Guide to the “second Yukos case. What is the fate of those involved in the Yukos case?

Mikhail Khodorkovsky is a Russian entrepreneur and ex-owner of the largest Russian oil company, Yukos. According to his net worth, in 2003 he was considered one of the richest and financially most powerful citizens of the Russian Federation; his capital was estimated at $15 billion.

In 2005, he became a key figure in a high-profile criminal case involving Yukos and was accused of fraud and tax evasion. As a result, the oil company was declared bankrupt, and its leader went to prison for 10 years and 10 months. Khodorkovsky's sentence had a resonant assessment in society - some consider him to be justly convicted, while others call him a “prisoner of conscience”, criminally persecuted for political reasons. At the time of his release from prison, the amount in his account did not exceed $100 million.

Childhood and youth

Mikhail Borisovich Khodorkovsky was born on June 20, 1963 in a working-class family in the capital. His parents Marina Filippovna and Boris Moiseevich were chemical engineers at the Kalibr plant, which produces precision measuring equipment.

According to Mikhail, his paternal relatives were Jews, but he himself felt Russian by nationality.

The family of the future oil magnate lived poorly in a communal apartment until 1971, after which the parents received their own housing. Since childhood, young Khodorkovsky was interested in experiments and chemistry, showing curiosity in this direction.

At the university, Khodorkovsky was considered the best student of the faculty, despite the fact that urgent financial need forced him to work as a carpenter in a housing cooperative in his free time. In 1986, he graduated with honors from the university and received a diploma in industrial engineering.

In his youth, Mikhail, together with like-minded people, created the Center for Scientific and Technical Creativity of Youth, which became his initial business project, with the help of which he earned his first big money. In parallel with his activities at NTTM, the future oil magnate studied at the Institute of National Economy named after. Plekhanov, where he met a relative of officials at the State Bank of the USSR, Alexei Golubovich, which determined the future fate of Khodorkovsky.

Bank "Menatep"

Thanks to his first “brainchild” and his acquaintance with Golubovich, Mikhail Khodorkovsky took a strong position in the world of big business and in 1989 created the commercial bank for scientific and technological progress Menatep, becoming the chairman of its board. Khodorkovsky's Bank was one of the first to receive a license from the State Bank of the USSR, which allowed it to carry out financial transactions with the tax authorities, the Ministry of Finance and Rosvooruzhenie.

In 1992, Khodorkovsky’s professional biography took a different direction and began to lean towards the oil business. First, he is appointed to the post of chairman of the Investment Fund for Industry and Fuel and Energy Complex. The new position gave Mikhail Borisovich all the rights and powers of the Deputy Minister of Fuel and Energy. After a few months of activity, he becomes a full-fledged deputy minister. To work in the civil service, he had to formally vacate his position as head of the Menatep Bank, but all the reins of government remained in his hands.

During this period, the oligarch decided to change the strategy of Menatep Bank. As a result, the financial organization began to focus exclusively on large clients who, with its help, carried out financial transactions and received services that required resolving issues with government authorities.

Over time, the activities of Menatep began to move more into the investment industry. The priority areas were industry and metallurgy, petrochemistry and building materials, as well as the food and chemical industries.

"YUKOS"

In 1995, Khodorkovsky turned to the First Deputy Prime Minister of the Russian Federation Oleg Soskovets with a proposal to exchange 10% of the shares of Menatep for 45% of the shares of the state-owned oil refining company Yukos, which was in a crisis state and was in crisis.

After the auction, Menatep became the owner of 45% of the shares of YUKOS, and then Khodorkovsky’s bank acquired another 33% of the shares of the oil company, for which, together with 5 partners, it paid $300 million.

Later, at a cash auction, Menatep again received an impressive number of shares in the most delicious piece of the Russian oil business and control over 90% of the shares of YUKOS.

Having become the owner of YUKOS, Khodorkovsky set about bringing the bankrupt oil company out of the crisis, but Menatep’s assets were not enough for this. It took the oligarch 6 years and investments from third-party banks to bring Yukos out of an acute crisis, as a result of which the oil refining company became the leader of the global energy market with a capital of more than $40 million.

Difficulties in running a business did not prevent Mikhail Borisovich from becoming a co-founder of the OpenRussia Foundation charity organization in 2001, the board of founders of which also included Mikhail Piotrovsky, Jacob Rothschild, and former US Ambassador to the USSR Arthur Hartman.

Later, on its basis, the all-Russian network socio-political movement “Open Russia” was created, which was persecuted on the territory of the Russian Federation. After Khodorkovsky was released from captivity, the organization continued its work under his leadership.

The Yukos case

In October 2003, Mikhail Khodorkovsky, who at that time became one of the richest people in Russia and the world, was arrested at the Novosibirsk airport and charged with theft of government funds and tax evasion. After this, a search was carried out at the Yukos office, and all shares and accounts of the company were seized by the Russian Prosecutor's Office.

According to the investigation, which was later recognized by the court, the oil tycoon in 1994 created a criminal group whose activities were aimed at illegally acquiring shares of various companies at a reduced price with the aim of reselling them at market prices.

As a result, Russia's largest oil company, Yukos, began to fall apart, as oil exports were stopped, and all the money from the company's assets was used to pay off the debt to the state. As a result of the first criminal case in May 2005, Khodorkovsky was sentenced to 8 years in prison to be served in a general regime colony. And the Yukos case against other company managers was investigated further.

In 2006, a second criminal case was opened against Khodorkovsky and his business partner, the head of the board of directors of Menatep, for oil theft, the indictment of which consisted of 14 volumes.

Khodorkovsky called the crime he was charged with absurd, because if he stole all of Yukos’s oil, which is 350 million tons, then why were wages paid to employees, taxes were paid to the state in the amount of $ 40 million and wells were drilled and new fields were developed .

In December 2010, the court found Khodorkosky and Lebedev guilty, sentencing them to 14 years in prison on a cumulative basis; the term of imprisonment was later reduced.

The convicts were transported to a correctional colony in the Karelian city of Segezha, and in Russia there was a loud discussion of the criminal trial of Khodorkovsky, which was publicly condemned by public figure, opposition politician, former mayor of Moscow, member of the Human Rights Commission under the Presidential Administration of the Russian Federation Lyudmila Alekseeva and others, who believe that in the YUKOS case the law was violated in a “malicious and brazen manner.” The West also condemned Khodorkovsky's sentence - the United States criticized Russian laws, the independence of the courts, tax policy in Russia and the inviolability of property.

As a sign of protest and non-recognition of the charges, Khodorkovsky went on hunger strike 4 times while serving his sentence. In addition, his stay in the colony was filled with various “adventures”. After the first sentence in the Chita colony, he ended up in a punishment cell, because during the inspection, orders from the Ministry of Justice of the Russian Federation on the rights of prisoners were confiscated from him, which, according to the administration, is prohibited by law.

There, in Chita, prisoner Khodorkovsky also became a “victim” of cellmate Alexander Kuchma, who cut the oligarch’s face with a shoe knife. According to Kuchma, he was pushed to commit a crime by unknown people who literally “beat” him out of actions against Mikhail. The prisoner said that he was also required to testify in front of the camera that he cut up Khodorkovsky’s face against the backdrop of the latter’s sexual harassment.

In December 2013, the Russian President signed the release of Khodorkovsky. The ex-head of YUKOS was hastily released from the colony, even forgetting to issue a release certificate, and transported to the St. Petersburg Pulkovo airport, from where Mikhail flew to Berlin on a private plane provided by the former head of the German Foreign Ministry.

Upon arrival in Berlin, Khodorkovsky spoke at a press conference and stated that after his release he no longer intended to participate in politics, sponsor the Russian opposition or engage in business. His key plan for the future was social activities aimed at the release of political prisoners in Russia.

Over the course of several years, the opinion of the former oil tycoon changed radically - before the presidential elections, he intensified his activities, which experts assessed as a desire to make his way to the pinnacle of power. Khodorkovsky himself states that he is ready to become president of the Russian Federation in order to carry out constitutional reform in Russia and redistribute presidential power in favor of society, parliament and the court.

Also on the Ukrainian Maidan in 2014, after the coup d’etat, Mikhail Khodorkovsky said that he was ready to become a peacemaker in the Ukrainian situation. Then, speaking on stage in front of the Ukrainian people, he openly criticized the Russian authorities, and called Ukrainian nationalists brave people who honestly defended their freedom.

While still in prison, Mikhail Borisovich began literary activity. His works were analytical in nature. In the mid-2000s, the books “The Crisis of Liberalism”, “Left Turn”, “Introduction to the Future. The world in 2020."

Later “Articles” were published. Dialogues. Interview: Author's collection" and "Prison and freedom". But the most popular was the entrepreneur’s book “Prison People,” which the author dedicated to his cellmates. Khodorkovsky called human life the only currency that exists in prison. In the dungeons, it is customary to go to the end in every situation, regardless of cowardice, even if you have to give up your life.

What Mikhail himself lacked was communication with friends, family, children and the opportunity to look beyond the horizon. The first thing after his release was that the businessman went to the sea, jumped with a parachute and crawled along a rock. According to Mikhail Borisovich, the feeling of adrenaline in his blood brought him back to life.

Repeatedly in his interviews, Khodorkovsky touched upon the topic of attitude towards the President of Russia. In one of his last conversations with journalists, Mikhail Borisovich spoke about Vladimir Putin as a politician who does not have a strategy for leaving the post of head of state. According to the businessman, the long term of the president's rule suggests that society has a stereotype of treating Russians as a people who cannot live without a strong hand. Khodorkovsky called this form of attitude towards the people “a form of racism.”

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Former British oil company CEO John Brown claimed in his autobiographical book More Than Business that shortly before Khodorkovsky's arrest, Vladimir Putin privately told him (Brown): “I have tolerated this man for too long.” In July 2009, former Russian Prime Minister Mikhail Kasyanov submitted an affidavit in which he said during an informal meeting with then-Russian President Vladimir Putin that Khodorkovsky had "crossed the line" by funding the Communist Party without the Kremlin's permission.

Representatives of the Communist Party of the Russian Federation have repeatedly asserted that neither the party nor its members have ever received funding from YUKOS. However, Mikhail Khodorkovsky claimed that assistance to this party was provided by one of the company’s shareholders from his own funds. In 2003, according to the list of the Communist Party of the Russian Federation, former member of the board of directors of YUKOS Sergei Muravlenko and former head of the analytical department of YUKOS Alexey Kondaurov were elected deputies of the State Duma.

As a number of experts have suggested, one of the factors in the Khodorkovsky case in 2003 and the nationalization of the Yukos company was Khodorkovsky's lobbying for a reduction in the tax burden on oil companies (in 2002, Khodorkovsky opposed government initiatives in this area).

Claims from tax authorities

It should be noted that during the corresponding period, not only YUKOS, but also other Russian oil companies carried out their activities through a network of legal entities registered in preferential tax zones. . In particular, the companies Lukoil and Sibneft acted this way. In December 2003, the Department of Information and Public Relations of the Accounts Chamber of the Russian Federation, based on the results of an audit of the financial and economic activities of OJSC Sibneft for 2001 and the first half of 2002, reported that such a scheme allowed the company “to pay income tax at a reduced rate within the framework of current legislation . We are, therefore, talking about the legal activities of Sibneft OJSC, aimed at minimizing the expenditure side of the company’s budget.”

Thus, what was recognized as legal in relation to Sibneft was recognized as illegal in relation to YUKOS.

In 2001, YUKOS had to pay $14.5 in various taxes for each barrel of oil produced, while all oil companies paid an average of only $5.2. In 2000, for each barrel of oil produced by YUKOS taxes were assessed at $10.50, while the other six oil majors paid an average of $6.00. For 2001 and 2002, the company was assessed taxes that amounted to 49.5% of revenue for 2001 and 58.15% for 2002, and the total amount of claims from the tax authorities, including fines, exceeded the company's revenue for these years.

The total amount of tax claims, taking into account fines and penalties for 2000-2003, amounted to 582 billion rubles, and taking into account claims against subsidiaries - 703 billion rubles. or almost $25 billion at the then exchange rate. According to Yukos, tax claims for 2004 significantly exceeded the company's revenue.

After this, Yukos shares fell sharply in price. Then, in one of his interviews, Vladimir Putin said that the state does not intend to bankrupt YUKOS. As a result, the shares almost quadrupled in price in one day.

Arbitration process for tax claims

All assets and accounts of Yukos and its subsidiaries were frozen. Funds were allowed to be withdrawn only to pay taxes and salaries to employees; the rest went to the state to pay off debts. The company began to gradually reduce staff, and after some time stopped exporting oil due to a lack of funds for customs payments. Russia's largest oil company began to fall apart.

Arbitration courts of all instances recognized the claims of the tax authorities as legitimate. The Federal Bailiff Service of Russia (FSSP) ordered the sale of Yuganskneftegaz to repay the debts of the Yukos Oil Company to the federal budget.

The company's management, together with shareholders, considered the possibility of declaring NK Yukos insolvent (bankrupt) in order to avoid dismemberment of the company. On December 14, 2004, YUKOS filed a claim for voluntary bankruptcy in court in Houston (USA). By a decision of December 16, 2004, this court prohibited companies and banks from taking any actions to alienate YUKOS property. Nevertheless, on December 19, 2004, 76.79% of Yuganskneftegaz shares were sold to the FSSP at auction for $9.3 billion. The winner was the little-known company Baikalfinancegroup LLC, whose shareholders, according to V. Putin, are “individuals who have been doing business for many years.” A few days later, this company was purchased by the state-owned OJSC Rosneft.

Bankruptcy of NK Yukos

Yukos oil production enterprises produced 24.5 million tons of oil. YUKOS's revenue according to RAS for the nine months of 2005 amounted to 2.03 billion rubles, net loss - 2.92 billion rubles. The state's tax claims against YUKOS at the beginning of 2006 amounted to $9.8 billion, and the company owed about $1.2 billion to commercial banks and Group Menatep.

The case of Khodorkovsky, Lebedev and Krainov

The formal reason for launching an investigation by the Prosecutor General's Office against YUKOS and its owners was a request from State Duma deputy Vladimir Yudin about the legality of the privatization in 1994 of the Apatit mining and processing plant (Murmansk region) by commercial entities controlled by Mikhail Khodorkovsky and his business partners.

A few days later, a criminal case was opened on embezzlement and tax evasion by structures controlled by the oil company YUKOS, from which dozens of criminal cases against individual employees of the company were subsequently spun off.

For the first month, the investigation was conducted in conditions of increased secrecy, and the investigation became known only on July 2, 2003, when the chairman of the board of directors of the Menatep International Financial Association, Platon Lebedev, was arrested.

After the arrest of Platon Lebedev, events developed rapidly, and reports of new charges and searches were received weekly. The investigation into Lebedev’s own case was completed in just two months. At first he was accused of stealing 20% ​​of the shares of Apatit OJSC, then a number of more charges were added.

After some time, the Yukos company itself was accused of tax evasion through various tax optimization schemes. Intensified tax audits followed for several years. According to senior managers of YUKOS, the calculated amount of arrears and fines exceeded the company's revenue over the years. According to the Ministry of Taxes and Duties, YUKOS's real revenue was much more than declared.

At first, the Prosecutor General's Office did not bother Mikhail Khodorkovsky himself very much - he was only interrogated several times as a witness shortly after the arrest of Platon Lebedev, and then left alone for a long time. But already in the fall of 2003, unambiguous hints began to come from the prosecutor’s office about the existence of serious claims against Khodorkovsky.

On the morning of October 25, 2003, Khodorkovsky’s plane, heading to Irkutsk, landed for refueling at Novosibirsk airport. As soon as the plane stopped, it was blocked by FSB officers. On the same day, Khodorkovsky was taken to Moscow, appeared in court and was placed in the Matrosskaya Tishina detention center.

The investigation into the Khodorkovsky case was also completed in a record two months. The claims against him completely repeated what Platon Lebedev had previously been accused of - theft of someone else's property, malicious failure to comply with a court decision that had entered into legal force, causing property damage to owners through deception, evasion of taxes from organizations and individuals, forgery of documents, embezzlement or embezzlement of someone else's property by an organized group on a large scale.

According to the investigation, which the court later agreed with, Mikhail Khodorkovsky and Platon Lebedev in 1994 created an organized criminal group in order to fraudulently take over shares of various enterprises (fraud) and then sell the products of the Apatit plant at reduced prices to controlled intermediary companies, who, in turn, sold them at market prices (causing property damage through deception or breach of trust). In addition, they were accused of tax crimes.

In addition to committing economic crimes, a number of Yukos employees were accused of organizing several murders. For example, Yukos security officer Alexey Pichugin, according to the prosecutor's office, organized the murder of Nefteyugansk mayor Vladimir Petukhov in 1998 - on the direct orders of Yukos board chairman Leonid Nevzlin.

Shortly after the arrest of Mikhail Khodorkovsky, the Russian Prosecutor General's Office launched a “general offensive” against Yukos, bringing charges against various employees of the group’s organizations. By May 2005, the list of defendants in the YUKOS cases already exceeded 30 people, most of whom, however, are abroad and inaccessible to the investigation.

The trials of Platon Lebedev and Mikhail Khodorkovsky began in April 2004, then they were merged, and the trial of the case began in July 2004.

Court verdict in the case of Khodorkovsky and Lebedev

Court verdict in the case of Khodorkovsky and Lebedev (end)

The court sentenced Khodorkovsky to nine years of imprisonment in a general regime colony under articles

• Part 3 of Article 147 of the Criminal Code of the RSFSR - “fraud”, “on a large scale, or by an organized group, or by a particularly dangerous recidivist”;
• Part 3 of Article 33, Article 315 of the Criminal Code of the Russian Federation (edition No. 162-FZ December 8, 2003) - “organizer”, “failure to comply with a court sentence, court decision or other judicial act”;
• paragraphs “a”, “b”, part 3 of article 160 of the Criminal Code of the Russian Federation (N 63-FZ June 13, 1996) - “misappropriation or embezzlement”, “by an organized group”, “on a large scale”;
• paragraphs “a”, “b”, part 3 of article 165 of the Criminal Code of the Russian Federation (N 63-FZ June 13, 1996) - “causing property damage by deception or abuse of trust”, “committed by an organized group”, “causing major damage” ;
• Part 2 of Article 198 of the Criminal Code of the Russian Federation (as amended by No. 162-FZ on December 8, 2003) - “evasion of taxes and (or) fees from an individual”, “on an especially large scale”;
• Part 3, Article 33, paragraphs. “a”, “b” part 2 of article 199 of the Criminal Code of the Russian Federation (edition No. 162-FZ December 8, 2003) - “organizer”, “evasion of taxes and (or) fees from an organization”, “a group of persons by preliminary conspiracy”, “on an especially large scale”;
• pp. “a”, “b” part 3 of article 159 of the Criminal Code of the Russian Federation (N 63-FZ June 13, 1996) - “fraud”, “by an organized group”, “on a large scale”.

According to the decision of the Moscow City Court dated September 22, 2005, the conviction against Mikhail Khodorkovsky, Platon Lebedev and Andrei Krainov, passed by the Meshchansky Court of Moscow, came into force. The Moscow City Court excluded only one episode and reduced the punishment for Khodorkovsky and Lebedev by one year to eight years in prison.

Pichugin case

In 1998-2002, the following crimes were committed, which were later incriminated against the former head of the internal economic security department at the Yukos oil company, Alexei Pichugin:

On April 21, 2008, prosecution witnesses Gennady Tsigelnik and Evgeny Reshetnikov stated that they had incriminated Leonid Nevzlin and the head of the Yukos security department, Alexei Pichugin, under pressure from the investigation in exchange for concessions in their prison sentences.

Criminal prosecution of other workers

The investigation into individual episodes of the activities of other YUKOS managers continued; some of them (managers) were convicted (some of them suspended or with a probationary period), some received political asylum abroad, or the states in which they were located refused Russia in extradition.

The second case of Khodorkovsky and Lebedev

In December 2006, Mikhail Khodorkovsky and his former business partner Platon Lebedev were transferred to the Chita pre-trial detention center to face new charges - in the case of money laundering (“Legalization of funds obtained by criminal means”, Article 174 part 3 of the Criminal Code of the Russian Federation).

On February 4, 2007, lawyers for Khodorkovsky and Lebedev, Yu. Shmidt, E. Baru, K. Rivkin, L. Saikin, K. Moskalenko, who arrived at Moscow Domodedovo airport to fly to Chita to see the accused, were detained at the check-in counter; they had tickets and passports were taken away, and they were taken to the basement of the line police station, where they were held for some time by armed law enforcement officers; During the inspection, all papers from the lawyer's files, all documents and letters were inspected and filmed.

On February 24, 2009, M. Khodorkovsky and P. Lebedev arrived in Moscow on a stage. On March 3, 2009, the Khamovnichesky Interdistrict Court of Moscow began preliminary hearings on a new criminal case. The prosecution was headed by Dmitry Shokhin, who represented the state prosecution at the first trial in the case of Khodorkovsky and Lebedev

Khodorkovsky and Lebedev were charged with the fact that, as part of an organized group with the main shareholders of OJSC NK YUKOS and other persons, in the period before June 12, 1998, they stole shares of subsidiaries of OJSC Eastern Oil Company in the amount of 3.6 billion rubles, in 1998-2000, shares of subsidiaries of OJSC Eastern Oil Company stolen for the same amount were legalized, and also in 1998-2003 they committed theft by appropriating oil from OJSC Samaraneftegaz, OJSC Yuganskneftegaz and OJSC Tomskneft in the amount of more than 892 .4 billion rubles and the legalization of part of these funds in 1998-2004 in the amount of 487.4 billion rubles and 7.5 billion dollars.

On May 17, 2010, Khodorkovsky went on a hunger strike due to the fact that the court hearing the second case extended his detention. Khodorkovsky considered the extension of the arrest to be contrary to the new law, which prohibits the detention of those accused of economic crimes without sufficient grounds. After that, the press secretary of Russian President Dmitry Medvedev reported that the president was familiar with the contents of Khodorkovsky’s letter to the chairman of the Supreme Court of Russia, and on May 19, Khodorkovsky stopped his hunger strike.

In May 2010, former Russian Prime Minister Mikhail Kasyanov appeared at the trial as a witness for the defense. He said that the methods of work at Yukos were no different from those of other leading oil companies and all companies were characterized by vertical integration, the use of transfer pricing and the use of preferential tax zones. Kasyanov said that he considers the case against Khodorkovsky and Lebedev to be initiated for political reasons and that Putin personally told him that “the Yukos company financed the political parties Yabloko and SPS, which he allowed to finance, and the Communist Party, which he did not allow.”

In May 2010, the defense asked to subpoena a whole group of former and current government officials, including Prime Minister Vladimir Putin and Deputy Prime Minister Igor Sechin. However, the court agreed to hear only German Gref, who in 1998 served as first deputy of the Ministry of State Property, and the former head of the Ministry of Industry and Energy, Viktor Khristenko.

On December 30, 2010, judge of the Khamovnichesky Court Viktor Danilkin found Khodorkovsky and Lebedev guilty under Articles 160 and 174 Part 1 regarding oil transactions and sentenced each of them to 14 years in prison with credit for previously served time. At the same time, regarding the episode with shares owned by OJSC Eastern Oil Company, the case was dismissed due to the expiration of the 10-year statute of limitations.

“I absolutely know for sure that the verdict was brought from the Moscow City Court. And the fact that this verdict was written by judges of the cassation instance in criminal cases, that is, the Moscow City Court. It is obvious".

Natalya Vasilyeva in an interview with Gazeta.ru

According to her, “I know a lot from a person close to the judge,” whom she declined to name. She also drew such conclusions from the fact that “they could have told her [when she brought documents for signature]: don’t interfere, Viktor Nikolaevich is talking to the Moscow City Court. Or he himself told her: “I’m talking to the ‘city’.” According to the statement, N Vasilyeva " this is slang for Moscow City Court" Accordingly, N. Vasilyeva concludes, “ some orders were given“Danilkin called this statement slander, and the Moscow City Court declared provocation.

In February 2011, Judge Danilkin said in an interview that the verdict against Mikhail Khodorkovsky and Platon Lebedev was written by him alone in compliance with all norms of the law. And the threats and pressure were, rather, from those sympathizing with Khodorkovsky: " Some strange people called me on the phone, found out my home phone number, went to my son’s website, and posted some nasty things there. Correspondence arrived addressed to me at the Khamovnichesky Court. At the time the verdict was announced, it had been announced for four days; there were already direct threats.

By a cassation ruling of the judicial panel for criminal cases of the Moscow City Court dated May 24, 2011, the verdict of the Khamovnichesky District Court in relation to Khodorkovsky and Lebedev was changed and their punishment was reduced to 13 years in prison for each.

On May 27, 2011, Khodorkovsky and Lebedev filed petitions for parole with the Preobrazhensky District Court of Moscow, since the articles imputed to them provide for such an opportunity after serving half of the sentence of imprisonment, and out of the assigned 13 years, they served more than seven and a half.

In June 2011, Khodorkovsky was transferred to correctional colony No. 7 in the city of Segezha in Karelia, and Lebedev was transferred to penal colony No. 14 near the city of Velsk in the Arkhangelsk region.

On December 20, 2012, the Presidium of the Moscow City Court, having considered the case in a supervisory manner, reduced the sentences of Mikhail Khodorkovsky and Platon Lebedev from 13 to 11 years. This was motivated by the reclassification of the charges in connection with the liberalization of the Criminal Code of the Russian Federation. In addition, the Presidium of the Moscow City Court excluded from the charges the indication of money laundering in the amount of more than 2 billion rubles, considering it too imputed. Also, due to the expiration of the statute of limitations, the court terminated criminal prosecution for one of the episodes of tax evasion. As a result, Lebedev should be released on July 2, 2014, Khodorkovsky on October 25, 2014.

Consideration of the case in the European Court of Human Rights

Khodorkovsky's lawsuit

Even before the verdict was pronounced in the first criminal case against Khodorkovsky, he filed a lawsuit with the European Court of Human Rights (hereinafter ECHR). At the end of May 2011, the ECHR, considering this claim, recognized that certain rights of Khodorkovsky were violated, but refused to recognize the case itself as politically motivated.

Lebedev's claims

Platon Lebedev filed several lawsuits with the ECHR.

In October 2007, the ECHR published a decision on one of the claims. According to the decision, the ECHR ordered Russia to pay Lebedev 3,000 euros in moral compensation and 7,000 euros to cover legal costs. In particular, the ECHR considered a violation of Article 5 of the European Convention on Human Rights by the fact that from March 30 to April 6, 2004, Lebedev was in custody without court authorization. Also, according to the ECHR, in two cases the time frame for considering complaints about arrest was excessively long.

YUKOS shareholders' lawsuit

YUKOS shareholders filed a complaint against the actions of the Russian authorities with the European Court of Human Rights in Strasbourg, which was accepted for consideration on January 30, 2009. In their complaint, Yukos shareholders asked that the actions of the Russian authorities be declared illegal, claiming that their property was illegally taken away, citing a violation of the provisions of the Convention for the Protection of Rights and Fundamental Freedoms regarding the right to a fair trial and the protection of property. The applicants demanded compensation for their damages from these actions in the amount of $98 billion.

The Russian authorities brought in 20 lawyers to consider the case, including the famous British royal lawyer Michael Swainston. YUKOS shareholders were represented by British lawyer Piers Gardner, who, according to lawyer Dmitry Gololobov, has less legal experience than Swainston. According to Gololobov, the class of explanations given by Swainston during his speeches during the hearings contributed to a shift in emphasis in the case in favor of the Russian side.

In its complaint, OJSC NK YUKOS (hereinafter referred to as the Company) argued that the Russian state violated the following provisions of the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms of November 4, 1950 (hereinafter referred to as the Convention):

• Article 6 of the Convention (right to a fair trial);
• Article 1 of Protocol 1 to the Convention (“Every natural or legal person has the right to the peaceful enjoyment of his property. No one shall be deprived of his property except in the public interest and under conditions provided by law and by the general principles of international law. The preceding provisions shall in no way shall not, in so far as they impair the right of the State to enforce such laws as it may deem necessary to control the use of property in accordance with the general interest or to enforce the payment of taxes or other charges or penalties.");
• Article 14 of the Convention (prohibition of discrimination);
• Article 18 of the Convention (“The restrictions permitted under this Convention in relation to these rights and freedoms shall not be applied for purposes other than those for which they were provided.”);
• Article 7 of the Convention (“No one shall be convicted of any criminal offense on account of any act or omission which did not constitute a criminal offense under national or international law at the time when it was committed”);
• Article 13 of the Convention (“Everyone whose rights and freedoms as set forth in this Convention are violated shall have the right to an effective remedy before a public authority even if the violation was committed by persons acting in an official capacity.”).

On September 20, 2011, the ECHR adopted a ruling on the claim of Yukos shareholders, the claim was partially satisfied:

• The ECHR found that the Russian state violated the company’s right to protect property. In particular, the amount of tax claims against the company for 2000-2001 was calculated with violations (however, the court considered similar calculations for the tax period for 2001-2003 to be legal and correct). Also, according to the court, a violation of the right to protect property was that the company was not given enough time to pay off the additional tax assessments. The court explained that this was “partly explained by the requirements” of Russian laws.
• According to the decision, the authorities allowed a restriction of the rights of Yukos in relation to a fair trial in the framework of the trial regarding tax payments for 2000: Yukos lawyers were not given enough time to familiarize themselves with the case materials in the first instance (to study 43,000 pages from the party there was only 4 days of protection). In the remaining trials in the Yukos case, the ECHR did not find any procedural violations.
• The ECHR did not find a discriminatory or political component in the Yukos case. According to the ECHR, the tax optimization schemes used by Yukos have never been legal in Russia. Also, the ECHR found no evidence that such techniques were generally accepted in Russian business.
• The amount of material compensation was not determined in the decision; it was stated that this issue would be specifically discussed.

The plaintiffs and defendants assessed the ECHR decision differently: both of them actually declared their victory. The press service of the Ministry of Justice of the Russian Federation stated that the ECHR rejected most of Yukos' claims against Russia, recognizing only some procedural violations. A Ministry of Justice spokesman said: “The court completely rejected the accusations against the Russian Federation of the “political motivation” and “repressive nature” of the persecution of the Yukos company, as well as the alleged discrimination against it by the Russian authorities.”. The plenipotentiary representative of the Russian government in the highest courts, Mikhail Barshchevsky, assessed the ECHR decision as a “colossal victory.” On the other hand, plaintiffs' lawyer Piers Gardner said that “the court's decision contains three major victories for Yukos: it was recognized that the company could not prepare for the trial; that property rights have been violated; that the fines were imposed illegally.”

Outside commentators also assessed the outcome of the case differently. The former chief lawyer of YUKOS, Dmitry Gololobov, said that in its decision the ECHR actually recognized that YUKOS optimized taxes illegally, and the Russian state, while fighting YUKOS, although it “went too far” in some places, generally acted reasonably and with for legitimate purposes. According to Gololobov, the recognition by the ECHR of the fairness of the assessment of taxes on YUKOS actually means the recognition that Mikhail Khodorkovsky was “absolutely legally convicted in the tax episode, in the so-called first case.” . Representatives of Mikhail Khodorkovsky, noting that the entrepreneur was not one of the plaintiffs and did not play any role in the court case, nevertheless stated that they “welcome the findings of the ECtHR on serious violations of the right to a fair trial and property rights committed by the Government of the Russian Federation under handling of YUKOS".

Consideration of the case in the International Arbitration Court in The Hague

On February 3, 2005, three companies associated with the former major shareholder of Yukos Group MENATEP Ltd (GML) - Yukos Universal Ltd, registered in the Isle of Man, Cypriot Hulley Enterprises Ltd and the Cyprus Veteran Petroleum Trust filed claims in the arbitration court of the International Chamber of Commerce in The Hague. The plaintiffs demanded about $100 billion from Russia, citing investment protection provisions of the Energy Charter, which Russia has signed but not ratified.

On November 30, 2009, the Hague Arbitration decided to consider the case on the merits on the basis of a special provision of the Energy Charter allowing its immediate application to a signatory state.

Consequences of the Yukos Affair

According to the Federal Tax Service, after the YUKOS case, almost all oil companies clarified their tax payment figures and began to contribute significantly larger amounts to the budget. In 2004, tax collection was 250% of the 2003 level.

The case caused a powerful resonance, including US President George W. Bush expressing concern about Khodorkovsky's fate. As foreign policy expert Alexander Rahr argued in 2005, German Chancellor Gerhard Schröder fully supports the process against Khodorkovsky - he is convinced that it is necessary to punish those people who “have not paid taxes for years, who were bribing the Duma, who participated in corrupt deals, of which there were many in Russia at one time.”

The international resonance was to a certain extent caused by the presence of numerous foreign shareholders. Trying to counteract their pressure, the authorities decided to involve a German bank in financing the transaction, but it was actually ostracized abroad.

In November 2003, Paul Klebnikov, senior editor of the Russian edition of Forbes magazine, wrote: “What conclusions will you draw from the Khodorkovsky case? What will you do to avoid ending up in jail with him? Obviously, you would prefer to always take the side of the president, or even better, to stay away from politics altogether. But you will also make every effort to stay within the law by avoiding get-rich-quick schemes. Then the prosecutor and the organizers of political campaigns will not have a clear reason to find fault with you. It is from such considerations that a law-abiding society is built. Khodorkovsky's arrest does not mark the triumph of the rule of law. Tough actions during detention indicate that the establishment of a civilized law enforcement system in Russia is still far away. It remains to be seen how Putin's people will take this matter further (I suspect things will get worse before they get better). But looking back on these events in the future, we will probably be able to state that they have led to the strengthening of both the fundamentals of property rights and the Russian market.”

Khodorkovsky's supporters held various seminars, organized rallies and distributed stickers, in which they mainly resorted to the following arguments:

• court bias;
• political motivation of the case;
• Khodorkovsky's efforts to ensure transparency of Yukos business.

The YUKOS case marked the beginning of the process of nationalization of the Russian oil and gas complex:

• in 2005, Gazprom acquired a controlling stake in Sibneft,
• in 2006, Gazprom became the main shareholder of the Sakhalin-2 project (previous project participants were presented with environmental claims, which were dropped after Gazprom acquired the asset). In the same year, Gazprom became a major shareholder of Novatek
• in 2007, in addition to the final inclusion of YUKOS assets into Rosneft, by decision of the judiciary, shares of enterprises in the oil and gas complex of Bashkiria were returned to state ownership, Gazprom received control over the Kovyktinskoye gas condensate field. The Russneft company was persecuted, whose owner Mikhail Gutseriev was forced to sell the business and then left the country
• in 2008, information appeared about the likely acquisition by Gazprom of a controlling stake in TNK-BP, which was presented with tax claims in the amount of 6 billion rubles

Opinions on the Yukos case

Some observers spoke out in support of the trial and the verdict, some considered the trial in the YUKOS case to be political, demonstrative and ordered.

In November 2003, Forbes magazine senior editor Paul Klebnikov wrote: “The arrest of Khodorkovsky is not at all the beginning of a campaign against the rich. Nor is it an example of repression based on trumped-up charges, similar to Stalin's show trials. By contrast, too many other Russian business leaders could be accused of crimes attributed to Khodorkovsky. We are watching how the kleptocratic system of Yeltsin's Russia is in its death throes. A blatant example of the depravity of the privatization era is the notorious loans-for-shares auctions of 1995-1997. who provided Khodorkovsky with his fortune.<…>By purchasing assets from the government in such a backroom deal and at such a reduced price, you risk that your rights to the new property will never be reliably protected. Your fellow citizens will view you as a fraud, and the state as a custodian of assets rather than their true owner.”

International lawyer Robert Amsterdam published a white paper in 2007 on abuses of state power in the Russian Federation, arguing that there were violations of the law in the prosecution of Khodorkovsky and his colleagues.

According to a survey of the Russian population conducted in October 2004 by the Public Opinion Foundation, in the proceedings around YUKOS, 47% of respondents were on the side of the state, 7% were on the side of YUKOS, the rest said that they did not know about the YUKOS case or found it difficult to answer.

Opinions and assessments of the “second case” of Khodorkovsky and Lebedev

In December 2009, Prime Minister Vladimir Putin said that “the bankruptcy procedure of the Yukos company was initiated by Western creditors, Western banks. And this bankruptcy was carried out in full compliance with Russian legislation.” According to him, the funds realized from the sale of the company’s assets went to the Housing and Communal Services Fund: “10 million people have already benefited from the results of the work of this fund; their houses and apartments have been renovated; 150 thousand will be resettled in new houses from slums.” Putin noted that “this money was once stolen from the people,” and also recalled: “there are only five proven murders there.” Putin emphasized: “the problem is that crimes of this kind should not be repeated in our country.”

On May 18, 2011, at a press conference, one of the journalists asked Russian President Dmitry Medvedev whether Khodorkovsky’s release was dangerous. Medvedev’s answer was: “The question is short and the answer is also short: absolutely not dangerous.”

Notes

1. S. Besson Switzerland - a refuge for exported Yukos funds (“Le Temps”, Switzerland, 03/04/2002) (translation by www.inosmi.ru)
2. S. Besson How the new Russian oil kings built a secret financial empire in Geneva (“Le Temps”, Switzerland, 06/21/2002) (translation by www.inosmi.ru)
3. Irina Reznik. Prosecutor's discount // Vedomosti, No. 180 (1954), September 25, 2007
4. Why Mikhail Khodorkovsky is imprisoned (part 3) // Izvestia
5. RBC - RosBusinessConsulting
6. Jailed tycoon Mikhail Khodorkovsky ‘framed’ by key Putin aid The Sunday Times, May 18, 2008
7. Sechin started the war against YUKOS out of greed, Khodorkovsky said NEWSru.com, May 18, 2008
8. I ask you to blame for my sentence... Mikhail Khodorkovsky named the initiator of the “YUKOS case” and the conditions for his possible release. Vremya Novostei, May 19, 2008
9. Mikhail Ocherchenko.“The first time BP went into Russia with its eyes closed,” John Brown, managing director and partner in Europe at Riverstone Holdings, former CEO of BP. // Vedomosti, 05/11/2011, No. 83 (2849). Archived from the original on March 3, 2012. Retrieved May 11, 2011.
10. Catherine Belton. Europe - Kasyanov reveals Putin’s pursuit of tycoon // Financial Times, July 20 2009 (Retrieved July 22, 2009)
11. Anastasia Kornya, Vera Kholmogorova. Pointed to Putin // Vedomosti, No. 134 (2404), July 22, 2009
12. Kommersant-Online - Temporary export duties forever
13. Resolution of the appeal court of the Moscow Arbitration Court in case No. A40-17669/04-109-241 dated June 29, 2004
14. Resolution of the Presidium of the Supreme Arbitration Court of the Russian Federation No. 8665/04 dated October 4, 2005.
15. Transfer pricing and Art. 40 Tax Code of the Russian Federation
16. According to the Yukos scenario, oil companies may be required to pay $6 billion
17. Problems of taxation of the Russian oil industry
18. Tax claims against Yukos exceed the company's revenue
19. YUKOS
20. Tax legislation of the Russian Federation, tax benefits for large and medium-sized companies
21. The Federal Tax Service has filed new major claims against Yukos.
22. Putin: the government must preserve Yukos
23. A court in Houston confirmed that the Yukos case cannot be tried in the United States.
24. V. Putin said that state-owned companies are not behind Baikalfinance Group
25. VEDOMOSTI - An entry on the liquidation of YUKOS was entered into the Unified State Register of Legal Entities
26. Lawyers demanded to transfer Lebedev closer to Moscow
27. New Year in the Arctic Circle
28. The court again declared legal the transfer of Khodorkovsky to the Chita region
29. News. Ru: Why Mikhail Khodorkovsky is imprisoned (part 2)
30. Kommersant-Gazeta - History of the issue
31. Kommersant-Gazeta - How Alexey Pichugin was tried
32. Kommersant-Gazeta - Alexey Pichugin’s imprisonment will be reclassified
33. Kommersant-Online - The court found Alexey Pichugin guilty of murder
34. Kommersant-Gazeta - Two murders added to Alexey Pichugin
35. Kommersant-Gazeta - The mayor of Nefteyugansk was killed as a gift
36. They renounced perjury, Vera Vasilyeva, Human Rights in Russia, April 21, 2008
37. Lists of those persecuted in the “YUKOS case”, press center of lawyers for Khodorkovsky and Lebedev
38. Fly to Khodorkovsky. Novaya Gazeta (February 12, 2009). - Mikhail Khodorkovsky’s lawyer was promised that they would “take” her to the police station if she did not go there herself. Archived from the original on March 3, 2012. Retrieved March 7, 2009.
39. Khodorkovsky and Lebedev transported to Moscow rosbalt.ru
40. A new trial in the Khodorkovsky case has begun. The prosecution was headed by order bearer Shokhin NEWSru March 3, 2009.
41. The court at the trial in the case of M. Khodorkovsky rejected the defense's motion to disqualify the judge rbc.ru
42. The lawyers of Khodorkovsky and Lebedev were unable to change the judge at the new trial NEWSru March 4, 2009.
43. The defense of the ex-owners of YUKOS asks to dismiss the second case for lack of evidence NEWSru March 6, 2009.
44. Khodorkovsky's third hunger strike ends: he reached Medvedev in record time
45. Khodorkovsky stopped his hunger strike
46. Kasyanov spoke about Yukos oil production methods
47. Gref to the rescue - Gazeta.ru, 06.21.10
48. “They are completely destroying what is written in the indictment” - Gazeta.ru, 06.22.10
49. The court found Khodorkovsky and Lebedev guilty of oil theft. ITAR-TASS. (inaccessible link - story) Retrieved December 27, 2010.
50. Khodorkovsky and Lebedev were given 13.5 years each // Sergei Smirnov, Maxim Glikin, Vedomosti, 12/30/2010.
51. Full text of the verdict against M. B. Khodorkovsky and P. L. Lebedev
52. “The verdict was brought from the Moscow City Court, I know for sure.” // Gazeta.ru, February 14, 2011 (Retrieved March 1, 2011)
53. The head of the Russian Armed Forces refused to comment on the statement about pressure on Danilkin
54. Danilkin: Strange people threatened me during the trial of Khodorkovsky:: Articles:: RBC daily
55. PRESS SERVICE REPORT
56. Mikhail Khodorkovsky and Platon Lebedev filed applications for parole
57. Khodorkovsky was taken to the colony in Segezha
58. Platon Lebedev was transferred to a colony near Velsk, Arkhangelsk region
59. The Moscow City Court reduced the prison terms of Lebedev and Khodorkovsky to 11 years
60. The ECHR decided to recover 10 thousand euros from the Russian Federation in favor of Khodorkovsky. - RIA Novosti, May 31, 2011
61. Russia owes Platon Lebedev - Gazeta.Ru
62. News Time: N°197, October 26, 2007
63. BBC: “Strasbourg accepted the claim of Yukos shareholders against Russia”
64. Error in footnotes? : Invalid tag ; no text specified for footnotes bbc_5.2F02.2F2010

With a complaint about the actions of the Russian tax authorities, which she regarded as illegal seizure of property. Yukos is seeking compensation from the Russian Federation for more than $98 billion.

In 2004-2005, the Moscow Arbitration Court recovered from Yukos a total of more than 300 billion rubles in tax arrears for 2000-2004, and in the summer of 2006 the oil company was declared bankrupt. In addition, the Moscow Arbitration Court rejected YUKOS's claim to invalidate the auction for the sale of Yuganskneftegaz (a subsidiary of the company) and compensate it for 388.3 billion rubles in losses. Companies affiliated with YUKOS also unsuccessfully sued in arbitration courts in the regions of the Russian Federation.

At the end of January 2009, the ECHR found YUKOS’ complaint admissible in terms of the forced execution of tax decisions, including the sale of Yuganskneftegaz (in order to collect taxes, the main asset of YUKOS was forcibly sold at auction - 76.79% of the shares of OJSC Yuganskneftegaz), as well as in part double tax penalties.

The ECHR held public hearings on this case in March 2010. After them, the plaintiffs expressed hope that a decision would be made in 2010, while Russia demanded that the complaint be rejected.

At the hearing, a Yukos representative said that Russian authorities arbitrarily and illegally assessed the company €19.6 billion in additional taxes, penalties and interest from 2000 to 2003, and "the draconian implementation of these decisions amounted to expropriation."

The company believes that the Russian authorities violated six articles of the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, as well as an article of the Protocol to the Convention (Articles 1, 6, 7, 13, 14 and 18 of the Convention and Article 1 of Protocol No. 1).

The company's claims take into account cost estimates allegedly "known to the government through Russian judicial procedures." This is the base value of Yukos shares in Yuganskneftegaz - 19.6 million euros, the value of other assets and compensation for lost profits due to “expropriation”.

The Russian side, in turn, insists that YUKOS in 2000-2003 used tax schemes in circumvention of Russian legislation. The company enjoyed preferential taxation in some Russian regions. The defendant also claims that the auction for the sale of Yuganskneftegaz was held strictly within the law.

On September 20, 2011, the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) partially ruled that the actions of the Russian tax authorities against the oil company Yukos violated its right to protect property. Having considered the complaint from YUKOS, the ECHR found Russia to have violated Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 (protection of property) to the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms; Moreover, the court found that these violations occurred in the period from 2000 to 2001, while YUKOS asked to recognize violations from 2000 to 2003. At the same time, the ECHR did not see any political motive in the proceedings.

On December 21, 2011, it became known that the YUKOS company in the Grand Chamber of the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) issued a decision in September in which the court refused to recognize the processes that led to the bankruptcy of the company as politically motivated.

On July 31, 2014, it was ruled that Russia must pay former Yukos shareholders about 1.9 billion euros in compensation plus taxes. The document states that “Russia must pay the Yukos shareholders existing at the time of the liquidation of the company, or their successors and heirs, the amount of 1,866,104,634 euros as compensation for material damage, (as well as) the amount of 300 thousand euros in legal costs.” ECtHR that the applicant company suffered material damage due to the retrospective collection of fines for tax offenses for 2000 and 2001 (1.3 billion euros), 7% of the enforcement fee on these fines (0.5 billion euros), the disproportionate nature of enforcement proceedings, which must be compensated.

Russia considers the decision of the ECHR in the “YUKOS case” controversial. Constitutional Court of the Russian Federation, that Russia, although it remains under the jurisdiction of the Strasbourg Court, will implement its decisions only taking into account the recognition of the supremacy of the Constitution of the Russian Federation.

In October 2016, the Russian Ministry of Justice on the possibility of implementing the ECHR ruling in the case of OJSC NK Yukos dated July 31, 2014. The Russian Ministry of Justice believes that the obligations imposed on Russia by the contested ruling are based on the application of the ECHR provisions of the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Rights freedoms in interpretation, leading to their discrepancy with the Constitution of Russia.

On December 15, 2016, the Constitutional Court of the Russian Federation at an open meeting of the Russian Ministry of Justice on the possibility of not implementing the decision of the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) in the “YUKOS case”. The Constitutional Court did not support the payment of 1.9 billion euros to the company's shareholders.

At the court hearing, representatives of all government bodies indicated that the ECHR decision should not be implemented, since it not only interferes with the country’s sovereignty, but will also prevent Russia from fulfilling its budgetary obligations to citizens.

The material was prepared based on information from RIA Novosti and open sources

In 2003, the defining event of the new Russian energy geopolitics under Vladimir Putin took place. It was carried out entirely in the spirit of Washington, which very clearly demonstrated its intention to station troops in Iraq and the Middle East, regardless of the protests in the world or the diplomatic subtleties of the UN.

To understand Russian energy geopolitics, it is necessary to take a brief look at the spectacular October 2003 arrest of Russian billionaire "oligarch" Mikhail Khodorkovsky and the state takeover of his giant oil group Yukos.

Khodorkovsky was arrested at the Novosibirsk airport on October 25, 2003, on charges of tax evasion by the Russian Prosecutor General's Office. Putin's government froze Yukos Oil shares due to tax charges. Then further steps were taken against Yukos, leading to the collapse of the share price.

What got little mention in Western media narratives, which tended to portray Putin's government's actions as a return to Soviet-era methods, was what actually provoked Putin's decisive actions.

Khodorkovsky was arrested just four weeks before important elections to the Russian Duma (the lower house of parliament), in which Khodorkovsky managed to buy majority votes using his enormous wealth. Control of the Duma was Khodorkovsky's first step in his plans to run against Putin in next year's presidential elections. Victory in the Duma would allow him to change the electoral law in his favor, as well as change the controversial law “Law on Subsoil” being prepared in the Duma. This law would prevent Yukos and other private companies from controlling raw materials underground, or from creating private pipelines independent of Russian state ones.

Khodorkovsky broke the promise made to Putin by the oligarchs that they would be allowed to keep their wealth (effectively stolen from the state in rigged auctions under Yeltsin) if they stayed out of Russian politics and returned some of the stolen money to the country. As the most powerful oligarch of the time, Khodorkovsky served as the engine of what was increasingly becoming a Washington-backed plot against Putin.

Khodorkovsky was arrested after a little-reported meeting that took place a little earlier (July 14) that year between him and Vice President Cheney.

After the meeting with Cheney, Khodorkovsky began negotiations with ExxonMobil and ChevronTexaco, Condie Rice's former firm, about acquiring a large stake in Yukos, some say between 25 and 40%. This was intended to give Khodorkovsky de facto immunity from the possible influence of the Putin government, by tying Yukos to the US oil giants, and therefore to Washington. It would also give Washington, through the US oil giants, a virtual veto over future Russian oil and gas pipelines and oil deals. A few days before his arrest in October 2003 on tax evasion charges, Khodorkovsky hosted George H. W. Bush, now the Moscow representative of the powerful and mysterious Carlyle Group. They discussed the final details of the purchase of Yukos shares by American oil companies.

Also, shortly before this, YUKOS announced its intention to buy rival Sibneft from Boris Berezovsky, another oligarch of the Yeltsin era. Yukos-Sibneft, with its 19.5 billion barrels of oil and gas, would then own the world's second largest oil and gas reserves, after ExxonMobil. Yukos-Sibneft would be fourth in the world in production, pumping 2.3 million barrels of oil per day. A purchase of Yukos-Sibneft shares by Exxon or Chevron would literally be an energy coup d'etat. Cheney knew it, Bush knew it, Khodorkovsky knew it.

But most importantly, Vladimir Putin knew this and resolutely prevented it.

Khodorkovsky maintained a number of very impressive contacts in the Anglo-American establishment. He created a charity, the Open Russia Foundation, modeled on the Open Society Foundation founded by his close friend George Soros. The elected board of the Open Russia Foundation included Henry Kissinger and Kissinger's friend, Jacob Lord Rothschild, the London heir to a banking family. Arthur Hartman, the former American ambassador to Moscow, also joined the foundation’s board.

After Khodorkovsky's arrest, the Washington Post reported that the imprisoned Russian billionaire continued to use the services of Stuart Eizenstat (former Under Secretary of the Treasury, Deputy Secretary of State, and Under Secretary of Commerce during the Clinton administration) to lobby Washington for his release. Khodorkovsky was completely tied to the Anglo-American establishment.

Subsequently, Western media and officials, who accused Russia of returning to communist methods and brute force politics, did not notice the fact that Khodorkovsky himself was hardly white and fluffy. Previously, Khodorkovsky unilaterally terminated his contract with British Petroleum. BP was a partner of Yukos and managed to invest $300 million in drilling the very promising Priobskoye oil field in Siberia.

As soon as BP completed drilling, Khodorkovsky kicked BP out using gangster methods that would be illegal in most countries of the developed world. By 2003, production at Priobskoye had reached 129 million barrels, equivalent to $8 billion in market value. Earlier, in 1998, after the IMF gave billions to Russia to support the ruble, Khodorkovsky’s bank Menatep redirected a “pathetic” $4.8 billion of IMF money to the accounts of selected crony banks, including American ones. Washington's howls of protest about Khodorkovsky's arrest in October 2003 were at least insincere, if not completely hypocritical. From the Kremlin's point of view, Washington has been caught by the hand, thrust into Russia's pocket.

The Putin-Khodorkovsky showdown marked a decisive turn by the Putin government to rebuild Russia and erect strategic barriers to the foreign offensive led by Cheney and his British friend Tony Blair. This reversal occurred in the context of the brazen American takeover of Iraq in 2003 and the Bush administration's unilateral announcement that the United States was abandoning its unbreakable obligations under the Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) treaty with Russia in order to build a US missile shield. This statement could be perceived in Russia only as an unfriendly act aimed at its security.

By 2003, it did not take a strategic military acumen to realize that Pentagon hawks and their allies in the military industry and Big Oil envisioned the United States as a country unbound by international obligations and unilaterally pursuing its own interests, which in turn , of course, are determined by hawks. Their recommendations were published by one of Washington's many conservative think tanks. In January 2001, the National Institute of Public Policy (NIPP) published the "Rationale and Requirements for the Control of US Nuclear Forces and Arms" just at the beginning of the Bush-Cheney administration. The report, demanding a unilateral American end to the nuclear drawdown, was signed by 27 senior officials from the previous and current administrations. The list included the man who is now Bush's national security adviser, Stephen Headley, special assistant to Defense Secretary Stephen Cambone, and Admiral James Woolsey, the former head of the CIA and chairman of the Washington NGO Freedom House. Freedom House played a central role in the US-sponsored Orange Revolution in Ukraine and all other color revolutions in the former Soviet Union.

These events were quickly followed by a series of Washington-financed covert destabilizations of governments on Russia's borders that had close relations with Moscow. This series includes the Rose Revolution of November 2003 in Georgia, which led to the resignation of Eduard Shevardnadze in favor of a young, US-educated, pro-NATO president, Mikheil Saakashvili. 37-year-old Saakashvili kindly agreed to support the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan oil pipeline, which would avoid Moscow's control over the Caspian oil pumped by Azerbaijan. The US has maintained close ties with Georgia since Mikheil Saakashvili came to power. American military trainers are training Georgian troops, and Washington has poured millions of dollars into preparations for Georgia's entry into NATO.

Following the Rose Revolution in Georgia, Woolsey's Freedom House, the National Endowment for Democracy, the Soros Foundation, and other Washington-backed NGOs organized Ukraine's controversial Orange Revolution in November 2004. The goal of the Orange Revolution was to establish a pro-NATO regime under the controversial presidency of Viktor Yushchenko, in a country strategically capable of interrupting the main pipeline flows of Russian oil and gas to Western Europe. Washington-backed "democratic opposition" movements in neighboring Belarus have also begun receiving millions of dollars from the Bush administration's bounty, as have opposition groups in Kyrgyzstan, Uzbekistan, and more distant former Soviet states that happen to be in the path of potential energy pipelines connecting China to Russia. and former Soviet republics such as Kazakhstan.

Once again, control of energy and oil and gas pipelines is the root cause of US moves. It should probably not be surprising that some people in the Kremlin, in particular Vladimir Putin, began to wonder whether the renewed Christian, George W. Bush Jr., was speaking to Putin with a “forked tongue,” as the Indians would say.

By the end of 2004, it became clear in Moscow that a new Cold War had long been underway, this time over strategic control of energy and unilateral nuclear superiority. It was also abundantly clear, judging by the nature of Washington's actions since the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991, that the ultimate goal, the endgame for US policy in Eurasia, was neither China, nor Iraq, nor Iran.

Washington's geopolitical "Endgame" was the complete destruction of Russia, a state in Eurasia that would be able to organize an effective combination of alliances based on its vast oil and gas reserves. Of course, this goal could never be declared openly.

After 2003, Putin and Russian foreign policy, especially energy policy, reverted to the original response to Sir Halford Mackinder's 'Heartland' geopolitics, a policy that had underpinned Soviet Cold War strategy since 1946 G.

Putin began to make a series of defensive moves to restore some degree of reliable balance in the face of Washington's increasingly obvious policies aimed at encircling and weakening Russia. Subsequent US strategic blunders made Russia's job a little easier. Now that the stakes have increased on both sides—NATO and Russia—Putin's Russia has moved from mere defense to a new dynamic offensive to maintain a more active geopolitical position, using its energy as leverage.

The YUKOS case is, of course, a favorite topic discussed by Democrats and the West when discussing the regime's atrocities. Of course, there is a lot of strangeness not even in the YUKOS case, but in Khodorkovsky’s very personality, in his relationship with Putin. It would seem that there is no history of personal relations, that is, this is not the relationship between Berezovsky and Putin. And that is why the YUKOS case, on the one hand, is absolutely transparent, and on the other hand, it shows all the problems that exist in Russia.

What is the Yukos case? Just a drain on the oil company's resources? No, of course not. Everything that happened before and after this, when certain businessmen lost their assets in various ways, happened on a completely different level. And the seemingly much harsher attack on Gusinsky at first did not end with everything being taken away from him for free. Gusinsky was left quite a lot (he was paid). The same thing with Berezovsky was not dealt with very harshly. Boris Abramovich was given the opportunity to leave, and his persecution looks more operatic than frightening. Therefore, it is obvious that in the YUKOS case there is another component that is not related to commercial interests, although, undoubtedly, commercial interests are also present. But these are more likely the interests of the people who are part of Putin’s team, rather than Putin himself. It seems to me that the YUKOS case just shows the work of the flywheel, that is, what happens when it starts to spin, and on the other hand, there was no attempt to follow the rules of the game, and ultimately circumstances became dominant. I believe that Putin himself was surprised at a certain stage by how everything turned out. I think that until some point he did not seriously admit the possibility of the actual arrest of Khodorkovsky and everything that followed in the future. But what was happening here was reminiscent of a situation when a person plays around with an electric meat grinder: once the tip of the tie gets into the meat grinder, there is no escape. The meat grinder is automatic. Hop - and the man disappeared.

The situation with YUKOS was on the rise. It became noticeable when in the summer, during a meeting with the oligarchs, Khodorkovsky began to teach Putin about life, and Putin replied that we must first figure out how he himself bought the assets, they say, we know who was corrupted and how. After this, open confrontation began. Moreover, the YUKOS case is especially complicated, because inside the Kremlin administration there were people who were very close to Khodorkovsky, as well as people who believed that such movements were extremely harmful to the image of Russian business and the whole of Russia. And, undoubtedly, immediately after the YUKOS case one could agree with their assessment. At the same time, indeed, as a result of the YUKOS case, Alexander Stalyevich Voloshin, who was a strong opponent of such a resolution of the issue, left his position. During the trial, I met with Putin several times in a group of human rights activists, looked at what was happening from the outside and met with some people who were surrounded by both Khodorkovsky and Putin. For example, German Gref, by the way, took a very tough position regarding YUKOS, but this did not mean that he was a supporter of a forceful solution. However, he had a negative attitude towards Khodorkovsky, as did almost all oligarchs.

Mikhail Komissar told me that when he held the position of deputy head of the Presidential Administration and then when he was a member of the RSPP, during oligarchic meetings many people (including Chubais) approached Khodorkovsky with various requests, wanting to obtain his permission to conduct Duma of this or that law. And Khodorkovsky reacted to this extremely impolitely, “through his lips,” deciding whether the law would pass through the Duma or not. At the same time, Khodorkovsky was least of all concerned about the democratic component in these matters, that is, he was the ultimate truth. They bowed to him, and he determined whether it was good or bad. In particular, this was one of Chubais' problems. This is probably why, when a misfortune happened to Khodorkovsky, the oligarchic “collective farm” reacted very calmly - that is, there was no unanimous support for Khodorkovsky.

In general, no one tried to explain what happened, but it turned out that at some point Khodorkovsky sincerely stopped perceiving the country as an independent subject of law. He felt Russia was more like an appendage of his oil company, its service. An attempt to merge with Western companies would give Yukos the opportunity to eventually become economically larger than the state and run the state itself. Here the points of view differ: either it was Khodorkovsky himself, or the people around him, primarily Nevzlin. Olga Kostina, who was one of the victims of the assassination attempt carried out by Nevzlin’s people, can tell a lot about this. Khodorkovsky acted using methods that, politely speaking, do not allow him to be treated as an angel. This is the incomprehensible death of the mayor of Nefteyugansk Petukhov, and the death of many other people, which each time occurred at an unusually successful time and extremely profitable. What always surprised me was that the Democrats would start shouting, “Aren’t there others?” This is very unconvincing, because it sounds something like this: if you caught Chikatilo or Pichuzhkin, then let him go until you catch all the other rapists and murderers. Of course, on the other hand, another phrase is much more reasonable: if you are accused of murder, then you are tried for organizing the murder. This phrase is true, and it should be said. But here we must clearly understand that we are talking about Russia, moreover, about Russia at that historical stage, under the legal system that was inherited from the previous oligarchic period.

The main problem is that as soon as the Khodorkovsky case began, the mechanism began to work, and the business interests of different people became involved. Moreover, these were the interests of different groups, ranging from those close to Russneft and ending with those close to Sibneft. And it is no coincidence that they say that behind many business interests one can see the classic tricks of Roman Arkadyevich Abramovich. I can neither dispute this nor agree, but many pointed the finger at him, as well as at Igor Ivanovich Sechin and people close to him from the RussNeft company. Maybe this is already “hindsight”, but I do not exclude the possibility that these people took part in developing a scheme to combat Khodorkovsky.

Obviously, for Putin himself, the economic aspect was absolutely secondary, and the primary one was the fact that Khodorkovsky, without hiding, began to declare his political views, while, as Putin was reported, he was “covered in blood up to his elbows” and at the same time remains extremely unscrupulous in matters of tax and economic activity. I'm not saying he acted like that; I say that is what was reported. But, since we are talking about politics, it is impossible not to note that the position that Khodorkovsky took was far from transparent. I’m not talking about the large number of seats that he and his company “held” in the State Duma, while controlling very different political directions. What was surprising was that when the Union of Right Forces tried to come to an agreement with Yabloko, Chubais spoke not with Yavlinsky, but with Khodorkovsky. Yavlinsky told me: in the last State Duma elections for Yabloko (before Khodorkovsky’s arrest), Khodorkovsky forced Yavlinsky to include certain people in the list, which he had never done before. It was unthinkable. At the same time, Khodorkovsky began to directly declare a change in the political system and the introduction of a parliamentary republic. And since the purchase of seats in the State Duma was still underway, it was at the same time clear who would become prime minister, who would govern the country (either Khodorkovsky or his creature). On the other hand, a big role was played by people creating a feeling of anxiety in Putin, that is, Putin constantly received messages on his desk that Khodorkovsky was there and there at the same moment when other oppositionists were meeting with them , is negotiating. So they flew to some city together and spoke at some rally. Then it turned out: yes, indeed, both of them were in the same city, but at completely different times. Or they reported that Khodorkovsky said this and that about Putin at some meeting, but here he called him this or that - that is, a colossal negative was constantly created. And for Putin, like for any normal person, this was extremely unpleasant.

I won’t say that the feeling of anxiety fundamentally influenced the decision made by Putin, but, probably, there was still a certain impact, at least emotional. And personally, Putin, I think, until a certain moment did not feel any particular antipathy towards Khodorkovsky, although there was no sympathy either. As a very specific and business-oriented person, Putin himself understood well how money was made, and there were no special secrets in privatization for him. But for him, the very fact of a person’s transition from one quality to another, the merging of financial capital and power, is unacceptable - this had to be combated systematically. The Yukos case turned out to be so important because Khodorkovsky pitted Putin against the pseudo-state that was Yukos. After all, YUKOS in many ways modeled a powerful totalitarian sect - with its own economy, with its own security service (headed by Nevzlin, who hired specialists from the former KGB in batches), with its own media, with its own education system. Sectarianism was emphasized by an incomprehensible disease that gripped all the leaders of YUKOS, and the nature of this disease goes back, of course, to the specifics of his business. It is now unfashionable to talk about this topic... Well, what about the lists of journalists who are on the payroll of YUKOS - after all, this is all true too. As well as the lists of publications that blocked any negative publication about YUKOS.

The formulation “yes, but not only YUKOS” is fair, however, on the other hand, YUKOS turned out to be the first and most important of the economic entities that tried to gain a whitewashed reputation, without having one, and to influence the authorities. If you like, after some time YUKOS became a “cancerous tumor” that grew inside the country and was ready to replace this country with itself. Therefore, the fight against YUKOS was much deeper, more systemic, more principled and important. But then, of course, the human factor and a million other nuances came into play. Sometimes it got comical, because everyone watched how this case developed in the Basmanny court. There are many reasons for irony here. Is a mockery. But this is our judicial system - it couldn’t even work properly. The judicial system that existed at that time has largely remained, although modified by the oligarchs. The police system, the investigative system... Of course, all these people worked next to the oligarchs, side by side and ate from their hands. But there were no other systems, there were no other people, and it was impossible to solve this largely political task of struggle in any other way.

Was there an economic aspect to this, an economic rightness? Considering how crookedly privatization was carried out in Russia, how crookedly the laws were written, I think that it is generally impossible to find a single clean company. Therefore, tax evasion in one form or another can be successfully attributed to anyone. It always seemed to me that we need to be consistent: together with Khodorkovsky, send to jail all those tax inspectors who, for a certain number of years (for which Khodorkovsky was accused), accepted tax returns from YUKOS.

The system showed colossal cruelty, in my opinion, largely unjustified, towards Bakhmina, a lawyer for YUKOS, the mother of two small children, who was given a long prison sentence. It seemed to me that the authorities should be merciful, that all this was completely in vain. But, again, Putin personally no longer influences such issues. Here we need to clearly understand how Putin’s decision-making mechanism is structured, how it works. If a case goes to court, Putin finds it fundamentally impossible for himself to pick up the phone and call the judge. Then the flywheel of the Russian government is already working, with all its colossal irresponsibility, rigidity, and often cruelty. You can be horrified, but nothing can be done.

Khodorkovsky became a hostage of both the system itself and the illusions created by the system: constant appeal to the opinion of the West, attempts to scare Russia by saying that “if you don’t behave correctly, we will show you how to love your Motherland,” led to the opposite results for us. Attempts to sue those companies that bought something that belonged to Yukos looked ridiculous and made the state even more embittered. The exorbitant fees paid to the lawyers also unexpectedly turned out to be unjustified... They told an incomprehensible story - I cannot guarantee its fairness - that at some point in time the case began to falter and could have fallen apart due to the statute of limitations on the main episodes. It was a matter of days. The lawyers who arrived made a mistake: the period is counted from the moment the contract is signed, and not from the moment of registration with government bodies. The difference of a few days turned out to be decisive. (However, I attribute this episode more to rumors than to reality.)

The YUKOS case, therefore, is generally a classic case for Russia: the main opponents did not agree on their personalities, both are stubborn, have completely different understandings of what is possible and what is not, and are guided by different principles. Putin has the principles of a statist who believes that the state cannot be privatized by anyone; Khodorkovsky has the principles of a man who has long been accustomed to consider only himself and does not see anyone around him.

Of course, this whole situation gives me mixed feelings. On the one hand, I have no sympathy for Khodorkovsky; on the other hand, I, of course, wanted him to be tried for more intelligible, understandable, transparent crimes. But I understand well that often in historical moments the authorities make decisions that are unpopular, but the only ones possible. The most striking explanation, which has been repeatedly given, is that Al Capone was imprisoned not for murder, but for tax evasion. But here the situation is different: in the end, the Russian economy got more than it would have gotten if YUKOS continued to operate. But the Yukos case could have yielded more. It's a difficult question. History does not know the subjunctive mood. It is extremely important for Putin: if the YUKOS case did not exist, it would have to be invented. Not even with the victory in the Chechen war, but with the Yukos affair, Putin showed who is the boss of the country and returned power to the Kremlin. The fact that the Russian President did not succumb to the arguments of the West, or to the pressure of the liberal intelligentsia, or to shouts, made it clear who the real President is in the country and who has the power. Moreover, the speed with which the oligarchy came to terms, and at the same time nothing happened in the country - no revolutions, no riots, no putsch - showed that Putin has already become so strong that he can afford to do what he did not have the opportunity to do, for example, Yeltsin. For Putin, this case was a litmus test, after which there was no longer any doubt: real power in the country belongs to the President.

It is interesting that the YUKOS affair instantly tore the entire so-called democratic opposition to shreds. Firstly, because one of the main sponsors left. Secondly, because the non-Russian nature of this sponsorship suddenly became apparent. Thirdly, because the constant appeal to American opinion led to a backlash from voters. The feeling of national pride does not allow us to constantly say: but they are right, they are always telling us. And the eternal references to the West as a moral authority also don’t look so good. The gigantic problem, of course, for the democratic parties is that the YUKOS affair cost both Yabloko and the Union of Right Forces their seats in the State Duma. For Yabloko - because of its proximity to Khodorkovsky and funding, and for the Union of Right Forces because they were unable to decide on their attitude towards both this matter and Putin as such. All this blurring of positions led to the fact that democratic movements of various kinds were no longer able to agree and each individually could not overcome the percentage barrier.

The reaction of society to the YUKOS case very clearly showed that the influence of the media is overestimated, that the influence of the outside world on Russian affairs is overestimated, that if there is a will and an understanding of how to solve a particular problem, any problem in Russia can be solved. That is, all the chimeras of the 1990s did not withstand the clearly constructed and clearly expressed presidential will. This is what the YUKOS case showed. And then, as often happens, after the ruler has struck, a sea of ​​mongrels and jackals appears around, who happily finish off, tear into pieces, torment, and show their little power. Of course, the criminal Kuchma, who tried to bite off or cut off Khodorkovsky’s ear, has nothing to do with Putin personally; or, for example, the decision not to give Khodorkovsky parole because he refused to keep his hands behind his back - it is clear that this is already excess and excess of the system. But, again, one must understand that these are not working costs in relation to Khodorkovsky. There should be no illusions: this, unfortunately, is how our penitentiary system works; This is the general attitude in Russia towards convicts.

It is very interesting to consider some parts of the YUKOS case. For example, as you know, Khodorkovsky was repeatedly offered to leave, but he did not understand these hints. But Nevzlin understood the hint, immediately left with the money and still talks about how bad everything is, but in Israel. Or, for example, the person who did not leave is Vasily Shakhnovsky, an order bearer. He was under investigation for some time, quietly and quietly gave all the testimony required of him and very quickly found himself free, and also saved his money. But then it didn’t shine anywhere, didn’t appear, although some time ago it could be found in Moscow restaurants, but then it simply disappeared.

I want to emphasize one more point: how the media, primarily the “democratic” ones, screamed about the horror that was happening! Real hysteria unfolded, including on television channels and radio stations. All this once again showed Putin (especially considering that he knew for sure who was getting paid for it and how much) the whole worthlessness of journalism in the 1990s, all its bias and corruption. And before that, the President had the feeling that all journalism was corrupt, in particular after the election campaign, when he saw technology in action thanks to Berezovsky and Dorenko. And the media’s reaction to the YUKOS case made him openly ironic. Because he saw this not as a position, but as a way to earn fees.

We sat with human rights activists, and Mr. Roshal asked a question: if Khodorkovsky did something like that, I would like to know about it. And it was stated: why doesn’t the President pick up the phone and demand from the Prosecutor General or the judges the release of Khodorkovsky? To which Putin replied: “How do you imagine this? In general, what country do we live in and what are we talking about? How can i do this? If we live in a democratic country, then I initially do not have the right to do this. This is a completely unacceptable option. There is a court, and please let the court decide.” I repeat once again: this sincere faith of Putin in the objectivity of the court causes only a sad and ironic smile among people who know how the judicial system works in Russia.

This is what I think about the YUKOS case. But the fact that there is a sea of ​​blood around YUKOS is, unfortunately, a truth that cannot be avoided.

Many asked the question: why only YUKOS? Why not the rest? The answer is clear - because YUKOS was one of the most transparent, but the most politically engaged company that solved its problems.

YUKOS can be compared to Don Corleone's clan. Maybe it was not the most terrible clan, but it was the most politicized. By the way, it is a big misconception to think about the “first wave” democrats, about the oligarchs, that they are democrats in their views. This is a lie. Of course, in their past they are Komsomol members, but in their views they are very far from democracy. Moreover, they always gravitated towards the KGB officers. It's funny to see what high KGB officials worked in big positions at YUKOS. Judging by their appearance and age, the leaders of YUKOS should have adhered to democratic convictions, but, as a rule, this kind of business requires a completely different approach. By its nature, it is rather close to tyranny, to dictatorship. At the very least, many YUKOS employees talk about real atrocities committed by the company's own security services. But the democratically minded press prefers not to write about this.