on a different flavor, which will highlight the qualities of the Russian fighter at a higher level compared to the Western allies.”

And again, behind the “Tragedy on Stokhod,” the brilliant actions of the southern wing of the Southwestern Front, especially the 9th Army of General Lechitsky, are somehow forgotten. Lechitsky successfully attacked Galich-Stanislav. In a four-day battle on a front of 50 km. four of his corps captured the city of Kolomyia and completed the defeat of the 7th Austro-Hungarian Army between the Dniester and Prut. During the 36 days of the operation, Lechitsky reached the Dolina - Vorokhta line near the Dniester for 15 km, along both banks of the Prut - for 70 km. The 9th Army began to seriously threaten Hungary and the oil wells of Galicia, captured more than 84,000 Austro-Germans, 84 guns, 272 machine guns, diverted a lot of various property from the main Russian attack of 6 enemy divisions and prompted Romania to “be more favorable towards Russia.” On August 11, Lechitsky took Stanislav and on August 13 gained a foothold on the front as much as 240 km away. There were now superior forces against him. Isn't this a brilliant success? I will again give just one example from the chronicle of these battles: “The 1st Zaamur Infantry Division attacked the 1st Reserve German Infantry Division. The commander of the 3rd regiment, Colonel Ziegler, led his regiment against the German wire on horseback, Skobel style, under hurricane fire. The participants in the attack forever remembered their commander, an old man with flowing sideburns, riding in front of the chains and shouting: “Remember, Zaamurians, that the crosses of St. George hang on German cannons, and not on machine guns!” The enthusiastic soldiers reached the point-blank battery, and the cavalry regiment quickly attacked the heavy battery through the thicket of the forest and captured 3 cannons.” The historian A. Kersnovsky, who evaluates our commanders very strictly, noted with delight: “And the iron Lechitsky was excellent, who gave us Bukovina, exterminated the Austrians and made the German enemy regret the hell of Verdun.”

General attacks launched on August 31 by the 8th, 11th, 7th, and 9th armies indicated that the efforts were ineffective, and the Brusilov breakthrough ended. Let me briefly summarize the best and, unfortunately, the last, victorious strategic operation of the Russian Imperial Army.

The military-political significance of the victory is enormous. Largely thanks to her, the Entente finally wrested the initiative from the enemy and forced him to go on the defensive. The combat effectiveness of the Austro-Hungarian troops was completely undermined, and the threat of their offensive was removed until the end of the war. Hindenburg wrote with regret: “The Danubian monarchy cannot withstand any more military and political failures. The disappointment was too great. The retreat after a promising attack on Italy, the rapid collapse of resistance aroused great pessimism and mistrust among the masses of the Austro-Hungarian people.” The enemy's losses, amounting to 1.5 million people, are more than impressive. Only 8924 officers and 408 thousand lower ranks were taken prisoners, 581 guns, 1795 machine guns, 484 bomb throwers and mortars were captured. Unfortunately, our losses are also impressive - 497 thousand killed, wounded, and missing. And yet, these are not huge losses for the defeated enemy.

The offensive of the Southwestern Front saved Italy from defeat and significantly strengthened the Allied forces for further struggle at Verdun and the Somme.

The troops of the Southwestern Front carried out the first successful offensive front-line operation in conditions of trench warfare. The delivery of several separate and simultaneous attacks on a wide front determined a new operational form of maneuver that made it possible to break through the enemy’s strong defenses. All this would later be successfully used by the Allies on the Western Front.

For the first time in the conduct of an operation, there was close interaction between artillery and infantry. An “artillery attack” was developed and used, involving the use of escort artillery. The attacking infantry was accompanied not only by fire, but also by the movement of artillery groups and batteries along with it.

The 60,000-strong mass of cavalry did not play a special role in the operation in converting tactical success into operational success, but aviation showed itself in the best possible way. She conducted reconnaissance, adjusted artillery fire, and bombed the enemy.

Historians will continue to analyze, discuss and evaluate the course, unrealized opportunities and outcome of this glorious battle for a long time. In my opinion, Brusilov with his armies did exactly what he could do. No more and no less. The Brusilov breakthrough could have been different if initially the main attack of the Russian troops in the summer campaign of 1916 had been prepared in the zone of action of the Southwestern Front

The fleet continued to play a supporting role in the summer campaign of 1916. In the Baltic Sea, military operations were limited; neither side took decisive action. The Russian fleet continued to strengthen mine and artillery positions in the Moonsundz, Abo-Aland regions and in the Gulf of Riga. Naval aviation became more active. All 40 aircraft conducted reconnaissance and attacked ships and coastal targets. In June, a detachment of ships of the Baltic Fleet attacked a German convoy and sank an auxiliary cruiser, 2 patrol ships and 5 transports. We have already talked about how the Black Sea Fleet acted to ensure the successful offensive of the Russian Caucasian Army. To this should be added the successful blockade of the Bosphorus by Russian submarines and the laying of minefields there.

The events of the summer of 1916 and the summer of 1943, the actions of the Russian Army and the Red Army, seem to be characterized by their victorious results. But even listing the victorious operations of the summer of 1943 speaks of the clear superiority of the Red Army. Here are the operations of Soviet aviation to gain air supremacy. From July 5 to August 23, the famous Battle of Kursk, which included a series of defensive and offensive operations to liberate Orel, Belgorod, and Kharkov. Liberation of Donbass. Still, the battle on the Kursk Bulge is more significant in terms of military-political results than the Brusilov breakthrough. That, in fact, did little to change the strategic situation on the Russian front. The victory at Kursk allowed the Red Army to finally seize the strategic initiative. From this time on, Hitler’s troops would only retreat and suffer defeats until their surrender in May 1945. But there was also the liberation of Donbass, and the entry of our armies to the Dnieper. The summer victories of 1943 had a much greater impact on the course and outcome of the world war than our victories in the Caucasus and Galicia in the summer of 1916. Our allies in the anti-Hitler coalition suddenly realized that the Soviet Union was capable of finishing off Nazi Germany without their active participation, and they hastened to begin hostilities in the European theater of operations, in Italy. On the agenda was the question of an early meeting of the heads of the USSR, the USA and Great Britain to develop not only a unified plan for the further conduct of the war, but also outlines for the future post-war world. The Allies no longer doubted their victory. The timing of the end of the war is the only doubt they have left. Nothing like this was even thought of in the summer of 1916 in Petrograd, Paris or London.

But the main difference between the summers of 1916 and 1943 lay not in the purely military, professional sphere, but in the moral and psychological state of the Russian Empire and the Soviet Union, the people, the government, and the armed forces.

The Soviet Union, front and rear fighters, and ordinary people began to rejoice at our victories. It is no coincidence that the festive fireworks that appeared to inspire this rejoicing on the occasion of the capture and liberation of cities. The country, its people, all as one, confidently, without any doubt, walked towards victory.

In 1916, even the brilliant victories in the Caucasus, even the Brusilov breakthrough could not inspire the active army and rear, the soldier and the average person with an ineradicable faith in victory over the enemy. But one could not even dream of unity between the people and the government, the army and the people. Moreover, artificially created difficulties continued in all spheres of life of the warring country, directed by some invisible force. How can you read excerpts from the official report of Minister of War Polivanov without indignation in your soul and heart: “There is a lack of everything. Fuel prices increased by 300% in Petrograd; in some cities there was no salt or sugar; there is still little meat in Petrograd; in many places flour and grain are sold at extremely high prices. In Siberia, grain is so cheap, but in Petrograd at prices that are only possible during a famine..... On the one hand, trains with artillery parks at the fronts are unloaded for a long time, and on the other hand, in Moscow for about six months 1000 cars loaded with artillery stand at a dead end factory machines, etc., which is exactly what is needed for industry.”

The destructive activities of the so-called democratic politicians in the Duma, the military-industrial complex, and various organizations and movements continued. The Emperor, his entourage, the government, all state power were denounced at every step, every minute, hour, day. The active army, which has just won a victory, is also being defamed. One of these figures, Rodzianko, publicly declares: “The Russian high command either does not have pre-prepared plans for operations, or if it has them, it does not carry them out. The high command does not know how or cannot organize a major operation... does not know how to prepare an offensive... does not take into account the losses of manpower.... A lethargic mood, a lack of initiative, a paralysis of courage and valor are manifested in the army. If now measures are taken as soon as possible, firstly, to improve the senior command staff, to adopt some definite plan, to change the views of the command staff on the soldier and to raise the spirit of the army with fair retribution for those who, through inept command, are ruining the fruits of the best exploits, that time, perhaps, is not lost.” This Duma chatterbox, wiping his pants in an easy chair a thousand miles from the front, talked about the soldiers and their commanders, unequivocally offering himself as future saviors. And the average person believed. It would be nice for a layman. This was believed at Headquarters, in the trenches, and in the reserve regiments. By the way, our sworn friends in the person of the head of the British mission, General Knox, assessed the Russian army and the Russian rear in a completely different way: “The Russian infantry is tired, but less than a year ago (1915 S.K.) ... almost all types of weapons, there was more ammunition and equipment than ever before. The quality of command improved every day... There is no doubt that if the rear had not been torn apart by contradictions, the Russian army would have crowned itself with new laurels... and, without a doubt, would have delivered such a blow that would have made possible the victory of the allies by outcome of this year." The saddest thing is that the chatter of Rodzianka and similar subverters began to penetrate the soul of a simple soldier. The lower ranks, the “trench rats,” could not help but notice this, and they were increasingly overwhelmed by indifference and apathy. It became unbearable to fight without knowing why, to shed blood, to die in thousands. It was in the summer of 1916 that the heroes of the Brusilov breakthrough sang:

Doo-doo-doo-doo-doo-doo;

How did I get into that trouble?

Into a burning tear,

War is inevitable.

Tell me, explain

Why did the war get better?

Things got better before the Russians.

Like our Russian people

Everyone would dig the garden,

Yes, I would plant a strong radish,

Yes, I would plant a sweet turnip,

Rye would sing across the fields,

But we cannot bear war...

In fairness, it must be said that after the Brusilov breakthrough, a persistent core of generals, officers and lower ranks was formed in the active army, inspired by our victory, ready to fight stubbornly and successfully until the victorious end, who believed in victory. The only pity is that there are fewer and fewer such active winners.

We have already mentioned the heroes of Trebizond and the Brusilov breakthrough by family name. The military leaders Yudenich, Brusilov, Lechitsky are also here. Denikin, Zayonchkovsky. Here are the heroes of the breakthrough - officers and privates. I would like to add that in the Brusilovsky breakthrough, our future Marshal of Victory A.M. Vasilevsky, who commanded a company in the 409th Novokhopersky Regiment, received a baptism of fire. It is curious that already in 1956, his former subordinate, and now a teacher from the Finnish city of Turku, A. Eichwald, reminded him of those battles in a letter: “In the fall of this year it will be 40 years since the battles on the heights near Kirli Baba. Do you still remember your Finnish junior officer of the first company of the glorious 409 Novokhopersky regiment, who participated in them? The marshal remembered. And we will not forget that these were all heroes, whom very soon the revolution and unrest would unwittingly turn into their worst, mortal enemies. This is where the sadness and tragedy lie. And against the “German”, “Austrian” and “Turk” they all fought with dignity and glory.

The fighting in the Eastern European theater of the First World War in the 1916 campaign was marked by such a major event as the offensive operation of the Russian Southwestern Front under the command of General A.A. Brusilova. During its implementation, for the first time in the entire positional period of hostilities, an operational breakthrough of the enemy front was carried out, which neither the Germans, nor the Austro-Hungarians, nor the British and French had ever been able to do before.

General A.A. Brusilov

The success of the operation was achieved thanks to the new method of attack chosen by Brusilov, the essence of which was to break through enemy positions not in one sector, but in several places along the entire front. The breakthrough in the main direction was combined with auxiliary strikes in other directions, as a result of which the enemy’s entire positional front was shaken and he was unable to concentrate all his reserves to repel the main attack.

“In the early warm morning of June 4, 1916, May 22, old style, the Austrian troops, buried in front of the Russian Southwestern Front, did not see the sun rise,” writes the historian. -Instead of the sun's rays from the east, dazzling and blinding death - thousands of shells turned habitable, heavily fortified positions into hell... That morning something unheard of and unseen in the annals of a dull, bloody, positional war happened. The attack was a success along almost the entire length of the Southwestern Front.” (Yakovlev N.N. The Last War of Old Russia. M., 1994. P. 169.)

This first, stunning success was achieved thanks to the close cooperation of infantry and artillery. Russian artillerymen once again demonstrated their superiority to the whole world. Artillery preparation on various sectors of the front lasted from 6 to 45 hours. The Austrians experienced all types of Russian artillery fire and even received their share of chemical shells. “The earth was shaking. Three-inch shells flew with a howl and whistle, and with a dull groan, heavy explosions merged into one terrible symphony.” (Semanov S.N. Makarov. Brusilov. M., 1989. P. 515.)

Under the cover of their artillery fire, the Russian infantry launched an attack. It moved in waves (3-4 chains in each), following one after another every 150-200 steps. The first wave, without stopping on the first line, immediately attacked the second. The third line was attacked by the third and fourth (regimental reserves) waves, which rolled over the first two (this method was called “roll attack” and was subsequently used by the Allies in the Western European theater of war).

The most successful breakthrough was carried out on the right flank, in the offensive zone of the 8th Army of General Kaledin, which operated in the Lutsk direction. Lutsk was taken already on the third day of the offensive, and on the tenth day the army troops went 60 km deep into the enemy’s position and reached the river. Stokhod. Much less successful was the attack of the 11th Army of General Sakharov, which faced fierce resistance from the Austro-Hungarians. But on the left flank of the front, the 9th Army of General Lechitsky advanced 120 km, crossed the Prut River and took Chernivtsi on June 18.

Success had to be developed. The situation required shifting the direction of the main attack from the Western Front to the Southwestern Front, but this was not done in a timely manner. The headquarters tried to put pressure on General A.E. Evert, commander of the Western Front, in order to force him to go on the offensive, but he, showing indecisiveness, hesitated. Convinced of Evert’s reluctance to take decisive action, Brusilov himself turned over his head to the commander of the left-flank 3rd Army of the Western Front, L.P. Lesha with a request to immediately go on the offensive and support his 8th Army. However, Evert did not allow his subordinate to do this.

Finally, on June 16, the Headquarters became convinced of the need to use the success of the Southwestern Front. Brusilov began to receive reserves (5th Siberian Corps from the Northern Front of General A.N. Kuropatkin and others), and Evert, although very late, was forced under pressure from the Chief of Staff of the Supreme Commander General M.V. Alekseev to go on the offensive in the Baranovichi direction. However, it ended unsuccessfully.

Meanwhile, in Berlin and Vienna the scale of the disaster that befell the Austro-Hungarian army became clear. From near Verdun, from Germany, from the Italian and even the Thessaloniki front, troops began to be hastily transferred to the aid of the defeated armies. Fearing the loss of Kovel, the most important center of communications, the Austro-Germans regrouped their forces and launched powerful counterattacks against the 8th Russian Army. By the end of June there was some calm at the front. Brusilov, having received reinforcements from the 3rd and then the Special Army (the latter was formed from guards corps, it was the 13th in a row and was called Special out of superstition), launched a new offensive with the goal of reaching the Kovel, Brody, Stanislav line. During this phase of the operation, Kovel was never captured by the Russians. The Austro-Germans managed to stabilize the front.

Due to the miscalculations of the Headquarters, the lack of will and inactivity of the commanders of the Western and Northern Fronts, the brilliant operation of the Southwestern Front did not receive the conclusion that could have been expected. But she played a big role during the 1916 campaign. The Austro-Hungarian army suffered a crushing defeat. Its losses amounted to about 1.5 million killed and wounded and turned out to be irreparable. 9 thousand officers and 450 thousand soldiers were captured. The Russians lost 500 thousand people in this operation.

The Russian army, having conquered 25 thousand square meters. km, returned part of Galicia and all of Bukovina. The Entente received invaluable benefits from her victory. To stop the Russian offensive, from June 30 to early September 1916, the Germans transferred at least 16 divisions from the Western Front, the Austro-Hungarians curtailed their offensive against the Italians and sent 7 divisions to Galicia, the Turks - 2 divisions. The success of the Southwestern Front operation predetermined Romania's entry into the war on August 28, 1916, on the side of the Entente.

Despite its incompleteness, this operation represents an outstanding achievement of military art, which is not denied by foreign authors. They pay tribute to the talent of the Russian general. "Brusilovsky breakthrough" is the only battle of the First World War, the name of which appears in the title of the commander.

Question about the name of the operation

Contemporaries knew the battle as the “Lutsk breakthrough,” which was in accordance with the historical military tradition: battles were named according to the place where they took place. We know the Battle of Borodino, not the Battle of Kutuzov; The Battle of Neva, and not the “battle named after Grand Duke Alexander Nevsky,” etc. However, it was Brusilov who was given an unprecedented honor: military operations in the spring of 1916 on the Southwestern Front received the name “Brusilov Offensive.”

The Russian liberal public often showed surprising activity when it came to glorifying a person whose exaltation was associated with the humiliation of the autocracy. When the success of the Lutsk breakthrough became obvious, according to military historian A.A. Kersnovsky, “a victory that we have not yet won in a world war,” which had every chance of becoming a decisive victory and ending the war, then in the ranks of the Russian opposition there was a fear that the victory would be attributed to the Tsar as the Supreme Commander-in-Chief, which would strengthen the monarchy, personified by Nicholas II build. To avoid this, it was necessary to try to place all the glory on the commander-in-chief of the front: Brusilov began to be praised in the press, just as N.I. was not praised. Ivanov for the victory in the Battle of Galicia, nor A.N. Selivanov for Przemysl, nor P.A. Pleve for Tomashev, nor N.N. Yudenich for Sarykamysh, Erzurum or Trabzon.

In Soviet times, the name associated with the name of the general who went to serve the Bolsheviks came to the court and Soviet historiographers; Soviet Lieutenant General M. Galaktionov wrote in his preface to Brusilov’s memoirs: “The Brusilov breakthrough is the forerunner of the remarkable breakthroughs carried out by the Red Army in the Great Patriotic War."

Brusilov's breakthrough as an object of mythology

Nelipovich S.G.

The Brusilov breakthrough of 1916 occupies an important place in the history of the First World War. Its scale and drama shocked the world no less than Verdun, which became a symbol of the strategy of attrition. However, today in Russia much less is known about this major operation of the Russian army than 60 years ago.

Currently, the myth of the Brusilov breakthrough, generated by official propaganda and military censorship during the war years, and subjected to serious criticism in the 20s, despite the opposition of A.A., has been revived again and is not going to die. Brusilov, refuted in the 30s and later recreated under the conditions of the Great Patriotic War. In the post-war years, serious researchers of the First World War (A.A. Strokov, I.I. Rostunov) were unable to overcome the “mythological” tendency; their assessments of the Brusilov offensive are contradictory, because the facts refute ideological constructions. Why is there a reason to talk about the mythologization of the Brusilov breakthrough, what is the myth and what are the objections to its provisions?

A.A. himself Brusilov in his memoirs, and after him, Soviet military historians of the 40-70s created the following main dogmas of the history of the offensive of the Southwestern Front:

the idea of ​​the offensive belonged to Brusilov personally, and he personally insisted on its implementation;

the offensive was a huge success - the enemy lost 2 million people, transferred 2.2 million soldiers and officers from other theaters of war, thanks to which operations at Verdun (France) and Trento (Italy) were stopped;

the breakthrough was successful only thanks to the method invented by Brusilov personally - an offensive by all armies at once, with tactical tasks for each, so that the enemy would not guess where the main blow was being delivered (modified into the “crushing strike theory” after 1941);

the offensive stopped due to the numerical superiority of the enemy, Brusilov’s lack of reserves, and the mediocrity of M.V. Alekseev and commander of the 8th Army A.M. Kaledin, “betrayal” by A.E. Evert.

An appeal to historical works of the 20-30s (both Soviet and foreign authors) and to documents of the Russian State Military Historical Archive makes it possible to refute the above. Here are the main arguments.

The idea of ​​a diversionary strike on Lutsk was expressed on April 1, 1916 at a meeting at Headquarters by the Chief of Staff of the Supreme Commander-in-Chief M.V. Alekseev and only modified by Brusilov in tactical and operational terms (1).

The breakthrough at Lutsk and on the Dniester really shocked the Austro-Hungarian army. However, by July 1916, she had recovered from the defeat and, with the help of German troops, was able not only to repel further attacks, but also to defeat Romania. According to published archival data, the enemy lost, including sick people, a little more than 1 million people on the Russian front by the end of the year. 35 divisions were deployed against Brusilov’s troops (including 8 badly battered ones from the west and 6 from Italy; 4 of them were taken back), i.e. less than what was required to be deployed against the Romanians (41).

It was because of Romania's performance that the German offensive at Verdun was stopped; the operation against Italy stalled even before the Brusilov breakthrough began.

The “broad offensive” method is not Brusilov’s invention. It was used by all sides in the 1914 campaign, and in 1915 by the Russian troops N.I. Ivanov in the Carpathians and our opponents in Galicia, Volyn, Poland, the Baltic states and Serbia. With a fortified front, success could only be achieved by enormous numerical superiority or in conditions of demoralization of the enemy. Otherwise, a frontal assault would lead to unjustified huge losses. The enemy already figured out the direction of the main attack in June and then repelled it with the help of mobile reserves at key sectors of the front.

Brusilov in vain blamed others for his miscalculations. Kaledin was his promoter and acted successfully until Brusilov himself began to interfere in every detail in the management of the army, which lost over 300 thousand people as a result of the operation (2).

Accusations of A.E.’s inaction are also unfair. Evert: his Western Front launched an offensive, which the enemy repelled. After the failure of the Western Front, Alekseev transferred the main blow to Brusilov’s zone. Up to half a million soldiers from other fronts and more than 600 thousand marching reinforcements are sent to the Southwestern Front. At the same time, only according to approximate calculations according to the Headquarters statements, Brusilov’s Southwestern Front lost 1.65 million people from May 22 (June 4) to October 14 (27), 1916 (3).

It was this circumstance that decided the fate of the offensive: the Russian troops, thanks to the “Brusilov method,” choked on their own blood. Brusilov did not complete a single task: the enemy was not defeated, his losses were less than those of the Russians, success for the attacks of the Western Front was also not prepared by this grandiose diversionary operation. Kovel, which attracted all the attention of Brusilov, like Selena the sleepwalker, was never taken, despite the monstrous losses of three armies that stormed it in vain. It is no coincidence that many authors associated the disintegration of the Russian army with the collapse of hopes of developing success as a result of Brusilov’s offensive.

It should be noted that a myth can only exist if the sources are neglected. Nowadays the task of expanding the source base of research on the First World War and, of course, on the Brusilov breakthrough is again faced. We are talking primarily about archival sources, firmly forgotten since the 40s. Mastering new documents will allow us to better and more deeply understand the great drama of 1914-1918.

Notes:

• (1) Strategic outline of the war of 1914-1918. M., 1920, Part 5. P.27, 28; Vetoshnikov L.V. Brusilovsky breakthrough. M., 1940. P.24.
• (2) Russian State Military Historical Archive. F.2003. Op.1. D.1304. L.227; F.2134. Op.2. D.308. L.43-280.
• (3) Calculated from: Ibid. F.2003. Op.1. D.613. L.7-308; D.614. L.1-277; D.615. L.3-209; Op.2. D.426. L.218-280.

Nelipovich S.G. Brusilov’s breakthrough as an object of mythology // The First World War: Prologue of the 20th century. M., 1998. P.632-634.

Brusilovsky breakthrough

Brusilovsky breakthrough- offensive operation of the Southwestern Front of the Russian army under the command of General A. A. Brusilov during the First World War, carried out on May 21 (June 3) - August 9 (22), 1916, during which a serious defeat was inflicted on the Austro-Hungarian army and Galicia and Bukovina are occupied.

Planning and preparation of the operation

The summer offensive of the Russian army was part of the Entente's overall strategic plan for 1916, which provided for the interaction of the allied armies in various theaters of war. As part of this plan, Anglo-French troops were preparing an operation on the Somme. In accordance with the decision of the conference of the Entente powers in Chantilly (March 1916), the start of the offensive on the French front was scheduled for July 1, and on the Russian front - for June 15, 1916.

The directive of the Russian Headquarters of the High Command of April 11 (24), 1916 ordered a Russian offensive on all three fronts (Northern, Western and Southwestern). The balance of forces, according to Headquarters, was in favor of the Russians. At the end of March, the Northern and Western Fronts had 1,220 thousand bayonets and sabers versus 620 thousand for the Germans, and the Southwestern Front had 512 thousand versus 441 thousand for the Austrians. The double superiority in forces north of Polesie also dictated the direction of the main attack. It was to be carried out by troops of the Western Front, and auxiliary attacks by the Northern and Southwestern Fronts. To increase the superiority in forces, in April-May the units were replenished to full strength.

Headquarters feared that the armies of the Central Powers would go on the offensive if the French were defeated at Verdun and, wanting to seize the initiative, instructed the front commanders to be prepared for an offensive earlier than planned. The Stavka directive did not reveal the purpose of the upcoming operation, did not provide for the depth of the operation, and did not indicate what the fronts were supposed to achieve in the offensive. It was believed that after the first line of enemy defense had been broken through, a new operation was being prepared to overcome the second line. This was reflected in the planning of the operation by the fronts. Thus, the command of the Southwestern Front did not determine the actions of its armies in the development of the breakthrough and further goals.

Contrary to the assumptions of the Headquarters, the Central Powers did not plan large offensive operations on the Russian front in the summer of 1916. At the same time, the Austrian command did not consider it possible for the Russian army to launch a successful offensive south of Polesie without its significant reinforcement.

By the summer of 1916, signs of war fatigue among the soldiers appeared in the Russian army, but in the Austro-Hungarian army the reluctance to fight was much stronger, and in general the combat effectiveness of the Russian army was higher than the Austrian one.

On May 2 (15), Austrian troops went on the offensive on the Italian front in the Trentino region and defeated the Italians. In this regard, Italy turned to Russia with a request to help with the offensive of the armies of the Southwestern Front, which was opposed mainly by the Austrians. On May 18 (31), the Headquarters, by its directive, scheduled the offensive of the Southwestern Front for May 22 (June 4), and the Western Front for May 28-29 (June 10-11). The main attack was still assigned to the Western Front (commanded by General A.E. Evert).

In preparation for the operation, the commander of the Southwestern Front, General A. A. Brusilov, decided to make one breakthrough at the front of each of his four armies. Although this scattered the Russian forces, the enemy also lost the opportunity to timely transfer reserves to the direction of the main attack. In accordance with the general plan of the Headquarters, a strong right-flank 8th Army launched the main attack on Lutsk to facilitate the planned main attack of the Western Front. Army commanders were given freedom to choose breakthrough sites. In the directions of the armies' attacks, superiority over the enemy was created in manpower (2-2.5 times) and in artillery (1.5-1.7 times). The offensive was preceded by thorough reconnaissance, training of troops, and the equipment of engineering bridgeheads, which brought the Russian positions closer to the Austrian ones.

Progress of the operation

The artillery preparation lasted from 3 a.m. on May 21 (June 3) to 9 a.m. on May 23 (June 5) and led to severe destruction of the first line of defense and partial neutralization of enemy artillery. The Russian 8th, 11th, 7th and 9th armies (over 633,000 people and 1,938 guns) that then went on the offensive broke through the positional defenses of the Austro-Hungarian front, commanded by Archduke Frederick. The breakthrough was carried out in 13 areas at once, followed by development towards the flanks and in depth.

The greatest success at the first stage was achieved by the 8th Army (commanded by General A. M. Kaledin), which, having broken through the front, occupied Lutsk on May 25 (June 7), and by June 2 (15) defeated the 4th Austro-Hungarian Army of the Archduke Joseph Ferdinand and advanced 65 km.

The 11th and 7th armies broke through the front, but the offensive was stopped by enemy counterattacks. The 9th Army (commanded by General P. A. Lechitsky) broke through the front of the 7th Austro-Hungarian Army and occupied Chernivtsi on June 5 (18).

The threat of an attack by the 8th Army on Kovel forced the Central Powers to transfer two German divisions from the Western European theater, two Austrian divisions from the Italian front, and a large number of units from other sectors of the Eastern Front to this direction. However, the counterattack of the Austro-German troops against the 8th Army, launched on June 3 (16), was not successful.

At the same time, the Western Front postponed the delivery of the main attack prescribed to it by Headquarters. With the consent of the Chief of the General Staff, General M.V. Alekseev, General Evert postponed the date of the offensive of the Western Front until June 4 (17). A private attack by the 1st Grenadier Corps on a wide section of the front on June 2 (15) was unsuccessful, and Evert began a new regrouping of forces, which is why the Western Front offensive was postponed to the beginning of July. Applying to the changing timing of the offensive of the Western Front, Brusilov gave the 8th Army more and more new directives - now of an offensive, now of a defensive nature, to develop an attack now on Kovel, now on Lvov.

By June 12 (25), relative calm had established on the Southwestern Front. On June 24, artillery preparation of the Anglo-French armies on the Somme began, which lasted 7 days, and on July 1, the Allies went on the offensive. The operation on the Somme required Germany to increase the number of its divisions in this direction from 8 to 30 in July alone.

The Russian Western Front finally went on the offensive on June 20 (July 3), and the Southwestern Front resumed its offensive on June 22 (July 5). Dealing the main blow to the large railway junction of Kovel, the 8th Army reached the line of the river. Stokhod, but in the absence of reserves was forced to stop the offensive for two weeks.

The attack on Baranovichi by the strike group of the Western Front, launched on June 20-25 (July 3-8) by superior forces (331 battalions and 128 hundreds against 82 battalions of the 9th German Army) was repulsed with heavy losses for the Russians. The offensive of the Northern Front from the Riga bridgehead also turned out to be ineffective, and the German command continued to transfer troops from areas north of Polesie to the south.

In July, the Headquarters transferred the guard and strategic reserve to the south, creating the Special Army of General Bezobrazov, and ordered the Southwestern Front to capture Kovel. On July 15 (28), the Southwestern Front launched a new offensive. Attacks of the fortified marshy defiles on Stokhod against German troops ended in failure. The 11th Army of the Southwestern Front took Brody, and the 7th Army took Galich. The 9th Army of General N.A. Lechitsky achieved significant success in July-August, occupying Bukovina and taking Stanislav.

By the end of August, the offensive of the Russian armies ceased due to the increased resistance of the Austro-German troops, as well as heavy losses and fatigue of personnel.

Results

As a result of the offensive operation, the Southwestern Front inflicted a serious defeat on the Austro-Hungarian troops in Galicia and Bukovina. The losses of the Central Powers, according to Russian estimates, amounted to about one and a half million people killed, wounded and captured. The high losses suffered by the Austrian troops further reduced their combat effectiveness. To repel the Russian offensive, Germany transferred 11 infantry divisions from the French theater of operations, and Austria-Hungary transferred 6 infantry divisions from the Italian front, which became a tangible aid to Russia’s Entente allies. Under the influence of the Russian victory, Romania decided to enter the war on the side of the Entente, although the consequences of this decision are assessed ambiguously by historians.

The result of the offensive of the Southwestern Front and the operation on the Somme was the final transition of the strategic initiative from the Central Powers to the Entente. The Allies managed to achieve such interaction that for two months (July-August) Germany had to send its limited strategic reserves to both the Western and Eastern Fronts.

At the same time, the summer campaign of the Russian army in 1916 demonstrated serious shortcomings in troop management. The headquarters was unable to implement the plan for a general summer offensive of three fronts, agreed upon with the allies, and the auxiliary attack of the Southwestern Front turned out to be the main offensive operation. The offensive of the Southwestern Front was not supported in a timely manner by other fronts. The headquarters did not show sufficient firmness towards General Evert, who repeatedly disrupted the planned timing of the offensive of the Western Front. As a result, a significant part of the German reinforcements against the Southwestern Front came from other sectors of the Eastern Front.

The July offensive of the Western Front on Baranovichi revealed the inability of the command staff to cope with the task of breaking through a heavily fortified German position, even with a significant superiority in forces.

Since the June Lutsk breakthrough of the 8th Army was not provided for by the Headquarters plan, it was not preceded by the concentration of powerful front-line reserves, therefore neither the 8th Army nor the Southwestern Front could develop this breakthrough. Also, due to fluctuations in the Headquarters and the command of the Southwestern Front during the July offensive, the 8th and 3rd armies reached the river by July 1 (14). Stokhod without sufficient reserves and were forced to stop and wait for the approach of the Special Army. Two weeks of respite gave the German command time to transfer reinforcements, and subsequent attacks by Russian divisions were repulsed. “The impulse cannot stand a break.”

It is for these reasons that some military historians will call the successful operation of the Southwestern Front a “lost victory.” The huge losses of the Russian army in the operation (according to some sources, up to half a million people in the SWF alone on June 13) required additional recruitment of recruits, which at the end of 1916 increased dissatisfaction with the war among the Russian population.