Publisher's abstract:

The book describes the combat operations of American submarines in the Second World War, mainly in the Pacific Ocean. It talks in detail about single and group actions of boats against the merchant fleet of Japan, as well as actions against its warships. The tactical techniques of submarines in the use of torpedo weapons, laying mines, performing special tasks and other issues are considered. The Russian edition of the book is intended for officers and admirals of the navy.

Sections of this page:

Chapter XIII. Japanese anti-submarine defense

Anti-submarine forces in the fight against American submarines

The capture of Guadalcanal (announced on February 7, 1943) was Japan's second catastrophic defeat since the start of the war.

However, the Japanese did not lay down their arms. Defending the front in the northern part of the Solomon Islands, they unleashed their attacks on the inexorable enemy pursuing them in the South Seas, that is, they directed the efforts of anti-submarine forces to fight American submarine forces.

In January it became apparent that the Japanese had strengthened their anti-submarine defenses, using every possible means to protect merchant shipping in the Bismarck Archipelago and Solomon Islands. The enemy strained all his strength and used all means of anti-submarine defense to suspend the actions of submarines.

If the Japanese had managed to better mobilize all the forces of industry, technical and scientific thought for anti-submarine defense, they could have won the anti-submarine war and delayed the Allied victory for many months. If American submarines were forced to counter anti-submarine measures roughly equal in effectiveness to those of the Allies, then driving the Japanese out of the Pacific would be almost impossible. Of course, the United States would lose many more submarines in this case.

Since the war was already in its second year, it was possible to evaluate Japanese anti-submarine efforts and imagine all the methods and means used by the enemy in the fight against submarines.

The US submarine force now knew that Japanese anti-submarine warfare was not particularly new or original. The Japanese did not possess any "secret weapon". They did not use any original tactics or unique techniques to combat submarines. Japanese anti-submarine measures were for the most part a copy of those used by the Allies. Due to many factors, the Japanese were unable to exert an effort equal to that of the Allies and maintain their momentum.

The weaker development of science and technology compared to the allies made it difficult to improve forces and means. The enemy lagged behind in terms of the use of electronic equipment. Some of his equipment was good, but the technique of using it was often incorrect. The enemy was late with such basic countermeasures as a convoy system and sufficient air cover for transports during sea crossings. Operating in the metropolitan area, the enemy could take advantage of the advantages of the island position, but, with the exception of the area lying east of the northern part of the island of Honshu, where several American submarines were destroyed, Japan's coastal waters were poorly protected. Merchant ships were constantly attacked near Japan, and, as will be discussed below, Japanese warships were attacked by submarines at the very entrance to Tokyo Bay. Summarizing all that has been said, we can conclude that the Japanese anti-submarine defense was built in haste and was carried out at that time in the most disorderly manner. Japanese anti-submarine techniques and methods could be effective in the fight against submarines operating during the First World War.

In matters related to the activities of Allied submarines, the Japanese anti-submarine command relied on the intelligence service of the navy. This service was intended to obtain information about the movement of submarines and their operational capabilities, to study captured documents and materials, and to interrogate prisoners of war in order to obtain additional information. Japanese offensive anti-submarine defense techniques involved the use of devices for detecting submarines (radar, ultrasonic equipment, etc.) and such generally accepted attack weapons as depth and aircraft bombs. Defensive minefields served to protect important harbors and trade routes. Another part of the methods and measures of anti-submarine defense of ships and convoys were some improvements and changes in the methods and methods of anti-submarine defense. But by the end of 1943 the picture was essentially the same as it remained throughout the rest of the war. During 1942, only three American submarines were lost in action in the Pacific.

Fifteen boats sank as a result of the fighting in 1943. Considering the anti-submarine warfare that American boats encountered and the heavy losses suffered in the southwest Pacific during the first quarter of 1943, the effectiveness of Japanese anti-submarine warfare during this period was at its highest point. Studying these activities provides a backdrop to the broader picture of American submarine operations.

Japanese Navy Intelligence Service

As it became obvious after the war, the information received by the Japanese intelligence service could not provide anything valuable in the fight against boats. The ubiquitous system of Japanese espionage turned out to be untenable. In Cavite, the Japanese were able to recover the submarine Sealyon, which sank in December 1941, but they could not learn much because its radio, sonar devices and fire control devices were destroyed before it sank.

Later, several American submarines were lost aground, but circumstances prevented the Japanese from obtaining the necessary materials and documents. The Japanese were unable to obtain any important information as a result of the disasters of these boats. The mediocrity of the Japanese intelligence service, which was apparent at the beginning, became obvious at the height of the war. This became evident in the spring of 1944, when the Japanese headquarters published a report from the so-called Combat Experience Research Committee. This message concerned the activities of submarines in the period from June 1943 to March 1944 inclusive.

This document was captured, translated and studied by the Allies. Japanese data on the deployment of American submarines was quite accurate. This data was undoubtedly based on a message received from the Japanese signals intelligence service. But as long as the Japanese were in defensive positions, this message about the enemy's strategic positions was of little value. The analysis of American submarine tactics was thorough, but it hardly revealed the cards. The message contained a number of individual errors. It described several anti-submarine attacks, and in each case the sinking of submarines was greatly exaggerated.

A typical example is an excerpt from a message that talks about a combat episode on November 9, 1943 at latitude 14° north and 118° 26? east longitude. At this time and at these coordinates, the Akatsuki Maru was traveling at a speed of 13–15 knots when it was attacked by three (as indicated in the message) submarines.

According to the Japanese document:

“At 5 o'clock. 39 min. traces of three torpedoes were spotted at a distance of 500 m along a bearing of 35° on the port side. They immediately turned left when three more torpedo tracks were spotted at a distance of 500 m on a bearing of 50° on the port side and two more torpedo tracks at a distance of 500 m abeam on the starboard side on a bearing of 100°; The first torpedo passed ahead of the ship. One of the torpedoes of the second group passed under the ship and another, although it hit a target near the bridge, did not explode. In the same way, one of the torpedoes of the third group hit the central part of the ship and did not explode. The other two torpedoes, which did not explode, hit the stern. The damage was minor."

In reality, this attack was carried out by the submarine Seawolf during her eleventh combat campaign. She fired four torpedoes from the bow tubes from a distance of 1450 m at a meeting angle of 90° on the port side and installed at a depth of 3 m. The torpedoes went normally, the torpedo track indicated their correct direction. The submarine commander later made the correct conclusion that the torpedoes either passed at a greater depth (against the previously established one) or for some reason did not explode.

A major shortcoming of the Japanese intelligence service was the lack of accurate data on the results of anti-submarine attacks. The Japanese took credit for sinking a number of submarines that was almost ten times the actual number. Apparently they saw no need to change the methods they believed were producing such good results. Japanese intelligence obtained the necessary information by interrogating captured submariners under torture. Undoubtedly, in this way the Japanese received small fragmentary technical information. But in most cases they did not represent anything important. The information (testimonies) given by the submarine crews contained misleading or inaccurate details. The experience of interrogating Japanese prisoners of war showed that a prisoner of war could, without fear of consequences, give out so much technical data, sufficient in volume and accurate in detail, that the interrogator was able to compile an impressive report. But such a report still gave the enemy nothing. There is an abyss between the knowledge of a design engineer, for example, and a simple investigator who is not versed in technology, and a prisoner of war, who is an expert in technology, can freely deceive the interrogator in this case.

There were several secrets that had to be kept until the end of the war. The maximum diving depth of submarines was the first secret, the future plans and operations of the submarines was the second. The technical side of the equipment, still in its development stage, may have been the third secret. It was also important to keep the Japanese in the dark about the ineffectiveness of their anti-submarine efforts. These secrets were not known to the enemy during the war. At the end of the war, it became obvious that the Japanese had made great efforts to obtain information about submarines.

To sum up, it can be said that the Japanese naval intelligence service was helpless. She could not obtain the necessary materials to facilitate effective anti-submarine operations.

Submarine detection devices

At the very beginning of the war, the Japanese did not have a shipborne radar. Japanese coastal radar was captured on Guadalcanal. Apparently it had been used since January 1942 as an aircraft detection device.

At the beginning of 1943, they installed a 10-SM type radar on the battleship Hyuga. But even when the Japanese had a fairly satisfactory shipborne radar, they were slow to install this equipment on escort and anti-submarine ships. It was not until September 1944 that Japanese escort ships went to sea for the first time equipped with radar.

Aircraft radar was installed on Japanese medium bombers in the fall of 1943. In December of the same year, the 901st Air Force was formed solely for the purpose of escorting convoys. But this group of radar-equipped aircraft consisted of obsolete aircraft, and it was only at the end of 1944 that a significant number of radar-equipped aircraft were sent to fight against submarines.

Japanese radar was inferior in every way to Allied radar. Japanese aircraft radar was known to be able to detect a submarine at a distance of 12 miles, and by the end of the war, radar-equipped aircraft were frequently detecting submarines in night conditions. However, the Japanese recognized the use of radar only at night or in poor visibility.

Visual search for submarines was stubbornly considered more reliable. In many cases, the Japanese removed their radar even at night, fearing that a radar search would reveal whoever was using it.

The Japanese began using detection radars early. They probably had shipborne radars as early as 1942. The date of their appearance on escort ships remains unknown, but by the end of 1944, most escort ships were equipped with the mentioned equipment. Japanese surface ships had directional radars. Some of the radars found on Japanese submarines late in the war were also directional. Search radars were installed on Japanese aircraft only at the end of 1944. The advantage in this regard remained with the aircraft of the carrier task force, and only a small amount of radar equipment was installed on anti-submarine aircraft.

After the victory over Japan, it became clear that Japanese aircraft had not achieved much success in detecting American submarines by radar stations.

The enemy's radio direction finder network was well developed. At any time, starting from the first day of the war, the Allied submarine commander who was transmitting messages by radio had to take into account that the Japanese could take a bearing on the boat's position. This, of course, did not apply to equipment operating at very low or very high frequencies with a short transmission range, usually not exceeding the visual range. Well-located stations could take direction of a transmitting station located within an area whose area was 100 square meters. miles; more accurate direction finding was usually unattainable.

The result of direction finding could be transmitted to all ships at sea. Although the frequency at which submarine transmissions were made varied, radio direction finding was nevertheless a means of locating the areas where American submarines were located and establishing a pattern of their common basing in the Pacific Ocean. Tactically, the assistance of direction finders was undoubtedly limited. The submarine's radio transmissions within range of the Japanese airbase aircraft attracted particular attention during the day's search. But the inaccuracy of direction finding of moving targets usually prevented the concentration of anti-submarine ships in the area where the submarine conducting the radio transmission was located.

Secret monthly maps indicating the location of all submarines were published in Tokyo and sent to many commanders of operational units. Several of these maps were captured during the war. The maps added little to the general information and should not have been classified as secret documents.

The Japanese were especially proud of a device they called the ji-kitanchiki. It was an aircraft-based magnetic submarine detector, similar in some respects to that used by the Allies. It could detect a submarine located at a distance (vertical) of 450 m from the aircraft. Experienced Japanese pilots flew an aircraft equipped with a magnetic detector at an altitude of 9–12 m above the water. An average pilot stayed at an altitude of 45–60 m. By the end of the war, about one third of land-based anti-submarine aircraft were equipped with the above-mentioned magnetic detector, the second third of the aircraft had radar, a few aircraft had both, and the rest had no search equipment.

The Japanese had good optical instruments. They spent a lot of effort training observers. However, in the second half of 1943, the camouflage of American submarines was significantly improved, making them difficult to detect visually. An anti-submarine ship, whose crew had only binoculars, rarely managed to detect a modern submarine. -

The anti-submarine ship, equipped with sonar equipment, initially proved to be a formidable adversary. As indicated in the previous chapter, destroyers and patrol ships equipped with hydroacoustic equipment posed a constant threat to an attacking or escaping submarine.

Offensive anti-submarine weapon

The Japanese did not invent any new anti-submarine weapons. As might be expected, the Japanese destroyers and larger escort ships left the submarines far behind in terms of gunfire output. In a few cases, submarines damaged by depth charges dropped from small escort ships surfaced and responded with gunfire to enemy fire. But in all cases when the submarine was forced to engage in surface combat with destroyers, it ended quickly and not in the boat’s favor.

The Japanese were unusually slow to arm their merchant ships. At the beginning of the war, their merchant ships were unarmed; many ships remained unarmed in the subsequent months of the war. The Japanese arsenals seemed completely unprepared for arming the merchant fleet. Advantage was given to merchant ships attached to the navy, but many ships transferred to the military command went to sea with field guns on deck. During the war, these shortcomings were gradually eliminated, but naval guns began to arrive too late and there were too few of them. In one of the official Japanese documents one could read:

“American submarines saw the guns that are installed on our ships. Our large ships have one gun each at the bow and stern, but our small ships have only one bow gun of small caliber, which the guns of a submarine can easily cope with. Therefore, the Americans probably believe that it is not difficult for them to launch an artillery attack at close range, especially from behind the ship. Moreover, they are convinced that the anti-submarine defensive power of our ships is less than they initially thought. Cases of the enemy using guns are constantly becoming more frequent.”

But the fairly strong armament of escort and patrol ships and individual merchant ships required caution on the part of the commander of the attacking submarine. An artillery duel puts a submarine at a disadvantage; it cannot withstand a large number of direct hits from shells. Nevertheless, during the war, American submarines opened artillery fire on enemy ships of all types and sizes 939 times, sinking 722 ships. Since some of these ships were heavily armed, we can say that the Japanese were inferior to the Americans in terms of shooting accuracy.

The enemy's most significant anti-submarine weapon was the depth charge. The standard was a 160 kg bomb with a charge of 100 kg.

At the beginning of the war, depth charges were actually available on Japanese ships of all types, down to the smallest patrol ships and boats. Slow-moving ships had depth charges with parachute arrangements designed to reduce the speed of the bomb's fall and therefore give the ship time to move a safe distance from the explosion site. Many merchant ships were equipped with bomb-throwers and bomb-droppers. Japanese destroyers carried 30 depth charges. Japanese frigates and patrol ships could each carry up to 300 depth charges.

Japanese patrol boats "RS-13" each had two bomb launchers and one (at the stern) bomb releaser. Such a boat could carry 36 depth charges. Artillery armament consisted of one 80-mm universal gun and one coaxial 13-mm machine gun.

The Japanese planes carried standard bombs modified for use as anti-submarine weapons. Small planes had 68 kg bombs, and larger planes had 295 kg bombs that exploded at a given depth. Delay fuses were triggered at depths of 25, 45 and 75 m.

An explosion at a distance of 18 m from a bomb weighing 295 kg was considered fatal for a submarine. The small bomb was dangerous if hit directly.

During 1943, Japanese inventors worked to develop a circulating torpedo for aircraft, which would be dropped from a height of about 80 m in front of the submarine.

The torpedo was supposed to follow a converging spiral and describe four full circles, plunging to a depth of 200 m. It was supposed to have a contact fuse.

During the first period of the war, the Japanese occasionally used a blast trawl. This mine-like device was towed behind the stern of a usually slow-moving patrol ship or merchant vessel. The trawl was equipped with a contact fuse. However, there is no information about cases of a submarine colliding with such a device.

Mine war

The main Japanese mine was the M-93 galvanic impact anchor mine. These mines were laid in large numbers in order to protect large sea areas from submarine approaches. Behind such minefields, Japanese merchant ships could apparently consider themselves safe.

One large minefield that blocked the East China Sea stretched from Formosa to Kyushu. The shallow waters of the East China Sea were ideal from the point of view of the opportunity to conduct mine warfare. Another large minefield blocked the Formosa Strait. In order to prevent submarines from entering the Sea of ​​Japan, the Tsushima, La Perouse and Tsugaru straits were mined. Other minefields guarded the shores of Kyushu and a large number of shipping canals in the Dutch East Indies. A significant number of obstacles were in the area of ​​​​the Sulu archipelago and the Philippines, where various straits were mined in order to prevent submarines from operating in these areas.

M-93 anchor mines could be placed at depths of up to 1000 m, but they were usually placed at depths less than 180 m, because in deeper waters they drifted or were diverted to the side by underwater currents. This reduced the effectiveness of the minefield. In an anti-submarine minefield, mines were laid at various depths, often in staggered rows.

According to the requirements of international law, they had a device that would drown the mine if the mine broke and it floated up.

The Japanese also had the M-92 anti-submarine anchor mine, which was used to mine harbor entrances and chokepoints. Such a mine with a charge of 500 kg had a hydrophone detector. The mines were placed in banks of six mines each. They were detonated from a coastal control station after hydrophones and electrical cables laid in loops on the bottom, creating a constant magnetic field, signaled that the submarine had entered a certain square. This system of using mine weapons, known for a long time, could not ensure success in the fight against submarines.

Minefields made from anchor contact mines are a different matter. which were placed on the open sea. Evidence suggests that during the war, three American submarines were lost when they struck minefields laid by the Japanese on the high seas. Perhaps for the same reason other boats disappeared during the fighting. A large minefield in the open sea was laid with the expectation that it would blow up one out of every ten submarines passing through it. The results did not live up to expectations. The effectiveness of minefields decreased because over time, either the mines were broken and the mines floated to the surface, or the mines sank due to the passage of water into the hull or due to the large fouling of the hull with shells.

Another obstacle to the widespread use of minefields is that the mine can also be dangerous for its own ship. There were cases when Japanese merchant ships were blown up by their mines. In addition, with the widespread use of mines, the Japanese were faced with the need to constantly inform their merchant ships of the coordinates of minefields. And such information can always get to the enemy. Notices of mines sent to merchant seamen often fell into Allied hands. Together with navigator's notes, old maps and other documents, these notices made it possible to determine the placement of minefields, which was immediately reported to the submarine commanders. As a result, American submarines were as careful as the Japanese ships themselves to avoid Japanese minefields.

Based on the foregoing, we can conclude that Japanese mines as defensive or tactical anti-submarine weapons were ineffective and their use was associated with operational difficulties.

The minefields proved effective in forcing American submarines to avoid dangerous areas. In addition, mines remained a potential threat to boats operating in mine-laying waters.

However, even in this sense, the mine did not pose an insurmountable danger. In many cases, a submarine could find channels and pass behind merchant or military vessels without risk. And, as will be shown in the next chapter, minefields posed no threat to American submarine forces during the last six months of the war.

Japanese anti-submarine tactics

The main warships, convoys, as well as expeditionary forces and other important naval formations at the beginning of the war were sufficiently provided with anti-submarine protection. But the enemy did not expect that the Allies would widely use submarines in the waters of the Japanese Empire. It was considered impossible to blockade Tokyo Bay. During the first year of the war, many Japanese ships made solo passages on their own, without any escort, using recommended routes and a zigzag course. On approaches to ports and bases, ships were met by basic anti-submarine patrols. The Japanese zigzag rules were known to the Allies and were used in submarine training, thus creating something similar to reality. Some of the rules came to light from documents captured during the war. All these rules of anti-submarine zigzags, used during the First World War as an anti-submarine technique, turned out to be weak and clearly ineffective protection against modern submarines.

The application of the rules of anti-submarine zigzags led to an increase in time and a lengthening of the path when a ship passed through waters in which submarines operated. And this reduced the speed of ships and thereby increased the time spent in a dangerous area.

Japanese patrol boats

Japanese anti-submarine patrol vessels operated in the area of ​​bases, on approaches to major ports and other points of strategic importance. They escorted cargo ships at a short distance from the port, but most of them carried out daily patrol duty directly on the approaches to bases or ports.

Most of the patrol ships had a low speed. Their displacement did not exceed 400–500 tons. All ships were armed with depth charges, which were dropped manually from the stern. On small patrol vessels, sonar equipment was rare. Some ships had a primitive microphone that could be lowered overboard. Patrol vessels of the Shonan Maru type, operating in the area of ​​​​the islands of Truk and Palau, had hydraphones, a receiving and transmitting radio station, bomb throwers and bomb releasers for depth charges, one three-inch gun and a machine gun. These ships had a speed of 18 knots. Whatever the size of these ships, they forced the submarine to remain submerged and evade their pursuit, since the depth charges that small anti-submarine ships carried posed the same danger to the boats as the depth charges of Japanese destroyers. If these patrol vessels could be made faster and equipped with better hydroacoustic equipment, they would pose a very serious danger to submarines.

Typically, torpedo attacks were not launched against anti-submarine patrol ships, and when a boat opened gun fire, this led to other anti-submarine ships and aircraft from a nearby base rushing to the spot where the boat was found.

In some places on the Malayan Barrier, especially in the Lombok Strait, where very strong currents forced submarines to pass on the surface, patrol vessels interacted with shore batteries. Around the Japanese islands, the patrol line of patrol ships was located 600 miles from the coastline.

As already mentioned in one of the previous chapters, these vessels combined fishing with patrol duties. Each of them usually had a specialist sailor who was obliged to observe and report on the appearance of the enemy and his actions in the patrol area. Reports of submarine activity were only part of the main mission, which was to detect operational formations of surface ships approaching the Japanese Empire.

When Japan began to be subject to air raids, guard patrols became an important element of the VNOS service.

Convoying Japanese ships

The command of the Japanese United Fleet usually itself provided anti-submarine cover for warships and tankers attached to the fleet, assigning destroyers to escort them, although the commander of the United Fleet could give instructions in this regard to the commander of the “local fleet”, such as, for example, the commander of the 4th Fleet in the Caroline and the Marshall Islands. Usually the commander of the local fleet was responsible only for convoying within his area.

Obviously, the Japanese did not adhere to any specific rules and regulations in this regard. Cover was organized for each case separately, in accordance with the situation and the distribution of security ships.

Typically, two or three destroyers were assigned to guard a large ship or an important auxiliary vessel. The Japanese destroyers that accompanied the convoys were the most complete anti-submarine ships.

Japanese escort system

Japanese military leaders erred by failing to develop effective measures to protect their merchant fleet. Their neglect of this issue cost Japan dearly. It was necessary to turn to the experience of England in the First World War and remember Jellicoe’s call: “We must stop these losses and stop them quickly.” The Japanese did not pay attention to the lesson that England received at that time. Even more unforgivable is their disregard for the lessons of the Battle of the Atlantic. That submarine warfare could become a serious threat to Japanese lines of communication and the economy probably never occurred to them, and if it did, the thought was quickly dismissed as very unpleasant for further consideration. Probably, the possibility of defeat seemed so unrealistic to the Japanese militarists in December 1941 that they considered it sufficient to limit themselves to elementary measures to protect Japanese shipping. Japanese merchant ships, lacking weapons, made sea crossings without effective protection in the first months of the war.

Although troop transports and important military supplies were guarded, many of the Japanese merchant ships sailed unescorted during the first two years of the war. The construction of special patrol ships began at the end of 1942. By this time, American submarines had caused serious damage to the Japanese merchant fleet. Merchant ships and escort ships now sailed in small groups, but there was no permanent convoy system until 1943, and even then it was limited to the Singapore route. Another year passed before the Japanese, feeling the urgent need to organize regular convoys, finally created a network of routes for them. Meanwhile, the merchant fleet suffered irreparable damage: the center of military operations moved to the west. As a result, many developed convoy routes became unacceptable.

Japanese convoy techniques were developed too late. It was not until early 1944 that an operational plan emerged, calling for ten or more standard orders corresponding to a certain number of ships in a convoy. In general, this belated plan required that the transports in the convoy move in close formation, surrounded by a ring of escort ships.

If there were a sufficient number of escort ships, then they should have been located ahead of the transports at a distance of up to 10,000 m.

By this time, there was an acute shortage of escort ships, which forced transports to be delayed in the port. The escort commanders did the best they could with little at their disposal. There were cases when several transports were accompanied by one escort ship, which, at best, could only harass the submarine after an attack was launched. Sometimes one flank of the convoy remained uncovered, and sometimes the transports went without any security at all. Throughout the war in the Pacific, it was impossible to predict the behavior of Japanese escort ships.

Surface convoy escort

In the middle of the war, it became obvious to the Japanese high command that area fleet commanders and naval base commandants, acting at their own discretion, could not provide sufficient security for the convoys. The way out was the organization in 1943 of the Grand Escort Fleet, which operated independently of the United Fleet. The commander of the escort fleet had the right to issue instructions on convoy issues, and the commandants of all naval bases were subordinate to him. The said fleet included the 1st and 2nd formations of escort ships and the 901st air force.

The 1st formation of escort ships later became the 1st escort fleet. This fleet was responsible for providing convoy escort ships on the sea routes between Japan, the Philippines, the Dutch East Indies and the Palau Islands. The 2nd unit was responsible for escorting convoys heading to the Mariana and Caroline Islands (after the fall of Saipan in 1944, the need for this unit was no longer necessary). At Singapore, Surabaya, Ambon, Manila and other bases in the southwestern Pacific theater, the area fleet commander was responsible for convoy duty. The commandant of the Sasebo naval base was responsible for escorting convoys on the approaches to the Ryukyu Islands.

Despite its loud name, the Large Escort Fleet had, until the spring of 1944, no more than 25 or 30 ships for regular convoy escort service. Then, with the establishment of convoy routes to Saipan, Manila, Saigon, northern Borneo and Formosa, the escort fleet was increased to 150 ships, but this was not enough.

At first, the senior escort officer was both the convoy commander and the escort commander. By the end of 1943, a convoy commander was assigned to each large convoy. By the time the Allied forces closed in the Philippines and Japan, a special group of officers was formed to command the convoys, consisting of 15 captains of the 2nd rank and four rear admirals of the Japanese navy.

At this time, the 1st Escort Fleet included only 60 ships:

4 escort destroyers, 45 frigates, 2 sea hunters, 4 minesweepers and

5 gunboats. The mainstay of the Japanese surface escort force were ships known to the American Navy as frigates or coastal defense ships (kaibokan). There were several types of such ships. About half of them had steam engines, and the rest had diesel engines.

The armament of such ships consisted of two 118 mm artillery guns (bow and stern), two machine guns and eleven 25 mm machine guns, a depth charge launcher, which included 12 bomb throwers (6 on each side), and one stern bomb releaser . Apart from depth charges, ready for immediate use, all the others were stored on special racks inside the ship, and they were brought up using a winch or elevator. Thus, frigates with up to 300 depth charges were floating ammunition depots. The ships' speed fluctuated between 16 and 20 knots, and their hydroacoustic equipment was first-class. Despite the imperfect radar installation, the kaibokan-class anti-submarine ship was a formidable opponent of the submarine.

But by the time the Grand Escort Fleet was finally assembled, a significant number of cargo ships, tankers, passenger ships and transports had been sunk or damaged. The Japanese were late in taking measures to protect the convoys.

Air escort convoys

Only in December 1943 did the Japanese create the 901st Air Force. As already indicated, it was intended for convoy service. Its planes, although equipped with radar, were outdated, and many of the pilots were underqualified. The results were bad. Throughout the war, communication between anti-submarine aircraft and anti-submarine surface ships was so difficult that there was almost no interaction between them.

Japanese army aviation partially performed transport protection tasks at remote bases, such as New Guinea. However, their actions were unsuccessful due to the weak connection between the Japanese army and the Japanese fleet.

Typically, when a Japanese aircraft came into contact with a submarine, it would aim to immediately attack it with depth charges. Anti-submarine aircraft, as a rule, did not have guns, so the boats were not fired upon. One or two bombs were dropped. As soon as a boat was discovered, data about its location was communicated to anti-submarine ships. If the opportunity presented itself, the aircraft would point the surface ship at the submarine. Japanese pilots were poorly trained in anti-submarine warfare tactics, so aircraft attacks were ineffective.

After a submarine attack, the aircraft remained on patrol until it was relieved or until there was enough fuel. But as soon as he noticed traces of oil or debris on the water, he was ready to leave, because it was believed that the submarine was sunk. In the first period of the war, an airplane, having discovered a boat, relatively quickly lost contact with it. In later times, the generally accepted rule was for the aircraft to continue to pursue the boat until relief arrived.

Typically, aircraft equipped with a magnetic detector searched only in a strip approximately 137 m wide. When the magnetic detectors detected a submarine, a red light on the pilot's instrument panel turned on and the Aluminum powder-marker was automatically reset. The aircraft then approached the submarine's designated position, flying four times from different directions, and each time its installation indicated the presence of magnetic mass underwater, the marker was reset. There should have been a submarine in the center of these markers. In a number of cases, the target was a ship that had been sunk because it was unseaworthy. However, the Japanese claimed that several American submarines were sunk in a similar way.

To fully provide security for a convoy traveling at 10 knots, at least six aircraft with magnetic detectors were required to constantly monitor the area ahead of the convoy. In addition, another aircraft equipped with radar was supposed to guard the convoy at night. However, such a number of aircraft were rarely available to escort a convoy. Valuable convoys were assigned two or three aircraft for air cover. Often they were limited to the fact that the waters along the route of the convoy were examined by plane in advance of the arrival of the ships. At the end of the war, the Japanese planned to carry out a constant anti-submarine search by aircraft in the area of ​​the East China and Yellow Seas. To comb a strip 30 miles wide during the day, up to 80 aircraft were required. The command could not allocate such a number of aircraft. When the Americans carried out a series of carrier-based aircraft raids on Formosa in the fall of 1944, the losses of Japanese anti-submarine aircraft were so significant that the Japanese were unable to replace them until the end of the war. In the end, American Army Air Corps aircraft operating from the Philippine Islands destroyed almost all of the Japanese anti-submarine aircraft, and by the end of the war they no longer existed at all. A similar fate awaited Japanese carrier aircraft. The Japanese began the war with five escort carriers, initially used exclusively for transporting aircraft. After the loss of Saipan to the Japanese, the four escort carriers that remained were used to escort convoys. But they didn't last long. During 1944, three aircraft carriers were sunk by boats. It should be pointed out that carrier-based aircraft were just as ineffective in protecting the convoy as land-based aircraft.

Obviously, the Japanese made no attempt to create small groups of ships, the core of which would be escort aircraft carriers designed to combat submarines.

Japanese counterattack

At the beginning of 1943, American submarine forces had information about the anti-submarine weapons available to the Japanese. The Japanese escort fleet to protect convoys and aviation to escort them, consisting of aircraft equipped with radars and magnetic finders, were still a matter of the future, but for now proven means were used.

Soon after the war began, the Americans learned that the Japanese had dropped depth charges at very shallow depths, interrupted anti-submarine attacks too early, and were overly optimistic about the results achieved.

Japanese pilots and sailors wrote boastful reports about brilliant successes in destroying enemy ships, without having reliable supporting data. This kind of report was always met with approval at headquarters, and lists of dead American submarines were broadcast over the radio. But this was incorrect information, and often submarine commanders could quote Mark Twain’s famous phrase: “Rumors of my death have been greatly exaggerated.”

However, although Japanese anti-submarine weapons were inferior in many respects to American ones, they posed a threat to American submarines. A heavily armed destroyer and an aircraft with great speed and maneuverability could be as dangerous as an accidental lightning strike, which could kill.

In February, March and April 1943, Japanese anti-submarine forces nevertheless inflicted brutal attacks on the enemy.

Loss of the submarine Amberjack

The submarine Amberjack, replacing a tanker, headed from Brisbane to the Solomon Islands.

Southeast of Treasure Island on February 3, 1943, a boat surfaced to attack a large schooner. The schooner was damaged by artillery fire and sank.

Later that day, the submarine was ordered to proceed south along the Buka-Shortland Island line and concentrate on the area east of Vella Lavella.

On the night of February 4, a boat observer noticed a cargo ship with a carrying capacity of about 5,000 tons. It was decided to attack it by opening artillery fire. The night surface attack turned into a fierce firefight. The ship turned out to be a well-armed transport for transporting ammunition. Then the boat commander fired five torpedoes at him. The vehicles responded with cannon and machine gun fire. Bullets whistled over the boat's conning tower. One of the torpedoes hit the transport. The boat commander sent a report about the sinking of the ship. There is no confirmation in Japanese documents that the transport was sunk at the location indicated, but it was certainly torpedoed, and the ship carrying ammunition was extremely vulnerable.

On the night of February 14, the boat reported that during the day it had saved a Japanese pilot who was drowning at sea, and in the evening it was attacked by two destroyers. This was the last report received from Amberjack. Further attempts to establish radio contact with the boat were unsuccessful, and on March 22 it was officially reported as lost. Much later it turned out that the Japanese torpedo boat Haedori, together with the sea hunter L ° 18, attacked an American submarine on February 16 in the area in which the Amberjack was located. Before this, the boat was attacked by a Japanese patrol plane. Oil stains and debris appeared on the surface of the water. Japanese anti-submarine ships reported the sinking of the boat.

Loss of the Grampus submarine

The submarine Grampus sailed into the Solomon Islands and was assigned to patrol the Buka-Shortland-Rabaul area on 14 February, and a week later was ordered to operate in waters east of the Buka and Bougainville Islands. On March 2, the boat headed to the island of Vella Lavella with the task of sinking enemy ships trying to pass through the Black Keat Strait in order to escape the American surface forces that were supposed to bombard the island on March 6.

The submarine Grayback was to participate in this operation together with the Grampus.

Both boats received a warning on March 5 that two enemy destroyers had been detected, sailing from Faisi near the southeastern part of Bougainville Island to Wilson Strait. The destroyers sailed through Blackkeet Sound and Kula Bay, where they were later intercepted and sunk by surface ships.

On March 7, US submarine force headquarters in Brisbane, concerned that no reports had been received from the Grampus, ordered the submarine to report its location. There was no answer. On March 8, headquarters sent a request again. The submarine did not respond. Her loss was officially announced on March 22.

The Japanese reported that at noon on February 18, one of their convoys was attacked by a submarine in the Rabaul area. In this case, a cargo ship was damaged by a torpedo. The escort ships responded with a fierce counterattack. The next day, two Japanese seaplanes spotted and attacked an American submarine in the same area. After this, a large oil slick was noticed on the surface. The pilots claimed that they sank the submarine. It is possible, however, that Grampus was intercepted and sunk by two destroyers that were passing through Blackkeet Sound on the night of 5 March. Submariners believe that the Grampus was sunk as a result of a night battle with these ships when she was about to destroy them in Kula Bay.

Loss of the submarine Triton

The losses of American submarines indicated the strengthening of Japanese anti-submarine defense in the area of ​​the Bismarck Archipelago and the Solomon Islands. The submarine Triton departed Brisbane on 16 February with a mission to operate in the area between Rabaul and Shortland.

On March 7, the submarine Triton reported that it had attacked a convoy of five transports escorted by a destroyer, and that as a result of the attack the cargo ship Kiriha Maru (3067 tons) was sunk and another ship was damaged. One of the fired torpedoes began to describe a circulation, which forced the boat to go deeper.

Two days later, the boat discovered and attacked another convoy, but was itself discovered by a destroyer, quickly counterattacked and forced to dive before it could determine the results of the torpedo fire. The last report from Triton was received on March 11: “Two groups of vessels with five or more transports each were detected. Accompanied by escort ships... I'm pursuing..."

The boat was ordered to remain south of the equator and was advised that the submarine Trigger was operating in a nearby area. Two days later, the commander of the Triton received a radio message that three Japanese destroyers had been spotted in the area where the boat was located, apparently conducting a search. There was no answer. On 25 March the boat was ordered to leave its area and return to Brisbane. When Triton did not respond to this order and did not return to Australia on the scheduled date, it became clear that another warship had been lost. The data that became known after the end of the war does not raise the slightest doubt regarding the time and place of the death of the Triton. She was lost in a battle with three destroyers that took place on March 15 north of the Admiralty Islands. During the entire period of hostilities, the Triton boat sank 11 Japanese ships and ships with a total displacement of 31,788 tons. Among those sunk by it were the Japanese destroyer Nenohi and the I-164 submarine.

Loss of the submarine Grenadier

In April 1943, the submarine Grenadier operated in the Strait of Malacca. There were reports of Japanese ships operating in the Penang area. This was a dangerous area for boat operations, but the commander decided to explore the approaches to Penang. Early on the morning of April 21, a few miles from Penang, two vessels were spotted from a boat and began pursuit.

At 8 o'clock, when the boat had about 15 minutes left. in order to take a position on the ships' course, the observers reported: “Plane on the left!” The boat commander gave the order to dive.

A few seconds after the boat submerged, the senior mate remarked: “It seems we are safe, we are at a depth of 35-40.” This remark was followed by an explosion that sounded as if an ammunition transport had exploded above the boat. The bomb exploded near the electric motor and aft torpedo compartments. The lights went out in the control room and the supply of electricity to the power grid stopped. The boat listed 15° and continued to sink; the depth in this place reached 83 m. Communication with the aft compartments was broken. Then an alarming cry was heard: “There’s a fire in the engine compartment!” Smoke was pouring out of the compartment, people were getting out of there. When the fire could no longer be controlled, the boat commander gave the order to bolt down the door in the bulkhead. About half an hour later, the door was opened, and the emergency team entered the compartment, having previously put on gas masks. It soon became clear that the cause of the fire was a short circuit in the power circuit of the electric motors when the boat tilted. The team began to extinguish the fire. When the fire was extinguished, it turned out that the engine compartment equipment was out of order. The explosion of the bomb damaged the valve of the water main, and water began to flow into the compartment, causing a short circuit in certain sections of the electrical circuit and damage to the equipment.

Meanwhile, part of the team, forming a chain, scooped up the water that had accumulated in the engine compartment with buckets, pouring it into the torpedo compartment so that it would not flood the main engines. Finally, it was possible to supply electric current from the main battery through temporary wires to the tide pump installed on the flooring of the engine compartment, and continue pumping out water mechanically. The team then moved on to repair other damage.

The depth charge explosion seriously damaged the boat. A dent formed in the forward part of the aft torpedo compartment on the starboard side with a deflection depth of 4–6 inches; the torpedo tubes shifted to the left, the propeller shafts and hull frames in the engine and stern torpedo compartments were bent. The door in the bulkhead between the said compartments was warped and did not close tightly. The longitudinal beam and the hatch cover for loading torpedoes were bent, as a result of which water made its way through the hatch, since the gasket was under. the hatch cover was partially torn off, and the cover itself was pressed inward.

The tightness of the hydraulic pipelines to the torpedo tubes, ventilation and steering gear was broken. Many devices were torn from their places. There was damage in the diesel compartment. The radio transmitter and antenna in the control room were also damaged. The radar could not be used. The least damage was sustained to the battery compartment, where only some of the devices were broken.

The boat's crew worked throughout the day trying to get the engines started. Electricians did everything they could to keep the electric motors and appliances safe from water, but the incessant leak negated their efforts.

The damage to the radio station has been repaired. At 21 o'clock. 30 min. the submarine began to float to the surface, while it turned out to be possible to keep it on an even keel. The boat commander hoped that on the surface they would be able to eliminate the leak and restore electrical equipment. Motor mechanics and electricians began to work on putting the power plant in order.

Finally they managed to turn one propeller shaft at low speed. But, since it was bent, it required approximately 2,750 amperes, whereas under normal conditions 450 would have been sufficient. Despite all efforts, the propulsion system did not actually work.

The boat's guns were also out of action: the boat could not conduct artillery fire, and it could not escape pursuit. Morning was approaching, the Japanese “hunters” were soon to appear. The boat commander needed to do something. It was decided to make sails, with the help of which it would be possible to approach the shore, disembark the crew, and blow up the boat. But the sail turned out to be useless: there was no wind. Since it was already dawn, the boat commander decided that it was time to approach the shore and scuttle the disabled boat.

A radio report was sent about the position of the boat and the commander's intention to abandon it. All secret papers were destroyed. Radio, radar and hydroacoustic equipment were disabled. While this was being done, a merchant ship and escort ship appeared on the horizon, and a little later a plane appeared in the distance, heading straight for the submarine. But the Grenadier was not completely paralyzed. The commander ordered to open fire from two 20-mm cannons and two heavy machine guns. At the first shots at the plane, he sharply turned away, and then began to attack the boat from the left side. As soon as the plane approached, the boat opened fire again. A bomb was dropped on the boat, which exploded 60 m from the side.

At the same time, Japanese surface ships approached the submarine. The boat crew, wearing life belts, stood on the deck. Rescue rubber boats were prepared for the sick. The commander gave the order to abandon the ship. The kingstons were opened, and the Grenadier began to sink with a trim to the stern.

Japanese ships surrounded the submarine. The entire team was captured. Despite being held captive by the Japanese for a long time and being subjected to severe torture, all but four of the crew survived and were released from Japanese prison camps after the war.

Fights without a break

The loss of three submarines in St. George's Channel in the spring of 1943 showed that the waters extending south of Rabaul Island were dangerous. Submariners returning from the area with stories of violent clashes and sustained depth charge attacks confirmed earlier indications that the enemy had launched a fierce anti-submarine warfare in the Rabaul area. In view of the increasing losses, the commander of the submarine force in Brisbane (which by that time was called Task Force 72) ordered the boat commanders to keep a considerable distance from dangerous areas. Day trips on the surface in the Solomon Islands region of the Bismarck Archipelago near the equator were prohibited, and the use of radar was limited, because it became known that shore and ship radio direction finders could detect and, apparently, find a boat within a radius of up to 150 miles. Such restrictions applied mainly to submarines conducting active reconnaissance in conditions of excellent visibility, when they could be detected by enemy aircraft.

Precautionary measures did not mean easing pressure on the islands of New Britain and Bougainville. As losses were reported, the submarines of Task Force 72 continued to fight, intensifying their efforts to disrupt Japanese communications, conduct reconnaissance, and carry out special missions in the South Seas. The war continued. The tension was growing.

The submarine "Gajen" made a trip to the island of Negros (Philippines), where on January 14 it unloaded 1 ton of various equipment and landed six Filipinos and one European - Major Villamora.

The submarine Grinling, commanded by Lieutenant Commander Bruten, completed a reconnaissance mission in the area of ​​the Admiralty Islands and made a trip to the east coast of the island of New Britain, where on February 2 it landed a group of intelligence agents. On February 10, the submarine Grouper, under the command of Lieutenant Commander McGregor, evacuated the pilot from Rengi Island.

At the same time, the submarine Gudgeon evacuated 28 refugees from the southern coast of Timor. Further to the west, the submarine Thresher operated under the command of Lieutenant Commander Milliken, which carried out a reconnaissance mission in the area of ​​Christmas Island. Similar missions were carried out by many submarines from Brisbane and Fremantle at a time when the battle for the South West Pacific was at its height.

On February 20, the submarine Albacore, commanded by Lieutenant Commander Lake, sank the Japanese destroyer Osio in the Admiralty Islands area. On April 3, the submarine Totog, under the command of Lieutenant Commander Siglaf, intercepted the destroyer Peonami in the area of ​​Boston Island and sank it with three torpedoes, and after some time sank the cargo ship Penang Maru (5214 tons).

When the “anti-submarine storm” raged in the area of ​​​​the Bismarck Archipelago and the Solomon Islands in February, March and April, the roar from the explosions of Japanese depth charges could not drown out the thunder of exploding American torpedoes. On February 19, the submarine Getou, commanded by Lieutenant Commander Foley, in cooperation with naval aviation aircraft based at coastal airfields in the area of ​​Bougainville Island, sank the cargo ship Hibari Maru (6550 tons). In the waters north of the Bismarck Archipelago, in mid-April, the submarine Drum, under the command of Lieutenant Commander McMahon, sank the cargo ships Oyama Maru and Nisshun Maru with a total displacement of about 10,000 tons.

In the area of ​​the Admiralty Islands on the western approaches to the Bismarck Archipelago, submarines continued to sink Japanese cargo ships. The submarine "Trigger", operating in the area of ​​the Admiralty Islands, sank the cargo ship "Momoha Maru" (3000 tons) on March 15. The commander of the Trigger was Lieutenant Commander Benson. In the same area, the submarine Tuna, part of the 72nd formation, sank the cargo ship Kurohime Maru (4697 tons) on March 30. The submarine was commanded by Lieutenant Commander Goltz. In other areas of the southwestern Pacific, combat operations to wear out the Japanese merchant fleet also developed successfully. Operating in the Sea of ​​Japan, the submarine Trout, under the command of Lieutenant Commander Ramed, destroyed the gunboat Hirotama Maru with a displacement of 1911 tons on February 14. The submarine Thresher in the same area sank the cargo ship Kuwayama Maru on February 21 and March 2 - tanker Goen Maru (10,900 tons), which disrupted Japan’s supply through the Java Sea.

One of the submarines that distinguished itself in action in the southwest Pacific this spring was the USS Gudgeon. Under the command of Lieutenant Commander Poust, the boat sailed from Fremantle on a military voyage to the “great East Asian sphere of mutual prosperity.” The boat's seventh combat campaign lasted only three weeks. During this short voyage, the Gajen sank one cargo ship, one oil tanker and damaged two cargo ships in the Java Sea, and Tsri, while retreating, fired at an enemy anti-submarine ship from her guns. The cargo ship Meigen Maru (5434 tons) sank on March 22 off the coast of Java.

The battle with the anti-submarine ship took place near the island of Great Masa-lembo. The enemy ship was moving at a speed of 15 knots. The boat commander decided to approach, hoping to sink it with artillery fire from a three-inch cannon. But when the distance was reduced to 1700 m, the enemy turned sharply to the right with the expectation of counterattacking the submarine. When the distance was reduced to 1650 m, the boat commander fired four torpedoes at the enemy ship, but they did not hit the target. However, the salvo forced the enemy to deviate from the course, which gave the boat commander the opportunity to take the initiative into his own hands. Since the enemy turned and was approaching again, the boat’s gunners prepared to fire. The Japanese responded to shots from a three-inch cannon with cannon and machine gun fire. “Our fourth shot,” reported the boat commander, “suppressed the fire of a Japanese 37-mm twin artillery mount.”

A twin-engine Japanese bomber appeared at the sound of gunfire. The commander ordered the dive, anticipating that the plane would drop depth charges. But the Java Sea remained calm. Four hours later, the boat surfaced and headed north towards the Makassar Strait. On March 29, the tanker Toho Maru (9997 tons) was discovered halfway between the islands of Borneo and Celebes. The tanker also discovered the submarine and opened fire...

The first shells did not reach the boat by about 45 m. Three torpedoes were fired from the boat at the tanker. Two explosions followed, the tanker was covered in thick smoke, and it began to sink. To finish it off quickly, the commander fired another torpedo, which also hit the target, but the ship stubbornly stayed on the water, and his gunners continued to fire at the boat. We had to fire a fifth torpedo to finish off the victim.

The sinking of the Toho Maru was a significant loss for the Japanese.

A few hours later, Gudgeon discovered and torpedoed another Japanese tanker, which was damaged.

During its next passage - from Fremantle to Pearl Harbor - the submarine Gudgeon discovered and sank a large Japanese liner, inflicting significant losses on the Japanese transport fleet.

The boat was returning to Pearl Harbor through the Philippine Islands area, where it surveyed the Sulu Sea between the islands of Negros and Palawan. At the end of April 27, she crossed the dark, stormy waters of the sea. The commander was about to write in the logbook that the day ended without significant incidents, when suddenly at 11 p.m. 45 min. the silhouette of a ship appeared in the light of lightning. It was an ocean liner traveling at high speed without an escort. It was not difficult to guess that he had troops on board. The boat commander decided to catch up with this fast transport, relying on the power of the boat's four diesel engines. The pursuit lasted a little over an hour, and when the distance was somewhat reduced, it turned out that it was most advisable to attack the liner from its stern corners.

At 1 o'clock. 4 min. On April 28, a salvo of four torpedoes was fired. Three explosions shook the air, the light of flashes tore through the darkness of the night. The stern of the huge liner settled into the water. The submarine dived to periscope depth and headed towards the liner with the aim of firing an additional salvo. Then, watching through the periscope, the boat commander saw that the bow of the ship began to rise above the water; the silhouette of the ship disappeared from the periscope's field of view, and then another explosion followed, a column of water rose high into the sky, and nothing more was visible on the radar screen. This was one of the classic cases of a successful attack. Only 12 minutes had passed since the torpedo salvo. A large amount of debris and lifeboats were visible on the surface of the water, picking up people floating in the water. So the Gajen sank one of Japan’s largest transports, the Kamakura Maru (17,526 tons), converted from the former passenger liner Chichibu Maru. Some time later, the boat intercepted a Japanese trawler in the Sulu Sea and sank it with artillery fire. During the same military campaign, the boat sank the cargo ship Sumatra Maru (5862 tons) on May 12. Thus, in more than two months, the Gudgeon submarine destroyed 38,819 tons of Japanese merchant tonnage.

For the reasons mentioned earlier, the enemy was unable to continue the offensive anti-submarine operations launched in the Rabaul area in the first quarter of 1943. Japanese anti-submarine warfare was as unsuccessful as the attempt to cope with the problem of supply and transportation. The shortcomings of the Japanese anti-submarine defense system are clearly visible in the death of the Kamakura Maru, which was sailing without an escort. While the Japanese naval command was moving anti-submarine forces to the front line, American submarines attacked weakened sectors behind the front line. The concentration of escort ships in one area left the sea communications of another area unprotected. The submarine Gudgeon's raid west of the Solomon Islands could provide another lesson for Japanese anti-submarine forces.

In early April 1943, a flight of Japanese bombers attacked Allied ships near the island of Guadalcanal. Bombers sank a New Zealand corvette, a tanker and the destroyer Aaron Ward. Army fighters from Henderson Airfield then headed to Bougainville Island to attack the Japanese. In addition, the Allies knew in advance that Admiral Yamamoto and his staff officers were flying on one of the planes to Bougainville. The admiral's plane was attacked and the admiral was killed as the plane was landing. Even if this had not happened, he would have arrived too late to change the position of Japanese forces in the South Seas. By April, the front in the Upper Solomon Islands area began to disintegrate. American aviation shifted the focus of its attack to the Bismarck Archipelago area. The command of the American submarine forces has already withdrawn some of the boats from the southern regions of the Pacific Ocean, in a northwest direction, that is, to Japan.

A source from the Izvestia newspaper from the Ministry of Defense said that Russia is creating a satellite surveillance system for submarines and deep-sea vehicles, which should significantly increase the country’s defense capability. The lead developer is the Kometa Special Purpose Space Systems Corporation, part of the Almaz-Antey concern. Dozens of Russian enterprises are taking part in the grandiose project.

Development work should be completed next year. And after approval of its results, the deployment of the system will begin.

It would seem that this should have been done much earlier. After all, everything is perfectly visible from space - the view is unlimited. After all, the Legend naval space reconnaissance and target designation system was put into service back in 1978. It was capable of tracking the entire waters of the World Ocean, monitoring the position of enemy surface ships and transmitting to the means of suppression and destruction the exact coordinates, direction and speed of movement of targets. After the “Legend” exhausted its resource, it was replaced by the “Liana” system, capable of detecting meter-sized objects, determining their coordinates with an accuracy of up to three meters.

However, the Legends and Liana satellites find marine objects using the radio reconnaissance method, that is, using radar. Like active, when a radar sends radio waves to an object, and they are reflected and return to it. So is passive, when radio waves emitted by an object are received. This is impossible with submarines because water can only transmit long radio waves; anything in the shorter ranges is attenuated in water.

There are several methods for detecting submarines, differing in effectiveness. At the moment, the most effective is hydroacoustic. Acoustic wave sensors - sonars - are located in the water, which allow you to “hear” the noises made by the boat. In principle, in terms of the mechanism of interaction with an object, this is very similar to radar. There is passive sonar. In this case, the sonar “listens” to the sea. This method is good because you can detect a submarine at a great distance - up to 200-300 kilometers. At the same time, the type of boat can be recognized by the nature of the noise - each of them has its own “acoustic portrait”. However, the distance to the object cannot be determined this way.

The distance is determined using active sonar or echo location. The principle here is similar to radar: the sonar emits waves, which, reflected from the hull of the boat, return to the receiver. This method has two disadvantages. Firstly, the boat itself picks up the sent waves, and in accordance with this, its crew changes the movement parameters. Secondly, the detection range with the active method is significantly less than with the passive one.

Among other methods of detecting submarines, it is practical to measure, using magnetometers, the magnetic fields that are distorted by a massive submarine. This method is used by anti-submarine aircraft and helicopters patrolling the water area. However, if the boat hull is made of non-magnetic titanium, then this method does not work.

But the most effective work of anti-submarine aircraft lies in the placement and periodic “interrogation” of sonar buoys, which report the appearance of foreign submarines in the region, and then transmit their coordinates to anti-submarine ships or independently destroy targets using depth charges and torpedoes.

The project, which is being implemented by the Kometa concern, involves delegating the interrogation and communication functions of anti-submarine aircraft to a satellite system. It is the satellites that will collect information from a permanent network of sonar buoys and transmit it for processing, analysis and target designation to ground control centers. It is these centers that will be the core of the system. Their creation cannot entail significant technical and technological complexity. In essence, this is a main supercomputer with powerful and reliable programs, connected in a single chain with peripheral computers on combat duty. Creating the necessary programs for accurate target localization using data obtained from hundreds of sonar sensors is, of course, a labor-intensive task. But they are created on the basis of well-known mathematical methods.

Of course, both coastal and sea-based communication networks between ground centers and the satellite system must be created on ships. And this is also not such a “Newton binomial”.

Izvestia’s source, citing the strict secrecy of the project, nevertheless points to the most complex sector of development. He is marine. It is necessary to create a huge network of buoys equipped with submersible sonars and fixed on the shallow shelf with anchors. They must control a section of the Russian maritime border several hundred kilometers long. Presumably the network will be located in the Arctic region. Most likely - in the Barents Sea, on the approaches to the main bases of the Northern Fleet.

The problem is that this network remains operational for a long time. We are talking, perhaps, about tens of years. Moreover, each buoy must be continuously supplied with electricity all this time, which is necessary both for the operation of active sonar sensors and for communication with satellites. Will this be a new type of energy source? Or is it supposed to periodically recharge the network, which is very difficult? This is not yet known to the general public.

The Americans solved this problem, as they say, head-on. The US Navy began building its SOSUS (SOund SUrveillance System) anti-submarine defense network in the early 50s to warn of the approach of Soviet nuclear submarines to the US coast. That is, proactively, since the Soviet Union, in fact, did not yet have a nuclear submarine fleet. SOSUS acquired its final form in the 60s. At the same time, the geography of the system expanded due to the construction of a border along the line Greenland - Iceland - Faroe Islands - Great Britain.

The American passive acoustic direction finding system is a network of numerous hydrophones strung together in groups on 300-meter receiving antennas of acoustic vibrations. Signals from hydrophones are transmitted via underwater cables to the shore, to signal processing centers. The cables also supply the system with electricity.

SOSUS is made, as they say, to last. And this is her weakness. The network was an effective way to combat first and second generation submarines. When third-generation boats with significantly reduced noise entered the USSR Navy, their detection and identification became very difficult. That is, the network turned out to have a “too large mesh.” This is due to the inconsistency of the characteristics of sonars with modern requirements, and to the insufficient density of their placement, and to the imperfection of methods for mathematical processing of information taken from the network. One good thing about the system is that it operates automatically and does not require the involvement of operators.

In 1990, a third generation boat detection system was tested in the Norwegian Sea. The result was disastrous: SOSUS determined the estimated coordinates of the boat as “somewhere in an ellipse with axes of 216 and 90 kilometers.” Undoubtedly, the search for fourth-generation boats will turn into a rather pointless exercise for SOSUS.

At the moment, the Americans are keeping this system afloat because dismantling it would be too expensive. In the future, the US Navy plans to completely abandon static passive acoustic detection fields and move to a dynamic system that will deploy “in the right place at the right time.” This is the so-called underwater lighting system (SOIS). It is a system of acoustic emitters that create constant illumination of underwater objects. And a system of receivers - sonars. That is, in a given region, after the deployment of FOSS, quite effective active acoustic direction finding begins to work.

It must be said that the concept of FOSS arose shortly after the end of the Cold War, when the United States realized that there was no one else to defend against. And, therefore, it is necessary to have undivided dominion over all four oceans. However, the situation is changing. And it is being changed not only by the developing Russian fleet, but also by the rapidly rushing forward Chinese fleet. By 2030, China's submarine fleet could grow to three hundred submarines. So the concept of undividedness begins to rapidly dry out. It’s time for the Pentagon to remember that it is necessary to protect at least the US coastline. Which is becoming an increasingly complex problem for Americans.

And in conclusion, it must be said: I want to believe that the creators of the Russian satellite anti-submarine system will not step on the same rake as the Americans. That is, the system will not only be passive, but will also gain active bearing capabilities. It is possible that other detection methods will be integrated into it.

A little history

The First World War was going on. On September 22, 1914, 3 British armored cruisers Hogue, Aboukir and Crecy carried out patrol duty in the southern part of the North Sea. Having strong artillery and strong armor protection, they could successfully engage in battle with any large enemy ship. But the sea horizon was clear. It seemed that nothing threatened the safety of the English squadron.
And suddenly, unexpectedly, a deafening explosion was heard near the side of Abukir. The ship settled on its stern, capsized and sank. Surviving people were floating on the surface of the water.
The cruiser Hog hurried to the scene of the disaster to help. The cruiser commander ordered the vehicles to be stopped and the boats lowered. At this time, the submarine's periscope was noticed from the ship. Only now did the commander realize what a mistake he had made by stopping the vehicles. But it was already too late. There were 2 new explosions. Hog's stern rose upward, the ship broke in half and, following Abukir, sank. The same fate befell Cressy.
1,135 British sailors and officers died. And all this was done by torpedoes from a submarine with a displacement of 500 tons and a crew of 28 people. The news of the death of British ships and the sensational success of the German submarine U-9 spread throughout the world. It became clear that a new class of warships had emerged at sea to be reckoned with.
During the First World War, submarines sank 6 thousand merchant ships and 200 warships with a total displacement of more than 13 million. tons But the submariners also suffered. The number of destroyed boats grew exponentially every year of the war. If in the first 2 years of the war the average monthly rate of boat deaths did not exceed 1-2, then in 1918 7-8 boats were destroyed per month. And this is the merit of the anti-submarine defense (ASD) forces and means that have emerged and received rapid development.
To fight the German submarines, the Allies sent hundreds of destroyers and thousands of auxiliary ships, airplanes and airships, and came up with decoy ships. Tens of thousands of anti-submarine mines were deployed in naval theaters of war. Hydroacoustic devices were invented to detect boats, and depth charges were invented to destroy them. Merchant ships bristled with guns. In English
The ships were equipped with 13 thousand small and medium caliber guns. 65,000 naval sailors were transferred to the merchant fleet.
A new type of ship has appeared in the fleet - a submarine hunter (fighter), armed with artillery and depth charges. When crossing the sea, merchant ships began to be guarded by warships and to travel as part of convoys.
The measures taken allowed the Allies to send 185 German submarines to the bottom during the First World War.

First steps of PLO

It can be said quite definitely that most of the ships that sank during the First World War sank as a result of the actions of submarines.
In Russia, the first truly combat-ready submarine appeared from 1902-1905, in France around 1901, in England around 1902 and
Germany in 1905-1907. From the very beginning of the war, as soon as German submarines began their activities, scientists from the Allied countries began to find ways to know in advance about the approach of a submarine. Various microphones were placed underwater to pick up the noise of boat propellers, but the effect was negligible. A similar noise was also created by a motor boat, a destroyer, a cruiser, a battleship and a commercial steamer. The movement of sea water also created a lot of noise, from which it was almost impossible to single out the one created by the submarine.
Success came when the American engineer William Dubilier, known for his improvements in the telegraph and wireless telephone, together with the French academician Tissot, set about solving this problem. Dubillier and Tissot were able to discover that submarines create sound waves of higher frequency than other sources of noise. Now all that remained was to exclude all extraneous sounds except those made by the boat and determine the direction and distance to it. After several months of intense search, such a device was created.
During the experiments, the location of the submarine was determined at a distance of up to 80 kilometers, but due to the high sensitivity, it was not possible to install this device on ships. A large number of stations equipped with a similar device were hastily installed on the coasts of England and France. Each station was equipped with fast boats and destroyers. The boats had a shallow draft and were not afraid of any mines. As soon as an enemy boat appeared within the reach of the station, boats were sent there to drive away or sink the enemy boat.

Naval battles of the Second World War.

The Second World War continued the deadly battle between the submarine and the submarine. The boats sank deeper and deeper. If in 1914 the maximum diving depth barely reached 30 meters, by 1918 it increased to 80 meters, and during the Second World War, submarines already sailed at depths of 200-250 m.
Their tactics have also changed. From free hunting and solo cruising, boats are moving to group activities. German submarines attacked merchant ships in “wolf packs.” Up to a dozen or more submarines simultaneously bit into the security convoy, tearing it apart.
Shipbuilders gave submariners a number of important inventions. One of them is a snorkel - a retractable vertical shaft for intake of air by engines and emission of exhaust gases. Using a snorkel (in the Soviet navy this device is called RDP - diesel operation under water), the boat could move in a submerged position under diesel engines, charge the battery
battery. At the same time, there was a barely noticeable snorkel head on the surface of the water. An acoustic torpedo has been created. Released from the boat, it inevitably rushed towards the noise of the propellers of the attacked ship.
The total number of boats also grew. In 1914-1918, there were 400 boats in the German submarine fleet; during the Second World War they were
about 1,200 boats were built. Allied losses grew from year to year. In 1940 they lost 587 ships (under the British flag), in 1941 about 700, and by 1942 the losses exceeded 1,160 ships. The results of unrestricted submarine warfare horrified the Allies. On June 19, 1942, American General D. Marshall writes to Admiral King: “The losses caused by submarines off the Atlantic and in the Caribbean Sea threaten to nullify all our war efforts. I fear that if this situation continues for another month or two, our transport means will not be able to deliver enough people and aircraft to the most important military theaters to have a decisive influence on the course of military operations.
And yet, the “Battle of the Atlantic,” as bourgeois historians like to call the battle between the German submarine fleet and the Allied submarines, was won by the Allies. The defeat of the Nazi troops on the Soviet-German front played a decisive role in this.
However, the scale of the Allied anti-submarine activities was truly enormous. The rate of build-up of anti-aircraft defense forces and equipment was several times higher than the rate of construction of German submarines. And although 1942 turned out to be the most productive year for the Dennitsa submarine fleet (1038 ships with a total displacement of 5.5 million tons were sunk), this success was accompanied by large losses
boats. Against 100 German boats operating simultaneously at sea, the British and Americans concentrated 3 thousand ships and 2,700 aircraft in 1943. Almost all surface ships have sonars installed, allowing them to detect a submerged boat at a distance of 2-4 kilometers. In addition to depth charges and bomb launchers, ships began to use multi-barrel rocket launchers. The radar finally drove the boat under water. The darkness of the night could no longer safely provide the crew with fresh air, provide the opportunity to ventilate the compartments, or charge the battery. Airplanes equipped with radar units suddenly appeared above the surfaced boats and destroyed them with bombs. Radio intelligence and an agent network worked in the interests of the PLO.
As a countermeasure against acoustic torpedoes it was used
Foxer (translated from English as fox, deceiver), towed behind the stern of the ship and attracting these torpedoes with powerful artificial noise. Merchant ships no longer sailed alone. During the passage by sea, they followed with strong security, warships maneuvered in an anti-submarine zigzag. To search and destroy boats, search and strike groups of ships (SUG) were created, which hunted for boats, not limiting themselves to just escorting convoys.
The boat destruction curve was inexorably rising. In 1939-1941
years, the Germans lost 2 boats every month, in 1942 - 7, in 1943 - 16, in 1944 - 20 (this year the Germans built 292 and lost 237 boats).
Submarines won where there was no strong anti-aircraft defense. American military historians extol the successes of the “sea devils,” as they call their submariners, in the Pacific. Indeed, US submarines, having fired 14,730 torpedoes, sent 1,152 Japanese ships to the bottom. But for some reason these historians forget to say that, in fact, the Japanese did not have anti-submarine defense. Their shipping during war was carried out in the same way as in peacetime. Due to the lack of escort ships, merchant ships in most cases made passages on their own. The beginnings of convoy service appeared among the Japanese only towards the end of 1943. American submariners attacked Japanese ships and warships with impunity, often attacking from the surface with
widespread use of radar, knowing that the Japanese fleet was hopelessly behind in the development of submarine detection equipment.
During the war, the Soviet Navy managed to effectively protect its sea communications. So Red Banner Northern
The fleet, which did not include battleships and cruisers, successfully covered the sea routes to our northern ports. Of the 778 transports traveling in 41 convoys, only 60 ships did not reach Murmansk and Arkhangelsk. 36 convoys crossed from our ports to the west, in which only 22 ships out of 707 transports were lost.
Light surface forces of the Northern Fleet guarded convoys of ships, searched for and destroyed boats in areas of their likely attacks on
transport. The USSR Navy made an outstanding contribution to the defeat of Nazi Germany. During the Great Patriotic War, Soviet sailors disabled about 1,250 enemy warships and more than 1,300 transport ships with a total displacement of 3 million tons. Fleet aviation and air defense destroyed more than 6,000 aircraft.

Nuclear boat

In the post-war period, a nuclear submarine was created. This event opened a new stage in the boat and PLO competition. Thanks to an almost inexhaustible supply of energy, the boat with a nuclear power plant has turned into a truly underwater ship, and not a ship that sinks, as before. The speed of the nuclear submarine has equaled and exceeded the speed of the best surface ships. It can remain underwater for several months without being replenished.
Nowadays, underwater autonomy is limited only by the endurance of the crew. As reported in the foreign press, the immersion depth
modern submarines exceeded 300m. Boats are being built that can dive to 900m. Experienced boats, or rather underwater projectiles, dive to 2000 meters. The boats have come into service with ballistic missiles, which defines a new area of ​​their application.
The exceptionally high combat qualities of nuclear boats, the great destructive power and relative invulnerability of ballistic missiles with nuclear warheads pose a new problem for anti-aircraft defense. This defense becomes of utmost importance. According to modern views, what forces and means will be used to fight the nuclear submarine?

Old opponents.

Foreign military experts believe that surface ships remain the traditional, ageless carriers of anti-submarine weapons, although their importance has fallen somewhat. It became too tough for a single ship to fight a nuclear submarine. In the last war, surface ships, which were actually helped by aviation, accounted for 4/5 of all destroyed boats. It is believed that it is increasingly difficult for a modern surface ship to compete with a nuclear submarine in speed and cruising range, regardless of weather conditions and the performance of hydroacoustic equipment. And there’s no need to talk about stealth: a surface ship at sea is clearly visible, while a boat is covered by thick water. And yet, naval experts believe that the surface ship will still be useful for anti-submarine defense. After the war, its characteristics improved significantly. The speed of surface ships could be increased even more, but due to the cavitation noise inherent in high speeds, hydroacoustic devices become ineffective. However, it is believed that hydrofoil or hovercraft could have
perspective in PLO. The speed of such ships reaches 100 km/h.
ASW ships are organized into search and strike groups, which inspect a large area of ​​the sea in a short time. Efficiency increases if ships interact with anti-submarine aircraft. In this case, the ship does not need to maintain direct hydroacoustic contact with the submarine. He uses his weapon, using target designation from an airplane or helicopter.
The key problem of PLO is detection and classification of targets. Surface ships are equipped with various means of detecting submarines. Among them, sonar equipment occupies a central place. Foreign low-frequency sound sonars installed on the latest ships make it possible to detect a boat in favorable conditions at a distance of 30-45 miles. Such a significant range of the sonar is achieved due to repeated reflection of acoustic energy from the seabed and the temperature jump layer. Without the use of bottom reflection, the range of the locator is 8-14 miles.
Depending on the placement of the antenna (vibrators or hydrophones), undercut, lowered and towed sonars are used. In the case of the keeled ones, the acoustic antenna is located permanently in the bottom of the ship. This is the most common type of locator. To reliably detect a boat under a layer of temperature jump, they resort to a non-stationary antenna, which can be lowered from the side of a ship (helicopter) to different depths. The towed sonar antenna stretches like a trail behind the stern of the ship, hundreds of meters away. The antenna recess is selected optimal from the point of view of hydrological conditions. As a rule, it is immersed under a layer of temperature jump. An antenna located far from the ship is almost unaffected by interference from propellers and operating ship machinery.
According to foreign press reports, some ships are equipped with noise direction finders in addition to sonars. Without emitting energy, they detect the boat by the noise of its propellers and determine the direction (bearing). However, the effectiveness of a direction finder largely depends on the ship's own noise level. After the boat is discovered, the attack begins.
The ships of many countries are armed with anti-submarine missile-torpedoes with a firing range of up to 25 km. The warhead of these torpedoes uses TNT or a nuclear warhead equivalent to 10-20 kt. A missile torpedo is fired in the direction of an underwater
boat, and then, on command from the ship, a torpedo equipped with a parachute is separated from it, which, upon entering the water, hovers at the boat. If the warhead of the rocket is a depth charge, it is not necessary to reduce its splashdown speed. The bomb sinks and explodes at a given depth. Anti-submarine torpedoes have an acoustic homing head in two planes - heading and depth. A wire-controlled torpedo is being developed, which, as the press claims, will not only be faster and less noisy, but also very deep-sea. The maximum diving depth of the torpedo will reach 1800m. If the distance to the boat is 2-6 km, then the anti-submarine ship can use rocket launchers. The charge of foreign bomb samples weighs 50-100 kg.
ASW ships of various classes and types are constantly being improved. Destroyers, patrol ships,
frigates, special anti-submarine ships. Much attention is paid to anti-submarine aircraft carriers. The Americans are even planning to build a nuclear aircraft carrier. Several dozen airplanes and helicopters are based on such a ship. The Soviet Navy has anti-submarine cruisers and helicopter carriers in service. Their main weapon is helicopters capable of searching and destroying
boat at any depth.

Aviation PLO

In operations against submarines, surface ships work closely with aviation, including those based at coastal airfields. To detect boats, airplanes and helicopters use sonar technology, magnetometric instruments, and radio sonobuoys. Magnetometers record changes in the earth's magnetic field due to the influence of the boat's mass. Their range is short - about 300m. The flight altitude of a helicopter or airplane when searching for a boat does not exceed 50m. Lowered or towed helicopter sonars can detect a boat at a considerable distance. When searching for a boat with a lowered sonar, the helicopter hovers at an altitude of several meters. Having listened to the horizon at one point, the helicopter raises the antenna (vibrator) and
flies to another position. With such leaps, it is possible to survey a large area in a short period of time. There is one more advantage of a helicopter over a ship: the boat will not hear it with its hydroacoustic means.
Radio sonobuoys include sonar and radio communication elements. A buoy dropped from an airplane or helicopter begins
examine the water column. The buoy automatically transmits information about a detected submarine based on noise or echo signals to the helicopter. Active buoys that emit acoustic energy transmit by radio the direction and distance to a detected submarine. For example, the AN SSQ-2 buoy in active mode allows you to detect a boat at a distance of 1.5-4.5 km. Duration of his work
15 hours, after which the buoy sinks. Passive combat has the advantage that it cannot be detected by a submarine. Radio sonobuoys can be used on convoy routes, at the entrances to harbors, in straits and other narrow places. As the foreign press reports, the possibility of setting up buoys in the open ocean and controlling them using artificial
satellites of the earth.
Among the aircraft weapons used to destroy submarines, the most powerful are atomic depth charges. Foreign samples of anti-submarine bombs have a charge equal to an average of 10 kt of TNT. However, military experts consider bombs to be an expensive weapon compared to other means and plan to use them when the location of the boat is determined with high accuracy. Aircraft mines are placed on anti-submarine lines and likely routes for boats. Torpedoes are a very common weapon used by anti-submarine aircraft and helicopters. To reduce the splashdown speed of torpedoes dropped from
airplanes use braking parachutes.
The high mobility of aircraft for searching and destroying submarines makes them an important element of anti-aircraft defense.

Boat vs boat

Despite the advantages of surface ships and aircraft as carriers of anti-submarine weapons, naval specialists are increasingly
are inclined to call the most formidable enemy of a nuclear submarine... a nuclear submarine, a special anti-submarine submarine or. As the Americans call it, attacking. By the way, the lost boat “Thresher” was just such a boat.
What attracts specialists to the nuclear submarine as an anti-aircraft defense force? The boat operates covertly until the moment of attack. She is able to swim in any area of ​​the ocean, including under Arctic ice. Of all the PLO forces, only the boat is in the same environment and the same conditions with the enemy boat. Its speed and autonomy allows it to pursue a target or remain in position for a long time. The nuclear attack submarines of the US Navy (their displacement exceeds 4000 tons) are armed with torpedoes. Having a speed of 35 knots, the attacking submarine easily catches up with the less mobile missile-carrying boat. The cruising ranges are enormous: without replenishing supplies, without surfacing, an anti-submarine submarine is capable of circumnavigating the globe twice.
The boats are very quiet. This has a beneficial effect on the operation of hydroacoustic devices. Hydroacoustic complex, which
Modern boats are equipped with PLO, allowing them to detect other boats at considerable distances. The detection range of one of the foreign samples under favorable conditions reaches 55 km. This complex provides a device for objective classification of targets. It should be said that the issue of classification has long occupied the minds of designers of sonar equipment. Too many false targets and signals can be mistaken by a sonar operator for a submarine.
To maintain stealth, anti-submarine boats use more passive mode - noise direction finding. However, in this case
The commander will only have a bearing on the target. The distance can be estimated very roughly, based on the expected range of the hydroacoustic system and in some other ways. The complex includes a computing and indicator unit that calculates the course and speed of a detected boat. This data enters the weapon control system.
In recent years, very effective anti-submarine weapons—missile-torpedoes—have been created for submarines. Americans widely
one of these boat-based missile torpedoes, the Sabrok, is advertised. The boat has up to 6 missile-torpedo firing devices. Conventional torpedoes can be fired from these same devices, since their dimensions are the same as sabroka. The missile firing range is 50-80 km. and exceeds the range of other types of anti-aircraft weapons. Not only missiles will be fired at the boat. Conventional torpedoes with
homing in 2 planes will still be quite useful. The range of some torpedoes reaches 20 km.

The boat is in danger everywhere.

Surface ships, aircraft and submarines are mobile maneuverable ASW forces. In the fight against boats, an important role is played by stationary or positional anti-submarine weapons. Their purpose is to detect a submarine on the distant approaches to the coast. A stationary hydroacoustic system consists of a network of noise direction-finding stations, the low-frequency hydrophones of which are installed within the continental shelf below the disturbed upper layers of water. Hydrophones are connected by cables to electronic equipment at shore posts. On shore, with the help of a computer, all incoming information is processed and the location of the detected object is determined. Such systems make it possible to detect boats hundreds of kilometers from the coast. In May 1968, with the help of the American Caesar hydroacoustic system, the approximate area of ​​the sinking of the Scorpio submarine was determined, 830 km southwest of the Azores. Active sonar stations can also be used in stationary complexes.
The principle of operation of the complex is as follows. The vibrator emits low-frequency acoustic signals, which are reflected from underwater objects and received by hydrophones in the form of echo signals. The latter convert acoustic signals into electrical signals, which are then transmitted via an undersea cable to a processing center. There, the signals are entered into a computer, which determines the coordinates of the detected underwater target. The sensitivity of the receiving system of one of the complexes of this type was sufficient to perceive the explosion of a 136-kilogram depth charge at a distance of 12,000 miles (off the coast of Australia).
Autonomous hydroacoustic stations operating as radio sonar buoys are placed at anti-submarine lines. Data
they transmit detections to a coastal post, aircraft or ship via radio channel. Buoy signals can be received by artificial earth satellites. Despite the fairly high reliability of boat detection by coastal hydroacoustic stations, it is believed abroad that low-noise missile submarines can launch missiles from positions outside the range of detection systems. Therefore, ways of long-range detection of submarines are being sought. For example, installing an autonomous hydroacoustic station at a depth of thousand meters away from the coast.
US military strategists believe that in the 70s the navy will be the main branch of the armed forces. For 1972, the largest share of military appropriations is allocated to the Navy. An important place in this is given to nuclear missile boats as the main strike force. The US Navy has more than 40 submarines armed with Polaris and Poseidon ballistic missiles.

The PLO of the Soviet Navy is constantly being improved and is in constant combat readiness so that at any
take a minute to deflect a shot from deep.

Which in its modern form appeared at the beginning of the 20th century, revolutionized naval weapons. The fight against enemy submarines has become one of the most important tasks of military fleets.

The first submarine of the modern type is considered to be the submarine "Holland", which was adopted by the US Navy in 1900. The "Holland" was the first to combine an internal combustion engine with an electric motor, which was powered by batteries and intended for underwater propulsion.

In the years before the outbreak of the First World War, boats similar to the Holland were adopted by all leading naval powers. They were assigned two tasks:

• coastal defense, mine laying, breaking the blockade of the coast by superior enemy forces;
• interaction with the surface forces of the fleet. One of the proposed tactics for such interaction was to lure enemy line forces to the boats lying in ambush.

1914-1918. World War I

Neither of the two tasks assigned to submarines (breaking the blockade and interaction with surface forces) was completed in the First World War. The close blockade gave way to a distant blockade, which turned out to be no less effective; and the interaction of submarines with surface forces was difficult due to the low speed of the boats and the lack of acceptable means of communication.

However, submarines became a serious force, excelling as commercial raiders.

Germany entered the war with only 24 submarines. In early 1915, she declared war on British commercial shipping, which became all-out in February 1917. During the year, Allied losses in merchant ships amounted to 5.5 million tons, which significantly exceeded the tonnage commissioned.

The British quickly found an effective remedy against the underwater threat. They introduced escorted convoys for trade transport. Convoying made it very difficult to search for ships in the ocean, since it is no easier to detect a group of ships than a single ship. The escort ships, not having any effective weapons against the boats, nevertheless forced the submarine to dive after the attack. Since the underwater speed and cruising range of the boat were significantly less than that of a merchant ship, the remaining ships afloat escaped from danger under their own power.

The submarines that operated in World War I were actually surface ships that submerged only to sneak attack or evade anti-submarine forces. When submerged, they lost much of their mobility and cruising range.

Due to the indicated technical limitations of submarines, German submariners developed special tactics for attacking convoys. Attacks were carried out most often at night from the surface, mainly by artillery fire. The boats attacked merchant ships, escaped from the escort ships underwater, then surfaced and again pursued the convoy. This tactic, having received its further development during the Second World War, became known as the “wolf pack” tactics.

The effectiveness of Germany's submarine warfare against Britain is due to three reasons:

• Germany was the first to widely introduce diesel instead of gasoline engines into the submarine fleet. Diesel significantly increased the cruising range of boats and allowed them to catch up with merchant ships on the surface.
• Germany systematically violated international laws that prohibited attacking merchant ships unless they were carrying military cargo. Until 1917, these laws were almost always followed for ships of third countries, but after the start of a total submarine war, everything that was in the field of view of German submariners was sunk.
• The escorted convoy tactic reduced the efficiency of commercial shipping because it forced ships to sit idle while the convoy formed. In addition, convoying diverted large numbers of warships needed for other purposes, so Britain did not always consistently pursue this tactic.

The decisive factor in the failure of unrestricted submarine warfare was the entry of the United States into the war.

1918-1939. Interwar period

The weakness of submarines of that time was that they spent most of the time on the surface and most often attacked the enemy from the surface. In this position, the boat was easily detected by radar.

Long-range bombers, hastily converted into anti-submarine aircraft and patrolling over the ocean for hours, could detect a surfaced submarine from a distance of 20-30 miles. The long flight range made it possible to cover most of the Atlantic with anti-submarine patrols. The inability for the boat to be on the surface near the convoy fundamentally undermined the tactics of the wolf packs. The boats were forced to go under water, losing mobility and communication with the coordinating center.

Anti-submarine patrols were carried out by radar-equipped B-24 Liberator bombers based in Newfoundland, Iceland and the North. Ireland.

Despite the victory won by the allied anti-submarine forces, it was achieved with great effort. Against 240 German boats (the maximum number reached in March 1943) were 875 escort ships with active sonars, 41 escort aircraft carriers and 300 base patrol aircraft. For comparison, in the First World War, 140 German boats were opposed by 200 surface escort ships.

1945-1991. Cold War

At the end of World War II, the battle with German submarines quickly turned into an underwater confrontation between the former allies - the USSR and the USA. In this confrontation, 4 stages can be distinguished according to the types of submarines that posed the most serious threat:

• Modifications of the German diesel-electric boat Type XXI;
• Fast deep-sea submarines;
• Low noise submarines.

For the USSR and the USA, these stages were shifted in time, since until very recently the USA was somewhat ahead of the USSR in improving its submarine fleet.

Other factors that influenced the balance of power between submarines and anti-submarine forces were also important:

• Submarine-launched cruise and ballistic missiles;
• Conventional and nuclear anti-ship missiles;
• Long-range nuclear ballistic missiles.

1945-1950. German boats type XXI

Modern boat SSK-78 "Rankin" of the Australian Navy at periscope depth under the RDP

AGSS-569 Albacore, the first submarine with a diving-optimized hull

Snorkel on the submarine U-3008

AN/SPS-20 radar mounted under the fuselage of a TBM-3 aircraft

SSK-1 Barracuda, the first anti-submarine submarine. A large BQR-4 acoustic array is mounted in the bow

At the end of World War II, Germany released a new type of submarine. These boats, known as the "Type XXI" had three design innovations aimed at radically changing submarine tactics towards underwater operations. These innovations were:

• high capacity batteries;
• hull shape aimed at increasing underwater speed;
• snorkel (RDP device), which allowed diesel engines to operate at periscope depth.

Type XXI boats undermined all elements of Allied anti-submarine weapons. The snorkel returned mobility to boats, making it possible to travel long distances using diesel and at the same time remain invisible to radar. The streamlined hull and large battery capacity allowed a fully submerged submarine to sail faster and further, breaking away from anti-submarine forces if detected. The use of packet radio transmission negated the capabilities of electronic intelligence.

After World War II, Type XXI boats fell into the hands of the USSR, USA and England. The study and development of underwater technologies created by Germany began. Very soon, both the USSR and the USA realized that a sufficiently large number of boats built using the “Type XXI” technology would nullify the anti-submarine defense system built during the Second World War.

Two measures have been proposed in response to the threat from Type XXI boats:

• Improving the sensitivity of radars to detect the top of the snorkel rising above the water;
• Creation of sensitive acoustic arrays capable of detecting a boat moving under the RDP at a great distance;
• Deployment of anti-submarine weapons on submarines.

By 1950, the American airborne radar APS-20 achieved a range of 15-20 miles for snorkel detection of a submarine. However, this range did not take into account the camouflage capabilities of the snorkel. In particular, giving the upper part of the snorkel a ribbed, multifaceted shape similar to modern “stealth” technologies.

A more radical measure to detect submarines was the use of passive acoustics. In 1948, M. Ewing and J. Lamar published data on the presence in the ocean of a deep-sea sound-conducting channel (SOFAR channel, SOund Fixing And Ranging), which concentrated all acoustic signals and allowed them to propagate practically without attenuation over distances of the order of thousands of miles.

In 1950, the United States began developing the SOSUS (SOund SUrveillance System) system, which was a network of hydrophone arrays located at the bottom that made it possible to listen to the noise of submarines using the SOFAR channel.

At the same time. In the USA, the development of anti-submarine submarines began under the Kayo project (1949). By 1952, three such boats were built - SSK-1, SSK-2 and SSK-3. Their key element was the large low-frequency hydroacoustic array BQR-4, mounted in the bow of the boats. During the tests, it was possible to detect a boat moving under the RDP by cavitation noise at a distance of about 30 miles.

1950-1960. The first nuclear boats and nuclear weapons

In 1949, the USSR conducted its first atomic bomb test. From this point on, both major Cold War rivals possessed nuclear weapons. Also in 1949, the United States began a program to develop a submarine with a nuclear power plant.

The atomic revolution in maritime affairs - the emergence of atomic weapons and nuclear submarines - posed new challenges for anti-submarine defense. Since a submarine is an excellent platform for deploying nuclear weapons, the problem of anti-submarine defense has become part of a more general problem - defense against nuclear attack.

In the late 1940s and early 1950s, both the USSR and the USA attempted to place nuclear weapons on submarines. In 1947, the US Navy successfully launched a V-1 cruise missile from a Gato-class diesel boat, Casque. Subsequently, the United States developed the Regulus nuclear cruise missile with a range of 700 km. The USSR conducted similar experiments in the 1950s. It was planned to arm the Project 613 (“Whiskey”) boats with cruise missiles, and the Project 611 (“Zulu”) boats with ballistic missiles.

The greater autonomy of nuclear submarines and the lack of the need to surface from time to time nullified the entire anti-aircraft defense system built to counter diesel submarines. Possessing high underwater speed, nuclear boats could evade torpedoes designed for a diesel boat traveling under the RDP at a speed of 8 knots and maneuvering in two dimensions. Active sonars of surface ships were also not designed for such speeds of the observed object.

However, the first generation nuclear boats had one significant drawback - they were too noisy. Unlike diesel boats, the nuclear one could not arbitrarily turn off the engine, so various mechanical devices (reactor cooling pumps, gearboxes) worked constantly and constantly emitted strong noise in the low-frequency range.

The concept of fighting first generation nuclear boats included:

• Creation of a global system for monitoring the underwater situation in the low-frequency range of the spectrum to determine the approximate coordinates of the submarine;
• Creation of a long-range anti-submarine patrol aircraft to search for nuclear submarines in a specified area; transition from radar methods of searching for submarines to the use of sonar buoys;
• Creation of low-noise anti-submarine submarines.

SOSUS system

The SOSUS (SOund SUrveillance System) system was created to warn of the approach of Soviet nuclear boats to the US coast. The first hydrophone test array was installed in 1951 in the Bahamas. By 1958, receiving stations were installed throughout the east and west coasts of the United States and the Hawaiian Islands. In 1959, the arrays were installed on the island. Newfoundland.

The SOSUS arrays consisted of hydrophones and undersea cables located inside a deep-sea acoustic channel. The cables ran ashore to naval stations where the signals were received and processed. To compare information received from stations and from other sources (for example, radio direction finding), special centers were created.

The acoustic arrays were linear antennas about 300 m long, consisting of many hydrophones. This antenna length ensured the reception of signals of all frequencies characteristic of submarines. The received signal was subjected to spectral analysis to identify discrete frequencies characteristic of various mechanical devices.

In those areas where the installation of stationary arrays was difficult, it was planned to create anti-submarine barriers using submarines equipped with passive hydroacoustic antennas. At first these were boats of the SSK type, then - the first low-noise nuclear boats of the Thrasher/Permit type. The barriers were supposed to be installed at the points where Soviet submarines left bases in Murmansk, Vladivostok and Petropavlovsk-Kamchatsky. These plans, however, were not implemented, since they required the construction of too many submarines in peacetime.

Attack submarines

In 1959, a new class of submarine appeared in the United States, which is now commonly called “multi-purpose nuclear submarines.” The characteristic features of the new class were:

• Nuclear power plant;
• Special measures to reduce noise;
• Anti-submarine capabilities, including a large passive sonar array and anti-submarine weapons.

This boat, called Thresher, became the model on which all subsequent US Navy boats were built. A key element of a multi-mission submarine is low noise, which is achieved by isolating all noisy mechanisms from the submarine's hull. All submarine mechanisms are installed on shock-absorbing platforms, which reduce the amplitude of vibrations transmitted to the hull and, consequently, the strength of sound passing into the water.

Thrasher was equipped with the BQR-7 passive acoustic array, the array of which was placed on top of the spherical surface of the BQS-6 active sonar, and together they constituted the first integrated sonar station, the BQQ-1.

Anti-submarine torpedoes

Anti-submarine torpedoes capable of hitting nuclear submarines became a separate problem. All previous torpedoes were designed for diesel boats traveling at low speed under the RDP and maneuvering in two dimensions. In general, the speed of the torpedo should be 1.5 times the speed of the target, otherwise the boat can evade the torpedo using the appropriate maneuver.

The first American submarine-launched homing torpedo, the Mk 27-4, entered service in 1949, had a speed of 16 knots and was effective if the target speed did not exceed 10 knots. In 1956, the 26-knot Mk 37 appeared. However, nuclear-powered boats had a speed of 25-30 knots, and this required 45-knot torpedoes, which did not appear until 1978 (Mk 48). Therefore, in the 1950s, there were only two ways to combat nuclear boats using torpedoes:

• Equip anti-submarine torpedoes with nuclear warheads;
• Taking advantage of the stealthiness of anti-submarine submarines, choose a position for attack that minimizes the likelihood of the target evading a torpedo.

Patrol aircraft and sonobuoys

Sonobuoys have become the main means of aircraft-based passive hydroacoustics. The practical use of buoys began in the early years of World War II. These were devices dropped from surface ships that warned the convoy of submarines approaching from behind. The buoy contained a hydrophone that picked up the noise of a submarine and a radio transmitter that transmitted a signal to a ship or carrier aircraft.

The first buoys could detect the presence of an underwater target and classify it, but could not determine the target's coordinates.

With the advent of the global SOSUS system, there was an urgent need to determine the coordinates of a nuclear boat located in a specified area of ​​the world ocean. Only anti-submarine aircraft could do this promptly. Thus, sonobuoys replaced radar as the main sensor for patrol aircraft.

One of the first sonobuoys was the SSQ-23. which was a float in the form of an elongated cylinder, from which a hydrophone was lowered on a cable to a certain depth, receiving an acoustic signal.

There were several types of buoys, differing in algorithms for processing acoustic information. The Jezebel algorithm could detect and classify a target through spectral analysis of noise, but did not say anything about the direction to the target and the distance to it. The Codar algorithm processed signals from a pair of buoys and calculated the coordinates of the source using the time delays of the signal. The Julie algorithm processed signals similarly to the Codar algorithm, but was based on active sonar, where explosions of small depth charges were used as a source of sonar signals.

Having detected the presence of a submarine in a given area using a Jezebel system buoy, the patrol aircraft deployed a network of several pairs of Julie system buoys and detonated a depth charge, the echo of which was recorded by the buoys. After localizing the boat using acoustic methods, the anti-submarine aircraft used a magnetic detector to clarify the coordinates, and then launched a homing torpedo.

The weak link in this chain was localization. The detection range using the wideband Codar and Julie algorithms was significantly less than that of the narrowband Jezebel algorithm. Very often, the Codar and Julie system buoys could not detect a boat detected by the Jezebel buoy.

1960-1980

see also

• Anti-submarine aircraft

Links

• Diagnosys technical support for the Department of Defense of the USA, Germany, England, France, India

Literature

• Military encyclopedia in 8 volumes / A. A. Grechko. - Moscow: Voenizdat, 1976. - T. 1. - 6381 p.
• Military encyclopedia in 8 volumes / A. A. Grechko. - Moscow: Voenizdat, 1976. - T. 6. - 671 p.

• Owen R. Cote The Third Battle: Innovation in the U.S. Navy's Silent Cold War Struggle with Soviet Submarines. - United States Government Printing Office, 2006. - 114 pp. - ISBN 0160769108, 9780160769108

US Navy in the postwar period
Aircraft carriers
Battleships
Cruisers and destroyer missile leaders
Destroyers
Frigates
Multi-purpose submarines
SSBN
Landing ships
Artillery
Rockets and missile systems
Launchers
Torpedoes
Radars	PL: AN/BPS-15/16 2D overview: AN/SPQ-9 AN/SPS-10 AN/SPS-29 AN/SPS-32 AN/SPS-37 AN/SPS-40 AN/SPS-43 AN/SPS-49 AN/SPS-55 AN/SPS-67 3D overview: AN/SPS-8 AN/SPS-26 AN/SPS-30 AN/SPS-33 AN/SPS-39 AN/SPS-42 AN/SPS-48 AN/SPS-52 Weapon Controls: AN/SPG-49 AN/SPG-51 AN/SPG-53 AN/SPG-55 AN/SPG-60 AN/SPG-62 Mk 23 Mk 95 Mk 115 Multifunctional: AN/SPG-59 AN/SPY-1 AN/SPY-2 AN/SPY-3 EW: AN/SLQ-32 Traffic control: AN/SPN-35 AN/SPN-41 AN/SPN-42 AN/SPN-43 AN/SPN-44 AN/SPN-45 AN/SPN-46 Navigational: AN/SPS-64 Other: AN/SPS-60 AN/SPS-73

Abstract on the topic:

Anti-submarine defense

Plan:

Introduction

1 1900-1914. Pre-war time 2 1914-1918. First World War 3 1918-1939. Interwar period 4 1939-1945. World War II 5 1945-1991. Cold War 6 1945-1950. German boats type XXI 7 1950-1960. The first nuclear boats and nuclear weapons
7.1 SOSUS system 7.2 Attack submarines 7.3 Anti-submarine torpedoes 7.4 Patrol aircraft and sonobuoys
8 1960-1980

Literature

Introduction

Escorts, armed with depth charges like the one that sank U-175 in this photo, were the most common means of anti-submarine defense in the first half of the 20th century.

Anti-submarine defense (PLO) or anti-submarine warfare- combat operations and special activities carried out by the fleet to search for and destroy submarines in order to prevent their attacks against ships, vessels and coastal objects, as well as their reconnaissance and mine laying. ASW is carried out both by naval ships and their carrier-based aircraft, and by coastal forces, primarily by coastal-based naval aviation. Anti-submarine defense includes actions to protect fleet bases and protect formations of warships, convoys and landing forces.

1. 1900-1914. Pre-war time

The submarine, which appeared in its modern form at the beginning of the 20th century, revolutionized naval weapons. The fight against enemy submarines has become one of the most important tasks of military fleets.

The first submarine of the modern type is considered to be the submarine "Holland", which was adopted by the US Navy in 1900. The "Holland" was the first to combine an internal combustion engine with an electric motor, which was powered by batteries and intended for underwater propulsion.

In the years before the outbreak of the First World War, boats similar to the Holland were adopted by all leading naval powers. They were assigned two tasks:

coastal defense, mine laying, breaking the blockade of the coast by superior enemy forces;

interaction with the surface forces of the fleet. One of the proposed tactics for such interaction was to lure enemy line forces to the boats lying in ambush.

2. 1914-1918. World War I

Neither of the two tasks assigned to submarines (breaking the blockade and interaction with surface forces) was completed in the First World War. The close blockade gave way to a distant blockade, which turned out to be no less effective; and the interaction of submarines with surface forces was difficult due to the low speed of the boats and the lack of acceptable means of communication.

However, submarines have become a serious force, excelling as commercial raiders.

Germany entered the war with only 24 submarines. In early 1915, she declared war on British commercial shipping, which became all-out in February 1917. During the year, Allied losses in merchant ships amounted to 5.5 million tons, which significantly exceeded the tonnage commissioned.

The British quickly found an effective remedy against the underwater threat. They introduced escorted convoys for trade transport. Convoying made it very difficult to search for ships in the ocean, since it is no easier to detect a group of ships than a single ship. The escort ships, not having any effective weapons against the boats, nevertheless forced the submarine to dive after the attack. Since the underwater speed and cruising range of the boat were significantly less than that of a merchant ship, the remaining ships afloat escaped from danger under their own power.

The submarines that operated in World War I were actually surface ships that submerged only to sneak attack or evade anti-submarine forces. When submerged, they lost much of their mobility and cruising range.

Due to the indicated technical limitations of submarines, German submariners developed special tactics for attacking convoys. Attacks were carried out most often at night from the surface, mainly by artillery fire. The boats attacked merchant ships, escaped from the escort ships underwater, then surfaced and again pursued the convoy. This tactic was further developed during the Second World War and became known as “wolf pack tactics.”

The effectiveness of Germany's submarine warfare against Britain is due to three reasons:

Germany was the first to widely introduce diesel instead of gasoline engines into the submarine fleet. Diesel significantly increased the cruising range of boats and allowed them to catch up with merchant ships on the surface.

Germany systematically violated international laws that prohibited attacking merchant ships unless they were carrying military cargo. Until 1917, these laws were almost always followed for ships of third countries, but after the start of a total submarine war, everything that was in the field of view of German submariners was sunk.

The escorted convoy tactic reduced the efficiency of commercial shipping because it forced ships to sit idle while the convoy formed. In addition, convoying diverted large numbers of warships needed for other purposes, so Britain did not always consistently pursue this tactic.

The decisive factor in the failure of unrestricted submarine warfare was the entry of the United States into the war.

3. 1918-1939. Interwar period

During the interwar period, submarines underwent a slow evolutionary development aimed at increasing their cruising range, autonomy, the number of torpedoes in a salvo and ammunition.

In Germany, the tactics of “wolf packs” were improved, the main theoretician of which was the German Admiral Doenitz. This tactic did not require radical changes in the design of submarines and therefore could easily be applied with existing technical capabilities. The advent of short-wave transceivers, which turned out to be an effective means of communication and control, had a great influence on the tactics of wolf packs. Shortwave radio, using small, low-power transmitters, made it possible to communicate over the horizon and transmit information about spotted convoys to a central command post, from where it was transmitted to other boats, creating opportunities for massive attacks involving dozens of boats. After the attack, the boats left the escort and overtook the convoy during the day on the surface in order to take up a position for the attack the next night. Thus, the attacks continued for several days.

The British Navy concentrated its interwar efforts on the First World War task of protecting convoys from single boats. As a result, the first active sonar was developed - ASDIC (Allied Submarine Detection Investigation Committee).

The use of hydroacoustic technology as an anti-submarine weapon was not a novelty in those years. During World War I, escort ships used hydrophones to detect submerged boats. The boats could be detected at a distance of several kilometers, but to do this it was necessary to stop and turn off their own engines. The disadvantage of passive sonar was also the inability to determine the distance to the target. Active sonar was devoid of these shortcomings and, together with depth charges, provided (as it was believed) an excellent weapon against submarines.

The creation of active sonar gave the British Navy confidence that it could effectively counter the German underwater threat. The events of the first years of the war showed that in the form in which sonar was created in the interwar period, it was practically useless.

4. 1939-1945. The Second World War

The Second World War in the Atlantic began the same way the first ended - with unlimited submarine warfare on the part of Germany. At the beginning of the war, Germany had 57 boats, of which only 27 were ocean-going (types VIII and IX). The tactics of the wolf packs began to bear fruit in full when the boats laid down before the war began to enter service.

There was a shortage of escort ships in Britain, which, since 1940, was exacerbated by the need to keep ships in the English Channel to counter a likely German invasion of the British Isles. Therefore, the convoy zone was limited to the immediate vicinity of Britain - the 15th meridian? h. d.

The first serious submarine battle took place in June-October 1940, when Britain lost 1.4 million tons of merchant tonnage. 30% of losses occurred on ships sailing as part of convoys. This showed that active sonar, designed to detect boats underwater, was virtually useless when the boat attacked from the surface at night.

In 1940, Germany gained bases in Norway and France, which, along with a rapidly increasing number of submarines, allowed the full use of wolf pack tactics. Despite the participation of Canada, which had been escorting transatlantic convoys since May 1941, British losses exceeded the newly introduced tonnage.

Only in the spring of 1943 were the Allies able to find effective means against the new tactics of German submarines. These funds included:

Patrolling of anti-submarine aircraft equipped with radars;

Electronic reconnaissance and radio interception in the HF and VHF bands;

New means of detecting and destroying boats (radars, magnetic anomaly sensors, sonar buoys, Mk 24 homing air torpedoes, ship HF antennas).

Among all these factors, the most significant was the anti-submarine aircraft armed with radar.

The weakness of submarines of that time was that they spent most of the time on the surface and most often attacked the enemy from the surface. In this position, the boat was easily detected by radar.

Long-range bombers, hastily converted into anti-submarine aircraft and patrolling over the ocean for hours, could detect a surfaced submarine from a distance of 20-30 miles. The long flight range made it possible to cover most of the Atlantic with anti-submarine patrols. The inability for the boat to be on the surface near the convoy fundamentally undermined the tactics of the wolf packs. The boats were forced to go under water, losing mobility and communication with the coordinating center.

Anti-submarine patrols were carried out by radar-equipped B-24 Liberator bombers based in Newfoundland, Iceland and the North. Ireland.

Despite the victory won by the allied anti-submarine forces, it was achieved with great effort. Against 240 German boats (the maximum number reached in March 1943) were 875 escort ships with active sonars, 41 escort aircraft carriers and 300 base patrol aircraft. For comparison, in the First World War, 140 German boats were opposed by 200 surface escort ships.

5. 1945-1991. Cold War

At the end of the Second World War, the battle with German submarines quickly turned into an underwater confrontation between the former allies - the USSR and the USA. In this confrontation, 4 stages can be distinguished according to the types of submarines that posed the most serious threat:

Modifications of the German diesel-electric boat type XXI;

First generation nuclear boats;

Fast deep-sea submarines;

Low noise submarines.

For the USSR and the USA, these stages were shifted in time, since until very recently the USA was somewhat ahead of the USSR in improving its submarine fleet.

Other factors that influenced the balance of power between submarines and anti-submarine forces were also important:

Nuclear weapon;

Submarine-launched cruise and ballistic missiles;

Conventional and nuclear anti-ship missiles;

Long-range nuclear ballistic missiles.

6. 1945-1950. German boats type XXI

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AGSS-569 Albacore, the first submarine with a diving-optimized hull

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AN/SPS-20 radar mounted under the fuselage of a TBM-3 aircraft

disc"> high-capacity batteries; hull shape aimed at increasing underwater speed; snorkel (RDP device), which allowed diesel engines to operate at periscope depth.

Type XXI boats undermined all elements of Allied anti-submarine weapons. The snorkel returned mobility to boats, making it possible to travel long distances using diesel and at the same time remain invisible to radar. The streamlined hull and large battery capacity allowed a fully submerged submarine to sail faster and further, breaking away from anti-submarine forces if detected. The use of packet radio transmission negated the capabilities of electronic intelligence.

After World War II, Type XXI boats fell into the hands of the USSR, USA and England. The study and development of underwater technologies created by Germany began. Very soon, both the USSR and the USA realized that a sufficiently large number of boats built using the “Type XXI” technology would nullify the anti-submarine defense system built during the Second World War.

Two measures have been proposed in response to the threat from Type XXI boats:

Improving the sensitivity of radars to detect the top of the snorkel rising above the water;

Creation of sensitive acoustic arrays capable of detecting a boat moving under the RDP at a great distance;

Deployment of anti-submarine weapons on submarines.

By 1950, the American airborne radar APS-20 achieved a range of 15-20 miles for snorkel detection of a submarine. However, this range did not take into account the camouflage capabilities of the snorkel. In particular, giving the upper part of the snorkel a ribbed, multifaceted shape similar to modern “stealth” technologies.

A more radical measure to detect submarines was the use of passive acoustics. In 1948, M. Ewing and J. Lamar published data on the presence in the ocean of a deep-sea sound-conducting channel (SOFAR channel, SOund Fixing And Ranging), which concentrated all acoustic signals and allowed them to propagate practically without attenuation over distances of the order of thousands of miles.

In 1950, the United States began developing the SOSUS (SOund SUrveillance System) system, which was a network of hydrophone arrays located at the bottom that made it possible to listen to the noise of submarines using the SOFAR channel.

At the same time. In the USA, the development of anti-submarine submarines began under the Kayo project (1949). By 1952, three such boats were built - SSK-1, SSK-2 and SSK-3. Their key element was the large low-frequency hydroacoustic array BQR-4, mounted in the bow of the boats. During the tests, it was possible to detect a boat moving under the RDP by cavitation noise at a distance of about 30 miles.

7. 1950-1960. The first nuclear boats and nuclear weapons

In 1949, the USSR conducted its first atomic bomb test. From this point on, both major Cold War rivals possessed nuclear weapons. Also in 1949, the United States began a program to develop a submarine with a nuclear power plant.

The atomic revolution in maritime affairs - the emergence of atomic weapons and nuclear submarines - posed new challenges for anti-submarine defense. Since a submarine is an excellent platform for deploying nuclear weapons, the problem of anti-submarine defense has become part of a more general problem - defense against nuclear attack.

In the late 1940s and early 1950s, both the USSR and the USA attempted to place nuclear weapons on submarines. In 1947, the US Navy successfully launched a V-1 cruise missile from a Gato-class diesel boat, Casque. Subsequently, the United States developed the Regulus nuclear cruise missile with a range of 700 km. The USSR conducted similar experiments in the 1950s. It was planned to arm the Project 613 (“Whiskey”) boats with cruise missiles, and the Project 611 (“Zulu”) boats with ballistic missiles.

The greater autonomy of nuclear submarines and the lack of the need to surface from time to time nullified the entire anti-aircraft defense system built to counter diesel submarines. Possessing high underwater speed, nuclear boats could evade torpedoes designed for a diesel boat traveling under the RDP at a speed of 8 knots and maneuvering in two dimensions. Active sonars of surface ships were also not designed for such speeds of the observed object.

However, the first generation nuclear boats had one significant drawback - they were too noisy. Unlike diesel boats, the nuclear one could not arbitrarily turn off the engine, so various mechanical devices (reactor cooling pumps, gearboxes) worked constantly and constantly emitted strong noise in the low-frequency range.

The concept of fighting first generation nuclear boats included:

Creation of a global system for monitoring the underwater situation in the low-frequency range of the spectrum to determine the approximate coordinates of the submarine; Creation of a long-range anti-submarine patrol aircraft to search for nuclear submarines in a specified area; transition from radar methods of searching for submarines to the use of sonar buoys; Creation of low-noise anti-submarine submarines.

7.1. SOSUS system

The SOSUS (SOund SUrveillance System) system was created to warn of the approach of Soviet nuclear boats to the US coast. The first hydrophone test array was installed in 1951 in the Bahamas. By 1958, receiving stations were installed throughout the east and west coasts of the United States and the Hawaiian Islands. In 1959, the arrays were installed on the island. Newfoundland.

The SOSUS arrays consisted of hydrophones and undersea cables located inside a deep-sea acoustic channel. The cables ran ashore to naval stations where the signals were received and processed. To compare information received from stations and from other sources (for example, radio direction finding), special centers were created.

The acoustic arrays were linear antennas about 300 m long, consisting of many hydrophones. This antenna length ensured the reception of signals of all frequencies characteristic of submarines. The received signal was subjected to spectral analysis to identify discrete frequencies characteristic of various mechanical devices.

In those areas where the installation of stationary arrays was difficult, it was planned to create anti-submarine barriers using submarines equipped with passive hydroacoustic antennas. At first these were boats of the SSK type, then - the first low-noise nuclear boats of the Thrasher/Permit type. The barriers were supposed to be installed at the points where Soviet submarines left bases in Murmansk, Vladivostok and Petropavlovsk-Kamchatsky. These plans, however, were not implemented, since they required the construction of too many submarines in peacetime.

7.2. Attack submarines

In 1959, a new class of submarine appeared in the United States, which is now commonly called “multi-purpose nuclear submarines.” The characteristic features of the new class were:

Nuclear power plant; Special measures to reduce noise; Anti-submarine capabilities, including a large passive sonar array and anti-submarine weapons.

This boat, called Thresher, became the model on which all subsequent US Navy boats were built. A key element of a multi-mission submarine is low noise, which is achieved by isolating all noisy mechanisms from the submarine's hull. All submarine mechanisms are installed on shock-absorbing platforms, which reduce the amplitude of vibrations transmitted to the hull and, consequently, the strength of sound passing into the water.

Thrasher was equipped with the BQR-7 passive acoustic array, the array of which was placed on top of the spherical surface of the BQS-6 active sonar, and together they constituted the first integrated sonar station, the BQQ-1.

7.3. Anti-submarine torpedoes

Anti-submarine torpedoes capable of hitting nuclear submarines became a separate problem. All previous torpedoes were designed for diesel boats traveling at low speed under the RDP and maneuvering in two dimensions. In general, the speed of the torpedo should be 1.5 times the speed of the target, otherwise the boat can evade the torpedo using the appropriate maneuver.

The first American submarine-launched homing torpedo, the Mk 27-4, entered service in 1949, had a speed of 16 knots and was effective if the target speed did not exceed 10 knots. In 1956, the 26-knot Mk 37 appeared. However, nuclear-powered boats had a speed of 25-30 knots, and this required 45-knot torpedoes, which did not appear until 1978 (Mk 48). Therefore, in the 1950s, there were only two ways to combat nuclear boats using torpedoes:

Equip anti-submarine torpedoes with nuclear warheads; Taking advantage of the stealthiness of anti-submarine submarines, choose a position for attack that minimizes the likelihood of the target evading a torpedo.

7.4. Patrol aircraft and sonobuoys

Sonobuoys have become the main means of aircraft-based passive hydroacoustics. The practical use of buoys began in the early years of World War II. These were devices dropped from surface ships that warned the convoy of submarines approaching from behind. The buoy contained a hydrophone that picked up the noise of a submarine and a radio transmitter that transmitted a signal to a ship or carrier aircraft.

The first buoys could detect the presence of an underwater target and classify it, but could not determine the target's coordinates.

With the advent of the global SOSUS system, there was an urgent need to determine the coordinates of a nuclear boat located in a specified area of ​​the world ocean. Only anti-submarine aircraft could do this promptly. Thus, sonobuoys replaced radar as the main sensor for patrol aircraft.

One of the first sonobuoys was the SSQ-23. which was a float in the form of an elongated cylinder, from which a hydrophone was lowered on a cable to a certain depth, receiving an acoustic signal.

There were several types of buoys, differing in algorithms for processing acoustic information. The Jezebel algorithm could detect and classify a target through spectral analysis of noise, but did not say anything about the direction to the target and the distance to it. The Codar algorithm processed signals from a pair of buoys and calculated the coordinates of the source using the time delays of the signal. The Julie algorithm processed signals similarly to the Codar algorithm, but was based on active sonar, where explosions of small depth charges were used as a source of sonar signals.

Having detected the presence of a submarine in a given area using a Jezebel system buoy, the patrol aircraft deployed a network of several pairs of Julie system buoys and detonated a depth charge, the echo of which was recorded by the buoys. After localizing the boat using acoustic methods, the anti-submarine aircraft used a magnetic detector to clarify the coordinates, and then launched a homing torpedo.

The weak link in this chain was localization. The detection range using the wideband Codar and Julie algorithms was significantly less than that of the narrowband Jezebel algorithm. Very often, the Codar and Julie system buoys could not detect a boat detected by the Jezebel buoy.

8. 1960-1980

Literature

Military encyclopedia in 8 volumes /. - Moscow: Voenizdat, 1976. - T. 1. - 6381 p. Military encyclopedia in 8 volumes /. - Moscow: Voenizdat, 1976. - T. 6. - 671 p.

Owen R. Cote The Third Battle: Innovation in the U.S. Navy's Silent Cold War Struggle with Soviet Submarines. - United States Government Printing Office, 2006. - 114 pp. - ISBN,