Analysis of the enormous, very complex historical figure of Kutuzov sometimes gets lost in the motley mass of facts depicting the war of 1812 as a whole. At the same time, Kutuzov’s figure, if not hidden at all, sometimes turns pale, his features seem to blur. Kutuzov was a Russian hero, a great patriot, a great commander, which is known to everyone, and a great diplomat, which is not known to everyone.

The identification of Kutuzov’s enormous personal merits was made difficult, first of all, by the fact that for a long time the entire war of 1812, from the moment the Russian army retreated from Borodino to its arrival in Tarutino, and then until its entry into Vilna in December 1812, was not considered as the implementation of a deep Kutuzov's plan - a plan for preparing and then implementing an uninterrupted counter-offensive, which led to the complete disintegration and final destruction of the Napoleonic army.

Now the historical merit of Kutuzov, who, against the will of the Tsar, against the will of even part of his staff, brushing aside the slanderous attacks of foreigners who interfered in his affairs like Wilson, Wolzogen, Winzengerode, carried out and implemented his idea, emerges especially clearly. Valuable new materials prompted Soviet historians dealing with 1812 to begin to identify their shortcomings and mistakes, omissions and inaccuracies, to revise previously established opinions about Kutuzov’s strategy, the significance of his counteroffensive, about Tarutin, Maloyaroslavets, Krasny, as well as about the beginning of the foreign campaign 1813, about which we know very little, which is the fault of almost all the literature about 1812, where only very few cursory remarks are devoted to this campaign. Meanwhile, the first four months of 1813 provide a lot for characterizing Kutuzov’s strategy and show how the counteroffensive turned into a direct offensive with the precisely set goal of destroying the aggressor and, subsequently, overthrowing the grandiose Napoleonic predatory “world monarchy.”

In the huge new (1946 and subsequent years) “Encyclopedia Britannica” we read the following about Kutuzov: “He fought the battle of Borodino and was defeated, but not decisively.” And then: “The old general’s cautious pursuit of the enemy caused a lot of criticism.” That's all. This assessment, especially its laconicism, vividly recalls the classic one and a half lines about Suvorov in one of the previous editions of the Small Encyclopedic Dictionary of Larousse: “Suvorov, Alexander. 1730-1800. Russian general, defeated by General Massena.” When and where? This is carefully not mentioned for a very obvious reason. This is all the French are supposed to know about Alexander Suvorov. It is said in no less detail about Kutuzov: “Kutuzov, Mikhail, Russian general, defeated at Moscow. 1745-1813.” That's all. To this should be added a remarkable review of Kutuzov, belonging to Academician. Louis Madeleine, who wrote in 1934 in the introductory article to the publication of Napoleon’s letters to Marie-Louise that after Borodin, Kutuzov “had the impudence (eut impudence) not to consider himself defeated.”

One very interesting observation should be noted. Foreign historians writing about 1812 in Russia use the method of defamation, malicious and dishonest criticism less and less often than the method of complete silence. Let's take the four-volume newest “History of Military Art within the Framework of Political History”, written by prof. Hans Delbrück. We are opening the fourth, weighty, dedicated to the 19th century. volume, especially the chapter “Napoleon's Strategy”. We are looking for the name Kutuzov in a very well compiled index, but we do not find it at all. About 1812, on page 386 we read: “The real problem of Napoleonic strategy is the campaign of 1812. Napoleon defeated the Russians at Borodino, took Moscow, was forced to retreat and during the retreat lost almost his entire army.” It turns out that if in Napoleon’s place the Privy Councilor Prof. G. Delbrück, Russia would have come to an end: “Wouldn’t Napoleon have acted better if in 1812 he had turned to the strategy of attrition and waged the war according to Frederick’s method?”

Kutuzov's intelligence and military prowess were recognized by both his comrades and superiors already in the first years of his military service, which he began at age 19. He fought in Rumyantsev’s troops, near Larga, near Cahul, and then with his unheard-of bravery he made people talk about him. He was the first to attack and the last to stop pursuing the enemy. At the end of the first Turkish war, he was dangerously wounded and only by some miracle (as both the Russian and German doctors who treated him believed) escaped with only the loss of an eye. Catherine ordered him to be sent at government expense for treatment abroad. This rather long trip played a role in his life. Kutuzov greedily pounced on reading and greatly expanded his education.

Returning to Russia, he came to the Empress to thank her. And then Catherine gave him an assignment that was unusually suited to his natural abilities: she sent him to Crimea to help Suvorov, who was then performing a task that was not very characteristic of him: conducting diplomatic negotiations with the Crimean Tatars.

It was necessary to support Shagin Tirey against Devlet-Girey and diplomatically complete the establishment of Russian rule in Crimea. Suvorov, who openly said that he did not like to engage in diplomacy, immediately left all these delicate political matters to Kutuzov, which he carried out to perfection. Here, for the first time, Kutuzov discovered such an ability to deal with people, to unravel their intentions, to fight against the intrigues of the enemy, without bringing the dispute to a bloody conclusion; and, most importantly, achieve complete success, remaining with the enemy personally in the most “friendly” relations, which Suvorov was delighted with.

For several years, until the annexation of Crimea and the end of the unrest there, Kutuzov was involved in the political development of Crimea. The combination in Kutuzov of unbridled, often simply insane courage with the qualities of a cautious, restrained, outwardly charming, subtle diplomat was noticed by Catherine. When she was in the Crimea in 1787, Kutuzov - then already a general - showed her such horse riding experiences that the Empress publicly reprimanded him: “You must take care of yourself, I forbid you to ride mad horses and I will never forgive you if I will hear that you are not following my orders.” But the reprimand had little effect. On August 18, 1788, near Ochakov, Kutuzov, rushing towards the enemy, was ahead of his soldiers. The Austrian general, Prince de Ligne, informed Emperor Joseph about this in the following terms: “Yesterday they shot Kutuzov in the head again. I think he will die today or tomorrow.” The wound was terrible and, most importantly, almost in the same place as the first time, but Kutuzov again escaped death. Having barely recovered, three and a half months later Kutuzov already took part in the assault and capture of Ochakov and did not miss a single big battle in 1789-1790. Of course, he took direct personal part in the assault on Ishmael. Near Izmail, Kutuzov commanded the sixth column of the left wing of the assaulting army. Having overcome “all the cruel fire of grapeshot and rifle shots,” this column, “soon descending into the ditch, climbed the stairs to the rampart, despite all the difficulties, and took possession of the bastion; the worthy and brave major general and cavalier Golenishchev-Kutuzov, with his courage, was an example to his subordinates and fought with the enemy.” Having taken part in this hand-to-hand battle, Kutuzov called up the Kherson regiment from the reserves, repulsed the enemy, and his column with two others that followed it “laid the foundation of victory.”

Suvorov ends his report about Kutuzov this way: “Major General and Cavalier Golenishchev-Kutuzov showed new experiments in his art and courage, overcoming all difficulties under strong enemy fire, climbed the rampart, captured the bastion, and when the excellent enemy forced him to stop, he, Serving as an example of courage, he held the place, overcame a strong enemy, established himself in the fortress and then continued to defeat the enemies.” In his report, Suvorov does not report that when Kutuzov stopped and was pressed by the Turks, he sent to ask the commander-in-chief for reinforcements, but he did not send any reinforcements, but ordered to announce to Kutuzov that he was appointing him commandant of Izmail. The commander-in-chief knew in advance that Kutuzov would rush into the city with his column even without reinforcements.

After Izmail, Kutuzov participated with distinction in the Polish war. He was already about 50 years old at that time. However, he was never given a completely independent post, where he could really fully show his strength. Catherine, however, no longer let Kutuzov out of sight, and on October 25, 1792, he was unexpectedly appointed envoy to Constantinople. On the way to Constantinople, deliberately not in a hurry to arrive at his destination, Kutuzov vigilantly observed the Turkish heritage, collected various information about the people and saw in them not the belligerence that frightened the Turkish authorities, but, “on the contrary, a warm desire for peace.”

On September 26, 1793, that is, 11 months after the rescript on October 25, 1792, appointing him envoy, Kutuzov entered Constantinople. Kutuzov remained in the rank of envoy until Catherine’s decree of November 30, 1793 on the transfer of all affairs of the embassy to the new envoy, V.P. Kochubey. In fact, Kutuzov left Constantinople only in March 1794. The tasks of his diplomatic mission in Constantinople were limited, but not easy. It was necessary to prevent the conclusion of an alliance between France and Turkey and thereby eliminate the danger of the French fleet penetrating the Black Sea. At the same time, it was necessary to collect information about the Slavic and Greek subjects of Turkey, and most importantly, to ensure the preservation of peace with the Turks. All these goals were achieved during his actual stay in the Turkish capital (from September 1793 to March 1794).

After the Constantinople mission, there was some break in Kutuzov’s military career and diplomatic activities. He held responsible positions: he was the Kazan and Vyatka governor-general, commander of the ground forces, commander of the flotilla in Finland, and in 1798 he went to Berlin to help Prince Repnin, who was sent to eliminate or at least weaken the dangerous consequences of a separate peace for Russia Prussia and France. He, in fact, did all the required diplomatic work for Repnin and achieved some important results: Prussia did not conclude an alliance with France.

Pavel trusted him so much that on December 14, 1800, he appointed him to an important post: Kutuzov was to command the Ukrainian, Brest and Dniester “inspections” in the event of a war against Austria. But Paul was gone; under Alexander, the political situation gradually began to change, and Kutuzov’s official position changed just as significantly. Alexander, who first appointed Kutuzov as the St. Petersburg military governor, suddenly, completely unexpectedly, on August 29, 1802, dismissed him from this position, and Kutuzov spent 3 years in the village, away from business. Let us note that the tsar disliked him even then, contrary to the false view that Kutuzov fell into disgrace only after Austerlitz. But, as we will see, in Kutuzov’s career under Alexander I, disgraces alternated in a fairly regular order, when Kutuzov was removed from business or sometimes given significant civil positions, and then equally

unexpectedly called up to the highest military post. Alexander may not have liked Kutuzov, but he needed Kutuzov's intelligence and talent and his reputation in the army, where he was considered Suvorov's direct heir.

In 1805, the war of the third coalition against Napoleon began, and an emergency courier from the tsar was sent to Kutuzov’s village. Kutuzov was offered to be the commander-in-chief on the decisive sector of the front against the French army, which was under the command of Napoleon himself.

If, of all the wars waged by Kutuzov, there was a war that could be called a vivid example of the criminal interference of two crowned mediocrities at the disposal of a highly talented strategist, an unceremonious, persistent and extremely harmful intervention, then it was the war of 1805, the war of the third coalition against Napoleon, which Alexander I and Franz I, completely disregarding the direct instructions and plans of Kutuzov, lost shamefully. With a lightning maneuver, having encircled and captured in Ulm perhaps the best army the Austrians had ever had until then, Napoleon immediately began to take action against Kutuzov. Kutuzov knew (and reported to Alexander) that after Ulm Napoleon had his hands completely free and that he had three times as many troops. The only way to avoid the Ulm disaster was to hastily go east, to Vienna, and, if necessary, beyond Vienna. But, in the opinion of Franz, to whom Alexander fully joined, Kutuzov and his soldiers had to defend Vienna at any cost. Fortunately, Kutuzov did not carry out senseless and disastrous advice, if only this opportunity was presented to him, that is, if the highest adviser was absent at the moment.

Kutuzov emerged from a desperate situation. Firstly, he, completely unexpectedly for Napoleon, gave a sharp rebuff to the advancing army: he defeated Napoleon’s advanced corps at Amstetten, and while Marshal Mortier was recovering, he stood in his way at Krems and here he already dealt Mortier a very strong blow. Napoleon, being on the other side of the Danube, did not have time to help Mortier. The defeat of the French was complete. But the danger was not over. Napoleon took Vienna without a fight and again chased Kutuzov. Never had the Russian army been so close to the danger of being defeated or capitulated as at this moment. But the Russians were not commanded by the Ulm Makk, but by the Izmailian Kutuzov, under whose command was the Izmailian Bagration. Murat was chasing Kutuzov, who needed to delay the Russians in any way, even for the shortest time, so that they would not have time to join the Russian army stationed in Olmutz. Murat started imaginary peace negotiations.

But it is not enough to be a dashing cavalry general and a grunt to deceive Kutuzov. Kutuzov from the very first moment figured out Murat’s cunning and, immediately agreeing to “negotiations,” he himself even more accelerated the movement of his army to the east, to Olmutz. Kutuzov, of course, understood that in a day or two the French would realize that there were no negotiations and would not be, and would attack the Russians. But he knew to whom he entrusted the difficult task of serving as a barrier from the advancing French army. Bagration already stood between Gollabrun and Shengraben. Bagration had a corps of 6 thousand people, Murat had four, if not five times more, and Bagration spent the whole day delaying the fiercely fighting enemy, and although he killed a lot of his own, he also killed a lot of the French, and left, not disturbed by them. During this time, Kutuzov had already retreated to Olmutz, followed by Bagration.

It was here that the criminal game against Kutuzov and the truly sabotage role of Alexander and the other, by the grace of God, promoted himself to the commander of the monarch-Franz, were fully revealed.

Nothing showed Kutuzov’s rich and versatile talent so clearly as in his ability not only to clearly understand the general political situation in which he had to wage war, but also to subordinate all other strategic and tactical considerations to a common political goal. This was not Kutuzov’s weakness, which both open enemies and secret envious people who stung his heel wanted to see in him. On the contrary, this was his mighty strength.

It is enough to recall this particular tragedy of 1805 - the Austerlitz campaign. After all, when hostilities began and when, despite all the gentle entreaties, and then quite transparent threats, despite all the vulgar comedy of the oath of eternal Russian-Prussian friendship over the tomb of Frederick the Great, so often and so painfully beaten by Russian troops, Frederick William III nevertheless refused to immediately join the coalition, then Alexander I and his then minister Adam Czartoryski, and the dull-witted Franz I from birth looked at this as a somewhat annoying diplomatic failure, but that’s all. And Kutuzov, as was immediately clear from all his actions, saw in this a threat of losing the entire campaign. He knew then and expressed this more than once that without the immediate joining of the Prussian army to the coalition, the only reasonable option left for the allies was to retreat to the Ore Mountains, spend the winter there in safety and prolong the war, i.e., do exactly what Napoleon feared.

When hostilities resumed in the spring, circumstances could either remain without significant changes, or become better if during this time Prussia finally decided to end its hesitation and join the coalition. But, in any case, Kutuzov’s decision was preferable to the decision to immediately dare to go against Napoleon, which would mean going towards an almost certain disaster. Kutuzov’s diplomatic sensitivity made him believe that as the war dragged on, Prussia might finally realize how much more profitable it was to join the coalition than to maintain neutrality, which was disastrous for it.

Why was the battle given, despite all Kutuzov’s admonitions? Yes, first of all, because Kutuzov’s opponents at military meetings in Olmutz - Alexander I, the tsar’s favorite, the arrogant helipad Pyotr Dolgorukov, the mediocre Austrian military theorist Weyrother - suffered from that most dangerous disease, which is called underestimating the strength and abilities of the enemy. For several days at the end of November 1805, Napoleon exhausted himself to instill in his allies the impression that he had an army exhausted in previous battles and was therefore timid and avoiding a decisive confrontation in every possible way. Weyrother thoughtfully said that it is necessary to do what the enemy considers undesirable. And therefore, having received such authoritative support from a representative of Western European military science, Alexander finally believed that here, on the Moravian fields, he was destined to reap his first military laurels. Only Kutuzov did not agree with these fanfares and explained to them that Napoleon was clearly playing a comedy, that he was not at all a coward, and if he was really afraid of anything, it was only the retreat of the allied army into the mountains and the prolongation of the war.

But Kutuzov’s efforts to keep the allied army from fighting did not help. The battle was fought, and the complete defeat of the allied army at Austerlitz followed on December 2, 1805.

It was after Austerlitz that Alexander I’s hatred of Kutuzov increased immeasurably. The Tsar could not help but understand, of course, that all the terrible efforts of both himself and the court hangers-on around him to blame Kutuzov for the defeat remained in vain, because Kutuzov was not at all inclined to accept the grave sin and guilt for the useless death of thousands of people and a horrific defeat. But the Russians, after Suvorov, were not accustomed to defeats. But at the same time, there was not a single military man near the tsar who could compare with Kutuzov in his intelligence and strategic talent. First of all, there was no person with such enormous and lasting authority in the army as Kutuzov.

Of course, contemporaries understood - and this could not but be especially unpleasant for Alexander I - that the already great military prestige of Kutuzov increased even more after Austerlitz, because absolutely everyone in Russia and in Europe who was in any way interested in the ongoing diplomatic and military struggle coalition against Napoleon, it was absolutely known that the Austerlitz disaster occurred solely because Weyrother’s absurd plan prevailed and that Alexander criminally neglected the advice of Kutuzov, which he had no right to ignore, not only moral, but also formal, because official It was Kutuzov who was the commander-in-chief of the allied army in the fateful time of Austerlitz. But, of course, the Austrians were most to blame for the disaster. After Austerlitz, Kutuzov was in complete disgrace, and just so that the enemy could not see in this disgrace an admission of defeat, the former commander-in-chief was nevertheless appointed (in October 1806) as the Kyiv military governor. Kutuzov's friends were insulted on his behalf. This seemed to them worse than complete resignation.

But he did not have to remain governor for long. In 1806-1807 During a very difficult war with Napoleon, when, after the complete defeat of Prussia, Napoleon won a victory at Friedland and achieved the Peace of Tilsit, which was unfavorable for Russia, Alexander learned from bitter experience that he could not do without Kutuzov. And Kutuzov, forgotten during the war of 1806-1807. with the French, was summoned from Kyiv so that he could improve matters in another war, which Russia continued to wage even after Tilsit - in the war against Turkey.

Russia's war against Turkey, which began back in 1806, turned out to be a difficult war and little successful. During this time, Russia had to go through the difficult situation created in 1806 after Austerlitz, when Russia did not make peace with Napoleon and was left without allies, and then at the end of 1806 it again had to begin hostilities, marked by big battles (Pultusk, Preusisch -Eylau, Friedland) and ending with Tilsit. The Turks did not make peace, hoping for open and, after Tilsit, secret help from Russia’s new “ally” - Napoleon.

The situation was difficult. The commander-in-chief of the Danube Army, Prozorovsky, could do absolutely nothing and anxiously awaited the offensive of the Turks from the beginning of spring. The war with Turkey dragged on, and, as always in difficult cases, they turned to Kutuzov for help, and he turned from the Kyiv governor into the assistant commander-in-chief of the Danube Army, and in fact into Prozorovsky’s successor. In Iasi in the spring of 1808, Kutuzov met with Napoleon's envoy, General Sebastiani, who was traveling to Constantinople. Kutuzov charmed the French general and, relying on the then “allied” relations between Russia and France, managed to obtain confirmation of a very serious diplomatic secret, which, however, was not news to Kutuzov - that Napoleon was playing a double game in Constantinople and, contrary to the Tilsit promises to Russia, will not leave Turkey without help.

Kutuzov very soon quarreled with Prozorovsky, an incompetent commander, who, contrary to Kutuzov’s advice, fought a big battle in order to capture Brailov and lost it. After this, angry not at himself, but at Kutuzov, Prozorovsky tried to get rid of Kutuzov, and Alexander, who always readily listened to any slander against Kutuzov, removed him from the Danube and appointed him Lithuanian military governor. It is characteristic that, saying goodbye to Kutuzov, the soldiers cried.

But they said goodbye to him for a relatively short time. The failures on the Danube continued, and again we had to ask Kutuzov to improve matters. On March 15, 1811, Kutuzov was appointed commander-in-chief of the Danube Army. The situation was difficult, completely ruined by his immediate predecessor, Count N.M. Kamensky, who turned out to be even worse than Prozorovsky, who had been removed before this.

Military critics who wrote the history of the war on the Danube unanimously agree that Kutuzov’s brilliant strategic talent unfolded to its full extent in this campaign. He had less than 46 thousand people, the Turks - more than 70 thousand. Kutuzov prepared for a long time and diligently for an attack on the main forces of the Turks. At the same time, he had to take into account the changed situation in Europe. Napoleon was no longer just an unreliable ally, as he was in 1808. Now, in 1811, he was definitely an enemy, ready to throw off his mask any day now. After long preparations and negotiations, skillfully conducted in order to gain time, on June 22, 1811, Kutuzov again inflicted a heavy defeat on the Turkish vizier near Rushchuk. The position of the Russian troops became better, but still continued to remain critical. The Turks, incited by the French envoy Sebastiani, intended to fight and fight. Only peace with Turkey could free the Danube Army for the upcoming war with Napoleon, and after the deliberately rude scene Napoleon staged for Ambassador Kurakin on August 15, 1811, no one in Europe had any doubts about the proximity of war.

And it was here that Kutuzov succeeded in something that, under similar conditions, no one had ever succeeded in and which, of course, puts Kutuzov in the first rank of people glorified in the history of diplomatic art. Throughout the history of Imperial Russia, there was certainly no more talented diplomat than Kutuzov. What Kutuzov did in the spring of 1812 after long and difficult negotiations would have been beyond the power of even the most outstanding professional diplomat, like, for example, A. M. Gorchakov, not to mention Alexander I, an amateur diplomat. “Now he is a collegiate assessor for foreign affairs,” - A. S. Pushkin awarded the Tsar with such a modest rank.

Napoleon had well-organized diplomatic and military espionage in Turkey and spent large sums on this organization. He more than once expressed the opinion that when you hire a good spy, there is no point in haggling with him about remuneration. In this regard, Kutuzov in Moldova had nothing at his disposal that could be seriously compared with the funds allocated by Napoleon for this matter. However, precise facts indicate that Kutuzov knew the situation in which he had to fight on the Danube much better than Napoleon. Kutuzov never made such truly monstrous mistakes in his calculations as the French emperor did, who quite seriously hoped that the hundred-thousand-strong Turkish army (!) would not only victoriously push Kutuzov away from the Danube, from the Dniester, from the upper reaches of the Dnieper, but would also approach The Western Dvina will join his army here too. Kutuzov received much fewer documents from military informants than Napoleon received, but Kutuzov knew how to read and understand them much better.

In the 5 years that have passed since the beginning of the Russian-Turkish war, despite the partial successes of the Russians, it was still not possible to force the Turks to peace. But what all his predecessors, from Mikhelson to Kamensky, failed to achieve, Kutuzov succeeded.

This was his plan. The war will be over and can be over, but only after a complete victory over the large army of the great “supreme” vizier. Vizier Akhmet Bey had about 75 thousand people: in Shumla - 50 thousand and near Sofia - 25 thousand; Kutuzov has a little more than 46 thousand people in the Moldovan army. The Turks began negotiations, but Kutuzov understood very well that it was only a question of delaying hostilities. Blackmailing Kutuzov, the vizier and Hamid Effendi really counted on the compliance of the Russians in view of the proximity of Russia's war with Napoleon and demanded that the border between Russia and Turkey be the Dniester River. Kutuzov's response, as stated, was a big battle near Rushchuk, crowned by the complete victory of the Russian troops on June 22, 1811. Following this, Kutuzov ordered, leaving Rushchuk, to blow up the fortifications. But the Turks still continued the war. Kutuzov deliberately allowed them to cross the Danube. “Let them cross, if only more of them would cross to our shore,” said Kutuzov, according to the testimony of his associates and then the historian Mikhailovsky-Danilevsky. Kutuzov besieged the vizier’s camp, and the besieged, having learned that the Russians had so far taken Turtukai and Silistria (October 10 and 11), without lifting the siege, realized that they were in danger of complete extermination if they did not surrender. The vizier secretly fled from his camp and began negotiations. And on November 26, 1811, the remnants of the starving Turkish army surrendered to the Russians.

Napoleon did not know the extent of his indignation. “Understand these dogs, these idiotic Turks! They have the gift of being beaten. Who could have expected and foreseen such nonsense?” - this is how the French emperor shouted beside himself. He did not foresee then that only a few months would pass, and the same Kutuzov would destroy the “great army,” which would be under the leadership of someone stronger than the Grand Vizier...

And immediately, having completed the military part of his program with complete success, Kutuzov the diplomat completed the work begun by Kutuzov the commander.

The negotiations, which opened in mid-October, predictably dragged on inordinately. After all, it was the possibly longer delay of peace negotiations that was the Turks’ main chance to soften Russian conditions. Napoleon did absolutely everything in his power to convince the Sultan not to sign peace terms, because not today or tomorrow the French would raid Russia and the Russians would make all concessions in order to free the Moldavian army. October, November, December passed, and the peace negotiations remained at a frozen point. The Turks proposed, however, not the Dniester, but the Prut as the Russian-Turkish border, but Kutuzov did not want to hear about that.

Projects were coming from St. Petersburg to carry out a demonstration against Constantinople, and on February 16, 1812, Alexander even signed a rescript to Kutuzov that, in his opinion, it was necessary to “carry out a strong blow under the walls of Tsaryagrad with combined sea and land forces.” However, nothing came of this project. Kutuzov considered it more realistic to disturb the Turks with small land expeditions.

Spring arrived, which complicated the situation. Firstly, the plague broke out in places in Turkey, and secondly, Napoleonic armies gradually began to move into the territory between the Oder and the Vistula. The Tsar was already on the verge of agreeing to recognize the Prut as a border, but demanded that Kutuzov insist on signing a union treaty between Turkey and Russia. Kutuzov knew that the Turks would not agree to this, but he convinced the Turkish commissioners that the moment had come for Turkey when the question of life or death was being decided for them: if the Turks did not immediately sign peace with Russia, then Napoleon would not care if he succeeded in Russia will turn against the Turkish Empire and, upon concluding peace with Alexander, will receive consent from Russia to occupy Turkey. If Napoleon offers reconciliation to Russia, then, naturally, Turkey will be divided between Russia and France. This argument had a very strong effect on the Turks, and they already agreed to recognize the Prut as a border until it merges with the Danube and that the further border would run along the left bank of the Danube until it flows into the Black Sea. However, Kutuzov decided to fully exploit the mood of the Turks and demanded that the Turks cede Bessarabia with the fortresses of Izmail, Bendery, Khotyn, Kiliya and Akkerman to Russia forever. In Asia, the borders remained as they were before the war, but according to a secret article, Russia held all the Transcaucasian lands that voluntarily joined it, as well as a 40-kilometer strip of coastline. Thus, a wonderful diplomat, as Kutuzov always was, not only freed the Moldavian army for the upcoming war with Napoleon, but also acquired vast and rich territory for Russia.

Kutuzov used all the efforts of his enormous intelligence and diplomatic subtlety. He managed to assure the Turks that the war between Napoleon and Russia had not yet been finally resolved, but that if Turkey did not reconcile with Russia in time, then Napoleon would again resume friendly relations with Alexander, and then both emperors would divide Turkey in half.

And what was later defined in Europe as a diplomatic “paradox” came true. On May 16, 1812, after negotiations that lasted for many months, peace was concluded in Bucharest: Russia not only freed its entire Danube army for the war against Napoleon, but in addition it received from Turkey all of Bessarabia for eternal possession. But that’s not all: Russia actually received almost the entire seashore from the mouth of the Rion to Anapa.

Having learned that the Turks signed a peace treaty in Bucharest on May 16 (28), 1812. Napoleon finally exhausted the vocabulary of French curses. He could not understand how Kutuzov managed to persuade the Sultan to accept such an incredibly beneficial peace for the Russians at the most dangerous moment for Russia, when it was they, and not the Turks, who absolutely needed to rush to end the war.

This was the first blow inflicted on Napoleon by Kutuzov the diplomat almost three and a half months before Kutuzov the strategist dealt him a second blow on the Borodino field.

One of the most entrenched historical falsifications created by French historiography, from the 20-volume history of the Consulate and the Empire of Thiers to the 14-volume history of Louis Madeleine, published in recent years and not yet completed in 1951, is the assertion that even in 1810 and even in 1811, peace between Russia and France could have been preserved if Alexander had refrained from protesting about Napoleon's seizure of the Duchy of Oldenburg and if he had given the required assurances regarding the strict observance of the continental blockade. This falsification can only be accepted by those who, like the chauvinistic French historians and the German, Italian, English and American authors who follow them, absolutely do not want to see the glaring reality. But the reality is that Napoleonic direct political aggression against Russia, in essence, began much earlier than June 12 (24), 1812, when the emperor gave the sign for his vanguard to cross the bridges across the Neman to the eastern bank of the river.

Since 1810, under various pretexts and without any pretext at all, without giving anyone any explanation and only informing the intimidated Europe about the fact that had happened. Napoleon annexed one after another the territories that separated the huge French Empire from the Russian border. Today the Hanseatic cities of Hamburg, Bremen and Lübeck with their territories; tomorrow the German lands northeast of the previously captured Kingdom of Westphalia; the day after tomorrow the Duchy of Oldenburg. The forms and pretexts of the capture were different, but from the point of view of the obvious and direct threat to the security of Russia, the real result was the same: the French army was steadily moving towards the Russian border. States were overthrown, fortifications were captured, water barriers were eliminated - the Elbe beyond the Rhine, the Oder beyond the Elbe, and the Vistula beyond the Oder.

Subsequently, Prince Vyazemsky, recalling this time, used to say that anyone who did not live during these years of Napoleon’s unrestrained rule over Europe could not fully imagine how difficult and anxious it was to live in Russia in those years about which his friend, A.S. Pushkin wrote: “The storm of the twelfth year was still subsiding, Napoleon had not yet tested the great people, he still threatened and hesitated.”

Kutuzov, more clearly than anyone, imagined the danger that threatened the Russian people. And when he had to wage war on the Danube in this critical, pre-storm time, his high talent as a strategist allowed him to consistently resolve, one after another, those issues that for 6 years all his predecessors had been stumped by, and the breadth of his political horizons covered not only the Danube , but also the Neman, and the Vistula, and the Dniester. He recognized not only the already completely clarified enemy - Napoleon, but also not yet fully clarified “friends”, such as Franz of Austria, King of Prussia Frederick William III, Lord Liverpool and Castlereagh.

Subsequently, Napoleon said that if he had foreseen how the Turks would behave in Bucharest and the Swedes in Stockholm, he would not have opposed Russia in 1812. But now it was too late to repent.

War broke out. The enemy entered Smolensk and moved from there straight to Moscow. Unrest among the people, anxiety and irritation among the nobility, the absurd behavior of the headless Maria Feodorovna and the courtiers, delirious about the evacuation of St. Petersburg - all this during the first days of August 1812 sowed anxiety, which grew more and more. The same incessant cry came from everywhere: “Kutuzova!”

“Justifying himself” to his sister, Ekaterina Pavlovna, who in the same way did not understand Kutuzov, did not love and did not appreciate him, like her brother, Alexander wrote that he “resisted” Kutuzov’s appointment, but was forced to yield to the pressure of public opinion and “ choose the one whom the general voice pointed to”...

We have a lot of news about what was happening among the people, in the army, with just one rumor about Kutuzov’s appointment, and then upon his arrival in the army. It would be inaccurate and inappropriate to use the word “popularity” in this case. The unshakable faith of people, deeply shocked by a terrible danger, that a savior had suddenly appeared - this is how one can call this feeling that has irresistibly taken possession of the masses. “They say that people greet him everywhere with indescribable delight. All the inhabitants of the cities come out to meet them, unharness their horses, and carry a carriage; the ancient elders force their grandchildren to kiss his feet; mothers carry out their babies, fall to their knees and lift them to the sky! All the people call him savior.”

On August 8, 1812, Alexander was forced to sign a decree appointing Kutuzov as commander-in-chief of the Russian armies operating against the enemy, on which the general opinion of the army and people imperatively insisted. And exactly 6 days later, on August 14, stopping at the Yazhembitsy station on the way to the active army, Kutuzov wrote to P.V. Chichagov, the chief commander of the Danube Army, a letter unusually characteristic of Kutuzov. This letter is one of the remarkable evidence of the entire breadth of the Eagle's horizons and the always close connection between the strategic plan and the actions of this commander, no matter what front, main or secondary, he commanded. Kutuzov wrote to Chichagov that the enemy was already near Dorogobuzh, and drew a direct conclusion from this: “From these circumstances, you can easily see that it is impossible now to think about ... any sabotage, but everything that we have, except for the first and second The army should act on the enemy’s right flank in order to solely stop him by his efforts. The longer circumstances change in the same way as they have been until now, the more necessary the rapprochement of the Danube Army with the main forces becomes.” But all the efforts of Kutuzov in April and all the conditions of the peace sealed by Kutuzov on May 16, 1812 tended to ensure that those who were destined for a formidable meeting with Napoleon would have the right and opportunity to count on the Danube Army! The letter to Chichagov at the same time exposes concern: lest this man, always consumed by ambition and envy, decide to launch the Danube Army liberated by Kutuzov on any risky, and most importantly, unnecessary adventures against Schwarzenberg. The strategist Kutuzov knew for sure that the Danube Army would sooner be able to join the Russian troops operating between Dorogobuzh and Mozhaisk than Schwarzenberg would be able to reach Napoleon’s army. And the diplomat Kutuzov foresaw that although Napoleon’s “alliance” with his father-in-law was beneficial to the French emperor in that it would force Alexander to divert part of the Russian forces to the southwest, but that in fact the Austrians would not play any real role in any military clashes.

That’s why Kutuzov needed it, and as soon as possible. The Danube army is on his left flank, on which, as he foresaw even a few days before arriving at the theater of operations, the most terrible blow from Napoleon's right flank would certainly be directed.

The moment was approaching when the commander-in-chief had to make sure that the tsar’s favorite Chichagov would not pay the slightest attention to the request of his predecessor in command of the Danube Army and that if any significant help and increase in the size of the army defending the Moscow road could be expected, it would be almost exclusively from the Moscow and Smolensk militia.

No matter how hard we try to give here only the most concise, most general description of Kutuzov’s military achievements, when speaking about Borodin, we would have made a completely unacceptable omission if we had not drawn the reader’s attention to the following. In the foreground of history at this formidable moment stood two adversaries facing each other, both aware of the incredible significance of what was at stake. Both made every effort to gain numerical superiority at the decisive moment. But one of them is Napoleon, for whom it is enough to order that everything that depends on human will be carried out immediately and unquestioningly. And the other - Kutuzov, whom, however, the tsar “most mercifully” appointed the supposedly unlimited ruler and manager of all Russian armed forces operating against Napoleon, found himself at every step shackled, hampered and constrained precisely in this oppressively important question of the size of the army. He demands that he be given newly formed regiments as soon as possible, and receives the following from Alexander: “Regarding the order you mentioned about the addition of newly formed regiments from Prince Lobanov-Rostovsky, I find it impossible to carry out.”

Kutuzov knew that, in addition to two armies, Bagration and Barclay, which came under his personal direct command on August 19 in Tsarev-Zaimishche, he had three more armies: Tormasov, Chichagov and Wittgenstein, which were formally obliged to obey him just as unquestioningly and immediately, as, for example, his marshals obeyed Napoleon. Yes, formally, but not actually. Kutuzov knew that the tsar could and would command them, and he himself could not command them, but only exhort and persuade them to quickly come to him to save Moscow and Russia. This is what he writes to Tormasov: “You will agree with me that in these critical moments for Russia, while the enemy is in the heart of Russia, the subject of your actions can no longer include the protection and preservation of our remote Polish provinces.” This call remained a voice crying in the desert: Tormasov’s army was united with Chichagov’s army and placed under Chichagov’s command. Kutuzov wrote to Chichagov: “Having arrived in the army, I found an enemy in the heart of ancient Russia, so to speak, near Moscow. My real subject is the salvation of Moscow itself, and therefore I have no need to explain that the preservation of some remote Polish provinces cannot be compared with the salvation of the ancient capital of Moscow and the inner provinces themselves.”

Chichagov did not even think of immediately responding to the call. The most interesting thing happened with the third (of these former “on the fly” from the main Kutuzov forces) Wittgenstein’s army. “The order given by Kutuzov to Count Wittgenstein was not found in the affairs,” Mikhailovsky-Danilevsky, who never reproaches Alexander for anything, delicately notes.

The Borodino victory was needed, a victorious, continuous counter-offensive destroying the French army was needed with a four-day terrifying defeat of the best Napoleonic corps at Krasnoye, a gigantically increased authority of the first and absolutely indisputable winner of Napoleon was needed, so that Kutuzov would have the actual opportunity to take everything without exception under his imperious hand “Western” Russian troops and so that Alexander would be convinced that he could no longer completely freely prevent Chichagov and Wittgenstein from carrying out the orders of the commander-in-chief. Tormasov, having lost the command of his (3rd Observation) army, arrived at the main apartment and valiantly served and helped Kutuzov.

Fetters, obstacles, traps and intrigues of all kinds, the tsar’s unceremonious, daring intervention in military orders, the disobedience of the generals encouraged from above - all this was overcome by two powerful forces: the boundless faith of the people and army in Kutuzov and the incomparable talents of this true luminary of Russian strategy and tactics. The Russian army retreated to the east, but it retreated fighting, inflicting heavy losses on the enemy.

But before the radiant days of complete triumph, the army still had to endure a lot: it was necessary to stand on a long August day knee-deep in blood on the Borodino field, to walk away from the capital, looking back at the distant burning Moscow, it was necessary to see off uninvited guests in the harshest conditions in a long counteroffensive bayonet and bullet.

Digital readings given in the materials of the Military Scientific Archive. (“Patriotic War of 1812,” vol. XVI. Combat operations in 1812, no. 129), are as follows: “On this day, the Russian army had under arms: line troops with artillery 95 thousand, Cossacks - 7 thousand, Moscow militia - 7 thousand and Smolensk - 3 thousand. In total, 112 thousand people are under arms.” This army had 640 artillery pieces. On the day of Borodin, Napoleon had more than 185 thousand troops with artillery. But both the young guard (20 thousand people) and the old guard with its cavalry (10 thousand people) were in reserve all the time and did not directly participate in the battle.

French sources admit that about 135-140 thousand people took direct part in the battle, even if we do not count the old and young guards at all, on the French side. It should be noted that Kutuzov himself, in his first report to the Tsar after arriving in Tsarevo-Zaimishche, believed that Napoleon could not have had not only 185 thousand, but even 165 thousand, and the size of the Russian army at that moment he calculated at 95 734 people. But within just a few days that passed from Tsarev-Zaimishche to Borodino, 15,589 people from Miloradovich’s reserve corps and another “2,000 people collected from different places” joined the Russian army, so that the Russian army increased to 113,323 people. In addition, as Alexander informed Kutuzov, about 7 thousand more people were supposed to arrive.

In fact, however, some researchers believe that Kutuzov’s armed regular forces near Borodino are ready for battle, fully trained, not 120, but at best about 105 thousand people, if we do not take into account the militias at all in this calculation and remember, that the Cossack detachment of 7 thousand people was not brought into battle at all. But the militia of 1812 showed themselves to be people whose combat effectiveness was beyond praise.

When the still poorly trained militias approached, Kutuzov had up to 120 thousand at his immediate disposal, and according to some, albeit not very convincing, estimates, even somewhat more. The documents generally differ in their testimony. Of course, Kutuzov was fully aware of the impossibility of equating the militias with regular troops. But still, neither the commander-in-chief, nor Dokhturov, nor Konovnitsyn completely discounted this hastily assembled militia. Near Borodino, near Maloyaroslavets, near Krasny, throughout the entire counteroffensive, since, at least, we are talking about personal courage, selflessness, and endurance, the militia tried not to yield to the regular troops.

The enemy also managed to appreciate the Russian militias of the 12th year. After the bloodiest battles at Maloyaroslavets, pointing to the gloomily silent Napoleon at the battlefield strewn with the bodies of French grenadiers, Marshal Bessieres convinced Napoleon of the complete impossibility of attacking Kutuzov in the position he occupied: “And what enemies are we fighting against? Didn't you see, sir, yesterday's battlefield? Didn’t you notice with what fury the Russian recruits, barely armed, barely dressed, went there to their death?” And in the defense of Maloyaroslavets, it was the militia that played a significant role. Marshal Bessieres was killed in the battles of 1813.

The war of 1812 was not like any of the wars that the Russian people had to fight since the beginning of the 18th century. Even during the campaign of Charles XII, the consciousness of danger for Russia was not and could not be as acute and widespread among all layers of the people as in 1812.

We will continue to talk about Kutuzov’s counter-offensive, which finally crushed the Napoleonic invasion, and now we will note the curious, hitherto unprecedented fact that even before Borodin, when huge enemy forces were marching in an unstoppable stream towards Shevardin, the Russians launched one after another successful attacks on the stragglers the French, exterminated the foragers and, what is most surprising, managed to take prisoners during these days of the general retreat of the Russian army.

Four days before Borodin, in Gzhatsk, Napoleon left indisputable documentary evidence that he was severely alarmed by these constant attacks. This is what he ordered to be sent throughout the army to his chief of staff, Marshal Berthier: “Write to the generals commanding the army corps that we are losing many people every day due to insufficient order in the way we obtain provisions. It is necessary that they agree with the commanders of the various units on the measures that need to be taken to put an end to the state of affairs that threatens the army with destruction. The number of prisoners taken by the enemy reaches several hundred daily; it is necessary, under pain of the most severe punishments, to prohibit the soldiers from leaving.” Napoleon ordered, when sending people to forage, “to give them sufficient protection against the Cossacks and peasants.”

Already these actions of Konovnitsyn’s rearguard, from where the parties of daredevils came out at that moment, embarrassing Napoleon, showed Kutuzov that with such an army one could hope for success in the most difficult situations.

Kutuzov had no doubt that the upcoming battle would cost the French army almost as many losses as the Russian one. In fact, after the battle it turned out that the French had lost much more. Nevertheless, Kutuzov’s decision remained unshakable, and he did not give a new battle in front of Moscow.

How can we now determine with complete confidence the main goals of Kutuzov? Before the War of 1812, in those wars in which Kutuzov had to take on the role and responsibility of commander-in-chief, he absolutely never set himself too broad final goals. In 1805, he never spoke about the defeat of Napoleon, about the invasion of France, about the capture of Paris - that is, about everything that the frivolous courtiers dreamed of at the headquarters of Emperors Alexander I and Franz I. Or, for example, in 1811 He had no intention of taking Constantinople at all. But now, in 1812, the situation was different. The main goal was imperatively set by all the conditions of the war: to end the war by exterminating the aggressor’s army. The tragedy of all the mistakes and miscalculations of Napoleon that were disastrous for the French lay in the fact that he did not understand to what extent the complete destruction of his hordes was for Kutuzov not the maximum, but the minimum program and that the entire grandiose edifice of Napoleon’s all-European dominion, based on military despotism and maintained by military dictatorship, will waver after the death of his army in Russia. And even then another (“maximum”) program may become feasible in a more or less near future: namely, the destruction of his colossal predatory empire.

The program of delivering a heavy blow to the enemy army, with which Kutuzov, without expressing it in speeches, appeared in Tsarevo-Zaimishche, began to be implemented in its first part at Shevardin and near Borodino. Despite the fact that the bloody battle near Preussisch-Eylau on February 8, 1807 showed Napoleon that the Russian soldier was incomparable with a soldier of any other army, the Shevardin battle struck him when, when asked how many prisoners were taken after a whole day of bloody battles, he received the answer: “There are no prisoners, the Russians do not surrender, Your Majesty.”

And Borodino, the day after Shevardin, eclipsed all the battles of Napoleonic’s long epic: it disabled almost half of the French army.

Kutuzov’s entire disposition was designed in such a way that the French could capture first Bagration’s flushes, and then Kurgan Heights, defended by Raevsky’s battery, only at the cost of completely unheard-of casualties. But the point was not only that these main losses were supplemented by new losses at various other points in the great battle; the point was not only that about 58 thousand French remained on the battlefield and among them 47 of Napoleon’s best generals - the point was that the surviving about 80 thousand French soldiers were no longer at all similar in spirit and mood to those who approached to the Borodino field. Confidence in the emperor's invincibility was shaken, but until that day this confidence had never left Napoleonic's army - neither in Egypt, nor in Syria, nor in Italy, nor in Austria, nor in Prussia, and nowhere else at all. Not only the boundless courage of the Russian people, who repelled 8 assaults at the Bagration flashes and several similar assaults at the Raevsky battery, amazed the seasoned Napoleonic grenadiers, but they could not forget and constantly later recalled the moment of a previously unfamiliar feeling of panic that gripped them when suddenly , obeying the order of Kutuzov, which was not foreseen by anyone - neither the enemy, nor even the Russian headquarters, Platov with the Cossack cavalry and the First Cavalry Corps of Uvarov, with an uncontrollable impulse, flew into the deep rear of Napoleon. The battle ended, and Napoleon was the first to move away from the scene of the grandiose massacre.

Kutuzov's first goal was achieved: Napoleon had about half of his army left. He entered Moscow with, according to Wilson's calculations, 82 thousand people. From now on, long weeks were provided for Kutuzov, when, having retreated into the interior of the country, it was possible to strengthen his personnel numerically, feed people and horses, and make up for the Borodino losses. And the main, main strategic success of Kutuzov at Borodin was that the terrible losses of the French made it possible to replenish, supply, and reorganize the Russian army, which the commander-in-chief then launched into a formidable counteroffensive that crushed Napoleon.

Napoleon did not attack Kutuzov during the retreat of the Russian army from Borodino to Moscow because he considered the war already won and did not want to lose people in vain, but because he feared the second Borodin, just as he feared him later, after the burning of Maloyaroslavets. Napoleon's actions were also determined by the confidence that after the occupation of Moscow peace would be close. But, we repeat, we should not forget that, one might say, in front of Napoleon’s eyes, the Russian army, taking with it several hundred surviving cannons, retreated in perfect order, maintaining discipline and combat readiness. This fact made a great impression on Marshal Davout and the entire French generals.

Kutuzov could have hoped that if Napoleon had decided to suddenly attack the retreating Russian army, then again it would have been “a hellish thing,” as the field marshal put it about the Shevardin battle in his letter dated August 25 to his wife Ekaterina Ilyinichna.

Napoleon accepted the success of the French in a possible new battle near Moscow, which was very important and desirable for him, but retreated before the risk of the enterprise. This was a new (by no means the first) sign that the French army was no longer at all what it was when Kutuzov, coming from Tsarev-Zaimishche, stopped near the Kolotsky Monastery and forced Napoleon to take battle there and then, when and where he admitted it Kutuzov himself is profitable.

To a large extent, not only the immediate, but also the final strategic success of the planned blow that Kutuzov wanted to inflict on Napoleon before Borodin on the routes of the French army to Moscow depended on the correct resolution of the problem: who would be able to make up for the serious losses that both armies would suffer first? will suffer in the upcoming general battle? Will reinforcements from his rear have time to arrive to Napoleon before Kutuzov, after the inevitable terrible massacre, will again have at his disposal such an armed force as the one that greeted him with joyful cries in Tsarev-Zaimishche? Kutuzov, in solving this vital problem, revealed in this case a much greater gift of foresight than his opponent. Both armies emerged from the Battle of Borodino weakened; but their immediate fates were not only not the same, but completely different: despite the large reinforcements that approached Napoleon, their stay in Moscow continued to weaken Napoleon’s army every day, and in these same decisive weeks, the vigorous organizational work in the Tarutino camp restored and restored it every day. multiplied Kutuzov's forces. Moreover, in the French army they looked and could not help but look at the occupation of Moscow as direct evidence that the war was coming to an end and a saving peace was very close, so that every day in Moscow brought gradually increasing anxiety and disappointment. And in the Kutuzov camp there was complete confidence that the war was just beginning and that the worst was behind us. The strategic consequences of the Russian Borodino victory were reflected primarily in the fact that the enemy’s offensive against Russia began to fizzle out and stopped without hope of renewal, because Tarutino and Maloyaroslavets were a direct and inevitable consequence of Borodin.

The firm retention of Russian positions at the end of the fighting day was an ominous harbinger for the aggressor. Borodino made possible a victorious transition to a counteroffensive.

These further consequences showed that Borodino was not only a strategically significant, but also a great moral victory for the Russian army, and the historian who is capable of underestimating this is very bad. After Borodin, the enemy began to run out of steam and gradually move towards death. Already at Tarutino and Maloyaroslavets, Napoleon and his marshals (primarily Bessieres) realized that the Borodino mortal battle was not over, but continued, albeit with a long break. Soon they saw that it would continue and intensify further and that the “breaks” would become shorter and shorter, and after Red they would completely disappear and there would be no rest at all. Having before him an opponent who had no rivals in Europe at that time, Kutuzov proved both before and after Borodin that he also knew how to take the time factor into account much better than Napoleon.

Kutuzov, in a report to the Tsar, called the position where the great battle broke out the best - of course, of the possible ones in the position he was in, since he decided to stop further retreat and give battle immediately.

The position was chosen, and already at dawn on August 22, Kutuzov, having driven around it, made an order that Napoleon had not foreseen: the commander-in-chief decided, even before the general battle, to delay the clearly accumulating enemy forces against the Russian left flank and to use the hills and hillocks near the village of Shevardino for this. On August 24 and 25, a bloody battle took place here, in which the French, with heavy losses, were driven back from the large redoubt built on the direct initiative of Kutuzov on August 22-23.

The Russians retreated from Shevardin by order only when it was no longer useful to delay the advancing enemy and when the work on strengthening Semenovsky and Kurgan Heights was almost completed.

Napoleon was irritated and concerned about the heroic resistance of the Shevardin defense and declared that if the Russians did not surrender, but preferred to be killed, then they should be killed. In general, as the decisive battle approached, he seemed to lose his ability to control himself. Thus, he did not prevent the barbaric burning and destruction of the city of Gzhatsk by the French army (which had been completely intact until that time) and generally allowed such outrages and fury (harmful primarily for the French army), which he had, of course, not fought against not long before. out of love for humanity, which I never sinned, but out of direct calculation.

Kutuzov, watching the Shevardin operation from close range, foreseeing that Napoleon would attack first of all on the left flank, no matter what sabotage actions he took in other places, entrusted the protection of the left flank. Semenovsky flashes and other points fortified here to the one on whom he always pinned the greatest hopes - Bagration. And the French got the flushes dearly when the hopelessly seriously wounded hero was carried away from the battlefield.

Throughout the entire battle, Kutuzov was, in the full sense of the word, the brain of the Russian army. Throughout the entire struggle for the Semyonovsky (Bagrationov) flashes, then for the Kurgan Heights, then during the brilliant defeat of Poniatovsky’s cavalry, and finally, at the end of the battle, adjutants rushed to and from him, bringing him reports and taking away orders from him.

In the struggle for the so-called Kurgan Heights (“Raevsky’s battery”), where after Semenovsky all the efforts of the fighting parties were concentrated, the final “success” of the French also closely resembled the extermination of Napoleon’s best regiments, which had still survived the repeated murderous battles at the Bagration flushes. Kutuzov’s order was categorical: two days before Borodin, on August 24 (the first day of the fight at the Shevardinsky redoubt), the commander-in-chief signed his memorable disposition for the upcoming battle. “In this case,” wrote Kutuzov, “I consider it unnecessary to introduce Messrs. commander-in-chief that reserves should be saved as long as possible, because the general who still retains the reserve will not be defeated.”

These words reveal not only Kutuzov as a general who is ready to meet such an enemy as Napoleon in a pitched battle, but also as the leader of a future counter-offensive, who, although he also writes in this disposition about how to act “in case of failure,” but he knows for sure

that in this “case” it is not Russia that will suffer the ultimate “failure”, but the aggressor who attacked it and the “reserves” will still play a colossal role.

In view of the slanderous efforts of foreign historiography to present Borodino as a victory for Napoleon, I consider it necessary to emphasize the following. Napoleon was not only the first to retreat from the valley of the bloody massacre, but he gave a simultaneous order to retreat from all points occupied by the French with such murderous casualties during the day: from the Bagration flushes, and from the Raevsky Kurgan Battery, and from the village of Borodin. Who decided to do this in front of his army, almost half of which lay in blood and dust? Napoleon, for whom maintaining the reputation of invincibility in the eyes of his soldiers was paramount. And when did he do this? A few hours before Kutuzov’s order. Zakrevsky, who was under Barclay de Tolly, subsequently showed Mikhailovsky-Danilevsky Kutuzov’s written order, given immediately after the battle to Barclay: to remain on the battlefield and manage preparations for the battle “for tomorrow.” Only almost in the middle of the night (after 11 o’clock) Kutuzov’s decision changed. Dokhturov appeared. “Come to me, my hero, and hug me. How can the sovereign reward you?” But Dokhturov went with Kutuzov into another room and talked about the losses in Bagration’s (former “second”) army defending the flushes. Kutuzov then only ordered a retreat. Not a single Frenchman had been on the battlefield or in the immediate vicinity for a long time.

There is irrefutable evidence coming from Napoleon himself that Borodino instilled considerable anxiety in him and radically changed all his immediate plans. Almost immediately after the battle, having counted his horrific losses, Napoleon sent an order to Marshal Victor to go immediately to Smolensk, and from there to Moscow. Until entering Moscow, Napoleon did not know whether Kutuzov would give a new battle. He ordered to gather troops closer to the Mozhaisk-Moscow direction. While reassuring Victor that the Russians at Borodino were “struck to the very heart,” he nevertheless, with his orders, showed the marshals and retinue that he was not at all confident in the success of the “second” battle of Moscow. This caution gave way to self-confidence and bragging when the emperor made sure that Moscow was abandoned and that Kutuzov had moved quite far away. But here he made a grave mistake, extremely exaggerating the distance between the camp (where Kutuzov and his army stayed) and Moscow. For quite a long time he did not want to part with this illusion.

The Russian army approached the village of Fili. A moment came in Kutuzov’s life, a moment more difficult than which he had never experienced, neither before nor later.

On September 1 (13), 1812, by order of Kutuzov, commanders of large units and generals of the Russian army gathered. Kutuzov, who lost an eye in battle, surprised Suvorov himself with his courage, the hero of Ishmael, could, of course, despise the vile insinuations of his enemies like the dishonest Bennigsen, who reproached, behind his back, of course, the old commander-in-chief for lack of courage. But such loyal people as Dokhturov, Uvarov, Konovnitsyn also spoke out for the decision to give the enemy a new battle. Kutuzov, of course, knew that not only the tsar, who hated him, would take advantage of the surrender of Moscow to shift his blame onto Kutuzov, but that many who wholeheartedly believed him might waver. And in order to say the words that he uttered at the end of the meeting, much greater courage was needed than to stand in front of enemy bullets and than to storm Ishmael: “As long as the army exists and is in a position to resist the enemy, until then we will retain the hope of safely completing war, but when the army is destroyed, Moscow and Russia will perish.” It didn't come to a vote. Kutuzov stood up and announced: “I order a retreat with the authority given to me by the sovereign and the fatherland.” He did what he considered his sacred duty. He began to implement the second part of his maturely thought-out program: the withdrawal of the army from Moscow.

Only those who do not understand anything about the nature of this Russian hero can be surprised that Kutuzov, on the night of September 2, the last night before leaving Moscow to the enemy, did not sleep and showed signs of severe excitement and suffering. The adjutants heard crying at night. At the military council, he said: “You are afraid of a retreat through Moscow, but I look at this as providence, because it saves the army. Napoleon is like a stormy stream that we still cannot stop. Moscow will be a sponge that will suck it up.” In these words, he did not develop all his deep, fruitful, saving thoughts about a formidable counter-offensive that would throw the aggressor and his army into the abyss. And although he knew for sure that the real war between Russia and the aggressor - a war that logically should end in military defeat and the political death of Napoleon - was just beginning, he, a Russian patriot, perfectly understanding the strategic, political, moral necessity that he I just did it in Fili, I was tormented and could not immediately get used to the thought of losing Moscow.

On September 2, the Russian army passed through Moscow and began to move away from it in an eastern direction - along the Ryazan (first) road

After Austerlitz, Kutuzov was in complete disgrace, and just so that the enemy could not see this as an admission of defeat, the former commander-in-chief was nevertheless appointed military governor of Kyiv, thereby insulting him.

But he did not have to remain governor for long. In 1806 - 1807 During a very difficult war with France, when, after the complete defeat of Prussia, Napoleon won a victory at Friedland and achieved the Peace of Tilsit, which was unfavorable for Russia, Alexander learned from bitter experience that he could not do without Kutuzov. And Kutuzov, forgotten during the war of 1806 -1807. he was called in with the French so that he could improve matters in another war that Russia continued to wage after Tilsit - the war against Turkey.

It began in 1806 and became protracted, as the Turks did not want to give up, relying on support from France. Generals A.A. Prozorovsky, P.I. Bagration, N.M. Kamensky, the commanders of the Russian troops in different years, were unable to win a decisive victory and force the Turks to conclude peace. In the context of the approaching war with France, Alexander 1 was forced to appoint Kutuzov as commander of the Moldavian army.

At the beginning of 1811, Kutuzov arrived in Bucharest and took office as commander-in-chief of an army numbering 45 thousand soldiers, while the Turks had more than 70 thousand. By this time, the Russian army was significantly weakened - almost half of its strength was recalled to fight Napoleon.

The main task that Kutuzov had to solve was to end the war as quickly as possible and conclude a peace beneficial for Russia. To solve it, it was necessary to defeat the Turkish army. After long preparations and negotiations, skillfully conducted in order to gain time, on June 22, 1811, Kutuzov inflicted a heavy defeat on the Turkish vizier near Rushchuk. The position of the Russian troops became better, but still continued to remain critical, especially since after the deliberately rude scene Napoleon staged for Ambassador Kurakin on August 15, 1811, there was no longer any doubt about the proximity of war. And the Turks, incited by the French envoy, intended to fight and fight. Then Kutuzov came up with a cunning plan for a complete victory over the vizier’s large army.

Kutuzov, having convinced the enemy of his weakness by blowing up fortresses and retreating, lured the Turks to the left bank of the Danube, where he concentrated his main forces. Kutuzov sent part of the troops to the right bank in order to close the path of retreat for the Turks. As a result, Kutuzov pressed the vizier’s army to the river and surrounded it on all sides with redoubts. The vizier realized that the troops in such conditions were in danger of complete extermination, secretly fled from his besieged camp and began negotiations. And on November 26, 1811, the remnants of the starving army surrendered to the Russians.

After the surrender of Ahmet Pasha's troops, peace negotiations lasted another six months - the disputes were mainly about the division of territories. In the spring of 1812, due to the approach of Napoleon’s troops, the tsar was already on the verge of agreeing to recognize the Prut as a border, but demanded that Kutuzov insist on signing an alliance treaty between Turkey and Russia. The Turks were in no hurry to sign such an agreement, as they hoped that Russia would soon enter the war with France. Here Kutuzov used all the efforts of his enormous intelligence and diplomatic subtlety. He managed to assure the Turks that the war between Napoleon and Russia had not yet been finally decided, but that if Turkey did not reconcile with Russia in time, then Napoleon would again resume friendly relations with Alexander, and then both emperors would divide Turkey in half.

On May 16, 1812, after negotiations that lasted for many months, peace was concluded in Bucharest: Russia not only freed its entire Danube army for the war against Napoleon, but in addition it received from Turkey all of Bessarabia for eternal possession. The results that Kutuzov achieved were subsequently defined in Europe as a diplomatic “paradox.”

This was the first blow in time that Kutuzov the diplomat dealt Napoleon almost three and a half months before Kutuzov the strategist dealt him a second blow on the Borodino field.

Transnistrian State University

Department of Civil Protection

History of the Russian Army

Generals

KUTUZOV (GOLENISHCHEV-KUTUZOV)Mikhail Illarionovich (1745-1813)

Abstract on the subject “Civil protection”

Completed by a student of group 202 of the linguistic department

Yakovlev S. N.

Checked by a teacher at the Department of Civil Protection

Kadomtsev A.V.

Tiraspol, 1999

ABSTRACT PLAN

BIOGRAPHICAL NOTE

MIKHAIL ILLARIONOVICH KUTUZOV - COMMANDER AND DIPLOMAT

IMMORTAL IS THE ONE WHO SAVED THE FATHERLAND...

CONCLUSION

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Great Russian commander, field marshal general (1812). Since 1761, company commander of the Astrakhan Infantry Regiment, since 1762, adjutant of the Revel Governor-General. In 1764-1765 commanded separate detachments. During the Russian-Turkish war of 1768-1774. distinguished himself in the battles of Ryaba Mogila, Larga and Kagul. For bravery shown in July 1774 in a battle near the village. Shumy (now Kutuzovka), awarded the Order of St. George, 4th degree. From 1776 he served in Crimea under the command of A.V. Suvorov, who entrusted him with the most important tasks in organizing the protection of the coast of the peninsula. Since 1777, commander of the Lugansk pikemen, then the Mariupol light horse regiments. In the Russian-Turkish war of 1787-1791. took part in the hostilities near Ochakov, Akkerman, and Vendors. In 1790, he distinguished himself during the assault and capture of Izmail, commanding the 6th column, for which he was awarded the Order of St. George, 3rd degree, and promoted to lieutenant general. Even during the assault on Izmail, he was appointed commandant of the fortress, and after the victory he remained commandant and became the commander of the troops located between the Dniester and Prut. In 1791, he defeated the Turkish troops at Babadag and in the Battle of Machinsky, for which he was awarded the Order of Alexander Nevsky and the Grand Cross of the Order of St. George, 2nd and 3rd degree. Since 1794, director of the Land Noble Corps, since 1795, commander and inspector of Russian troops in Finland, since 1799, Lithuanian and since 1801 - St. Petersburg military governor. In 1805, he was appointed commander-in-chief of one of the Russian armies in the war with Napoleon I. In October of the same year, he made a retreat march from Braunau to Olmutz and, having defeated the French near Amstetten and Dürenstein, withdrew his troops from the looming threat of encirclement. Participant in the Battle of Austerlitz in 1805. For courage shown in battles against French troops, he was awarded the Order of St. Vladimir, 1st degree.

During the Russian-Turkish War of 1806-1812. Kutuzov, being the commander-in-chief of the Moldavian army (April 1811 - May 1812), inflicted a crushing defeat on the Turkish troops in the Battle of Rushchuk (1811). At the beginning of the Patriotic War of 1812, he was elected head of the St. Petersburg and then Moscow militia. Since August, the commander-in-chief of the entire Russian army led the Battle of Borodino. After leaving Moscow, Kutuzov secretly carried out the flanking Tarutino maneuver and brought the army out from under enemy attack, skillfully controlled the Russian troops in the battle on the river. Chernishnya and in the battle of Maloyaroslavets in October 1812, and then inflicted a crushing defeat on the French army on the river. Berezina. For his high military leadership, Kutuzov received the title of Prince of Smolensk and was awarded the Order of St. George, 1st degree. Since January 1813, commander-in-chief of the Russian army, which began its campaign in Western Europe.

Mikhail Illarionovich Golenishchev-Kutuzov, His Serene Highness Prince of the Russian Empire, with the title of Smolensky, Field Marshal of the Russian and Prussian armies, member of the State Council, and orders: Russian, St. Andrew with Diamonds, St. Alexander Nevsky, St. George 1st degree, St. Vladimir 1st degree, St. Anne 1st degree, St. John of Jerusalem Grand Cross, Austrian Maria Theresa 1st degree and Prussian Black Eagle cavalier, who had a gold sword with diamonds and an emerald laurel wreath and a portrait of Emperor Alexander, decorated with diamonds, was born on September 5 1745. The Kutuzov family belonged to the honorary families of the Russian nobility. The “honest husband Gabriel,” the founder of the Kutuzovs, who left “Germany” under Alexander Nevsky, was the founder of the Kutuzovs, one of whom, in contrast, took the name Golenishchev-Kutuzov.

Having learned about Napoleon's entry into Russia, Kutuzov considered it obligatory to come to the capital from his estate, where he had been after the conclusion of peace with Turkey. Aware of his merits, he was entrusted with command of the troops in St. Petersburg. In July, Moscow and St. Petersburg at the same time elected Kutuzov as the head of their militia squads. Upon the arrival of Emperor Alexander I, Kutuzov was elevated to princely dignity, with the title of His Serene Highness, and appointed a member of the State Council, and on August 8 he was appointed commander-in-chief of all armies operating against Napoleon. A confrontation between two huge armies, unprecedented in history, began, ending with the complete expulsion of Napoleonic troops. The highest honors marked the exploits of Kutuzov: the rank of field marshal, 100,000 rubles and the title of state lady to his wife for the Battle of Borodino, a golden sword with diamonds and a laurel wreath of emeralds for the Battle of Tarutino; title Smolensky for the battles near Smolensk, the Order of St. George, 1st degree, diamond insignia of the Order of St. Andrew for expelling the enemy from Russia. Russian troops crossed the Neman. The cities surrendered one after another. On February 14, the alliance with Prussia was renewed and the commander-in-chief of the Prussian army, Blucher, submitted to Kutuzov. But, returning from a meeting between Emperor Alexander and the King of Prussia, on April 5, 1813, Kutuzov caught a cold, took to his bed and died on April 16, at 68 years old.

Kutuzov was of average height, obese, slow in his movements, healthy until his old age, despite his labors and serious wounds. He belonged to the most educated people of his century, had extensive knowledge, spoke French, German and Polish, and loved to relax by reading. His military knowledge and experience were extraordinary. He was fully familiar with the positions of engineer, quartermaster and commissar (at that time the position involved in supplying troops), having experienced them himself. His distinctive features were secrecy, cunning and independence. Not tolerating other people's advice, he never argued or contradicted, and he mastered the art of getting along with others to an amazing degree. Kutuzov's courage was unshakable, but all the impressions of love and friendship were available to him.

Field Marshal General, His Serene Highness Prince Mikhail Illarionovich Golenishchev-Kutuzov-Smolensky - an outstanding commander, a talented diplomat, an outstanding administrator, skilled educator.

Introduction

Analysis of the enormous, very complex historical figure of Kutuzov sometimes gets lost in the motley mass of facts depicting the war of 1812 as a whole. At the same time, Kutuzov’s figure, if not hidden at all, sometimes turns pale, his features seem to blur. Kutuzov was a Russian hero, a great patriot, a great commander, which is known to everyone, and a great diplomat, which is not known to everyone.

The historical merit of Kutuzov, who against the will of the Tsar, against the will of even part of his staff, brushing aside the slanderous attacks of foreigners like Wilson, Wolzogen, Winzengerode who interfered in his affairs, carried out and implemented his idea, emerges especially clearly. Valuable new materials prompted historians dealing with 1812 to begin to identify their shortcomings and errors, omissions and inaccuracies, to revise previously established opinions about Kutuzov’s strategy, the significance of his counteroffensive, about Tarutin, Maloyaroslavets, Krasny, as well as about the beginning of the foreign campaign of 1813 city, about which we know very little, which is the fault of almost all the literature about 1812, including my old book, where only a very few cursory remarks are devoted to this campaign. Meanwhile, the first four months of 1813 provide a lot for characterizing Kutuzov’s strategy and show how the counteroffensive turned into a direct offensive with the precisely set goal of destroying the aggressor and subsequently overthrowing Napoleonic’s grandiose predatory “world monarchy.” One very interesting observation should be noted.

Foreign historians writing about 1812 in Russia use the method of defamation, malicious and dishonest criticism less and less often than the method of complete silence. Let me give you a typical case. Let's take the four-volume newest "History of Military Art within the Framework of Political History", written by prof. Hans Delbrück. We are opening the fourth, weighty, dedicated to the 19th century. volume, especially the chapter "Napoleon's Strategy". We are looking for the name Kutuzov in a very well compiled index, but we do not find it at all. About 1812, on page 386 we read: “The real problem of Napoleonic strategy is the campaign of 1812. Napoleon defeated the Russians at Borodino, took Moscow, was forced to retreat and during the retreat lost almost his entire army.” It turns out that if in Napoleon’s place the Privy Councilor Prof. G. Delbrück, Russia would have come to an end: “Wouldn’t Napoleon have acted better if in 1812 he had turned to a strategy of attrition and waged the war according to Frederick’s method?”

In my work I want to show the role that Kutuzov played in the history of Russia, as well as the main stages of his entire life’s journey until 1812, which brought him immortality.

Kutuzov the diplomat

Kutuzov's intelligence and military prowess were recognized by both his comrades and superiors already in the first years of his military service, which he began at age 19. He fought in Rumyantsev’s troops, near Larga, near Cahul, and then with his unheard-of bravery he made people talk about him. He was the first to rush into the attack and the last to stop pursuing the enemy. At the end of the first Turkish war, he was dangerously wounded and only by some miracle (as both the Russian and German doctors who treated him believed) escaped with only the loss of an eye. Catherine ordered him to be sent to the government account for treatment abroad. This rather long trip played a role in his life. Kutuzov greedily pounced on reading and greatly expanded his education. Returning to Russia, he came to the Empress to thank her. And then Catherine gave him an assignment that was unusually suited to his natural abilities: she sent him to Crimea to help Suvorov, who was then performing a task that was not very characteristic of him: conducting diplomatic negotiations with the Crimean Tatars.

It was necessary to support Shagin-Girey against Devlet-Girey and diplomatically complete the establishment of Russian rule in Crimea. Suvorov, who openly said that he did not like to engage in diplomacy, immediately left all these delicate political matters to Kutuzov, which he carried out to perfection. Here, for the first time, Kutuzov discovered such an ability to deal with people, to unravel their intentions, to fight against the enemy’s intrigues without bringing the dispute to a bloody conclusion, and, most importantly, to achieve complete success, remaining with the enemy personally in the most “friendly” relations that Suvorov had from him excited.

For several years, until the annexation of Crimea and the end of the unrest there, Kutuzov was involved in the political development of Crimea. The combination in Kutuzov of unbridled, often simply insane courage with the qualities of a cautious, restrained, outwardly charming, subtle diplomat was noticed by Catherine. When she was in the Crimea in 1787, Kutuzov - then already a general - showed her such horse riding experiences that the Empress publicly reprimanded him: “You must take care of yourself, I forbid you to ride mad horses and I will never forgive you if I will hear that you are not following my orders.” But the reprimand had little effect. On August 18, 1788, near Ochakov, Kutuzov, rushing towards the enemy, was ahead of his soldiers. The Austrian general, Prince de Ligne, informed Emperor Joseph about this in the following terms: “Yesterday they shot Kutuzov in the head again. I think he will die today or tomorrow.” The wound was terrible and, most importantly, almost in the same place as the first time, but Kutuzov again escaped death. Having barely recovered, three and a half months later Kutuzov already took part in the assault and capture of Ochakov and did not miss a single big battle in 1789 - 1790. Of course, he took direct personal part in the assault on Ishmael. Near Izmail, Kutuzov commanded the sixth column of the left wing of the assaulting army. Having overcome “all the cruel fire of grapeshot and rifle shots,” this column, “soon descending into the ditch, climbed the stairs to the rampart, despite all the difficulties, and took possession of the bastion; the worthy and brave major general and cavalier Golenishchev-Kutuzov, with his courage, was an example to his subordinates and fought with the enemy.” Having taken part in this hand-to-hand battle, Kutuzov called up the Kherson regiment from the reserves, repulsed the enemy, and his column with two others that followed it “laid the foundation of victory.”

Suvorov ends his report about Kutuzov this way: “Major General and Cavalier Golenishchev-Kutuzov showed new experiments in his art and courage, overcoming all difficulties under strong enemy fire, climbed the rampart, captured the bastion and, when the excellent enemy forced him to stop, he, serving example of courage, held the place, overcame a strong enemy, established himself in the fortress and then continued to defeat the enemies.”

In his report, Suvorov does not report that when Kutuzov stopped and was pressed by the Turks, he sent to ask the commander-in-chief for reinforcements, but he did not send any reinforcements, but ordered to announce to Kutuzov that he was appointing him commandant of Izmail. The commander-in-chief knew in advance that Kutuzov would rush into the city with his column even without reinforcements.

After Izmail, Kutuzov participated with distinction in the Polish war. He was already about 50 years old at that time. However, he was never given a completely independent post, where he could really fully show his strength. Catherine, however, no longer let Kutuzov out of sight, and on October 25, 1792, he was unexpectedly appointed envoy to Constantinople. On the way to Constantinople, deliberately not in a hurry to arrive at his destination, Kutuzov vigilantly observed the Turkish population, collected various information about the people and saw in them not the belligerence that frightened the Turkish authorities, but, “on the contrary, a warm desire for peace.”

On September 26, 1793, that is, 11 months after the rescript on October 25, 1792, appointing him envoy, Kutuzov entered Constantinople. Kutuzov remained in the rank of envoy until Catherine’s decree of November 30, 1793 on the transfer of all affairs of the embassy to the new envoy, V.P. Kochubey. In fact, Kutuzov left Constantinople only in March 1794.

The tasks of his diplomatic mission in Constantinople were limited, but not easy. It was necessary to prevent the conclusion of an alliance between France and Turkey and thereby eliminate the danger of the French fleet penetrating the Black Sea. At the same time, it was necessary to collect information about the Slavic and Greek subjects of Turkey, and most importantly, to ensure the preservation of peace with the Turks. All these goals were achieved during his actual stay in the Turkish capital (from September 1793 to March 1794).

After the Constantinople mission, there was some break in Kutuzov’s military career and diplomatic activities. He held responsible positions: he was the Kazan and Vyatka governor-general, commander of the ground forces, commander of the flotilla in Finland, and in 1798 he went to Berlin to help Prince Repnin, who was sent to eliminate or at least weaken the dangerous consequences of a separate peace for Russia Prussia and France. He, in fact, did all the required diplomatic work for Repnin and achieved some important results: Prussia did not conclude an alliance with France. Pavel trusted him so much that on December 14, 1800, he appointed him to an important post: Kutuzov was to command the Ukrainian, Brest and Dniester “inspections” in the event of a war against Austria. But Paul was gone; under Alexander, the political situation gradually began to change, and Kutuzov’s official position changed just as significantly. Alexander, who first appointed Kutuzov as the St. Petersburg military governor, suddenly, completely unexpectedly, on August 29, 1802, dismissed him from this position, and Kutuzov spent 3 years in the village, away from business. Let us note that the tsar disliked him even then, contrary to the false view that Kutuzov fell into disgrace only after Austerlitz. But, as we will see, in Kutuzov’s career under Alexander I, disgraces alternated in a fairly regular order; when Kutuzov was removed from business or sometimes given significant civilian positions, and then just as unexpectedly called up to the highest military post. Alexander may not have liked Kutuzov, but he needed Kutuzov's intelligence and talent and his reputation in the army, where he was considered Suvorov's direct heir.

In 1805, the war of the third coalition against Napoleon began, and an emergency courier from the tsar was sent to Kutuzov’s village. Kutuzov was offered to be the commander-in-chief on the decisive sector of the front against the French army, which was under the command of Napoleon himself.

If, of all the wars waged by Kutuzov, there was a war that could be called a vivid example of the criminal interference of two crowned mediocrities at the disposal of a highly talented strategist, an unceremonious, persistent and extremely harmful intervention, then it was the war of 1805, the war of the third coalition against Napoleon, which Alexander I and Franz I, completely disregarding the direct instructions and plans of Kutuzov, lost shamefully. With a lightning maneuver, having encircled and captured in Ulm perhaps the best army the Austrians had ever had until then, Napoleon immediately began to take action against Kutuzov. Kutuzov knew (and reported to Alexander) that after Ulm Napoleon had his hands completely free and that he had three times as many troops. The only way to avoid the Ulm disaster was to hastily go east, to Vienna, and, if necessary, beyond Vienna. But, in the opinion of Franz, to whom Alexander fully joined, Kutuzov and his soldiers had to defend Vienna at any cost. Fortunately, Kutuzov did not carry out senseless and disastrous advice, if only this opportunity was presented to him, that is, if the highest adviser was absent at the moment.

Kutuzov emerged from a desperate situation. Firstly, he, completely unexpectedly for Napoleon, gave a sharp rebuff to the advancing army: he defeated Napoleon’s advanced corps at Amstetten, and while Marshal Mortier was recovering, he stood in his way at Krems and here he already dealt Mortier a very strong blow. Napoleon, being on the other side of the Danube, did not have time to help Mortier. The defeat of the French was complete. But the danger was not over. Napoleon took Vienna without a fight and again chased Kutuzov. Never had the Russian army been so close to the danger of being defeated or capitulated as at this moment. But the Russians were not commanded by the Ulm Makk, but by the Izmailian Kutuzov, under whose command was the Izmailian Bagration. Murat was chasing Kutuzov, who needed to delay the Russians in any way, even for the shortest time, so that they would not have time to join the Russian army stationed in Olmutz. Murat started imaginary peace negotiations.

But it is not enough to be a dashing cavalry general and a grunt to deceive Kutuzov. From the very first moment, Kutuzov figured out Murat’s cunning and, immediately agreeing to “negotiations,” he himself even more accelerated the movement of his army to the east, to Olmutz. Kutuzov, of course, understood that in a day or two the French would realize that there were no negotiations and would not be, and would attack the Russians. But he knew to whom he entrusted the difficult task of serving as a barrier from the advancing French army. Bagration already stood between Gollabrun and Shengraben. Bagration had a corps of 6 thousand people, Murat had four, if not five times more, and Bagration spent the whole day delaying the fiercely fighting enemy, and although he killed a lot of his own, he also killed a lot of the French and left, not disturbed by them. During this time, Kutuzov had already retreated to Olmutz, followed by Bagration.

It was here that the criminal game against Kutuzov and the truly sabotage role of Alexander and another monarch, Franz, who, by the grace of God, promoted himself to commander, were fully revealed.

Nothing showed Kutuzov’s rich and versatile talent so clearly as in his ability not only to clearly understand the general political situation in which he had to wage war, but also to subordinate all other strategic and tactical considerations to a common political goal. This was not Kutuzov’s weakness, which both open enemies and secret envious people who stung his heel wanted to see in him. On the contrary, this was his mighty strength.

It is enough to recall this particular tragedy of 1805 - the Austerlitz campaign. After all, when hostilities began and when, despite all the gentle entreaties, and then quite transparent threats, despite all the vulgar comedy of the oath of eternal Russian-Prussian friendship over the tomb of Frederick the Great, so often and so painfully beaten by Russian troops, Frederick William III nevertheless refused to immediately join the coalition, then Alexander I and his then minister Adam Czartoryski, and the dull-witted Franz I from birth looked at this as a somewhat annoying diplomatic failure, but that’s all. And Kutuzov, as was immediately clear from all his actions, saw in this a threat of losing the entire campaign. He knew then and expressed this more than once that without the immediate joining of the Prussian army to the coalition, the only reasonable option left for the allies was to retreat to the Ore Mountains, spend the winter there in safety and prolong the war, i.e., do exactly what Napoleon feared.

When hostilities resumed in the spring, circumstances could either remain without significant changes, or become better if during this time Prussia finally decided to end its hesitation and join the coalition. But, in any case, Kutuzov’s decision was preferable to the decision to immediately dare to go against Napoleon, which would mean going towards an almost certain disaster. Kutuzov’s diplomatic sensitivity made him believe that as the war dragged on, Prussia might finally realize how much more profitable it was to join the coalition than to maintain neutrality, which was disastrous for it.

Why was the battle given, despite all Kutuzov’s admonitions? Yes, first of all, because Kutuzov’s opponents at military meetings in Olmutz - Alexander I, the tsar’s favorite, the arrogant helipad Pyotr Dolgorukov, the mediocre Austrian military theorist Weyrother - suffered from that most dangerous disease, which is called underestimating the strength and abilities of the enemy. For several days at the end of November 1805, Napoleon exhausted himself to instill in his allies the impression that he had an army exhausted in previous battles and was therefore timid and avoiding a decisive confrontation in every possible way. Weyrother thoughtfully said that it is necessary to do what the enemy considers undesirable. And therefore, having received such authoritative support from a representative of Western European military science, Alexander finally believed that here, on the Moravian fields, he was destined to reap his first military laurels. Only Kutuzov did not agree with these fanfares and explained to them that Napoleon was clearly playing a comedy, that he was not at all a coward, and if he was really afraid of anything, it was only the retreat of the allied army into the mountains and the prolongation of the war.

But Kutuzov’s efforts to keep the allied army from fighting did not help. The battle was fought, and the complete defeat of the allied army at Austerlitz followed on December 2, 1805.

It was after Austerlitz that Alexander I’s hatred of Kutuzov increased immeasurably. The Tsar could not help but understand, of course, that all the terrible efforts of both himself and the court hangers-on around him to blame Kutuzov for the defeat remained in vain, because Kutuzov was not at all inclined to accept the grave sin and guilt for the useless death of thousands of people and a horrific defeat. But the Russians, after Suvorov, were not accustomed to defeats. But at the same time, there was not a single military man near the tsar who could compare with Kutuzov in his intelligence and strategic talent. First of all, there was no person with such enormous and lasting authority in the army as Kutuzov.

Of course, contemporaries understood - and this could not but be especially unpleasant for Alexander I - that the already great military prestige of Kutuzov increased even more after Austerlitz, because absolutely everyone in Russia and in Europe who was in any way interested in the ongoing diplomatic and military struggle coalition against Napoleon, it was absolutely known that the Austerlitz disaster occurred solely because Weyrother’s absurd plan prevailed and that Alexander criminally neglected the advice of Kutuzov, which he had no right to ignore, not only moral, but also formal, because official It was Kutuzov who was the commander-in-chief of the allied army in the fateful time of Austerlitz. But, of course, the Austrians were most to blame for the disaster.

After Austerlitz, Kutuzov was in complete disgrace, and just so that the enemy could not see in this disgrace an admission of defeat, the former commander-in-chief was nevertheless appointed (in October 1806) as the Kiev military governor. Kutuzov's friends were insulted on his behalf. This seemed to them worse than complete resignation.

But he did not have to remain governor for long. In 1806 - 1807 During a very difficult war with Napoleon, when, after the complete defeat of Prussia, Napoleon won a victory at Friedland and achieved the Peace of Tilsit, which was unfavorable for Russia, Alexander learned from bitter experience that he could not do without Kutuzov. And Kutuzov, forgotten during the war of 1806 - 1807. with the French, was summoned from Kyiv so that he could improve matters in another war, which Russia continued to wage even after Tilsit - in the war against Turkey.

Russia's war against Turkey, which began back in 1806, turned out to be a difficult war and little successful. During this time, Russia had to go through the difficult situation created in 1806 after Austerlitz, when Russia did not make peace with Napoleon and was left without allies, and then at the end of 1806 it again had to begin hostilities, marked by big battles (Pultusk, Preusisch -Eylau, Friedland) and ending with Tilsit. The Turks did not make peace, hoping for open, and after Tilsit, secret help from Russia’s newly-minted “ally” - Napoleon.

The situation was difficult. The Commander-in-Chief of the Danube Army, Prozorovsky, could not do anything and had been anxiously awaiting the onset of the Turks since the beginning of spring. The war with Turkey dragged on, and, as always in difficult cases, they turned to Kutuzov for help, and he turned from the Kiev governor into the assistant commander-in-chief of the Danube Army, and in fact into Prozorovsky’s successor. In Iasi in the spring of 1808, Kutuzov met with Napoleon's envoy, General Sebastiani, who was traveling to Constantinople. Kutuzov charmed the French general and, relying on the then “allied” relations between Russia and France, managed to obtain confirmation of a very serious diplomatic secret, which, however, was not news to Kutuzov - that Napoleon was playing a double game in Constantinople and, contrary to the Tilsit promises made to Russia, will not leave Turkey without help.

Kutuzov very soon quarreled with Prozorovsky, an incompetent commander, who, contrary to Kutuzov’s advice, gave a big battle in order to capture Brailov and lost it. After this, angry not with himself, but with Kutuzov, Prozorovsky tried to get rid of Kutuzov, and Alexander, who always readily listened to any slandered Kutuzov, removed him from the Danube and appointed him Lithuanian military governor. It is characteristic that, saying goodbye to Kutuzov, the soldiers cried.

But they said goodbye to him for a relatively short time. The failures on the Danube continued, and again we had to ask Kutuzov to improve matters. On March 15, 1811, Kutuzov was appointed commander-in-chief of the Danube Army. The situation was difficult, completely ruined by his immediate predecessor, Count N.M. Kamensky, who turned out to be even worse than Prozorovsky, who had been removed before this.

Military critics who wrote the history of the war on the Danube unanimously agree that Kutuzov’s brilliant strategic talent unfolded to its full extent in this campaign. He had less than 46 thousand people, the Turks - more than 70 thousand. Kutuzov prepared for a long time and diligently for an attack on the main forces of the Turks. At the same time, he had to take into account the changed situation in Europe. Napoleon was no longer just an unreliable ally, as he was in 1808. Now, in 1811, he was definitely an enemy, ready to throw off his mask any day now. After long preparations and negotiations, skillfully conducted in order to gain time, on June 22, 1811, Kutuzov again inflicted a heavy defeat on the Turkish vizier near Rushchuk. The position of the Russian troops became better, but still continued to remain critical. The Turks, incited by the French envoy Sebastiani, intended to fight and fight. Only peace with Turkey could liberate. The Danube Army for the upcoming war with Napoleon, and after the deliberately rude scene Napoleon staged for Ambassador Kurakin on August 15, 1811, no one in Europe had any doubts about the proximity of war.

And it was here that Kutuzov succeeded in something that, under similar conditions, no one had ever succeeded in and which, of course, puts Kutuzov in the first rank of people glorified in the history of diplomatic art. Throughout the history of Imperial Russia, there was certainly no more talented diplomat than Kutuzov. What Kutuzov did in the spring of 1812. after long and difficult negotiations, it would have been beyond the power of even the most outstanding professional diplomat, like, for example, A. M. Gorchakov, not to mention Alexander I, an amateur diplomat. “Now he is a collegiate assessor for foreign affairs,” - A. S. Pushkin awarded the Tsar with such a modest rank.

Napoleon had well-organized diplomatic and military espionage in Turkey and spent large sums on this organization. He more than once expressed the opinion that when you hire a good spy, there is no point in haggling with him about remuneration. In this regard, Kutuzov in Moldova had nothing at his disposal that could be seriously compared with the funds allocated by Napoleon for this matter. However, precise facts indicate that Kutuzov knew the situation in which he had to fight on the Danube much better than Napoleon. Kutuzov never made such truly monstrous mistakes in his calculations as the French emperor did, who quite seriously hoped that the hundred-thousand-strong Turkish army would not only victoriously push Kutuzov away from the Danube, from the Dniester, from the upper reaches of the Dnieper, but would also approach the Western Dvina and here he will join his army. Kutuzov received much fewer documents from military informants than Napoleon received, but Kutuzov knew how to read and understand them much better.

In the 5 years that have passed since the beginning of the Russian-Turkish war, despite the partial successes of the Russians, it was still not possible to force the Turks to peace. But what all his predecessors, from Mikhelson to Kamensky, failed to achieve, Kutuzov succeeded.

This was his plan. The war will be over and can be over, but only after a complete victory over the large army of the great “supreme” vizier. Vizier Akhmet Bey had about 75 thousand people: in Shumla - 50 thousand and near Sofia - 25 thousand; Kutuzov has a little more than 46 thousand people in the Moldovan army. The Turks began negotiations, but Kutuzov understood very well that it was only a question of delaying hostilities. Blackmailing Kutuzov, the vizier and Hamid Effendi really counted on the compliance of the Russians in view of the proximity of Russia's war with Napoleon and demanded that the border between Russia and Turkey be the Dniester River. Kutuzov's response, as stated, was a big battle near Rushchuk, crowned by the complete victory of the Russian troops on June 22, 1811. Following this, Kutuzov ordered, leaving Rushchuk, to blow up the fortifications. But the Turks still continued the war. Kutuzov deliberately allowed them to cross the Danube. “Let them cross, if only more of them would cross to our shore,” said Kutuzov, according to the testimony of his associate and then historian Mikhailovsky-Danilevsky. Kutuzov besieged the vizier’s camp, and the besieged, having learned that the Russians had so far taken Turtukai and Silistria (October 10 and 11), without lifting the siege, realized that they were in danger of complete extermination if they did not surrender. The vizier secretly fled from his camp and began negotiations. And on November 26, 1811, the remnants of the starving Turkish army surrendered to the Russians.

Napoleon did not know the extent of his indignation. “Understand these dogs, these idiotic Turks! They have the gift of being beaten. Who could have expected and foreseen such nonsense?” - this is how the French emperor shouted beside himself. He did not foresee then that only a few months would pass, and the same Kutuzov would destroy the “great army,” which would be under the leadership of someone stronger than the Grand Vizier...

And immediately, having completed the military part of his program with complete success, Kutuzov the diplomat completed the work begun by Kutuzov the commander.

The negotiations, which opened in mid-October, predictably dragged on inordinately. After all, it was the possibly longer delay of peace negotiations that was the Turks’ main chance to soften Russian conditions. Napoleon did absolutely everything in his power to convince the Sultan not to sign peace terms, because not today or tomorrow the French would raid Russia and the Russians would make all concessions in order to free the Moldavian army. October, November, December passed, and the peace negotiations remained at a frozen point. The Turks proposed, however, not the Dniester, but the Prut as the Russian-Turkish border, but Kutuzov did not want to hear about that.

Projects were coming from St. Petersburg to carry out a demonstration against Constantinople, and on February 16, 1812, Alexander even signed a rescript to Kutuzov that, in his opinion, it was necessary to “carry out a strong blow under the walls of Tsaryagrad with combined sea and land forces.” However, nothing came of this project. Kutuzov considered it more realistic to disturb the Turks with small land expeditions.

Spring arrived, which complicated the situation. Firstly, the plague broke out in places in Turkey, and secondly, Napoleonic armies gradually began to move into the territory between the Oder and the Vistula. The Tsar was already on the verge of agreeing to recognize the Prut as a border, but demanded that Kutuzov insist on signing a union treaty between Turkey and Russia. Kutuzov knew that the Turks would not agree to this, but he convinced the Turkish commissioners that the moment had come for Turkey when the question of life or death was being decided for them: if the Turks did not immediately sign peace with Russia, then Napoleon would not care if he succeeded in Russia will turn against the Turkish Empire and, upon concluding peace with Alexander, will receive consent from Russia to occupy Turkey. If Napoleon offers reconciliation to Russia, then, naturally, Turkey will be divided between Russia and France. This argument had a very strong effect on the Turks, and they already agreed to recognize the Prut as a border until it merges with the Danube and that the further border would run along the left bank of the Danube until it flows into the Black Sea. However, Kutuzov decided to fully exploit the mood of the Turks and demanded that the Turks cede Bessarabia with the fortresses of Izmail, Bendery, Khotyn, Kiliya and Akkerman to Russia forever. In Asia, the borders remained as they were before the war, but according to a secret article, Russia held all the Transcaucasian lands that voluntarily joined it, as well as a 40-kilometer strip of coastline. Thus, a wonderful diplomat, as Kutuzov always was, not only freed the Moldavian army for the upcoming war with Napoleon, but also acquired vast and rich territory for Russia.

Kutuzov used all the efforts of his enormous intelligence and diplomatic subtlety. He managed to assure the Turks that the war between Napoleon and Russia had not yet been finally resolved, but that if Turkey did not reconcile with Russia in time, then Napoleon would again resume friendly relations with Alexander, and then both emperors would divide Turkey in half. And what was later defined in Europe as a diplomatic “paradox” came true. On May 16, 1812, after negotiations that lasted for many months, peace was concluded in Bucharest: Russia not only freed its entire Danube army for the war against Napoleon, but in addition it received from Turkey all of Bessarabia for eternal possession. But that’s not all: Russia actually received almost the entire seashore from the mouth of the Rion to Anapa.

Having learned that the Turks had signed a peace treaty in Bucharest on May 16 (28), 1812, Napoleon finally exhausted the vocabulary of French curses. He could not understand how Kutuzov managed to persuade the Sultan to accept such an incredibly beneficial peace for the Russians at the most dangerous moment for Russia, when it was they, and not the Turks, who absolutely needed to rush to end the war.

This was the first blow inflicted on Napoleon by Kutuzov the diplomat almost three and a half months before Kutuzov the strategist dealt him a second blow on the Borodino field.

Kutuzov the strategist

Subsequently, Prince Vyazemsky, recalling this time, used to say that anyone who did not live during these years of Napoleon’s unrestrained rule over Europe could not fully imagine how difficult and anxious it was to live in Russia in those years about which his friend, A.S. Pushkin wrote: “The storm of the twelfth year was still subsiding, Napoleon had not yet tested the great people, he still threatened and hesitated.”

Kutuzov, more clearly than anyone, imagined the danger that threatened the Russian people. And when he had to wage war on the Danube in this critical, pre-storm time, his high talent as a strategist allowed him to consistently resolve, one after another, those issues that for 6 years all his predecessors had been stumped by, and the breadth of his political horizons covered not only the Danube , but also the Neman, and the Vistula, and the Dniester. He recognized not only the already completely clarified enemy - Napoleon, but also not yet fully clarified “friends” like Franz of Austria, King Frederick William III of Prussia, Lord Liverpool and Castlereagh.

Subsequently, Napoleon said that if he had foreseen how the Turks would behave in Bucharest and the Swedes in Stockholm, he would not have opposed Russia in 1812. But now it was too late to repent.

War broke out. The enemy entered Smolensk and moved from there straight to Moscow. Unrest among the people, anxiety and irritation among the nobility, the absurd behavior of the headless Maria Feodorovna and the courtiers, delirious about the evacuation of St. Petersburg - all this during the first days of August 1812 sowed anxiety, which grew more and more. The same incessant cry came from everywhere: “Kutuzova!”

“Justifying himself” to his sister, Ekaterina Pavlovna, who in the same way did not understand Kutuzov, did not love and did not appreciate him, like her brother, Alexander wrote that he “resisted” Kutuzov’s appointment, but was forced to yield to the pressure of public opinion and “ choose the one whom the general voice pointed to.”

We have a lot of news about what was happening among the people, in the army, with just one rumor about Kutuzov’s appointment, and then upon his arrival in the army. It would be inaccurate and inappropriate to use the word “popularity” in this case. The unshakable faith of people, deeply shocked by a terrible danger, that a savior had suddenly appeared - this is how one can call this feeling that has irresistibly taken possession of the masses. “They say that people greet him everywhere with indescribable delight. All the inhabitants of the cities come out to meet them, unharness their horses, and carry a carriage; the ancient elders force their grandchildren to kiss his feet; mothers carry out their babies, fall to their knees and lift them to the sky! All the people call him the savior.”

On August 8, 1812, Alexander was forced to sign a decree appointing Kutuzov as commander-in-chief of the Russian armies operating against the enemy, on which the general opinion of the army and people imperatively insisted. And exactly 6 days later, on August 14, stopping at the Yazhembitsy station on the way to the active army, Kutuzov wrote to P.V. Chichagov, the chief commander of the Danube Army, a letter unusually characteristic of Kutuzov. This letter is one of the remarkable evidence of the entire breadth of the Eagle's horizons and the always close connection between the strategic plan and the actions of this commander, no matter what front, main or secondary, he commanded. Kutuzov wrote to Chichagov that the enemy was already near Dorogobuzh, and drew a direct conclusion from this: “From these circumstances, you can easily see that it is impossible now to think about any sabotage, but everything that we have, except for the first and second armies, must would act on the enemy’s right flank in order to solely stop his desire. The longer circumstances change in the same way as they have now, the more necessary the rapprochement of the Danube Army with the main forces becomes.” But all the efforts of Kutuzov in April and all the conditions of the peace concluded by Kutuzov on May 16, 1812 tended to ensure that those who were destined for a formidable meeting with Napoleon would have the right and opportunity to count on the Danube Army. The letter to Chichagov at the same time exposes concern: lest this man, always consumed by ambition and envy, decide to launch the Danube Army liberated by Kutuzov on any risky, and most importantly, unnecessary adventures against Schwarzenberg. The strategist Kutuzov knew for sure that the Danube Army would sooner be able to join the Russian troops operating between Dorogobuzh and Mozhaisk than Schwarzenberg would be able to reach Napoleon’s army. And the diplomat Kutuzov foresaw that although Napoleon’s “alliance” with his father-in-law was beneficial to the French emperor in that it would force Alexander to divert part of the Russian forces to the southwest, but that in fact the Austrians would not play any real role in any military clashes.

That is why Kutuzov needed, and as quickly as possible, the Danube Army on his left flank, which, as he foresaw a few days before arriving at the theater of operations, the most terrible blow from Napoleon’s right flank would certainly be directed.

The moment was approaching when the commander-in-chief had to make sure that the tsar’s favorite Chichagov would not pay the slightest attention to the request of his predecessor in command of the Danube Army and that if any significant help and increase in the size of the army defending the Moscow road could be expected, it would be almost exclusively from the Moscow and Smolensk militia.

No matter how much I would like to give here only the most concise, most general description of Kutuzov’s military achievements, but, speaking about Borodin, we would have made a completely unacceptable omission if we had not paid attention to the following. In the foreground of history at this formidable moment stood two adversaries facing each other, both aware of the incredible significance of what was at stake. Both made every effort to gain numerical superiority at the decisive moment. But one of them is Napoleon, for whom it is enough to order that everything that depends on human will be carried out immediately and unquestioningly. And the other - Kutuzov, whom, however, the tsar “most mercifully” appointed the supposedly unlimited ruler and manager of all Russian armed forces operating against Napoleon, found himself at every step shackled, hampered and constrained precisely in this oppressively important question of the size of the army. He demands that he be given newly formed regiments as soon as possible, and receives from Alexander the following: “Regarding the order you mentioned about the annexation of newly formed regiments from Prince Lobanov-Rostovsky, I find it impossible to carry out.”

Kutuzov knew that, in addition to two armies, Bagration and Barclay, which came under his personal direct command on August 19 in Tsarev-Zaimishche, he had three more armies: Tormasov, Chichagov and Wittgenstein, which were formally obliged to obey him just as unquestioningly and immediately, as, for example, his marshals obeyed Napoleon. Yes, formally, but not actually. Kutuzov knew that the tsar could and would command them, and he himself could not command them, but only exhort and persuade them to quickly come to him to save Moscow and Russia. This is what he writes to Tormasov: “You will agree with me that in these critical moments for Russia, while the enemy is in the heart of Russia, the subject of your actions can no longer include the defense and preservation of our remote Polish provinces.” This call remained a voice crying in the desert: Tormasov’s army was united with Chichagov’s army and placed under the command of Chichagov. Kutuzov wrote to Chichagov: “Having arrived in the army, I found an enemy in the heart of ancient Russia, so to speak, near Moscow. My real subject is the salvation of Moscow itself, and therefore I have no need to explain that the preservation of some remote Polish provinces cannot be compared with the salvation of the ancient capital of Moscow and the inner provinces themselves.”

Chichagov did not even think of immediately responding to the call. The most interesting thing happened with the third (of these former “on the fly” from the main Kutuzov forces) army - Wittgenstein. “The order given by Kutuzov to Count Wittgenstein was not found in the affairs,” Mikhailovsky-Danilevsky, who never reproaches Alexander for anything, delicately notes.

The Borodino victory was needed, a victorious, continuous counter-offensive destroying the French army was needed with a four-day terrifying defeat of the best Napoleonic corps at Krasnoye, a gigantically increased authority of the first and absolutely indisputable winner of Napoleon was needed, so that Kutuzov would have the actual opportunity to take everything without exception under his imperious hand “Western” Russian troops and so that Alexander would be convinced that he could no longer completely freely prevent Chichagov and Wittgenstein from carrying out the orders of the commander-in-chief. Tormasov, having lost the command of his (3rd Observation) army, arrived at the main apartment and valiantly served and helped Kutuzov.

Fetters, obstacles, traps and intrigues of all kinds, the tsar’s unceremonious, daring intervention in military orders, the disobedience of the generals encouraged from above - all this was overcome by two powerful forces: the boundless faith of the people and army in Kutuzov and the incomparable talents of this true luminary of Russian strategy and tactics. The Russian army retreated to the east, but it retreated fighting, inflicting heavy losses on the enemy.

But before the radiant days of complete triumph, the army still had to endure a lot: it was necessary to stand on a long August day knee-deep in blood on the Borodino field, to walk away from the capital, looking back at the distant burning Moscow, it was necessary to see off the uninvited in the harshest conditions in a long counter-offensive guests with a bayonet and a bullet.

The digital readings given in the materials of the Military Scientific Archive (“Patriotic War of 1812”, vol. XVI. Combat operations in 1812, No. 129) are as follows: “On this day, the Russian army had under arms: line troops with artillery 95 thousand, Cossacks - 7 thousand, Moscow militia - 7 thousand and Smolensk militia - 3 thousand. In total, 112 thousand people are under arms.” This army had 640 artillery pieces. On the day of Borodin, Napoleon had more than 185 thousand troops with artillery. But both the young guard (20 thousand people) and the old guard with its cavalry (10 thousand people) were in reserve all the time and did not directly participate in the battle.

French sources admit that about 135 - 140 thousand people took direct part in the battle, even if we do not count the old and young guards at all, on the French side.

It should be noted that Kutuzov himself, in his very first report to the Tsar after arriving in Tsarevo-Zaimishe, believed that Napoleon could not have had not only 185 thousand, but even 165 thousand, and the size of the Russian army at that moment he calculated at 95 734 people. But within just a few days that passed from Tsarev-Zaimishche to Borodino, 15,589 people from Miloradovich’s reserve corps and another “2,000 people collected from different places” joined the Russian army, so that the Russian army increased to 113,323 people. In addition, as Alexander informed Kutuzov, about 7 thousand more people were supposed to arrive.

In fact, however, some researchers believe that Kutuzov’s armed regular forces near Borodino are ready for battle, fully trained, not 120, but at best about 105 thousand people, if we do not take into account the militias at all in this calculation and remember, that the Cossack detachment of 7 thousand people was not brought into battle at all. But the militia of 1812 showed themselves to be people whose combat effectiveness was beyond praise.

When the still poorly trained militias approached, Kutuzov had up to 120 thousand at his immediate disposal, and according to some, albeit not very convincing, estimates, even somewhat more. The documents generally differ in their testimony. Of course, Kutuzov was fully aware of the impossibility of equating the militias with regular troops. But still, neither the commander-in-chief, nor Dokhturov, nor Konovnitsyn completely discounted this hastily assembled militia. Near Borodino, near Maloyaroslavets, near Krasny, throughout the entire counteroffensive, since, at least, we are talking about personal courage, selflessness, and endurance, the militia tried not to yield to the regular troops.

The enemy also managed to appreciate the Russian militias of the 12th year. After the bloodiest battles at Maloyaroslavets, pointing to the gloomily silent Napoleon at the battlefield strewn with the bodies of French grenadiers, Marshal Bessieres convinced Napoleon of the complete impossibility of attacking Kutuzov in the position he occupied: “And what enemies are we fighting against? Didn't you see, sir, yesterday's battlefield? Didn’t you notice with what fury the Russian recruits, barely armed, barely dressed, went there to their death?” And in the defense of Maloyaroslavets, it was the militia that played a significant role. Marshal Bessieres was killed in the battles of 1813.

The war of 1812 was not like any of the wars that the Russian people had to wage since the beginning of the 18th century. Even during the campaign of Charles XII, the consciousness of danger for Russia was not and could not be so acute and widespread among all layers of the people , as in 1812

Before talking about Kutuzov’s counter-offensive, it is worth noting the curious, hitherto unprecedented fact that even before Borodin, when huge enemy forces were marching in an unstoppable stream towards Shevardin, the Russians launched one after another successful attacks on the stragglers of the French detachments, exterminated the foragers and, what The most amazing thing is that during these days of the general retreat of the Russian army they managed to take prisoners.

Four days before Borodin, in Gzhatsk, Napoleon left indisputable documentary evidence that he was severely alarmed by these constant attacks. This is what he ordered to be sent throughout the army to his chief of staff, Marshal Berthier: “Write to the generals commanding the army corps that we are losing many people every day due to insufficient order in the way we obtain provisions. It is necessary that they agree with the commanders of the various units on the measures that need to be taken to put an end to the state of affairs that threatens the army with destruction. The number of prisoners taken by the enemy reaches several hundred daily; it is necessary, under pain of the most severe punishments, to prohibit the soldiers from leaving.” Napoleon ordered, when sending people to forage, “to give them sufficient protection against the Cossacks and peasants.”

Already these actions of Konovnitsyn’s rearguard, from where the parties of daredevils came out at that moment, embarrassing Napoleon, showed Kutuzov that with such an army one could hope for success in the most difficult situations. Kutuzov had no doubt that the upcoming battle would cost the French army almost as many losses as the Russian one. In fact, after the battle it turned out that the French had lost much more. Nevertheless, Kutuzov’s decision remained unshakable, and he did not give a new battle in front of Moscow.

How can we now determine with complete confidence the main goals of Kutuzov? Before the War of 1812, in those wars in which Kutuzov had to take on the role and responsibility of commander-in-chief, he absolutely never set himself too broad final goals. In 1805, he never spoke about the defeat of Napoleon, about the invasion of France, about the capture of Paris - that is, about everything that the frivolous courtiers dreamed of at the headquarters of Emperors Alexander I and Franz I. Or, for example, in 1811. he had no intention of taking Constantinople. But now, in 1812, the situation was different. The main goal was imperatively set by all the conditions of the war: to end the war by exterminating the aggressor’s army. The tragedy of all the mistakes and miscalculations of Napoleon that were disastrous for the French lay in the fact that he did not understand to what extent the complete destruction of his hordes was not the maximum, but the minimum program for Kutuzov and that the entire grandiose edifice of Napoleon’s all-European dominion, based on milk-war despotism and maintained by military dictatorship, will waver after the death of his army in Russia. And even then another (“maximum”) program may become feasible in a more or less near future: namely, the destruction of his colossal predatory empire.

To a large extent, not only the immediate, but also the final strategic success of the planned blow that Kutuzov wanted to inflict on Napoleon before Borodin on the routes of the French army to Moscow depended on the correct resolution of the problem: who would be able to make up for the serious losses that both armies would suffer first? will suffer in the upcoming general battle? Will reinforcements from his rear have time to arrive to Napoleon before Kutuzov, after the inevitable terrible massacre, will again have at his disposal such an armed force as the one that greeted him with joyful cries in Tsarev-Zaimishche? Kutuzov, in solving this vital problem, revealed in this case a much greater gift of foresight than his opponent. Both armies emerged from the Battle of Borodino weakened; but their immediate fates were not only not the same, but completely different: despite the large reinforcements that approached Napoleon, their stay in Moscow continued to weaken Napoleon’s army every day, and in these same decisive weeks, the vigorous organizational work in the Tarutino camp restored and restored it every day. multiplied Kutuzov's forces. Moreover, in the French army they looked and could not help but look at the occupation of Moscow as direct evidence that the war was coming to an end and a saving peace was very close, so that every day in Moscow brought gradually increasing anxiety and disappointment. And in the Kutuzov camp there was complete confidence that the war was just beginning and that the worst was behind us. The strategic consequences of the Russian Borodino victory were reflected primarily in the fact that the enemy’s offensive against Russia began to fizzle out and stopped without hope of resumption, because Tarutino and Maloyaroslavets were a direct and inevitable consequence of Borodin. The firm preservation of Russian positions by the end of the fighting day was an ominous harbinger for the aggressor. Borodino made possible a victorious transition to a counteroffensive.

Preparing for a counteroffensive

The program of delivering a heavy blow to the enemy army, with which Kutuzov, without expressing it in speeches, appeared in Tsarevo-Zaimisha, began to be implemented in its first part at Shevardin and near Borodino. Despite the fact that the bloody battle near Preussisch-Eylau on February 8, 1807 showed Napoleon that the Russian soldier was incomparable with a soldier of any other army, the Shevardin battle struck him when, when asked how many prisoners were taken after a whole day of bloody battles, he received the answer: “There are no prisoners, the Russians do not surrender, Your Majesty.”

And Borodino, the day after Shevardin, eclipsed all the battles of Napoleonic’s long epic: it disabled almost half of the French army.

Kutuzov's entire disposition was designed in such a way that the French could capture first the Bagration flushes, and then the Kurgan Heights, defended by Raevsky's battery, only at the expense of completely unheard-of casualties. But the point was not only that these main losses were supplemented by new losses at various other points in the great battle; the point was not only that about 58 thousand French remained on the battlefield and among them 47 of Napoleon’s best generals - the point was that the surviving about 80 thousand French soldiers were no longer at all similar in spirit and mood to those who approached to the Borodino field. Confidence in the emperor's invincibility was shaken, but until that day this confidence had never left Napoleonic's army - neither in Egypt, nor in Syria, nor in Italy, nor in Austria, nor in Prussia, and nowhere else at all. Not only the boundless courage of the Russian people, who repelled 8 assaults at the Bagration flashes and several similar assaults at the Raevsky battery, amazed the seasoned Napoleonic grenadiers, but they could not forget and constantly later recalled the moment of a previously unfamiliar feeling of panic that gripped them when suddenly , obeying the order of Kutuzov, which was not foreseen by anyone - neither the enemy, nor even the Russian headquarters, Platov with the Cossack cavalry and the First Cavalry Corps of Uvarov, with an uncontrollable impulse, flew into the deep rear of Napoleon. The battle ended, and Napoleon was the first to move away from the scene of the grandiose massacre.

Kutuzov's first goal was achieved: Napoleon had about half of his army left. He entered Moscow with, according to Wilson's calculations, 82 thousand people. From now on, long weeks were provided for Kutuzov, when, having retreated into the interior of the country, it was possible to strengthen his personnel numerically, feed people and horses, and make up for the Borodino losses. And the main, main strategic success of Kutuzov at Borodin was that the terrible losses of the French made it possible to replenish, supply, and reorganize the Russian army, which the commander-in-chief then launched into a formidable counteroffensive that crushed Napoleon.

Napoleon did not attack Kutuzov during the retreat of the Russian army from Borodino to Moscow because he considered the war already won and did not want to lose people in vain, but because he feared the second Borodin, just as he feared him later, after the burning of Maloyaroslavets. Napoleon's actions were also determined by the confidence that after the occupation of Moscow peace would be close. But, we repeat, we should not forget that, one might say, in front of Napoleon’s eyes, the Russian army, taking with it several hundred surviving cannons, retreated in perfect order, maintaining discipline and combat readiness. This fact made a great impression on Marshal Davout and the entire French generals.

Kutuzov could have hoped that if Napoleon had decided to suddenly attack the retreating Russian army, then again it would have been “a hellish thing,” as the field marshal put it about the Shevardin battle in his letter dated August 25 to his wife, Ekaterina Ilyinichna.

Napoleon accepted the success of the French in a possible new battle near Moscow, which was very important and desirable for him, but retreated before the risk of the enterprise. This was a new (by no means the first) sign that the French army was no longer at all what it was when Kutuzov, coming from Tsarev-Zaimishche, stopped near the Kolotsky Monastery and forced Napoleon to take battle there and then, when and where he admitted it Kutuzov himself is profitable.

Will reinforcements approach Napoleon from his rear before Kutuzov, after the inevitable terrible massacre, will again have at his disposal such an armed force as the one that greeted him with joyful cries in Tsarev-Zaimishche? Kutuzov, in solving this vital problem, revealed in this case a much greater gift of foresight than his opponent. Both armies emerged from the Battle of Borodino weakened; but their immediate fates were not only not the same, but completely different: despite the large reinforcements that approached Napoleon, their stay in Moscow continued to weaken Napoleon’s army every day, and in these same decisive weeks, the vigorous organizational work in the Tarutino camp restored and restored it every day. multiplied Kutuzov's forces. Moreover, in the French army they looked and could not help but look at the occupation of Moscow as direct evidence that the war was coming to an end and a saving peace was very close, so that every day in Moscow brought gradually increasing anxiety and disappointment. And in the Kutuzov camp there was complete confidence that the war was just beginning and that the worst was behind us. The strategic consequences of the Russian Borodino victory were reflected primarily in the fact that the enemy’s offensive against Russia began to fizzle out and stopped without hope of resumption, because Tarutino and Maloyaroslavets were a direct and inevitable consequence of Borodin. The firm preservation of Russian positions by the end of the fighting day was an ominous harbinger for the aggressor. Borodino made possible a victorious transition to a counteroffensive.

(13) September 1812, by order of Kutuzov, commanders of large units and generals of the Russian army gathered. Kutuzov, who lost an eye in battle, surprised Suvorov himself with his courage, the hero of Ishmael, could, of course, despise the vile insinuations of his enemies like the dishonest Bennigsen, who reproached, behind his back, of course, the old commander-in-chief for lack of courage. But such loyal people as Dokhturov, Uvarov, Konovnitsyn also spoke out for the decision to give the enemy a new battle. Kutuzov, of course, knew that not only the tsar, who hated him, would take advantage of the surrender of Moscow to shift all the blame onto Kutuzov, but also that many would selflessly believe in him. They may hesitate. And in order to say the words that he uttered at the end of the meeting, courage was needed, much greater than standing in front of enemy bullets and than storming Ishmael. “As long as the army exists and is able to resist the enemy, until then we will retain the hope of successfully completing the war, “and when the army is destroyed, Moscow and Russia will perish.” It didn't come to a vote. Kutuzov stood up and announced: “I order a retreat by the authority given to me by the sovereign and the fatherland.” He did what he considered his sacred duty. He began to implement the second part of his maturely thought-out program: the withdrawal of the army from Moscow.

Only those who do not understand anything about the nature of this Russian hero can be surprised that Kutuzov, on the night of September 2, the last night before leaving Moscow to the enemy, did not sleep and showed signs of severe excitement and suffering. The adjutants heard crying at night. At the military council, he said: “You are afraid of a retreat through Moscow, but I look at this as providence, because it saves the army. Napoleon is like a stormy stream that we still cannot stop. Moscow will be a sponge that will suck it up” 18. In these words, he did not develop all his deep, fruitful, saving thoughts about a formidable counter-offensive that would throw the aggressor and his army into the abyss. And although he knew for sure that the real war between Russia and the aggressor - a war that logically should end in military defeat and the political death of Napoleon - was just beginning, he, a Russian patriot, perfectly understanding the strategic, political, moral necessity that he I just did it in Fili, I was tormented and could not immediately get used to the thought of losing Moscow. On September 2, the Russian army passed through Moscow and began to move away from it in an eastern direction - along the Ryazan (first) road.

At night the retreating Russian army saw the enormous glow of the burning old capital, and Kutuzov looked and looked at it. The field marshal, with anger and pain, occasionally broke out vows of vengeance along this path; his heart beat in unison with the heart of the Russian army.

The army did not foresee that although it would still face many severe trials, the day would finally come on March 30, 1814, when Russian soldiers, approaching the Pantensky suburb, would exclaim: “Hello, Father Paris! How will you pay for Mother Moscow?” Looking at the Moscow glow, Kutuzov knew that the day of reckoning would come sooner or later, although he did not know when exactly, and did not know whether he would live to see that day.

An analysis of the scant data regarding the initial cause of the Moscow fire, and a feasible assessment of their scientific weight will be given in a concise description of Kutuzov; it is enough to recall that there cannot be the slightest doubt about the assessment of the immediate consequences of the Moscow fire for the French army. The fires did not strengthen, but weakened the enemy when he was in Moscow. This fact is indisputable, although there is no reason to classify the Moscow fire as the main, decisive moments of the struggle, as many subsequently tended to do.

A new phase of the war began - the beginning of a counteroffensive. Having moved away from Moscow and disoriented the French with the most skillful maneuver, breaking away from Murat’s cavalry and directing it to the Ryazan road, Kutuzov turned to Tula.”

Beginning of the End

Kutuzov immediately began to strengthen his Tarutino position and made it impregnable. Then Kutuzov continuously replenished his army, which already before the Tarutino battle numbered up to 120 thousand people. Particular attention was paid to organizing the militia. After Borodin, Kutuzov could definitely equate the militia with such troops that, after a relatively short training, could be considered part of the regular army. Supplies were actively collected. By the end of the Tarutino period, Kutuzov’s artillery was much stronger than Napoleon’s. According to minimal estimates, the Russians had from 600 to 622 guns, Napoleon - about 350 - 360. At the same time, Kutuzov had a well-supplied cavalry, and Napoleon did not have enough horses even to freely transport guns. The French cavalry was forced to dismount more and more. Active preparations were made for the transition from active defense to the upcoming offensive.

In Tarutin and after Tarutin and especially after Maloyaroslavets, Kutuzov paid great attention to relations with partisan detachments and the issue of increasing their numbers. He attached enormous importance to the partisans in the upcoming counter-offensive. And in these last months (October, November, the first days of December 1812) he himself revealed himself as a remarkable leader not only of regular armies, but also of the partisan movement.

Under such and such conditions, on October 6 (18), 1812, Kutuzov began and won the battle, defeating Murat’s large “observation” detachment. This was a victory for the counteroffensive that was just beginning... The first victory, but not the last!

The orders of Kutuzov, who quickly created a powerful new army and huge reserves, were carried out with great zeal, with zeal and eagerness, just as combat missions are carried out by soldiers eager for battle. The regular regiments and the militia regiments were full of anger, a thirst to repay Moscow, to defend the Motherland.

A few days later, Maloyaroslavets showed Napoleon what the army that had arisen in Tarutino was like. The partisan force was also organized and strengthened under the watchful supervision of the commander-in-chief.

The thoughtful reflections of French historians about the reasons for the “coincidence” of the Tarutino battle with Napoleon’s departure from Moscow can be successfully replaced by the most understandable formula: the emperor immediately realized that Kutuzov was again starting, on his own initiative, the war of regular armies that had fallen silent after Borodin. He knew very well that the “irregular”, partisan war did not stop for a single day after Borodin. The French left Moscow. “To Kaluga! And death to those who interfere!” - Napoleon exclaimed.

The battle near Maloyaroslavets was of enormous importance in the history of the counteroffensive. In terms of his significance in the history of the war, he ranks directly after Borodin. After eight desperate attacks and the burning of Maloyaroslavets, Napoleon faced a formidable alternative: either decide on a general battle, or immediately, from the Kaluga roads that led to the south, turn northwest, to Smolensk. He did not dare to go to Kaluga. Kutuzov became a wall in front of him.

Kutuzov’s army at that moment was larger and better; the French cavalry and artillery, if we exclude the guard (and even then with reservations), were equipped and combat-ready incomparably worse than the Russians. It was not in Moscow, but in Maloyaroslavets that the disastrous stage of Napoleonic retreat began, and the victorious phase of Kutuzov’s counteroffensive began already in Tarutino. It was here, near Maloyaroslavets, that Napoleon finally became convinced of the irreparableness of his real defeat at Borodino, which in his bulletins and in letters to Marie-Louise was so easy to turn into a victory. Borodino killed one half of his army physically and the other morally. Kutuzov stood before him fully armed, at the head of a stronger Russian army than the one that was under Borodin, and most importantly, an army animated by an unquenchable feeling of anger towards the enemy and complete faith in its old leader. The most deadly feature of the Kutuzov counteroffensive for the French was its continuity. Kutuzov's strategic plan found its full implementation in the most appropriate tactics.

Kutuzov sat in Yelnya, then in Kopys, and information flowed to him: the regular units had such and such meetings and confiscated so many; the partisans had such and such meetings and took so much. “Cossacks and peasants” - under this double designation, Russian partisans increasingly began to appear in Napoleon’s orders for the army and in private orders of marshals and corps commanders for corps. Kutuzov even had to reckon with the competition, sometimes quite intense, between the partisan commanders and the officers of the regular troops. Essentially, it was a competition in feats of selflessness. It can be said that Kutuzov not only created a counteroffensive plan, but also found an unusually valuable operational force in the form of guerrilla warfare to help his regular army carry it out. Popular anger, a feeling of patriotic hatred of the invader and robber found a way out in guerrilla warfare, and Kutuzov introduced partisan warfare into the system of those forces that, carrying out the counteroffensive he had planned, steadily drove the aggressor to the terrible catastrophe that awaited him.

The general conclusion about the partisan movement, which will be substantiated by incomparably more abundant factual material, is as follows: the irreconcilable hatred of thousands and thousands of peasants that surrounded Napoleon’s “great army” with a wall, the exploits of elders Vasilisa, Fyodor Onufriev, Gerasim Kurin, who, risking their lives every day, went to forests, hiding in ravines, lay in wait for the French - this is what most characteristically expressed peasant sentiments in 1812 and what turned out to be disastrous for Napoleon’s army.

Kutuzov was a great commander and therefore thought not only about victorious orders and the brilliance of the approaching complete triumph, but also about many things that his contemporaries who condemned him easily forgot and which some of the later historians are inclined to forget. In December, the Russian army was approaching Vilna, and Kutuzov did not want Napoleon’s dream to come true, that an uprising against the Russians would begin in Lithuania. He knew that Napoleonic emissaries were campaigning in Lithuania against the Russian army. Kutuzov took serious measures to ensure that normal relations were maintained between the army and the local population. “I gave Count Platov a special duty to pay all possible attention and take all appropriate measures so that this city, during the passage of our troops, would not be subject to the slightest offense, moreover, making him aware of what consequences could arise from that in the current circumstances.” He repeatedly wrote about this to Chichagov and others, even when they were entering Oshmyany.

On December 10, 1812, Chichagov and Kutuzov entered Vilna simultaneously. Kutuzov’s immediate next military task was to prevent MacDonald from joining the remnants of the French army. He ordered Wittgenstein and Chichagov to do everything possible to achieve this goal. At the same time, it was recommended on behalf of the tsar to “let the Prussian troops who were part of Napoleonic army (in Macdonald’s corps) feel” that the Russians considered the French, not the Prussians, their only enemy. Those were the days when the Prussian General York was preparing to switch to the side of Russia.

On December 12, Kutuzov not only knew about the inevitability of a foreign campaign, but began to make the corresponding orders: “Now a general action is being taken on Prussia, if this can be done conveniently. It is already known that the remnants of the French army retreated in that direction, and therefore pursuit there alone can only be useful,” Field Marshal wrote to Chichagov on December 12 (24), that is, even before the Vilna disputes with Alexander. This irrefutably proves that the disputes themselves did not concern the essence of the issue of a foreign campaign, but only the timing, i.e., whether to cross the border immediately or later. No more! The very question was resolved by Kutuzov in the affirmative. The quoted letter decides and clarifies everything: Kutuzov wanted the liberation of Europe and clearly considered the work of victory unfinished, while Napoleon ruled in Europe like a boss, he did not want the Germans to be able to actively get involved in the cause of their own liberation.

In Vilna, a question of enormous importance had to be decided - whether to immediately continue military operations, pursuing the pitiful remnants of the almost completely destroyed, defeated French forces retreating beyond the Neman, or to stop and allow the Russian army, which had suffered greatly during the brilliant counteroffensive that ended the war, to rest and recover.

When Kutuzov spoke out for some time against continuing the war immediately, this did not mean at all that he considered the war with Napoleon already over. The expulsion, or, more precisely, the complete destruction of 600 thousand perfectly armed people who arrived in Russia at different times starting from June 12 (24), 1812, covered Russia with glory, was a well-deserved formidable response to the aggressor, but it did not destroy the predatory empire. Kutuzov, a diplomat and politician, knew much better and understood much more subtly than Alexander, who argued with him, that the great victory won in Russia, from the point of view of a broad program for the destruction of a predatory empire, is not the end, but the beginning of the matter.

The last victory of Marshal Kutuzov

The greatness of the brilliant strategist and diplomat, the greatness of the perspicacious Russian patriot who defeated Napoleon’s army in 1812, who always had the firm intention of ending his empire and that is why he wanted to better prepare the final blow - this greatness is clearly revealed not only in 1812, but also in 1813 d. “Let us try to complete the defeat of the enemy on his own fields!” - said Kutuzov, expelling the French from Russia. But he wanted that in 1813 the Russian army would no longer have to fight Napoleon alone, as it fought against him in 1812. He, the great patriot, the victorious commander, would rightfully have the honor of introducing the Russian army in March 1814. army to Paris; him, and not Barclay or anyone else. But death overtook him at the very beginning of new bloodshed, which led to the final triumph he had foreseen.

A little over a month before his death, the old hero, the conqueror of Napoleon, had to listen to the impatient advice of one of Alexander’s many hangers-on and flatterers, Winzengerode, to quickly meet Napoleon, who was at that time gathering a new huge army.

This time Kutuzov interrupted this unsolicited adviser: “Let me once again repeat my opinion about the speed of our progress. I know that throughout Germany every little individual allows himself to cry out against our slowness. They believe that every forward movement is tantamount to victory, and every lost day is a defeat. I, obedient to the duty imposed by my duties, submit to calculations, and I must carefully weigh the question of the distance from the Elbe to our reserves and the collected forces of the enemy that we may meet at such and such a height. I must contrast our progressive weakening in rapid progress with our increasing distance from our resources. Rest assured that the defeat of one of our corps will destroy the prestige we enjoy in Germany."

But when Kutuzov finally decided to agree to accept the post of commander-in-chief in the new stage of the war against Napoleon that was beginning, he conducted the matter in such a way that in all four months that he had left to live, he never had to experience failure, and his negotiations with the Prussian authorities, with Prussian cities, the influence of his always smartly considered statements, assurances and promises on the confused, hesitant population, intimidated by the long Napoleonic oppression, was enormous. In these critical first four months of 1813, the enemy never dared to attack Kutuzov the commander, and Kutuzov the politician peacefully, without open struggle, defeated the Francophile party, which was still strong at the Berlin court and in some places in the country.

During the four months of his foreign campaign, Kutuzov, old and sick, clearly felt more independent of the court than during the entire campaign of 1812. The conqueror of Napoleon, the savior of Russia, the idol of the people, he could feel for minutes much more like a king than Alexander. Kutuzov's orders were carried out throughout Russia in the most zealous manner. In the last three days of December 1812, when Kutuzov crossed the Neman, he had a total of 18 thousand people ready for battle, but when he entered Kalisz, and his generals were delivered by him along the Oder, in early and mid-February 1813. , then he already had more than 140 thousand. The genius, organizer, and creator of the Tarutino army surpassed himself in Kalisz. He also demanded (and received!) the tsar’s consent to form reserves numbering 180 thousand people.

And yet, King Frederick William was a coward and in confusion did not know to whom, to whom, and, most importantly, when he should betray and sell: Napoleon to Alexander or Alexander to Napoleon. He was so afraid of both of them that on the same day he sometimes wrote truly loyal letters to both emperors. But then Kutuzov the diplomat appeared on stage again in all his splendor. He said that he would directly send Wittgenstein with an army to Berlin, affectionately warning the king that he wanted to reinforce him. Friedrich Wilhelm understood the hint very well... and obeyed. But Kutuzov had reason to count not on the king, but on the German people, and he lived to see these hopes begin to come true. In the first months of 1813, the Germans were still slowly, but already recovering from the long stupor generated by the Napoleonic yoke.

On February 10, 1813, Frederick William III finally signed the Russian-Prussian alliance treaty. True, he hastened to deceive Kutuzov and instead of the required 80 thousand people he gave a little more than 55 thousand. He only promised to add the rest, but demanded that Kutuzov speed up the campaign, so that Prussia would remain behind the line of fire. Kutuzov refused. Then the king, who at that time, under the influence of fear, was reaching the point of acting like a crazy person, sent his chancellor Hardenberg to have a heart-to-heart talk with Kutuzov and promise that the Russian commander-in-chief would receive an estate as a gift if he agreed to quickly cover Prussia from the west, accelerating the movement of troops Kutuzov replied that and without this gift “the emperor will not leave his children and himself.”

The king had to give up. Kutuzov, ignoring the king, had already addressed appeals and beautifully composed calls and messages directly to the Prussian people, to the Saxon people (the King of Saxony stood on the side of Napoleon), to the German people in general, and these appeals, which Metternich’s minions later equated with revolutionary proclamations, raised the spirit of the Germans. The Prussian people finally joined the ranks of fighters against Napoleon.

The French emperor formed an army of 200 thousand people. He again had before him his old enemy, the only one who managed to defeat him in 1812. Berlin was liberated by Kutuzov's troops on February 27, 1813. Kutuzov was still in no hurry to do what, in his opinion, should have been done only in due time, and he paid much less attention to the advice of Friedrich Wilhelm than in December 1812 to the wishes of Alexander. But both commanders - Kutuzov and Napoleon - no longer had to measure their strength. At the end of March it became difficult for the old field marshal to move; in April he fell ill and never had to get up.

It must be said that during his illness at the end of March and throughout April, Alexander, who took over the reins of command of the army, managed, despite the wishes of the field marshal, to implement some measures and give some orders, which later, in May, had a harmful effect near Lützen.

Exactly a month before his death (March 28, 1813), Kutuzov laconically and, of course, not to mention the behavior of the king, wrote to Login Ivanovich Kutuzov: “It was necessary to occupy Berlin.” And further in the same letter he adds: “I agree that moving away from the borders distances us from our reinforcements, but if we had remained behind the Vistula, then we would have had to fight the war that we fought in 1807. There would be no alliance with Prussia; the entire German land would serve the enemy with people and in every way.”

Kutuzov was not destined to eliminate the difficulties and dangers facing the Russian army, which he foresaw in Vilna in December 1812 and which appeared immediately after his death. On April 28, 1813, he died, and in May the Battle of Lützen already took place, followed by Bautzen and Dresden. “Will you forgive me, Mikhailo Illarionovich?” - “I forgive you, Sovereign, but Russia will not forgive you.” This conversation at the deathbed of the great field marshal should have reminded Alexander of many things. He had, one might say, to see the very next day how difficult it was to replace Kutuzov the strategist with Wittgenstein, and Kutuzov the diplomat with Karl Nesselrode.

But the aura of Kutuzov's immortal triumph of 1812 was so powerful that the temporary setbacks of the spring and summer of 1813. were outdated and quickly forgotten by the time in the fall the Russian army lived to see new remarkable victories at Kulm and Leipzig.

Conclusion

In my work, I wanted to reveal the strategic genius of Kutuzov in his characteristic features. Here, in the proposed general description, it is enough to say that both in the tactics of struggle “by attrition” and in the tactics of crushing blows, Kutuzov resorted to a remarkably skillful variation of military techniques, and therefore it is absurd to associate his strategy with Friedrich’s “tactics of attrition” or Napoleonic tactics of “crushing blows." He had his own, Kutuzov’s, tactics, the power of which lay precisely in the fact that he resorted to the most unexpected and varied methods in war (which he succeeded in, for example, in Turkey in 1811).

But what he was great about was that in 1812. he unmistakably guessed to what extent the tactics of an army, constantly pursuing the enemy and not giving him respite with either small or large attacks, is the main means that will most likely (and even most likely) destroy the “great army.” The great talent of the strategist was not only in this, but also in the fact that Kutuzov understood to what extent his method of warfare corresponds, as the most effective means, to the use of a “small war” on the widest scale. It was precisely these own, Kutuzov’s, tactics that destroyed the then best army of the Western world and the best then best commander of the Western world.

Guerrilla war before the start and in the first stage of development of the counteroffensive and guerrilla war, which was already turning into a “small war”, or, more precisely, united with it in November, are concepts that do not completely coincide. The “small war” was waged by small and sometimes quite large army detachments, to which Kutuzov often gave very serious tasks. These detachments entered into direct contact with partisan detachments (for example, with a large detachment of the peasant Chetverikov and others) and their joint actions usually ended in achieving very positive results. This “small war” is one of the manifestations of Kutuzov’s creative thought.

It seems to me that Kutuzov’s strategy defeated the formidable enemy at Borodino, and then created a brilliantly executed counter-offensive that ruined Napoleon. And the heroic behavior of the regular army in all combat encounters with the enemy, the active assistance of the guerrilla war, the popular character of the entire war as a whole, the consciousness of the justice of this war that deeply penetrated into the people - all this created an indestructible stronghold, solid ground on which they arose, developed and led to Kutuzov's strategic combinations to a victorious end.

I think it was Kutuzov’s breadth of outlook, the ability to foresee and determination in implementing the intended plan that was combined with other characteristics characteristic of him: reasonable caution, the ability to soberly assess the strengths and weaknesses of the enemy and the ability to always set a clear and strictly defined goal at every given moment. When a series of absurd orders and interventions by the Austrian Emperor Franz, who knew absolutely nothing about military affairs, and generals quite worthy of their monarch like Weyrother and Mack, put Kutuzov in a completely desperate situation in October 1805, then, according to later reviews even from the enemy (Napoleonic marshals), a high level of both the moral qualities of the troops and the strategic art of their leader was necessary in order to get rid of the threatened defeat and surrender.

A luminary of military art, a first-class diplomat, a remarkable statesman - Kutuzov was first and foremost a Russian patriot. Where it was about Russia and its military honor, about the Russian people and their salvation, Kutuzov was always indestructibly firm and knew how to stand his ground. He even knew how to abruptly and publicly cut off the king, as he did with Alexander before the cleansing of the Pratsen Heights on the day of Austerlitz. That is why the tsar and the courtiers, military and civilian disheers, both Russian and foreign, hated the old field marshal and feared him. Their enmity towards him especially intensified because they knew very well that in difficult times they would still have to bow to this frail old man with a broken eye and pray to him for salvation and that the Russian people would force them to call him. “Go, save! “You stood up and saved,” the people turned to Kutuzov with these words long before Pushkin.

All the best, priceless features of the Russian national character distinguish the nature of this extraordinary personality, right down to the rare ability to treat a defeated enemy humanely, even compassionately, to recognize and respect the enemy’s courage and other military qualities.

His love for Russia exacerbated his natural suspicion of foreigners, as soon as he noticed in them the desire to use Russia in their own interests. And his enormous and penetrating mind quickly revealed to him the most intimate secrets of complex diplomatic lies and intrigue. That is why Wilson and the British cabinet, and Metternich’s minions, and Emperor Franz, and the Prussian king Frederick William III, who, out of desperation, even wanted to bribe Kutuzov with the offer of a rich gift - a large estate, did not tolerate him.

Kutuzov lived for Russia and served Russia, but he only waited to be recognized as a national hero, fully worthy of his immortal merits, in our times of the overthrow and destruction of the most vile of all aggressors who have ever attacked the Russian people.

Introduction…………………………………………………………….1

Kutuzov the diplomat……………………………………………………..2

Kutuzov the strategist……………………………………………………….11

Preparing for a counteroffensive……………………………………18

The beginning of the end……………………………………………………….21

The last victory of Marshal Kutuzov……………………………….24

Conclusion………………………………………………………27

References……………………………………………………………………...29

Mikhail Illarionovich Kutuzov (Golenishchev-Kutuzov), famous Russian commander, field marshal general (August 31, 1812). (His Serene Highness Prince Golenishchev-Kutuzov-Smolensky from 1812), Hero of the Patriotic War of 1812, the first full holder of the Order of St. George.

Always cheerful, sociable, he was distinguished by amazing composure in the most difficult situations. Strict calculation and restraint were his hallmarks. He knew how to talk to a soldier and, like Suvorov, knowing that ceremonial tinsel and external splendor were not to the heart of the Russian commoner, he, being already the commander-in-chief, appeared before the troops on a small Cossack horse, in an old frock coat without epaulettes, in a cap and with a whip across shoulder.

Origin of Kutuzov: from Boots and Kutuz

The noble family of Golenishchev-Kutuzov traces its origins to a certain Gabriel, who settled in the Novgorod lands during the time of Alexander Nevsky (mid-13th century). Among his descendants in the 15th century was Fyodor, nicknamed Kutuz, whose nephew was called Vasily, nicknamed Boots. The sons of the latter began to be called Golenishchev-Kutuzov and were in the royal service. Grandfather M.I. Kutuzov only rose to the rank of captain, his father was already promoted to lieutenant general, and Mikhail Illarionovich earned hereditary princely dignity.

Childhood and youth of Mikhail Kutuzov

Mikhail Kutuzov is the only son of Lieutenant General and Senator Illarion Matveevich Golenishchev-Kutuzov (1717-1784) and his wife, née Beklemisheva. Mikhail Kutuzov's father, Illarion Golenishchev-Kutuzov, rose to the rank of lieutenant general and the rank of senator.
Having received an excellent home education from the age of 7, Mikhail completed a course in the artillery and engineering corps (his father taught artillery art there). At the age of 14 he entered the service as a corporal of artillery, then he was a conductor in the engineering corps and at the age of 16 he was promoted to officer.

Fate threw him from headquarters to the line and back; He served both in the army of Rumyantsev and under the command of Potemkin, and in 1762, with the rank of captain, he was appointed commander of a company of the Astrakhan Infantry Regiment, headed by Colonel A.V. Suvorov. The rapid career of the young Kutuzov can be explained both by receiving a good education and by the efforts of his father. In 1764-1765, he volunteered to take part in military skirmishes of Russian troops in Poland, and in 1767 he was seconded to the commission for drawing up a new Code created by Catherine II.

Kutuzov's dizzying military career

The school of military excellence was his participation in the Russian-Turkish war of 1768-1774, where he initially served as a divisional quartermaster in the army of General P. A. Rumyantsev and was in the battles of Ryabaya Mogila, r. Largi, Kagul and during the assault on Bendery. From 1772 he fought in the Crimean Army. On July 24, 1774, during the liquidation of the Turkish landing near Alushta, Kutuzov, commanding a grenadier battalion, was seriously wounded - a bullet exited through his left temple near his right eye. Kutuzov used the vacation he received to complete his treatment to travel abroad; in 1776 he visited Berlin and Vienna, and visited England, Holland, and Italy. Upon returning to duty, he commanded various regiments, and in 1785 he became commander of the Bug Jaeger Corps. From 1777 he was a colonel, from 1784 he was a major general.

Kutuzov family

Kutuzov got married in the Church of St. Nicholas the Wonderworker in the village of Golenishchevo, Samoluksky volost, Loknyansky district, Pskov region. Nowadays, only ruins remain of this church.
Mikhail Illarionovich's wife, Ekaterina Ilinichna (1754-1824), was the daughter of Lieutenant General Ilya Aleksandrovich Bibikov, the son of Catherine's nobleman Bibikov. She married thirty-year-old Colonel Kutuzov in 1778 and gave birth to five daughters in a happy marriage (the only son, Nikolai, died of smallpox in infancy).

Daughters: Praskovya, Anna, Elizaveta, Ekaterina, Daria. Two of them (Liza and Katya) had their first husbands die fighting under the command of Kutuzov. Since the field marshal did not leave any descendants in the male line, the surname Golenishchev-Kutuzov was transferred to his grandson, Major General P.M., in 1859. Tolstoy, son of Praskovya.

On the brink of death

During the Russian-Turkish War of 1787-1791, during the siege of Ochakov (1788), Kutuzov was again dangerously wounded - the bullet went right through “from temple to temple behind both eyes.” The surgeon who treated him, Massot, commented on his wound: “We must believe that fate appoints Kutuzov to something great, for he survived after two wounds, fatal according to all the rules of medical science.”

At the beginning of 1789, he took part in the battle of Kaushany and in the capture of the fortresses of Akkerman and Bender. During the storming of Izmail in 1790, Suvorov assigned him to command one of the columns and, without waiting for the capture of the fortress, appointed him first commandant. For this assault, Kutuzov received the rank of lieutenant general.

"I serve Russia!"

At the conclusion of the Peace of Yassy, ​​Kutuzov was unexpectedly appointed envoy to Turkey. When choosing him, the Empress took into account his broad outlook, subtle mind, rare tact, ability to find a common language with different people and innate cunning. In Istanbul, Kutuzov managed to gain the trust of the Sultan and successfully led the activities of a huge embassy of 650 people.

Upon returning to Russia in 1794, he was appointed director of the Land Noble Cadet Corps. Under Emperor Paul I, he was appointed to the most important posts (inspector of troops in Finland, commander of an expeditionary force sent to Holland, Lithuanian military governor, commander of the army in Volyn), and was entrusted with important diplomatic missions.

Hot spots: Austerlitz and Ruschuk

At the beginning of the reign of Alexander I, Kutuzov took the post of St. Petersburg military governor, but was soon sent on leave. In 1805 he was appointed commander of the troops operating in Austria against Napoleon. He managed to save the army from the threat of encirclement, but the arriving Alexander I, under the influence of young advisers, insisted on holding a general battle. Kutuzov objected, but was unable to defend his opinion, and at Austerlitz the Russian-Austrian troops suffered a crushing defeat.

Having become the commander-in-chief of the Moldavian army operating against the Turks in 1811, Kutuzov was able to rehabilitate himself - not only inflicted defeat on them near Rushchuk (now Ruse, Bulgaria), but also, showing extraordinary diplomatic abilities, signed the Bucharest Peace Treaty in 1812, which was beneficial for Russia. The emperor, who did not like the commander, awarded him the title of count (1811), and then elevated him to the dignity of His Serene Highness (1812).

French invasion

At the beginning of the 1812 campaign against the French, Kutuzov was in St. Petersburg in the secondary post of commander of the Narva Corps, and then the St. Petersburg militia. Only when disagreements among the generals reached a critical point was he appointed commander-in-chief of all armies operating against Napoleon (August 8). Kutuzov was forced to continue his retreat strategy. But, yielding to the demands of the army and society, he fought the Battle of Borodino (promoted to field marshal general) and at the military council in Fili made the difficult decision to leave Moscow. Russian troops, having completed a flank march to the south, stopped at the village of Tarutino. Kutuzov himself was sharply criticized by a number of senior military leaders.

“The entry of the enemy into Moscow does not yet mean the conquest of Russia,” wrote Mikhail Illarionovich to the emperor, who did not expect that Moscow would be abandoned. “Now, not far from Moscow, having gathered my troops, I can wait with a firm foot for the enemy, and while the army of Your Imperial Majesty is intact and driven by a certain courage and our zeal, until then the loss of Moscow is not the loss of the Fatherland.” In the village of Panki near Moscow, the field marshal celebrated his last birthday. He was sixty-seven years old. His days were already numbered.

Kutuzov’s Tarutino maneuver became one of the hitherto unseen masterpieces of world military art. While Napoleon, sitting in Moscow, was waiting for surrender from the Russian Tsar, our army rested, perked up and was significantly replenished. When Moscow went up in flames, the debate over whether the commander-in-chief had acted correctly ceased; now everyone saw the genius of his plan and the benefit of the position he had chosen.

Finally, Napoleonic ambassador Lauriston arrived to Kutuzov. Seeing the Russian field marshal in front of him, whose only eye shone with confidence in the impending victory, Lauriston plaintively exclaimed: “Is this unprecedented, this unheard-of war really supposed to continue forever? The Emperor sincerely wants to put an end to this feud between two great and generous peoples and stop it forever.” .
It’s as if it wasn’t the French who came to us as uninvited guests, it wasn’t the French who robbed everything in their path, it wasn’t the French who behaved barbarously towards the Russian people, it wasn’t Napoleon who ordered even all the crosses to be removed from Moscow churches and bell towers, but we invaded France, took and They burned Paris, raked out the treasures of Versailles! And Lauriston still dared to call his European robbers “generous people”!

Kutuzov’s answer was full of dignity: “When I was appointed to the army, the word “peace” was never mentioned. I would have brought upon myself the curse of posterity if I had been considered the culprit of the agreement with you. This is the current way of thinking of my people!”

Having waited for the French troops to leave Moscow, Kutuzov accurately determined the direction of their movement and blocked their path at Maloyaroslavets. The parallel pursuit of the retreating enemy, which was then organized, led to the virtual death of the French army, although army critics reproached the commander-in-chief for passivity and the desire to build Napoleon a “golden bridge” to exit Russia.

On October 6, Murat's corps attacked the Russian army near Tarutino and was defeated. From this day began the triumphant expulsion of Napoleon from the borders of the Fatherland. Emperor Alexander, who had hitherto still not recognized the correctness of the surrender of Moscow, sent Kutuzov congratulations on his victory. But at the same time, he demanded to give another general battle, and Kutuzov only tiredly repeated: “No need. All this will now fall apart on its own.” A wise diplomat and politician, he understood perfectly well that the complete defeat of Napoleon within Russia could lead to England taking possession of France. He said: “Napoleon’s inheritance will not go to Russia, but to that power that already dominates the seas, and then its dominance will be unbearable.”

Kutuzov's further victory over Bonaparte did not consist of a general battle, but in the fact that he did not allow the enemy to leave Russia through the rich lands of the Oryol region and Little Russia, forcing the uninvited guests to retreat along the war-ravaged old Smolensk road. At the same time, Mikhail Illarionovich was forced to defend his plan for the slow extermination of the “great army”, to argue with those who demanded that he encircle the remnants of the French troops and take them prisoner.

It is also surprising that Napoleon, without actually losing a single battle to Kutuzov, completely lost his powerful army and crawled away from Russia, content only with the looted goods. It's funny, but thanks to this, the French still consider the War of 1812 a success! They claim that they won the Battle of Borodino, took Moscow, made a great profit - why not a victorious campaign! But be that as it may, in reality it was not Napoleon who won a complete victory, but a wiser commander, Mikhail Illarionovich Kutuzov.

A magnificent swan song!

In December 1812, 18 thousand pitiful, ragged and frostbitten people, who could no longer be called soldiers, returned from Russia to Europe through the Neman. 130 thousand ended up in Russian captivity, and 350 thousand Europeans from twelve countries remained forever in the vast and beautiful Russian expanses.

At the beginning of 1813, Kutuzov led military operations in Poland and Prussia with the goal of completing the defeat of the remnants of Napoleonic army and liberating the peoples of Europe from Napoleon's yoke, but death interrupted his implementation of his planned plan. His body was embalmed and transported to St. Petersburg, where he was buried in the Kazan Cathedral.
Kutuzov's general art was distinguished by the breadth and variety of all types of maneuver in offensive and defensive, and the timely transition from one type of maneuver to another. All contemporaries, while differing in their assessment of Kutuzov’s secondary qualities, unanimously noted his exceptional intelligence, brilliant military and diplomatic talents and selfless service to the Motherland. During the Great Patriotic War of 1941-45, the Order of Kutuzov of the 1st, 2nd (July 29, 1942) and 3rd degree (February 8, 1943) was established in the USSR.

The adoration and unconditional trust of the soldiers, a very special gift for commanding, doing it so that the command sounded like a gentle request, the charm of the mind and the alluring nobility of character - in a word, everything that in Kutuzov captivated people from the very first years of his life is, of course, very , helped Kutuzov, with all his fatigue, with all the attacks of malaise that he skillfully hid from those around him, to bear the incredibly heavy load of work and responsibility.

The old man, who, counting, for example, from the day of the Borodino battle to the day of death, had exactly seven months and three weeks to live, bore the burden of gigantic labor...

He, a great patriot, a victorious commander, would rightfully have the honor of leading the Russian army into Paris in March 1814; him, and not Barclay or anyone else. But death overtook him at the very beginning of new bloodshed, which led to the final triumph he had foreseen...

During the four months of his foreign campaign, Kutuzov, old and sick, clearly felt more independent of the court than during the entire campaign of 1812. The conqueror of Napoleon, the savior of Russia, the idol of the people, he could feel for minutes much more like a king than Alexander. Kutuzov's orders were carried out throughout Russia in the most zealous manner...

At the end of March it became difficult for the old field marshal to move; in April he fell ill and never had to get up. On April 28, Kutuzov died.

It must be said that during his illness at the end of March and throughout April, Alexander, who completely took over the reins of command of the army, managed, contrary to the wishes of the field marshal, to implement some measures and give some orders that subsequently had a harmful effect...

“Will you forgive me, Mikhail Illarionovich?” - “I forgive you, sir, but Russia will not forgive you” - such a conversation took place between them at the deathbed of the great field marshal.