Economic behavior as decision making. Within the framework of economic theory, the behavior of economic agents - actions aimed at the rational use of limited resources - is considered as a sequence of decision-making acts. An economic agent, based on its target function - the utility function for the consumer, the profit function for the entrepreneur, etc. - and the existing resource limitations, chooses such a distribution of resources between possible areas of their use that ensures the extreme value of its target function.

This interpretation of economic behavior is based on a number of explicit and implicit premises (which are discussed in detail in the final chapter of the textbook), among which it is important to highlight one here: the mentioned choice option for using resources is of a conscious nature, i.e. it involves knowledge agent both the purpose of his actions and the possibilities of using resources. Such knowledge can be either reliable, deterministic in nature, or include knowledge of only some probabilities, but in any case without information about the purpose of the action and resource limitations, the choice of action option (use of resources) is impossible.

The information necessary for making a decision can either already be in the memory of an economic agent (individual) or be specially collected by him to select an option of action. In the first case, a decision can be made immediately; in the second, a certain period of time must pass between the emergence of the need to distribute limited resources and the act of distribution itself. time, necessary to obtain (collect, purchase, etc.) the necessary data. In addition, obtaining the necessary information (in addition to what is already in the individual’s memory) inevitably requires the expenditure of resources, i.e., the incurrence of certain costs by the agent.

Limitations in decision making. This means that the restrictions that arise within the framework of the decision-making task that mediates economic action include not only “standard” restrictions on the available material, labor, natural, etc. resources. They also include restrictions on available information, and time limit- by the amount of time during which it is necessary to optimally (from the point of view of a particular objective function) distribute resources.

If the time for collecting the necessary information in the presence of other restrictions (for example, on funds for its acquisition) exceeds the maximum permissible, the individual is forced to make a decision with incomplete information, obviously losing efficiency use of the resources available to him.

Let's assume that the government has announced a competition for the executor of a very profitable contract, setting a limited deadline for submitting proposals, and announcing that the winner is determined not only by the criterion of price, but also by the criterion of the quality of the elaboration of the project for the execution of the contract. In such circumstances, a firm that fails to develop a detailed contract execution plan within a specified period of time may find itself at a loss, despite adequate ability to perform the contract on its merits.

Obviously, in this example, the time constraint determines the increased costs of other resources for its implementation. If a company, for example, had not sought to develop a business plan only with its own (limited) resources, but had hired third-party specialists to develop it (naturally, incurring high costs), it would have entered the competition with better documentation and could have become its winner. In other words, this example demonstrates some “interchangeability” of time and resource constraints.

Consider, however, another example: suppose a worker was given the task of turning some part on a lathe. Obviously, this task involves the performance of a whole series of separate actions, each of which, in principle, can be carried out in many different ways: the workpiece can be carried from the place of storage to the machine quickly or slowly, in a straight line or in another line, the workpiece can be secured by tightening nuts with more or less force, you can cut with different cutters, the cutting speed can also be chosen in a fairly wide range, etc. If our worker decided to optimize all his actions, explicitly setting and solving the corresponding problems of resource allocation, it is not difficult to guess that, having received the task last year, he would still be solving such problems this year. The fact is that, say, just optimizing cutting conditions requires setting up hundreds of experiments to obtain the necessary data, and formulating, for example, a criterion for optimizing the trajectory of an individual’s movement is generally a task that is not clear how to solve. This example also highlights the importance of this type of constraint, such as limited calculative abilities of people, the impossibility of carrying out long and large-scale calculations without appropriate tools.

Let's look at one more example. Let a group of citizens wishing to jointly engage in business on the territory of Russia seek to register as a legal entity. She can prepare a certain set of documents, which, as it seems to her it is quite sufficient for this, having spent your efforts, time and money on it, and come with it to the registration authorities. If this set does not comply with the requirements of the law, these authorities will naturally not register such a legal entity. Our group of citizens can repeat their unsuccessful attempts indefinitely, using essentially trial and error, but not succeed. After all, the mentioned

higher limited calculative and predictive abilities will not allow them to guess which documents and in what form must be submitted to the registration authorities to obtain the desired status.

The above provisions, examples and reasoning clearly show that real economic agents - business entities - make decisions not only on the basis incomplete, limited information about resources and how to use them, but are also limited in processing capabilities and processing this information to select the best course of action. Thus, real economic agents, according to the terminology proposed by Herbert Simon, are boundedly rational subjects.

Bounded rationality is a characteristic of economic agents solving the problem of choice in conditions of incomplete information and limited capabilities for processing it.

Meanwhile, of course, no normal person in the situations outlined above with processing a part on a lathe or preparing documents for registering an enterprise poses and solves the problem of sequential optimization of each of his actions, or predicting a set of requirements for documents. Instead people use samples(templates, models) behavior.

So, in relation to the example of making a technological decision, instead of calculating the optimal trajectory and speed of movement from the workpiece warehouse to the machine, the worker walks as follows: used to it walk: habit- this is typical and widespread sample behavior. Instead of experimentally discovering the best cutting mode for a material with which he has not yet worked (if he already has work experience, then habit takes effect), the worker will use reference book, which records the optimal processing modes for various materials.

For the example of preparing documents for registering an enterprise, instead of “experimentally” identifying the requirements for this set, people use regulatory documents, for example, the text of the Civil Code of the Russian Federation (Part 1, Chapter 4) and other regulations.

It is easy to see that such an entry in a directory or a provision of a normative act (as well as a habit, if you try to logically reconstruct it) represents finished model rational (optimal) action:

if the current situation is S, act in the manner A(S).(1.1)

This implies that the method A(S) is such that the resulting result is the best possible from the point of view of decision-making criteria typical for the situation S.

Regardless of whether there is a ready-made pattern of behavior directly in the individual’s memory (it is developed on the basis of one’s own experience, a series of trial and errors, or obtained in the learning process, it also does not matter), or is found in external sources of information, its application occurs according to quite standard scheme:

situation identification;

selection of a template of the form (1.1), including the identified situation;

Action in a manner consistent with the pattern.

If we compare the above stages with the stages of the decision-making process, there is an obvious saving effort(and therefore saving resources and time) when determining what action to take. Adding to this the fact that the listed actions are often performed unconsciously, in “automatic mode,” it is easy to come to the conclusion that

Patterns and patterns of behavior represent means of conserving resources in the task of determining the best course of action.

The highlighted characteristic of behavioral models used by economic agents in the course of rationalizing the use of their limited resources to determine how to use them, implicitly assumes that individuals either use internal models (habits) or themselves choose some external role models (to follow). them). At the same time, following patterns and templates, in full accordance with the provisions of economic theory, they behave rationally and maximize their utility (value, cost, etc.).

However, direct observation shows that in life there are other patterns and patterns of behavior, following which interferes a person to maximize his utility function.

Let's consider another example, this time not conditional, but quite specific. In Western universities, when conducting written exams, there are often no teachers or other faculty members in the classrooms. It would seem (from the point of view of a typical domestic student) that ideal conditions have been created for cheating, using cheat sheets, etc. However, none of the examinees behave this way. The explanation (more precisely, its first, superficial layer) is very simple: if one of those taking the exam decides to do this, his colleagues will immediately inform the teacher about this (“they will inform” or “tell”, as they say), and the dishonest student will receive the well-deserved zero points (if not expelled at all).

On the part of students who honestly write their work, such behavior (“informing”) will be simply following a habit, which, like many other habits, has a completely rational basis. After all, depending on the exam results, students receive an appropriate rating, and depending on the rating, the demand for graduates from employers is formed. Consequently, a student who uses a cheat sheet or cheats on an exam receives an unreasonable competitive advantage when applying for a job and determining his salary. By reporting his incorrect behavior, other students thereby eliminate the unscrupulous competitor, which is a completely rational action.

At the same time, for those examinees who do not have sufficient knowledge to successfully pass the exam, the mentioned habit of others is clearly interferes take an action that could bring to him benefit. At the same time, being confident that the deception will definitely be revealed (which threatens a significant loss of usefulness), such a student, despite the temptation, will still refrain from trying to get an inadequately high score.

In this situation it can be said that he also follows the pattern or pattern of behavior - however against your will, rationally comparing the benefits and costs of deviation from this model, actually imposed on him by others.

Models or patterns of behavior that indicate how one should behave in a given situation are usually called rules or norms.

Summarizing the above, we can conclude that in real life, in addition to the resource, time and information restrictions on the choice of courses of action and methods of using resources known from economic theory, there are other types of restrictions associated with the existence of norms or rules1.

Norm (rule). Philosophers, sociologists, and social psychologists have traditionally been (and are) involved in the study of norms, primarily social ones, i.e., those operating in society and its individual groups, and not being individual habits. In neoclassical economic theory, which forms the core of all modern economic science, this category is absent. The explanation for this, in light of the above informational explanation the emergence of rules is quite transparent: if the information about the decision-making situation is complete, free and instantaneous, there is no need for the emergence of rules and, especially, for their introduction into economic theory.

Since in reality there are nevertheless rules, and they significantly influence the behavior of economic agents, their costs and benefits, this phenomenon deserves a fairly detailed and careful study.

The most general category within the discussed range of concepts is the concept social norm.“Social norms are the most important means of social regulation of behavior. With their help, society as a whole and various social groups that develop these norms present to their members requirements that their behavior must satisfy, direct, regulate, control and evaluate this behavior. In the most general sense of the word, normative regulation means that an individual or a group as a whole is prescribed, “set” a certain - proper - type of behavior, its form, one or another way of achieving a goal, realizing intentions, etc., “set” the proper form and the nature of the relationships and interactions of people in society, and the real behavior of people and the relationships of members of society and various social groups are programmed and assessed in accordance with these prescribed, “given” standards - norms,” wrote the domestic philosopher M.I. Bobneva2.

The presence in society of norms as patterns of behavior, deviation from which gives rise to punishment of the violator by other members of society, limits, as noted, the possibilities of choice for the individual, preventing the implementation

1 In principle, the concept of a norm and the concept of a rule can be differentiated, but such a distinction is purely of a “taste” nature, so we will not do this here, accepting the premise that the corresponding terms are synonyms. The use of one or another of them will further be regulated only by the stylistic rules of Mäyä (1978), Social norms and regulation of behavior, M.: Science, p. Z.

tions of his desire for rationality. “Rational action is result-oriented. Rationality dictates: “If you want to achieve goal Y, take action X.” On the contrary, social norms, as I understand them, not results oriented. The simplest social norms are “Take action X” or “Don’t take action X.” More complex norms say, “If you take action Y, then take action X,” or, “If others take action Y, then take action X.” Even more complex norms might dictate: “Do X because it would be good if you did.” Rationality is inherently conditional and future-oriented. Social norms are either unconditional or, if conditioned, they are not future-oriented. To be social, norms must be shared by other people and to some extent rely on their approval or disapproval of this or that type of behavior,” noted J. Elster3.

It should be noted that the “formulas” of social norms given by J. Elster are their abbreviated expressions that do not reflect logical structure corresponding type of statements. The latter includes:

description of the conditions (situations) in which the individual is obliged to follow the model;

description of a sample action;

a description of sanctions (punishments that will be applied to an individual who behaves not in accordance with the model, and/or rewards that an individual who follows the model will receive if he finds himself in the appropriate situation) and their subjects; subjects of sanctions are also called guarantors norms.

It is important to emphasize here that the term “description” used to characterize the structure of any norm is understood quite broadly: it can be any sign structure, from spoken or thought words to records on paper, stone or magnetic media. In other words, the given structure is characteristic of any norm - both existing (as a symbolic model of proper behavior) only in the minds of a group of people or in the form of a record of a researcher of their behavior, and written down in the form of a certain official text and sanctioned by the government of the state or the leadership of an organization.

IN logical research A more complex characteristic of norms is usually considered. When analyzing them, the following are distinguished: content, terms of application, subject And character norms. “The content of a norm is an action that can, must or must not be performed; application conditions are the situation specified in the norm, upon the occurrence of which it is necessary or permissible to implement the action provided for by this norm; a subject is a person or group of persons to whom a norm is addressed. The nature of a norm is determined by whether it obliges, permits or prohibits the performance of some action,” wrote the domestic logician A.A. Ivin4.

This characterization of norms does not contradict their full logical structure introduced above. The fact is that from the point of view of economic analysis

3Elster Y. (1993), Social norms and economic theory // THESIS, vol. 1, issue. 3, p.73.

4Ivin A.A. (1973), Logic of norms, M.: Moscow State University Publishing House, p.23.

The nature of the norm - obligatory, prohibitory or permissive - is not its essential feature. After all, any norm, regardless of its nature, in the implementation of economic action acts as a certain selection limiter. Even a norm that clearly provides new opportunities does so only for a relatively limited circle of the latter, adding to the set of acceptable alternatives, but by no means making it universal or comprehensive.

The restrictive nature of any norm is very important for understanding many forms of economic behavior observed in practice. If an agent sees that his action A is capable of bringing him significant benefit, but is prohibited by some norm N, he may well think incentive to violate this norm. How is a decision usually made in this case? If the expected benefit from the violation, B, exceeds expected costs of violation, C, then it turns out to be rational disrupt N. The expected costs of a violation depend on whether the violator is identified and punished, therefore, forms of violator behavior such as deception, disinformation, cunning, etc. will help reduce the likelihood of punishment.

Behavior aimed at pursuing one's own interest and not limited by moral considerations, that is, associated with the use of deception, cunning and deceit, is usually called opportunistic behavior in economic theory.

However, violation of a particular rule, while individually beneficial, can lead to negative external effects, i.e., impose additional costs on other individuals, which in total may exceed the individual benefit of the violator (for example, costs associated with the increase in uncertainty that is generated by deviations individuals from the expected courses of action in a “normalized” situation). Therefore, from a value maximization perspective, such violations are undesirable. A means of preventing them are sanctions - certain punishments for violating a norm, that is, actions aimed at reducing the utility for their object, for example, by imposing certain additional costs on it. The subject of sanctions is the guarantor of the norm - the individual who identifies the violation and applies sanctions to the violator.

Quite often, breaking the rule can lead, however, to maximizing value. Let’s assume that a certain merchant has agreed with a wholesaler to buy a batch of 100 teapots from him at a price of 200 rubles. This agreement led to the emergence of some temporary rules for their mutual behavior. Having hired a truck for 1000 rubles, he comes to the wholesaler and discovers that the teapots have already been sold to that other dealer, for example, at a price of 220 rubles. a piece. This violation of the agreement (a temporary rule formed by two private individuals) created an increase in value of 2000 rubles, but imposed a cost of 1000 rubles on the first dealer. The total balance still remains positive, but there are negative externalities - direct losses of one of the subjects of the rule. These losses would obviously be eliminated if the wholesaler reimbursed the defrauded buyer for his costs, but does the wholesaler have an incentive to do so? Such incentives will arise if the original rule is protected, that is, if there is some guarantor that will force the wholesaler either to fulfill the first agreement (which is economically irrational) or to compensate the costs of the first merchant. In the latter case, violation of the rule will lead to an increase in cost, and no negative external effects will arise, i.e., a Pareto improvement of the initial situation will occur.

Thus, taking into account the above,

The norm includes: situation B (conditions for applying the norm), individual I (addressee of the norm), prescribed action A (content of the norm), sanctions S for failure to comply with A’s order, as well as the entity applying these sanctions to the violator, or guarantor of norm G.

Obviously this full the structure (or formula) of a norm may often not exist in reality. In other words, she is only logical reconstruction, model a complex set of behavioral acts, subconscious ideas, images, feelings, etc.

Institute as a unit of analysis. The above formula of the norm describes a wide variety of different rules, from individual habits that often change under the influence of circumstances to traditions that endure through centuries, from rules of behavior in a school signed by its director to state constitutions adopted in referendums by the majority of the country's population.

Within the framework of this variety of rules, it is important to distinguish, at this stage of analysis, two large classes that differ in the mechanisms for enforcing their execution. In general mechanism for enforcing the rule we will call the totality consisting of its guarantor (or guarantors) and the rules of its actions governing the application of sanctions to identified violators of the “basic” rule. On this basis, many different rules are divided into:

matches its addressee I; such rules were described above as habits; they can also be called stereotypes of behavior or mental models of behavior; characteristic of habits interior a mechanism for enforcing them, since sanctions for their violations are imposed by the addressee of the rule;

Rules in which the guarantor of norm G Notmatches its addressee I; typical for such rules external a mechanism for enforcing them, since sanctions for violating such rules are imposed on the violator from the outside, by other people.

Accordingly, the concept of institution can be given the following definition:

An institution is a set consisting of a rule and an external mechanism for forcing individuals to comply with this rule

This definition differs from other definitions widely used in the economic literature. For example, Nobel Prize laureate in economics Douglas North gives the following definitions:

“institutions are the “rules of the game” in society, or, more formally, the man-made boundaries that organize relationships between people”5, they are “the rules, the mechanisms that ensure their implementation, and the norms of behavior that structure repeated

5 North D. (1997), M.: Nachala, p.17.

interactions between people”6, “formal rules, informal restrictions and ways to ensure the effectiveness of restrictions”, or “human-created restrictions that structure people’s interactions. They consist of formal restrictions (rules, laws, constitutions), informal restrictions (social norms, conventions and self-adopted codes of conduct) and mechanisms for enforcing their implementation. Collectively, they determine the structure of incentives in societies and their economies.”*

Summarizing these definitions, A.E. Shastitko interprets the institute as

“a series of rules that serve as restrictions on the behavior of economic agents and regulate the interaction between them, as well as corresponding mechanisms for monitoring compliance with these rules”9.

In practice, you can use any of these definitions, if we clearly remember the fact that the mechanism for enforcing the execution of a “basic” rule within an institution is an external mechanism, specially created by people for this purpose.

Attention to the definition of the concept of institution is important for the reason that institutions represent the basic unit of analysis institutional economic theory, and their totality amounts to item this theory. Obviously, a clear definition of the subject of research is necessary for the systematic presentation of any scientific theory. At the same time, separating the content of one concept from similar ones is also important from a purely practical point of view, since it guarantees against the erroneous transfer of conclusions made in relation to one objects and situations to other objects and situations that are different from them.

To explain the importance of this role of a strict definition of the concept of institution, let us pay attention to the following points. The behavior of economic agents following one or another rule demonstrates a certain regularity, i.e. is repetitive. However, it is not only existing institutions that lead to repeated behavior of individuals, but also other mechanisms having a natural origin, i.e. completely not created by people.

The existence of the institution suggests that people's actions depend from each other and influence on each other that they cause consequences (externalities, or in other words, external effects) taken into account by other people and the acting economic agent himself. Natural mechanisms, as a result of their objective existence, lead to similar results, but repeated actions turn out to be consequences of decisions made by individual economic agents independently of each other and without taking into account the possible sanctions that the guarantor of a particular norm may apply to them.

6North D. (1993a), Institutions and economic growth: a historical introduction// THESIS, vol. 1, issue 2, p.73.

7North D. (19936), Institutions, ideology and economic performance// From plan to market. The future of post-communist republics, L.I. Piyasheva, J. A. Dorn (ed.), M.: Catallaxy, p. 307.

8North, Douglass S. (1996), Epilogue: Economic Performance Through Time, in Empirical Studies in Institutional Change, Lee J. Alston, Thrainn Eggertsson, and Douglass C North (eds.), Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 344.

9Shastitko A.E. (2002), M.: TEIS, p. 5 54.

Let's look at a few conditional examples. People living on the upper floors of tall buildings, wanting to go outside, use elevators (if they break down, they go down the stairs), thereby demonstrating the unconditional repetition of their behavior. None of them (with the exception of suicides) jump out of windows: the person understands that such an act will be “punished” by the law of gravity. Is it possible to talk about the noted regularity as an institution? No, because the mechanism for “punishing” deviations from the general order of actions has nothing to do with its creation by people.

In a competitive market, prices for homogeneous products, although showing a certain dispersion, nevertheless have the same level. A seller who sets twice the price in such a market will definitely be “punished” by ruin. Is it possible to talk here about the existence of an institution for establishing an equilibrium price? No, since buyers who avoid purchasing goods at an inflated price do not at all set themselves the goal of punishing the corresponding merchant - they simply make (independently of each other) rational decisions, the unintended result of which is the “punishment” of such a seller.

People tend to eat regularly: a person who deviates from this regularity risks sacrificing his health. Is eating regularly an institution? The reader who has read the above examples will confidently answer “no”, but he will be only partially right: there are situations in life in which regular eating is an institution! For example, the regularity of children's meals in the family is supported by various punishments for those who evade from the elders; the regularity of food for soldiers in the army is supported by the formal norms of the regulations; The regularity of meals for patients in hospitals is ensured by sanctions from the staff. Thus, the same observable behavior can be either a consequence of rational choice (say, a creative worker in the process of creating a work of art forces himself to break away from work in order to eat) or habit (the majority of people eat regularly), or a consequence of action social institution.

The importance of distinguishing patterns of behavior into those determined by institutions and those determined by other reasons is associated with a correct understanding meaning of institutions in economics and other spheres of social life, with the solution of practical problems of increasing well-being and efficient use of resources. If analysis shows that some mass actions are irrational, the source of this can (and should) be sought both in the sphere of objective reasons and in the sphere of institutions regulating behavior.

The importance of institutions. From observations of economic life, it is easy to see that the laws adopted by the state authorities, which determine certain rules for carrying out various business transactions - concluding contracts, maintaining accounting records, conducting advertising campaigns, etc. - most directly affect both the structure and levels of costs, as well as the efficiency and results of economic activities of enterprises.

Thus, tax incentives for venture capital stimulate risky investments in the innovation process - the most important resource for economic growth in a modern economy. A ban on the use of aircraft engines with excessive noise levels in the countries of the European Community could lead to significant negative consequences for the domestic aircraft industry and tourism. Various options for resolving conflicts between employers and employees, in particular those related to the participation or non-participation of trade unions, can significantly change the situation in the labor market. The rules of tariff and non-tariff regulation of exports and imports, along with the ratio of prices in the domestic and world markets, directly affect the incentives for carrying out relevant transactions, etc.

The mentioned (and other similar) rules are, as is easy to see, forms of state regulation of the economy, that is, conscious actions of the state and its individual bodies aimed at changing the behavior of economic agents. Obviously, some special

no significant proof of the influence of institutions formed and conditioned by such actions is required. Another question is often more relevant: why the rules being introduced do not influence on the real behavior of economic agents and the economy as a whole, or influence them completely not this way, as intended by their authors?

From the point of view of economic theory, legally established rules of economic activity are nothing more than a special type of restrictions on the possibilities of using resources, or resource restrictions, and the latter, of course, affect economic results.

However, the same direct observations of economic processes do not provide a clear answer to another question: do rules (both those introduced through laws and those formed in the past in some other way) affect the economy? not being forms of government regulation, methods of conducting economic policy? In other words, do all institutions matter for the functioning and development of the economy, or only those that directly prescribe or limit the actions of agents in the distribution and use of resources?

The question of the importance of institutions, their impact on economic growth and economic efficiency, is repeatedly raised in the classic works of researchers who laid the foundations of the new institutional economic theory.

Thus, in the already mentioned book by D. North “Institutions, institutional changes and the functioning of the economy,” many historical examples are given that clearly demonstrate the diverse nature and scale of such influence.

One of the most striking examples of this kind is D. North’s explanation of the sharp divergence in the economic power of England and Spain that occurred in modern times, after a long state of approximate equality of their forces in the 16th–17th centuries. In his opinion, the reason for the growth of the English economy and the stagnation of the Spanish economy was not resources as such (Spain received more of them from the American colonies than England), but the nature of the relationship between royal power and the economically active nobility. In England, the crown's ability to seize income and other property was significantly limited by the parliament, which represented the nobility. The latter, thus having reliable protection of its property from governmental encroachments, could make long-term and profitable investments, the results of which were expressed in impressive economic growth. In Spain, the power of the crown was limited by the Cortes purely formally, so the expropriation of property from potentially economically active subjects was quite possible. Accordingly, it was very risky to make significant and long-term capital investments, and the resources received from the colonies were used for consumption rather than accumulation10. As a long-term consequence of the basic political-economic (constitutional) rules adopted in these countries, Great Britain became a world power, and Spain was transformed into a second-rate European country.

Institutions, which were by no means ways of state regulation of the economy, in this example showed themselves to be powerful in Spain. restrictions on business activity, which actually suppressed economic initiative. In modern Russian history, the period is 1917–1991. in this regard, can be characterized as decades during which economic initiative

The problem of the influence of the level of property security on economic decisions and economic development will be discussed in more detail in Chapter 3 of the textbook.

was suppressed not only indirectly, but also formally and legally: in the Criminal Code of the USSR, private entrepreneurial activity was interpreted as criminal offense. At the same time, Britain's political institutions have acted as powerful accelerators of economic growth.

The above examples, demonstrating the economic significance of seemingly non-economic institutions, have one feature: all of them are in fact only possible interpretations observable social processes.

In this regard, of particular importance for convincing proof of the economic importance of various groups of institutions is the evidence obtained in studies of the second half of the 90s of the 20th century, which used the technique of econometric analysis to conduct cross-country comparisons and identify the impacts of various factors on economic growth. To date, about a dozen similar large-scale and expensive projects have been completed, which, differing in detail, show a statistically reliable positive relationship between the indicators of economic growth of countries and the “quality” of institutions functioning in them: the higher the indicators of the latter, the higher and more stable, in general, demonstrated indicators of economic growth.

Let us briefly present the results of one of these studies conducted by the World Bank11. It compared data for 84 countries for the period 1982–1994, characterizing, on the one hand, their economic growth, and, on the other, the quality of their economic policies and the degree of protection of property rights and contracts. The growth indicator of real GDP per capita was used as a measure of economic growth. The quality of economic policy was assessed by three indicators: inflation rate, tax collection and openness to foreign trade. The degree of security of property rights and contracts as an expression of the quality of the institutional environment in a country was measured by an indicator developed in the International Country Risk Assessment Guide. This indicator includes numerous assessments of the security of property rights and contracts, combined into five groups: the rule of law, the risk of expropriation of property, refusal to fulfill contracts by the government, the level of corruption in government structures and the quality of the bureaucracy in the country.

At the first stage of the study, F. Kiefer and M. Shirley built a typology of countries based on the values ​​of the above-mentioned quality indicators, identifying two gradations for each of them - high level and low level, then determining for each of the formed four groups of countries the average values ​​of the economic growth indicator . It turned out that in countries with high quality economic policies and high quality institutions, economic growth rates were about 2.4%; in countries with low quality economic policies and high quality institutions - 1.8%; in countries with high quality policies and low quality institutions - 0.9%; in countries with low quality of both factors -0.4%. In other words, countries with inadequate economic policies but high-quality institutional environments grew on average twice as fast as countries with the opposite combination of quality levels of relevant factors.

At the second stage of this study, an econometric equation was constructed linking the growth rate of real income per capita with indicators characterizing political and institutional indicators, investment activity and the level of labor force quality in the country. This more subtle analysis showed that the qualitative conclusions obtained on the basis of a typological comparison are fully confirmed quantitatively: the degree of influence of the institutional indicator on the growth rate of real souls

11 Keefer, Philip and Shirley, Mary M. (1998), From the Ivory Tower to the Corridors of Power: Making Institutions Matter for Development Policy, World Bank (mimeo).

income was almost twice as high as the degree of influence of political indicators.

So, based on theoretical principles and empirical evidence, we can conclude:

"Institutions matter"

Douglas North

Coordination and distribution functions of institutions. Through what mechanisms do institutions acquire and realize their economic significance? To answer this question, it is necessary to characterize the functions that they perform in economic life, in the activities of economic agents.

First of all, as noted earlier, institutions limit access to resources and the variety of options for their use, i.e. they perform the function restrictions in problems of economic decision making.

By limiting possible courses of action and behavior, or even by prescribing only one acceptable course of action, institutions also coordinate behavior of economic agents who find themselves in a situation described by the conditions of application of the relevant norm.

Indeed, a description of the content of an institution operating in a certain situation gives each of the economic agents in it knowledge about how its counterparty should (and, most likely, will) behave. Based on it, agents can and most likely will form their own line of behavior, taking into account the expected actions of the other side, which means emergence of coordination in their actions.

We emphasize that the condition for such coordination is awareness of agents about the contents of the institute, regulating behavior in a given situation. If one of the subjects knows how to behave under certain circumstances, but the other does not, coordination may be disrupted, as a result of which the participants in the interaction may incur unproductive costs. A typical example is the rules of the road: a driver who does not know them, when crossing his path with the main road, may try to pass without allowing passing traffic, which, in turn, can lead to a collision between cars.

The fulfillment by institutions of the function of coordinating the actions of economic agents gives rise to and conditions the emergence of coordination effect. Its essence is to provide savings for economic agents on the costs of studying and predicting behavior other economic agents they encounter in various situations.

Indeed, if the rules are strictly followed, there is no need to specifically expend effort on predicting how the partners will behave: the range of their possible actions is directly outlined by the current institution.

Thereby,

the coordination effect of institutions is realized through reducing the level of uncertainty environment in which economic agents operate

The reduction in the level of uncertainty in the external environment, ensured by the existence of institutions, makes it possible to plan and implement long-term investments, achieving greater value creation. In addition, the funds saved on researching and predicting the behavior of counterparties can also be used for productive purposes, enhancing the coordination effect. On the contrary, in an uncertain environment, in the absence of existing institutions, economic agents are not only faced with low expected benefits from planned investments (which, obviously, can lead to refusal to implement them), but are also forced to spend funds on various precautionary measures when carrying out economic activities. activities, for example, to insure transactions or their individual components. Thus, the coordination effect is one of the mechanisms through which institutions influence the efficiency of the economy.

It should be noted here that the coordination effect of institutions arises and manifests itself as a factor positive influencing the economy only if institutions agreed upon among themselves according to the prescribed directions of action of economic agents. If different rules, coinciding in the conditions of their application, determine divergent types of behavior, the uncertainty of the external environment for economic agents increases if in the totality of institutions there is no certain “meta-rule” that regulates the actions of contradictory rules.

For example, in systems of national legislation, such a meta-rule is usually present in the form of a provision that in case of conflict between national and international law, the rules of international law apply; If a government body adopts two contradictory by-laws, it is generally accepted that the one adopted later should be applied, etc.

Therefore, the coordination effect inherent in any individual institution may not be observed when considering the totality of the latter if the institutions are not coordinated with each other (see also the section of this chapter “Options for the relationship between formal and informal rules”).

Any institution, by limiting the many possible courses of action, therefore influences resource allocation economic agents, performing a distribution function. It is important to emphasize that the distribution of resources, benefits and costs is affected not only by those rules whose content directly involves the transfer of benefits from one agent to another (for example, tax legislation or rules for determining customs duties), but also by those that do not directly relate to these issues.

For example, the introduction of zoning of urban land, according to which in certain areas only housing construction and the construction of trade and service enterprises are permissible, while in others industrial construction is possible, depending on the capacity of the corresponding territories, can significantly affect the directions of investment activity. The establishment of complex rules for issuing licenses to engage in certain types of business activities can significantly reduce the influx of novice entrepreneurs into it, reduce the level of competitiveness of the relevant market, increase prices for goods traded on it and ultimately redistribute the funds of buyers.

In addition to various specific distribution consequences, any institution is also characterized by some general, “standard” distribution effect: by limiting the set of possible courses of action, it either directly switches resources to their permitted subset, or at least increases the costs of implementing prohibited courses of action by including them in the composition of the expected damage from the application of punishment (sanctions) to the rule violator.

The scale of the distributional consequences of the action of an institution can vary within very wide limits, and the connection of these scales with the content of the norm, with its “proximity” to the processes of economic functioning, is far from direct.

For example, discussed in the winter of 2001–2002. changes in the rules of the Russian language could, if adopted, cause serious economic damage, generating significant additional costs for almost all economic agents, diverting their resources to study new rules, reprinting codes of laws, official forms, texts of instructions, etc., condemning high school graduates to relearning the rules they had learned, diverting their attention from other subjects, demanding the reprinting of all textbooks, publications of literary classics, etc. The above-mentioned ban on entrepreneurial activity that existed in the USSR, on the one hand, redistributed entrepreneurial initiative to the shadow component of the economy, on the other hand, he switched it to the sphere of managerial activity, significantly modifying the entire structure of preferences in the labor market. The Russian economy today faces the long-term consequences of these redistributions, experiencing a clear shortage of small businesses.

So, the impact of institutions on the distribution of resources, benefits and costs constitutes the second mechanism that determines their economic significance.

Formal and informal rules. The description of any existing institution is contained, to varying degrees of completeness, in the memory of individuals who follow the rules included in it: the recipients of the norm know how they should behave in the appropriate situation, the guarantor of the norm knows what violations of the norm are and how to respond to them . Of course, all this knowledge may be incomplete, and may also differ from each other in some details.

In addition, the content of the institute can also have an external representation - in the form of text in a particular language.

For example, an ethnologist studying the customs and norms of behavior of a newly discovered Indian tribe in the Amazon basin can describe the existing forms of interaction between members of the tribe and publish them in a scientific journal. Likewise, rules governing the behavior of agents in the shadow economy can be described and published. E. De Soto's book “The Other Way,” which analyzes the functioning of the shadow sector of the Peruvian economy, is a classic example of such a description.

Along with this kind of descriptions of customs followed by various groups of people, the content of institutions is presented in the form of other texts - laws, codes, sets of rules, instructions, etc.

What is the fundamental difference between the two groups of texts mentioned? Publications containing descriptions of customs are the result of initiatives -

no work of researchers, they are of no use to anyone not obligated. Publications containing the texts of laws and instructions are official publications carried out on behalf of states, or registered, i.e. recognized, private organizations by the state (for example, the internal regulations of a university or trading company), and they oblige everyone to whom they relate, comply with the rules of conduct contained therein.

However, knowledge of the customs of members of the tribe or illegal entrepreneurs very strictly obliges both of them to behave in accordance with the norms existing in these groups: apostates face serious sanctions applied to them by other members of these groups - those who discover significant, with its point of view, deviation from the “correct” behavior. Since the behavior of the members of these groups is monitored by virtually all of their other participants, it is clear that the probability of detecting a violation is high, which determines the rigidity of the implementation of this type of rules.

On the contrary, knowledge of officially adopted laws and instructions does not mean that citizens of the state or employees of the organization will strictly comply with them. After all, control over compliance with such norms is usually carried out not by all citizens or employees, but only by a part of them that specializes in performing the functions of a guarantor of the corresponding rule - law enforcement officers or executives of the organization. Thus, the probability of detecting a violation may be lower than in the previous case.

Rules that exist in the memory of participants in various social groups, of which he acts as a guarantor. any member of the group, who notices their violation are called informal rules

Rules that exist in the form of official texts or oral agreements certified by a third party, in the role of guarantors of which individuals act, specializing on this function are called formal rules

These definitions differ from the more widely accepted ones, which define formal rules as those adopted by the state or any organization recognized by the state. Accordingly, all other rules are called informal. This understanding of the formal and informal goes back to sociology, within which the state is a special phenomenon, sharply different from other social phenomena.

Within the framework of the new institutional economic theory, the state is one of many organizations, which, of course, has significant differences from other organizations, but these differences are not fundamental. Therefore, in the proposed definitions of formal and informal rules, the distinguishing feature between them is the presence or absence of specialization of people in carrying out the function of enforcing the execution of the rules.

At the same time, the proposed definitions do not contradict the “sociological” understanding of formality, since specialization in enforcing rules for execution logically follows from the fact that the relevant rules are established or recognized by the state.

Methods of enforcing compliance with rules. Formal and informal institutions differ from each other not only by these characteristics, but also by other characteristics. Chief among them are the methods or mechanisms for enforcing these types of rules.

Regardless of the type of rules, the general logic of any mechanism for enforcing a rule can be characterized as follows:

(A) The guarantor of the rule observes the behavior of its addressees and compares their actions with the model of behavior determined by this rule;

(B) If a discernible deviation of the actual behavior of agent X from the model behavior is detected, the guarantor determines what sanction should be applied to X in order to ensure that the latter complies with the corresponding rule;

(B) The guarantor applies a sanction to the agent, ordering his current and future actions.

This simplest scheme of operation of the mechanism for enforcing rules can be clarified and complicated in terms of the description of stages A and B. Thus, at stage A, the guarantor can not only directly observe the behavior of agents, but also receive information from other subjects who accidentally noticed deviating actions of X; at stage B, he can detect not the process of violating the rule itself, but the consequences of such a violation; in this case, the guarantor faces an additional task - searching for the violator and identifying him.

Above was a classification of mechanisms for enforcing rules, dividing them into internal and external. The logic of the mechanism of enforcement of rules, highlighting its components, makes it possible to construct theoretical typology possible specific mechanisms of such coercion. Like any theoretical typology, it can be built on the basis of particular classifications of variants of each of the identified components of the mechanism under discussion. Let's take a closer look at these classifications.

Guarantor of the rules. This role can be performed, as noted above, by (1) either any member of the group in which the institution operates, or (2) an individual (several individuals or an organization) specializing in performing the function of a guarantor, or (3) both at the same time.

Model of behavior of rule recipients. Such a model can be (1) formal, recorded in the form of an official text, the exact knowledge of which is simultaneously in the memory of the recipients and in the memory of the guarantor of the institution, or (2) informal, existing only in the memory of people, or (3) exist formally and at the same time in the form of people’s knowledge of the actual practice of implementing the rule, different from a formal order.

The last case, as observation shows, is the most typical, frequent case of the existence of formal institutions. The practice of their existence may differ from formal regulations for several reasons, ranging from the impossibility of providing for in a formal norm all the variety of actually developing situations, and ending with the deliberately inaccurate and incomplete implementation of the norm by its addressees, which, however, is not punished by the guarantors - for example, due to their bribery with side of the offenders. This practice of implementing formal rules can be called their deformalization

Comparison of actual behavior with model behavior. It can be carried out by the guarantor of the rule both (1) based on his own discretion (his own understanding of what constitutes a punishable deviation from the norm), and (2) in accordance with a certain formal rule (list of violations).

Choice of sanction. It, as in the previous classification, can be carried out (1) in accordance with the free decision of the guarantor, or (2) prescribed by some formal rule that assigns its own specific sanction to each possible violation of the norm.

A set of sanctions. This classification can be constructed in various ways, for example, by dividing sanctions into social and economic, formal and informal, one-time and long-term, etc. Obviously, in the aggregate, such individual classifications will determine a certain typology of sanctions. However, for the purpose of describing mechanisms for enforcing rules to be followed,

In our opinion, another, simpler way is more productive: the formation empirical classification of sanctions that directly summarizes the practice of their application:

public condemnation expressed in disapproval of an action by word or gesture, loss of respect or deterioration of the reputation of the sanctioned subject;

official censure in the form of an oral or written comment made by the formal guarantor of the rule; such censure, in particular, may contain the threat of a subsequent more serious sanction that will be applied to the violator in the event of a repeated violation of the rule;

money penalty, imposed on the offender;

forceful termination of the started action;

forceful coercion (or its threat) to repeat the committed action, but according to the rules, - in cases where the violation committed is not irreversible;

restriction of the violator in some of his rights, for example, a ban under threat of more serious punishment from engaging in a certain type of activity;

deprivation of liberty(imprisonment);

the death penalty.

The listed types of sanctions can also in some cases be applied jointly, in the form of various complex sanctions.

Implementation of sanctions. The chosen sanction can either (1) be directly imposed at the scene of the violation by the guarantor himself, or (2) carried out by other entities or organizations, or (3) combine both of these methods (for example, a policeman separates or restrains the fighters, applying sanctions of type (4), and the court subsequently awards a fine to the detainees, i.e., applies a sanction of type (3)).

Variants of the relationship between formal and informal rules. The above characteristics of formal and informal rules and methods of forcing individuals to comply with the rules allow us to discuss the issue of ratio options formal and informal rules. The importance of such a discussion is due to the fact that informal rules are often understood as non-rigid, violations of which are quite possible and acceptable, while formal ones are interpreted as hard, strictly enforced, since their violation is necessarily associated with punishment of violators.

Meanwhile, since enforcement of formal rules presupposes specialized activities of guarantors carried out by them on the basis rewards for their labor efforts, the success of this activity is largely determined by the incentives of the guarantors to conscientiously perform their official duties. If such incentives are weak, formal rules may actually be less stringent than informal rules. Therefore, the question of the relationship between formal and informal rules operating in the same situations becomes important for a correct understanding of the observed facts.

We will consider this relationship first in statics and then in dynamics. IN statics two options are possible: (i) formal and informal norms correspond to each other; (II) formal and informal norms do not correspond (contradict) each other.

Case (I) is ideal, in the sense that the behavior of the recipients of formal and informal rules is regulated by all possible guarantors acting in concert, so that the probability of inappropriate behavior in regulated situations can be assessed as minimal. We can say that formal and informal rules in this case mutually support each other.

Case (P) seems more typical, since many formal rules introduced either by the state or by the leaders of various organizations are often aimed at realizing their narrow interests, while informal rules shared by various social groups meet the interests of their participants. Of course, a contradiction between such interests is not inevitable, but it is quite likely.

In appropriate situations, the actual choice by recipients of non-agreed norms of one of them (and, consequently, the choice in favor of violating the other) is determined by balance between benefits and costs compliance with each of the compared standards. Moreover, along with the direct benefits and costs of each action, such balances also include the expected costs of applying sanctions for violating an alternative rule.

The relationship between formal and informal rules in dynamics has a more complex character. The following situations stand out here:

formal rule is introduced on the base a positive informal rule; in other words, the last formalized which makes it possible to supplement the existing mechanisms for enforcing it with formal mechanisms; An example of such a relationship can be the medieval codes, in which norms protected by the state, norms of customary law that guided townspeople in resolving conflict situations were written down and acquired force;

a formal rule is introduced for counteraction established informal norms; if the latter are assessed negatively by the state, the creation of a mechanism for enforcing behavior that differs from that suggested by informal rules is one of the options for state action in the relevant area; a typical example is the introduction of bans on duels, which were practiced among the nobility until the first half of the 19th century;

informal rules are crowding out formal, if the latter generate unjustified costs for their subjects, without bringing tangible benefits to either the state or directly the guarantors of such rules; in this case, the formal rule seems to “fall asleep”: without being formally canceled, it ceases to be an object of monitoring by the guarantors and, due to its harmfulness for the addressees, ceases to be enforced by them; examples include numerous precedent-setting court decisions in US states, adopted in isolated conflict cases and subsequently forgotten, such as the ban on peeling vegetables after 11 pm;

12. emerging informal rules contribute to the implementation introduced formal rules; such situations arise when the latter are introduced in a form that does not sufficiently clearly and fully characterize the actions of either the addressees or the guarantors of the rule; in this case, the practice of implementing the “spirit” of the introduced formal rule (if, of course, its implementation is generally beneficial for its addressees) develops and selects such informal models of behavior that contribute to achieving the goal of the original formal rule - deformalization of rules; examples can be the norms of relationships in organizations, which actually develop “around” formal instructions, aimed at more effectively achieving set goals.

In general, as can be seen from the situations analyzed, formal and informal rules can either contradict each other, compete with each other, or mutually complement and support each other.

hema Williamson. A discussion of the concept of an institution, its relationship with the concept of a norm (rule), as well as other general issues related to the role of institutions in determining economic behavior, allows us to move on to a description of the entire totality institutions within the economic system as a whole. To solve this problem, it seems useful to take as a basis the three-level analysis scheme proposed by O. Williamson, somewhat modifying its interpretation (see Fig. 1.1). This diagram visually represents the interaction of individuals (first level) and institutions of different types: those that represent institutional agreements(second level), and those that are components institutional environment(third level).

Figure 1.1. Interactions between individuals and institutions

Institutional environment

Institutional agreements

In accordance with the terminology proposed by D. North and L. Davis,

Institutional agreements are agreements between economic units that determine the modes of cooperation and competition

Examples of institutional agreements are, first of all, contracts - exchange rules voluntarily established by economic agents, rules for the functioning of markets, rules of interaction within hierarchical structures (organizations), as well as various hybrid forms of institutional agreements that combine features of market and hierarchical interactions (they will be discussed in more detail in subsequent sections of the textbook).

Institutional environment - a set of fundamental social, political and legal rules that define the framework for establishing institutional arrangements

The components of the institutional environment are the norms and rules of the social life of society, the functioning of its political sphere, basic legal norms - the Constitution, constitutional and other laws, etc. A more detailed description of the components of the institutional environment will be presented in subsequent sections of this chapter. In principle, it would be possible to include the components of the institutional environment directly into the above diagram, but this would significantly complicate the entire presentation without bringing tangible benefits in terms of clarifying the content of interactions.

Let's consider the main connections between the blocks of the circuit, indicated by numbers in the above figure.

As a general note to all types of influences characterized below, it should be emphasized that all influences, influences, etc. in economics, strictly speaking, are carried out according to the principle of methodological individualism (see the final chapter for more details), only individuals. This means that when we talk about, for example, influence of institutional arrangements on each other(below, paragraph 2), this expression essentially has metaphorical character and is used simply for brevity. Using strict language, we should talk here about the impact of individuals who have entered into one institutional agreement on other individuals when some other institutional agreement is formed between them. However, such overcomplication of the presentation, taking into account the remark made, would, of course, be unnecessary.

1. The influence of individuals on institutional agreements. Since institutional arrangements are, by definition, voluntary agreements, preferences and interests of individuals play a decisive role in the emergence (creation) of certain institutional agreements(of course, within the framework determined by the institutional environment).

Depending on what behavioral premises the researcher accepts - that is, depending on how the researcher interprets the economic agent - the explanations for the observed institutional agreements will also be different. For example, if we assume that individuals have all the information needed to make decisions, including perfect anticipation of future events, as well as the perfect ability to make inference and optimization calculations, it becomes impossible to explain the existence of many types of contracts. It becomes unclear why individuals spend time and resources on their preparation, if the mentioned complete knowledge should initially give them the answer - it is worth implementing

It is not worth it to make some long exchange. If we assume that knowledge is not complete and computing capabilities are not perfect, the role of contracts becomes quite clear - such (temporarily established) rules bring certainty to the unknown future and streamline future interactions of economic agents. The issues raised will be discussed in more detail in the final chapter of the textbook.

The influence of institutional agreements on each other. The content of this type of relationship is quite diverse: the behavior of individual organizations influences the nature of the changing market (for example, building barriers to entry can bring the market closer to a monopoly), comprehensive agreements predetermine the types of more private contracts, the rules of action of contract guarantors influence the choice by economic agents of the types of contracts concluded, and the nature of the market (for example, its segmentation) - on the structure of the company, etc.

The influence of the institutional environment on institutional agreements. The content of this connection directly follows from the definitions of the institutional environment and institutional agreements: the rules included in the institutional environment determine the divergent costs of concluding various institutional agreements. If some type of them is prohibited by general rules, then the costs of individuals who decide, despite the ban, to nevertheless enter into such an agreement, increase (for example, the costs of concealing information are added); the expected benefits from such an agreement are also reduced, since the likelihood of success is reduced, etc.

The influence of institutional agreements on individual behavior. Although institutional agreements are concluded voluntarily by economic agents, unforeseen circumstances can change the decision-making situation in such a way that following, for example, a previously concluded contract may turn out to be unprofitable for the individual. However, breaking a contract by one party may bring losses to the other party, and in amounts exceeding the benefits of the first (for example, if the second party has made investments that are no longer switchable). Under these conditions, the existence of a mechanism for enforcing a contract (for example, a judicial one) clearly influences the decision of the first party, thereby preventing the occurrence of unjustified social losses.

The influence of institutional agreements on the institutional environment. The most typical way of such influence is closely related to the distributional effects of institutions: an institutional agreement that provides tangible benefits to its participants can form a so-called special interest group - a set of individuals interested in maintaining and increasing the benefits received. For this purpose, under certain circumstances, such a group is able to influence, for example, the legislative process in order to achieve the adoption of a law that consolidates the benefits obtained by formalizing a previous private agreement.

In economic theory, this method of action refers to rent-seeking behavior, the analysis of which was paid much attention by such famous economists as J. Buchanan, G. Tullock and R. Ackerman.

The influence of the institutional environment on individual behavior. Such an impact is exerted by fundamental rules both directly (for example, the Constitution of the Russian Federation is a law of direct effect, i.e. a citizen can directly go to court if he believes that someone is violating his rights guaranteed by the Constitution), and through institutional agreements, also formed, as noted above, under the influence of the institutional environment.

The influence of the individual on the institutional environment. Individuals influence the institutional environment in two main ways: firstly, through participation in elections of state legislative bodies that pass laws, and secondly, through the conclusion of institutional agreements, the content of which, as noted above, is also capable of influencing the institutional environment.

Not all of the interactions considered are currently studied in economic theory to the same extent. At the same time, the described scheme is a useful tool for systematically representing institutions and their interactions through individual behavior. In fact, we will encounter the relationships outlined in it throughout the presentation of the content of the foundations of the new institutional economic theory in this textbook.

Hierarchy of rules. The three-level structure shown in Fig. 1.1, clearly reflects the hierarchical nature of the relationships between socially protected rules operating in society and the economy. At the same time, dividing the entire set of institutions into the institutional environment and institutional agreements is only the first approximation to the actual relationship of the mentioned rules in terms of subordination, the degree of influence on each other and the rigidity of determining the behavior of economic agents.

The idea of ​​subordination (subordination) of rules gives the relationship between any law and regulations adopted on its basis by executive authorities, or by-laws: the law defines principles, strategies of behavior, while by-laws specify these principles into algorithms of action. For example, tax legislation determines the profit tax rate, and the instructions fix the rules for calculating the amount of taxable profit, linked to specific accounting forms, accounts, etc. A long-term contract concluded by two firms regarding their interaction in the field of research and development fixes, that firms will jointly conduct research in which they are interested; at the same time, for each specific research project, a special agreement is concluded, fixing such issues as the subject and purpose of the project, forms of participation of the parties, amounts of funding, distribution of copyrights, etc.

The subordination of rules is, as follows from the examples given, a widespread phenomenon that takes place both within the institutional environment and in the totality of institutional agreements. The examples given also demonstrate the general principle meaningful ordering rules: a norm of a lower order clarifies and reveals the content of a norm of a higher order. The latter, more general ones, outline the framework, the details within which regulate more specific norms.

Of course, not all rules are interconnected by such content-logical relationships. A significant part of them in this regard do not correlate with each other at all, that is, regarding their pairs it cannot be said that one rule is more or less general in nature than the other. For example, traffic rules and rules for calculating income tax are not comparable within the framework of the principle of content-logical ordering.

However, any rules become comparable if, as a basis for comparison, we choose such a characteristic as costs of introducing (or changing) regulations Costs include not only monetary costs, but also the entire totality of efforts of economic agents, including psychological costs, as well as the time required to introduce or change an institution12.

With this approach, rules that are more general and higher up the hierarchical ladder are those whose costs of changing or introducing are greater than those of the rules being compared with them.

The “economic” hierarchy of rules strongly correlates with their substantive hierarchy (of course, if the latter exists). Thus, it is obvious that the costs of developing and adopting the Constitution through a referendum are higher than the corresponding costs for laws, which, in turn, are higher than the corresponding costs for by-laws. Therefore, the convenience of the economic hierarchy of rules lies, first of all, in the fact that it allows one to compare and organize rules whose contents have no semantic connection.

Now, based on the division of the entire set of rules into those that form the institutional environment and those that represent institutional agreements, as well as from the introduced ideas about the hierarchy of rules, let us consider in more detail the content of the institutional environment and institutional agreements

Superconstitutional rules. All components of the institutional environment represent rules that determine the order and content of “lower” rules. Such “meta-rules” can be either formal or informal. The most general and difficult to change informal rules, which have deep historical roots in the life of various peoples, are closely related to prevailing stereotypes of behavior, religious ideas, etc., and are often not realized by individuals, i.e., they have become stereotypes of behavior of large groups of the population , are called nadkv constitutional rules. They determine the hierarchy of values ​​shared by broad layers of society, people’s attitude to power, mass psychological attitudes toward cooperation or confrontation, etc.

Supra-constitutional rules are among the least studied, both theoretically and empirically. In fact, regarding them there are only separate speculative constructions and scattered

12 In this case, time costs do not necessarily correlate with monetary costs, since changes in rules of behavior are also influenced natural forgetting of information, not associated with special costs incurred for this purpose.

actual observations of researchers (mainly philosophers and sociologists), which do not allow for a strict logical reconstruction of this layer of the institutional environment.

Probably the first (at least the most famous) work essentially devoted to the study of supra-constitutional rules was Max Weber’s book “The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism”, in which this German sociologist convincingly showed the influence of religious behavioral attitudes and moral values ​​inherent in Protestantism, on the relationships and rules of interaction of economic agents and their attitude towards work, i.e. the rules of labor behavior.

Constitutional rules. In economic theory constitutional It is customary to call rules of a general nature that structure the relationship between individuals and the state, as well as individuals among themselves. In fulfilling these functions, constitutional rules, firstly, establish the hierarchical structure of the state; secondly, they determine the rules for making decisions on the formation of government bodies (ministries, departments, agencies, etc.), for example, voting rules in democracies, rules of inheritance in monarchies, etc.; thirdly, they determine the forms and rules for monitoring state actions by society.

Constitutional rules can be both formal and informal. For example, the rules of succession to power in monarchies may take the form of unwritten custom or tradition, while the rules of voting in the election of the legislative body of a state may take the form of carefully written law.

Constitutional rules as a special layer of the institutional environment can be distinguished not only at the level of the state, but also at the level of other organizations - firms, corporations, non-profit foundations, etc. Their function in them is performed, first of all, by charters, as well as various corporate codes , mission statements, etc. The identification of such local, intra-organizational rules with constitutional ones is possible on the basis functional understanding of the latter, since from a legal point of view the relevant documents have, of course, nothing in common with the Constitution as the fundamental law of the state.

In this regard, it is necessary to draw attention to the significant difference between the economic and legal understanding of constitutional rules, which prevents the establishment of mutual understanding between representatives of the relevant branches of science. If, as follows from the above, the economic understanding of constitutional rules is very broad and has nothing to do with the form of presentation of the corresponding rules (remember, they can also be informal), then the legal understanding of the constitution has a much more strict and narrow meaning. For example, the rules of inheritance of power in monarchies mentioned above, which have the forms of custom or tradition, from a legal point of view have no relation to the constitution, as well as intra-company codes, mission statements of non-profit organizations, etc. Economists need to keep this difference in mind when reading legal research touching on issues of constitutional law.

economic rules and property rights. Economic rules are rules directly defining forms of organization of economic activity, within the framework of which economic

agents form institutional agreements and make decisions about the use of resources.

For example, economic rules include quotas for the import or export of certain products, prohibitions on the use of certain types of contracts, legally established deadlines for the validity of patents for inventions, etc.

Economic rules are the conditions and prerequisites for the emergence property rights: the latter arise where and when rules are formed in society that regulate their choice of ways to use limited goods (including resources). In this regard, we can say that by studying property rights, we study economic rules, and vice versa.

Probably, one of the first economic rules regulating economic activity were the rules defining the boundaries of the territories in which primitive tribes searched for and collected edible plants and animals. This rule determined the ownership rights of the tribe to the corresponding territory: within its borders, gathering could be carried out unhindered, while outside it, a member of one tribe could encounter representatives of another, which would result in a conflict over who owned the found plant or the caught animal.

Confirmation that the “rule of territory” could be one of the first economic rules is the fact that many animals leading a (relatively) sedentary lifestyle have similar territories (ethologists, specialists who study animal behavior, call them reveres ). Some of the animals (for example, dogs, wolves) mark the boundaries of their reveres in a certain way, and the marks serve as signals for other individuals of the same biological species that the territory is “occupied”, “belongs” to one of the other individuals.

Property rights define those actions in relation to an object that are permitted and protected from obstacles to their implementation by other people. From this point of view, we can say that the situation of choice is determined by property rights.

Property rights are those permitted and protected from obstacles to their implementation possible ways of using limited resources that are the exclusive prerogative of individuals or groups

Essential for understanding property rights is, on the one hand, their specifications, and on the other - blur.

Specifications of property rights are the creation of a regime of exclusivity for an individual or group by defining the subject of law, the object of law, the set of powers that the subject has, as well as the mechanism that ensures their compliance.

To understand the specification of property rights, it is important who (which it is the guarantor) that provides it and how it is carried out broadcast rights (if it is allowed at all).

When it comes to formal rights, they are usually specified by state. At the same time, within an enterprise, for example, certain formal property rights may be specified by its management. Along with the formal it is possible impersonal specification, which is based on the everyday practice of interaction between economic agents, i.e. the guarantor acts any member of the group who noticed a violation. It usually refers to informal property rights that exist as a consequence of the existence of informal rules.

The most important function of the process of specifying property rights is to give them the properties exclusivity.

The power of ownership is called exclusive if its subject is able to effectively exclude other economic agents from the decision-making process regarding the use of this power

The exclusivity of a particular property right does not mean that it belongs to the individual i.e. to a private person. A group of people, an economic organization (legal entity), and finally the state can have exclusive rights. These issues are discussed in more detail in Chapter 3, which examines different property regimes.

The exclusivity of property rights is economically important because it is what creates incentives for the efficient use of resources: if the property rights of a subject to the result of the use of its resources are not exclusive, it has no incentive to maximize this result, since all or any part of it can go to someone else.

For example, if the farmers of a sedentary tribe are regularly raided by nomads who take away most of the crop and leave behind enough grain to keep the farmers from starving, there is no incentive for the farmers to make efforts to maximize the productivity of the land. They will strive to grow only the necessary minimum of grain, spending the “freed up” resources for other purposes, for example, specifying their rights by hiring armed protection, or simply spending time in idleness.

In a sense, the inverse of the specification process is erosion of property rights. This term refers to the practice of violating the exclusivity of rights, leading to a decrease in the value of the object of right for the subject, since the stream of expected income must be discounted at a higher interest rate (taking into account the risk of expropriation). Regular raids by nomads, which appeared in the previous example, are precisely a form of erosion of farmers’ property rights to crops. Thus, the actual level of exclusivity of a particular property right is a function of the processes of specification/erosion of property rights.

Contracts. As noted above, contracts (agreements) are the most typical types of institutional agreements. In terms of the latter, a contract can be defined as a rule that structures, in time and/or space, interactions between two (or more) economic agents regarding the exchange of property rights on the basis of obligations voluntarily assumed by them as a result of an agreement reached13.

In principle, any rule can be interpret like some kind of contract. For example, the relationship between a slave owner and a slave, despite their obvious inequality, was subject (especially in the late period of slavery) to very specific rules. Accordingly, these rules can be interpreted like some exchanges: the owner provided the slave with housing and food in exchange for his work; the owner limited the slave's freedom in exchange for his protection from

13 The topic of contracts is discussed in detail in Chapter 5 of the textbook.

encroachments of other, perhaps more cruel, masters, etc. Of course, since the mentioned rules were by no means the result of a voluntary agreement (with the exception of the conscious sale of oneself into slavery by a previously free citizen), the identification of such “exchanges” is precisely a possible interpretation of the rules of slavery . An expansive interpretation of contracts similar to the one given is called contract approach to the analysis of economic institutions.

The essential points of a contract as a rule that distinguish it from other types of rules are:

consciousness and purposefulness of the development of this rule by its addressees (parties to the contract); other rules can be formed without preliminary thinking or design, by trial and error;

voluntariness, mutual benefit of participation in the contract of its parties; other types of rules may be highly asymmetrical in terms of the distribution of costs and benefits;

the limitation of the validity of this rule only to its addressees - the parties to the contract; other types of rules, such as state-imposed laws, apply not only to legislators, but also to all other citizens;

direct connection of the contract with the exchange or other movement of property rights (for example, a contract of donation of any property that does not imply a “counter” movement of other property from the beneficiary to the donor); other types of rules may not directly affect the transfer of property rights.

Contracts are rules that “serve” (i.e. coordinate) various exchanges. Market exchanges are considered the most common form of exchange, but in general the variety of types of exchange is much wider.

We will call exchange the alienation and appropriation of property rights to certain goods between two or more agents, due to their conscious interaction.

Alienation and appropriation of property rights means their redistribution. An exchange is a redistribution of property rights that involves decision-making by its participants. The results of the redistribution of property rights (exchange) obviously depend on how, and under what conditions, decisions are made by its participants. It is important to distinguish these conditions, or decision-making situations, by characteristics selectivity And symmetry. On the basis of selectivity, the entire set of exchanges can be divided into selective - those where subjects have the opportunity to choose the counterparty, the subject and proportions of the exchange (in particular, price) - and non-selective, where this opportunity is absent. Based on symmetry, exchanges are divided into symmetric and asymmetric. Within the first group, the options for choice are the same for the parties; within the second group, they are unequal.

Combining these features, it is easy to obtain a theoretical typology that includes 4 types of exchanges, two of which are asymmetrically selective and

asymmetrically indiscriminate - actually describe one asymmetrical type of exchange.

Additional diversity in the typology of exchanges is introduced by the “guarantor of exchange” feature - a subject or social mechanism that protects the new distribution of property rights to the item(s) of exchange. The following options are highlighted here: (1) one of the exchange participants; (2) both parties to the exchange; (3) third party - individual or private organization; (4) the state, represented by one or more state law enforcement organizations; (5) tradition, custom. In this case, a typical case is the protection of an exchange simultaneously or sequentially by several guarantors.

For example, for market contracts corresponding to symmetrically selective exchanges, a typical case is their multi-layer protection, including all of the listed types of guarantors, some in several different versions. Thus, to prevent violation of the agreement within the framework of option (3), the following are used: large and reputable trading companies, enterprise associations, arbitration courts, as well as criminal organizations; within option (4) - representatives of the regional administration, regional legislative assemblies, as well as courts14.

Since contracts are consciously developed rules that structure the interactions of their parties for a certain (finite or indefinite) period of time, each contract can be considered as joint activity plan these parties. If every rule supplies the agents who know it only some descriptive information about future possible actions of other economic agents (in situations regulated by the relevant rule), the contract, being a set of mutual obligations, carries normative, directive information about actions that must be committed parties in the future.

Of course, like other rules, contracts may not be fulfilled, i.e., violated (broken) by the party that considers that the benefits of breaking (i.e., from switching the violator’s resources to another type of activity) exceed the costs associated with sanctions imposed on her for failure to fulfill obligations. However, the probability of violating a contract can generally be assessed as lower than the probability of violating other rules. After all, the contract is developed and concluded purposefully; this means that its parties have the opportunity to take into account their own interests in this plan of joint action. On the contrary, many rules are focused on realizing the interests of their developers, while completely different economic agents must implement such rules. If such rules impose excessive unproductive (for them) costs on the latter, and enforcement control is not too strict, or the sanctions are small, the rule will not be enforced with a high probability.

Rules and rights. In the section "Economic Rules and Property Rights" we defined property rights as derived from economic rules. This ratio holds true for any rights and rules. Any right of an individual (or organization) is the ability to freely carry out certain actions, in particular, actions in order to

14 The classification of exchanges is described in more detail in the book: Tambovtsev V.L. (1997), The state and the transition economy: limits of controllability, M.: TEIS.

or other object (property). This possibility is a direct logical consequence of the rule, according to which such actions are not subject to sanctions by the guarantor of this rule. Actions punished within the framework of forcing the rule to be executed do not constitute the content of someone’s right.

When an individual acts in accordance with a rule, that is, becomes its addressee, he automatically acquires the rights inherent in this role. This means that, while performing actions permitted by the rule, he will not encounter any opposition and, therefore, will not have to incur the costs necessary to protect against such opposition15. This means that from an economic point of view, rights are means of saving resources in the process of carrying out actions.

Of course, individuals can perform actions to which they have no rights. However, as noted above, they may be subject to sanctions and incur losses. Consequently, the expected benefits from performing such an action will be less than if the individual had the corresponding right.

It can therefore be concluded that it is rights are another (in addition to the coordination effect) specific social mechanism with the help of rules provide cost savings.

Conclusion

The content of this chapter, devoted to the basic concepts of the new institutional economic theory, of course, does not exhaust all the problems associated with them. A number of important, but more “subtle” issues remained outside its scope. These include, for example, issues of diversity forms for describing institutions and their comparative advantages for solving various theoretical and applied problems, issues explanations the origin of institutions (partially discussed in Chapter 6) and predictions the emergence of new institutions, etc. Many of these problems are only discussed in current scientific research, there are no generally accepted solutions for them, which is an obstacle to including them in a textbook, while others have been sufficiently worked out, but are of a private nature, and are considered as part of training at the master's level.

Chapter Concepts

Bounded rationality

Pattern of behavior

Norm (rule)

Opportunistic behavior

Mechanism for enforcing the rule

15 Unless, of course, this rule contradicts some other rule shared by an individual who also has a claim to the goods with which the first individual acts. See above about the relationship between formal and informal rules.

Institute

The restrictive function of the institution

Coordination function of the institute

Distributive function of the institute

Formal rules

Informal rules

Institutional environment

Institutional agreement

Hierarchy of rules

Superconstitutional rules

Constitutional rules

Economic rules

Contracts

Ownership

Exclusivity of property rights

Property Rights Specification

Erosion of property rights

Review questions

Is information a constraint in economic decision making?

What is the relationship between limited information and the formation of habits?

Do behavioral patterns always maximize utility?

Is breaking a rule always undesirable from an economic point of view?

Is every rule an institution?

Does the presence of regularity in behavior always mean the existence of a corresponding institution?

Is it true that any institution creates a distribution effect?

How do formal rules differ from informal ones?

How can formal and informal rules relate to each other in statics and dynamics?

What is the logic behind the mechanism for enforcing the rule?

What is included in the institutional environment?

What are institutional arrangements?

What types of rules are, from an economic point of view, constitutional rules?

What are rights?

How do rules and rights relate?

What are property rights?

What is the main function of a property rights specification?

Is it true that the exclusivity of property rights is possible only when their subject is an individual?

What is an exchange and how can exchanges be classified?

Questions to Consider

How, with the help of what research procedures, can one identify among the various observed regularities in people’s behavior those that are caused by the existence of institutions?

Are institutions public goods? If they are, what is the overall effect of underproduction of public goods for them?

Is the state always interested in a clear specification of property rights?

Literature

Main

North D. (1997), Institutions, institutional change and economic performance, M.: Beginnings, preface, ch. 2, 3, 5, 6, 7.

Eggertsson T. (2001), Economic behavior and institutions, M.: Case, ch. 2.

Additional

North, D. (1993a), Institutions and Economic Growth: A Historical Introduction. THESIS, vol. 1, issue 2, p. 69–91.

Tambovtsev V.L. (ed.) (20016), Economic analysis of regulations, M.: TEIS, ch. 1–3.

Shastitko A.E. (2002), New Institutional Economics, M.: TEIS, ch. 3, 4, 5.

Elster Y. (1993), Social norms and economic theory // THESIS,vol. 1, issue. Z, pp.73–91.

a specific combination of party system and voting method

organization of supreme power in a certain territory

136.Lobbying as a phenomenon reflects...

evolution of legitimate power

the process of influence of interest groups on government bodies

way of forming an elite

centralization of the power system

137.According to the elite theory, power in society always belongs to...

the majority of the people

possessing the necessary qualities to the minority

Political party

charismatic leader

138.International environmental organizations were formed in...

X years

1900-1910s

1940-1950s

139. A social phenomenon that represents one of the forms of resolving social contradictions between states, peoples, classes and social groups by means of armed violence is ...

War

confrontation

competition

140.Ideology__________emphasizes the continuity of development, the priority of the interests of the state over the interests of the individual, cult, traditions.

Marxism

liberalism

conservatism

social democracy

141.Coercive nature has...

autonomous participation

mobilized participation

Subjective activity

political participation

142.The subjects of political science as a science and academic discipline are (at least two answer options) ...

scientific and professional communities engaged in research and teaching of the subject area of ​​political science

scientists and teachers engaged in research and teaching of problems of politics and power

Politics and its central element - political power, reflecting political reality, political ideas

state power and its activities in pursuing domestic and foreign policy

143.Methods of political forecasting do not include...

imagination

Extrapolation

expertise

scenario building

144. The sociometric method is a method...

identification of indicators that are most characteristic of the problem situation as an object of study and their cause-and-effect analysis

creating necessary and sufficient conditions for the manifestation and measurement of connections between phenomena

A survey aimed at identifying the state and dynamics of interpersonal relationships by recording feelings of sympathy and antipathy

collection of factual information, which involves replacing the properties and parameters of the research object with a system of symbols and meanings

145. The study of political processes and phenomena using survey techniques is called ____________ method

Statistical

institutional

communicative

sociological

146.The dynamic aspect of political relations, which expresses their dependence on the system of people’s actions and their consequences, is expressed by the concept ...

"political protest"

"political conflict"

"political norms"

"political activity"

147.The political system includes_____________________ subsystem

educational

economic

Social

normative

148.A prerequisite for the formation of civil society is not...

emergence of private property

establishment of a democratic political regime

affirmation of the ideology of collectivism

development of a market economy

149.A constitutional (parliamentary) monarchy is characterized by...

Strong limitation of monarchical power in the judicial and executive branches, virtually complete absence of powers in the legislative

limitation of powers only in the field of legislation

unlimited powers of the monarch in the field of legislative and executive activities

unlimited powers of the monarch in the field of legislative activity

150. Legitimate power, according to M. Weber, is ...

trusted power

power that is ignored

power of force

power that ensures economic efficiency and stability

151.The main function of a political party is...

representation of public interests

formation of the ruling elite

conducting an election campaign

political socialization

152.The change in the political system in the process of transition from a traditional society to a modern one is called ...

intrasystem changes

revolution

modernization

functioning

153.The function of political communication is...

making the most important decisions

development of new rules and regulations

application of sanctions against lawbreakers

The financial system, as a rule, is a set of financial markets and the state financial system (tax system, state budget, monetary policy, system of state financial transfers, etc.).

It is generally accepted that, in turn, financial markets are a combination of the money market, as well as securities and capital markets. A clear separation of these institutions is practically impossible. However, the dominant view is that “money markets” are those financial markets in which short-term liabilities are exchanged for external money,
and the term “capital market” covers both financial markets and markets in which “real” property is transacted.

All components (parts) of the financial system have a certain similarity: in financial transactions there is an increased risk, compared to non-financial business agents, which, naturally, is compensated by an additional premium (additional bonus). In economic theory, this phenomenon has been described by capital asset pricing models in space (CAPM, average variance), intertemporal models and arbitrage pricing theory.

As we see it, the financial system is a subsystem of the economy and is designed to ensure (1) the monetary circulation of the movement of goods and services, (2) the redistribution of funds and (3) the transformation of financial
assets. Our research is aimed at identifying the essence of the last, third component of the financial system - financial intermediation for the transformation of assets.

In its most general form, financial intermediaries are enterprises involved in the purchase and sale of financial assets. Thus, financial intermediaries are the main participants in organized financial markets. The financial business, in contrast to the ordinary one, and the financial market, in contrast to the organized (material, non-financial) market, are branches of non-price competition, where the quality and nature of the services offered are important (very often they are differentiated and specified by consumers), traditions of interaction with clients. Historical experience has shown that non-price factors quickly become monopolized or oligopolized. Economic theory is based on the assumption that financial transactions are epiphenomena that form a “veil” that hides the internal content of real processes from a superficial observer. The Modigliani-Miller theorem implied that the cost
financial assets are exactly equal to the value of those external assets for which the owners of the financial assets have claims. However, modern economics has completely refuted these assumptions: the financial economy not only serves the real economy, but also has the properties of self-expansion and self-generation. Upon further analysis, we will be convinced that in terms of scale and profits, the financial economy has become significantly ahead of non-financial corporations.

Financial intermediation is the field of activity of agents of the financial system. According to some economists, through the financial system, purchasing power is transferred from economic units with a surplus budget (or with surplus finance - A.B.) to economic units with a deficit budget. At the same time, financial intermediaries transform financial requirements into such
in such a way that they become more attractive to the end investor. The process of purchasing direct claims of economic units with a shortage of funds, and their transformation (transformation) into indirect claims, is financial intermediation. At the same time, the transfer of funds from enterprises with a positive budget to enterprises with a negative budget is carried out through (1) direct or (2) indirect financing.

This is an overly classic and honest definition. Things are changing rapidly these days. The development of the financial system in the world over the past decade and a half has largely refuted the above point of view. First, by the beginning of the 20th century and during its first 15 years, financial intermediation was associated not only with the transformation of claims. Secondly, in order to lend money it is not necessary to have a surplus in the balance of financial flows (budget). And in order to borrow them, there is not necessarily a shortage of funds. A clear example is the United States and American companies that have the largest deficits
among OECD countries, but they are the ones who are engaged in large-scale mediation projects.

D. Blackwell, D. Kidwell, R. Peterson understand financial intermediation as the activity of firms in which the EEDB buys the financial claims of the EEDB. One could completely agree with this approach, if not for one very important circumstance: who determines a company with a surplus and a company with a deficit budget? Some states themselves artificially create a deficit or surplus of financial resources (for example, the budget). Soon the results of such decisions affect the activities of financial intermediaries, increasing their deficits or surpluses.

R. Levin identifies financial intermediation as the ability of this subsystem of economic relations to reduce risks, mobilize savings, increase the awareness of business entities, stimulate exchange processes, etc. According to A. Darbinyan and E. Sandoyan, financial intermediation is work in the following four areas: possession of information, consumption smoothing, delegation of investment monitoring and positioning in

as a “liquidity pool” or “coalition of investors”

According to other scientists (Pomogaeva E.A.), financial intermediation is a joint activity of a set of financial institutions to ensure the continuity of capital flows between economic entities, implemented through a double exchange of debt claims and obligations. We see no problem with this definition, except that it is overly general.

In our opinion, the system of financial intermediation in the sense of professional subjects should be recognized as a set of institutions of non-price competition designed to transform some types of claims into others, some types of assets into others (for example, external assets into internal ones), potential future income into actual expenses of the present, relative time financial surpluses of some
receivers into real money of others. The time for financial intermediation has come: it fell to the second half of the 20th century and the beginning of the 21st. The development of the financial system has exceeded all expectations. Therefore, statements that were “fresh” just yesterday about the essence of the modern system of financial intermediation turn out to be outdated or insufficient.

Typically, among the instruments of financial intermediation, the following should be considered: deposit, loan, seigniorage (seigniorage), currency exchange, shares, bonds, options, mortgage, markets for derivative financial instruments (futures, forwards, options), provision of guarantees and guarantees, insurance contracts (policies, premiums, payments), shares, financial leasing and factoring, pawnshops. And the institutions of financial intermediation are banks, treasuries, international financial institutions, insurance companies, mutual and investment funds, stock markets, hedge funds, other derivative funds, etc. Recently, financial services have been seriously analyzed as a separate type of financial services.

remittances from labor migrants (MTM), reached

534 billion dollars in 2012 Not always, but more often

27 Gaidutsky A.P. Banks and migration capital. K.: Information Systems LLC, 2013. P. 39. According to the World Bank, these transfers to

After the transfer, these funds are also transformed from one type of asset to another. According to the World Bank, remittances almost reach the level of 50%

of FDI in the world and account for about 0.5% of global

GDP, and the number of migrants over the past 5 years is already 213 million people. Therefore, in our opinion, DTMs have also become a tool of financial intermediation in our time.

Until recently, it was customary to represent the essence of financial intermediation through a system of services provided by financial intermediaries (splitting the loan amount; transferring one national currency to another; establishing a flexible system of repayment terms; diversifying the risk of non-payment; ensuring illiquidity). At the same time, the following types of financial intermediaries were noted: (1) deposit-type institutions (commercial banks, savings institutions, credit unions); (2) savings institutions operating on
contractual basis (life insurance companies; accident insurance companies; pension funds); (3) investment funds (mutual funds; money market mutual funds) and (4) a number of other types of financial intermediaries (financial companies for consumer, business and trade loans; government financial institutions and agencies, derivatives institutions or derivatives). To this list, without a doubt, one should add insurance brokers and agents, currency dealers, pawnshops and exchange offices, and payment and settlement organizations. The list of types of services has changed greatly over the past 20 years (new products include hedge funds, wealth management, natural resource insurance, etc.). In this regard, some confusion is obvious in the systematization of types and types of services.

For example, in F. Fabozzi we find the following system for structuring financial intermediation institutions: he divides the entire range of financial institutions into 2 camps. He calls the first camp “financial
mi institutions,” and also divides them into (1) insurance companies, (2) depository organizations (banks, savings institutions, etc.) and (3) investment companies. In the second camp, he notes non-financial institutions: savings funds, savings of non-financial

owl corporations, etc.

Of course, each researcher has the right to decide for himself regarding the research methodology. But in the case of financial intermediation institutions, there is one important circumstance: one cannot help but notice that part of these institutions is associated with the processes of accumulation of funds, the second part is more due to the transformation of these accumulated funds into savings, the third transforms savings into investments, and, finally, the very last part transforms investments into income. There are also institutions of financial intermediation that simply transform some types of assets into other types and, the most “fashionable” of them, convert future income into present expenses. At the same time, in our opinion, it is very important to avoid cross (double, triple, etc.) accounting when structuring and assessing the financial system. Very often, sometimes at the level of reputable international financial organizations, when assessing total assets or financial
new markets, a mechanical summation of the corresponding assets takes place. For example, the IMF in 2011 assessed capital markets by summing up the capitalization of stock markets, public and private bonds, and bank assets. In principle, you can do this. But a significant part of banks’ assets is tied to bonds, and about half of purchases of shares

tions are therefore carried out through the capitalization of stock markets through bank loans.

The main structural units of the financial intermediation market are presented schematically in Figure 1.1.

The scheme is constructed taking into account the fact that the following requirements are imposed on money (as well as financial) market instruments: (1) low risk of non-payment; (2) low risk of fluctuation in their value (or short payment period); (3) high marketability and (4) low transaction costs. At the same time, the process of withdrawal of newly issued financial claims by the EEDB is called “primary placement”.

In this regard, we propose to divide the entire set of financial intermediation institutions into 4
groups: structures that transform income into savings and savings; structures that transform savings into investment and income; structures that transform future income into present expenses, and structures that transform one type of asset into another (Fig. 1.2.). This model approach to the problem brings a certain clarity and logical consistency to the presentation.

According to the sources of origin, methods of functioning and purposes of lending, the financial system, it seems to us, can be presented as follows:

Corporate securities market;

Derivatives market (including hedging);

Payment systems;

Pension funds;

Mutual Funds and Asset Management Industry;

Rice. 1.1. Financial intermediation market and its elements.

Government securities market;

Banking system;

Consumer lending (including credit cards, loans and pawnshops).

Some other institutions of the financial system should also be mentioned here. For example, it would be appropriate to remind about the monetary system under the control of the government (budget, guarantees, guarantees), etc. However, as noted above, in our work we will study only institutions of financial intermediation and only professional subjects. In this regard, for example, public finances are not the object of our study. Along with this, hedging institutions have recently begun to be considered an important institution of financial intermediation. All
The hedging system is built on the theories of efficient market, opportunity costs, efficient markets hypothesis (EMH), dual concepts of profitability and risk, pricing of close substitutes in the absence of arbitrage, etc. All this is becoming increasingly important. In our work, however, hedging institutions are not specifically considered. Their development is associated with the presence of a mature system of financial intermediation.

Rice. 1.2. Structure of financial intermediation institutions.

As for currency exchange operations, sales and purchases of bonds, investment dealerships, etc., we do not consider them either. Foreign exchange transactions and partly bond transactions are institutions of external (formal in relation to the financial system) transformation of assets and, as it were, instruments of financial intermediation - no less interesting.

Thus, our attention will be fully paid to such structural elements of financial intermediation as: banks and credit institutions, pension funds and insurance companies, mutual and investment funds (banks), intermediate borrowers and stock markets.

The presence in the country of a specialized system of financial intermediaries allows us, it seems to us, to have a transformation of assets, money, and funds that are carried out more efficiently and quickly. Indeed, in this case, the following are triggered: (1) economies of scale, (2) cost savings on transactions, (3) increased speed of action and reduced likelihood of errors for clients, (4) the ability to systematize events and predict the actions of transaction participants. Research by J. Tobin showed that the velocity of money circulation, calculated according to

GNP in the US economy is 6–7 times its growth per year. But if not only final, but also intermediate transactions with goods and services are considered, the number of turnovers per year can be 20 or 30, and in the case of bank deposits - even 500. And here the main accelerator is the financial system.

The question arises: what determines the volume and scale of the modern financial system? According to R. Goldsmith, the modern financial system is a “superstructure” in the economic system. N. Hakansson believes that the essence of financial intermediation institutions is the financial market, which consists of instruments such as shares, bonds, options and insurance contracts. As we can see, this author does not have a loan or deposit as financial market instruments.

A representative of the Paris School of Economics, T. Piketty, whose work aroused great interest at the beginning of 2014, believes that the influence of finance on economic

growth is cyclical. So, in his opinion, for 1700–1820. return on capital (profit) was 5.1%, although global growth was then at 0.5%. For 1820–1913 the numbers have changed: 5 and 1.5%, respectively, for 1913–1950. – 5.2% and 1.9%, for 1950–2012. 5.3% and 3.8%. But, in his opinion, for 2013–2100. there will be a decrease in these indicators, respectively, to 4.3% and 1.5%. The author believes that thus the times have come when the marginal efficiency of investments and financial intermediation will fall, as happened in the late Middle Ages.

The development of the financial system is also influenced by taxation requirements: the higher the development of the state’s financial institutions, the greater the chances for relative

very low taxes.

R. Goldsmith's approach may have previously been relevant - 28-30 years ago, when, for example, in the USA, the cost of transactions on the stock market was 1/3 of GNP. Today (2014) the capitalization of the stock market of this country is 151.2% of GDP, and in the world in
on average - 94.6% (peak value - 114.7% in 2007). Many are already beginning to doubt whether it is right to consider the financial sector as a “superstructure”? In 2011 The US produced only 9% of goods and services traded in the world, 22% of global GDP ($15.09 trillion from $66.99) and 65% of all financial services. The country's losses in global exports and in global GDP production were offset by a sharp increase in its share of financial services. The United States is the only country in the world for which a decrease in its share in world exports does not threaten to weaken the economic influence of this country. Due to the effectively organized financial sector, dollars that have “gone away” due to a negative balance of payments have been returning to this country for 30 years now. The opinion of T. Piketty is of serious scientific interest, but for now we are witnessing the unbridled growth of the sphere of financial intermediation throughout the world.

Now let’s answer this question: what determines the amount of total assets of financial institutions?
mediation? How to decide in order to more or less correctly diagnose: what level of financial services is sufficient for a given (discussed, considered) period of time? Starting with, to what extent might further growth in financial services harm the development of the real economy? Only for 2007–2013. Fed assets to US GDP increased from 5.5% to 21%, the Bank of England - from 6 to 26% and the Bank of Japan - from 21 to 45%. All this gives rise to the need to reassess the activities of financial intermediation institutions (for example, banks). After all, the growth of any industry means increased resource consumption. Therefore, growth in one sector of the economy is always a loss of growth in another sector. Hence, in our opinion, excessive swelling of the financial intermediation system always, to one degree or another, means a pause or slowdown in growth in the real sector of the economy. For example, the construction of a residential building, of course, needs to be insured and, possibly, reinsured. But "reinsurance of reinsurance" means from
excess flow of resources into the financial sector. Rather, it generates GDP growth, but is in no way related to the needs of economic growth.

According to some authors, the limit to the growth of the financial intermediation system is the substitution of external assets, namely: the flow of resources from one sphere of the economy to another will continue until equal opportunities for economic growth appear in all spheres. One way or another, the behavior of financial intermediation institutions has always been unpredictable. A good illustration of what has been said can be a comparison of the fact and analysts’ forecasts for the “S&P composite” index for 1985–2009. Only in 1998 analysts managed to predict the

the identity of the index.

The process of replacing external assets (assets located outside the functioning of a particular business) or money with internal ones (money “arrives” in the industry for direct use) occurs through depository instruments. J. Tobin thinks so
It is also true that financial intermediation makes it possible to reduce inventories, redistributes risks towards those savings owners who are more ready for this and, finally, reduces the need for money by pooling risks. But Tobin, being a representative of the Keynesian school, is looking for a certain deterministic explanation. Monetarists may not like this approach. In their opinion, there is no need to look for artificial differences between the various sectors of the economy (real and financial), each of them plays its irreplaceable role in expanding consumption. Some authors went further: in their opinion, instead of the system of national accounts, it is necessary to use the system of international accounts, and therefore they propose the use of an indicator of aggregate financial and economic results within individual countries, and in international comparison they propose to take into account only the exported added value of financial companies

So, where should we look for the boundaries of development of the overall system of financial intermediation? Are these boundaries constant or do they evolve?

In our opinion, there cannot be a single and constant opinion on the issue of the boundaries of the financial intermediation system. Historically, over a certain period of time, the essence of the financial system has changed. For example, if a few decades ago banks (the main financial intermediaries at that time) created a certain value of financial services by accumulating savings, now the ratio of deposits to loans is constantly decreasing. The mobilization of “savings” also occurs through bond institutions, the issue of banknotes, collateral of real estate (the so-called “wealth management”), demonetization of foreign exchange reserves, sterilization of “surpluses” of the balance of payments (sterilization of foreign exchange earnings from the sale of oil, gas, raw materials, transfers of labor migrants , excess of exports over imports). Thus, in general, the development of financial intermediation, multiple financial services (lending, refinancing, credit insurance, credit reinsurance, refinancing insurance, refinancing reinsurance, etc.) are normal phenomena. It is also normal that a certain volume of GDP and a share of financial
intermediation in the economy is constantly growing. To achieve a certain economic growth, it is completely unimportant that at the same time there is a strong growth in financial services and a decrease in the share of the real economy. Such a financial economy is needed and must be taken into account. However, there are and should be certain boundaries for the distribution of financial services. First, it must be clearly determined whether these services result in the current use of resources for future generations? In particular, doesn’t every development of the institutions of debt and bonds cause absolute and comparative poverty for future generations, and doesn’t it narrow the field of their economic activity? And doesn’t this explain the salaries of the heads of financial organizations, unprecedented compared to other sectors of the economy? Secondly, doesn’t the system of financial intermediation lead to an artificial transfer of resources from one industry to another, and doesn’t this stop the growth of certain sectors of the economy? Thirdly, does not the flexibility of financial instruments in the modern global world allow us to minimize economic risks in this system and does not increase them in other sectors of the economy?

Table 1.1.

Region	Capital	Duty	Assets
1	2	3	4
Asia	13.1	17.6	27
USA	15.1	31.6	14.2
Europe	10	32.8	46.4

Volume of financial markets, trillion. dollars (2011).

Table 1.1 data. show what impressive dimensions financial markets have reached these days. It is characteristic that in Asia, which still lags behind America and Europe in terms of economic development, and in other developing regions, the indicators for the development of financial markets ($57.7 trillion) are no less (USA - $60.9 trillion, Europe - 89.2). Thus, according to the indicators, loans (issued by the banking sector) / GDP (Table 1.2.) some Asian countries or countries with economies in transition, despite the repeated lag in terms of GDP per capita, in 2012. were at a completely comparable level with developed countries. For example, China is ahead of Germany and France in this indicator, and Ukraine, where economic development (GDP per capita) is on average 11 57 The Economist. May 14th-20th, 2011. R. 4.

times lower than in developed countries and 3.5 times lower than the world average; according to the indicator under consideration, it is at the level of 61% compared to the indicators in Germany. In Armenia, the dynamics of the financial system also significantly outstrips the growth of other sectors of the economy. However, in 2013 the “loans/GDP” indicator in Armenia amounted to 44.8%: its growth rate decreased. In relation to Russia, as E.D. Sorokin rightly notes in his analyses, the share of the economy in the structure of the world economy is insignificant (3.2%). But in the capital and investment markets this share is even smaller: 2.8 and 1.5%, respectively 58 .

Table 1.2.

Ratio of domestic lending volumes to GDP, 2012, %. 59

Countries	Loans / GDP
USA	228,6
Japan	346,1
EU	156,5 60
Germany	123,6
France	136,4

58 Sorokin D.E. Strategic guidelines for anti-crisis policy (http://shabrov.info/elbrus/sorok.pdf). C. 53.

59 http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/FS.AST.DOMS.GD.ZS

60 Average for 2011

Great Britain	210,1
Poland	63,8
China	155,1
Russia	42,5
Ukraine	74,1
Türkiye	71,9
Armenia	44,4
Georgia	35,0
Azerbaijan	25,3
World on average	164,9

1870–1960 this figure decreased by 8–10 times. This means that in 1960 banks needed 10 times less funds to lend to the economy than in 1870. After 1960 the cost of banking services is rising sharply, but their cost is growing even faster. At the very end of the 20th century, the cost of banking services was already 3 times higher than in the 60s of the 20th century. After the financial crisis of 2008–2009, when in order to ensure further stability the Basel III system was activated, with a sharp increase in the capital adequacy requirements of banks and credit institutions,
the cost of loans increased by another 1.5–1.7 times and returned to the level of the late 19th – early 20th centuries.

Rice. 1.3. Capital/assets ratio in the banking systems of the USA and Great Britain for 1870–1990. 62

Consequently, the financial system has gone through a 120-year cycle: it is increasingly less effective and worthwhile in driving global economic growth. Below, taking into account the above, we will try to outline a certain model that regulates the “fair” volumes and share of the financial system in the economy at this stage of development of the country’s economy.

The market is a set of institutions that ensure the organization of joint economic activity of people, economic exchange between them in the form of purchase and sale of goods and services. The functioning of the market is based on such basic principles as:

Private property;

Voluntary and equivalent interaction of independent and independent economic entities;

Competition.

The set of institutions forms an integral system or institutional environment. The “marketability” of institutions is determined by the conformity of their character with the basic principles of a market economy:

Freedom of economic activity;

The universality of market relations;

Pluralism and equality of forms of ownership;

Self-regulation of economic activities;

Free pricing;

Self-financing and economic responsibility;

A harmonious combination of state and market.

In accordance with the most recognized formulation, institutions are understood as formal and informal rules that structure the forms of social relationships in all spheres of public life, as well as the mechanisms for their compliance. From the above it follows that institutions act as restrictions on social actions in the broadest sense or as rules of the game in those other sectors of the general social space.

The most important markets where real market institutions, processes and mechanisms operate are factor markets, financial and commodity.

plays a system-forming function in a market economy factor market(they are divided into four groups: land, labor, capital, entrepreneurial activity). They are also considered as supply factors. Sometimes, depending on the purpose of the analysis, they include technology, information and ecology.

Institutional and organizational basis The functioning of the market for factors of production is the exchange mechanism (commodity and stock exchanges, labor exchanges, etc.).

Financial markets cover the money market, foreign exchange market, gold market, capital market. The latter is often divided into the securities market (stock market) and the loan capital market.

To the main institutions commodity markets(markets for goods and services) include trading enterprises (wholesale and retail), trading houses and commodity exchanges.

Issues of the functioning of markets, including the requirements for its participants, regulated by both government agencies and market mechanisms themselves. IN transitional economies, including Belarus, key market institutions not yet developed enough. Monopolies have remained in the economy, many of them even strengthened their positions. However, as the openness of the Belarusian economy grows and the state masters the methods of antimonopoly policy, it gradually a competitive environment is emerging; almost all have been created basic elements market system non-state financial institutions, including commercial banks, insurance companies, investment funds, stock exchanges, etc.; act market financial mechanisms and market regulators(prices, taxes, interest rates, exchange rates, dividends, etc.).

But for the full functioning of the economy deeper and more comprehensive institutional changes are needed, including increasing capacity and improvement of created institutions (for example, the tax system), as well as formation of new structures (capital, land, labor markets), which are still at the initial stage of their development. All this requires comprehensive and consistent measures to strengthening the institution of private property, conducting effective privatization, improvement bankruptcy mechanisms insolvent enterprises and removing them from economic circulation without causing significant damage to employee groups.

Key element transition to a market economic system is the creation efficient labor markets. As a factor of production, labor is the most significant of all. In industrialized countries, labor accounts for up to 75% of GNP.

Labor market- This multi-level system of market institutions, organizations and institutions of the public sector, the business community and public associations (trade unions, etc.), solving the whole range of problems reproduction of labor power and use of labor.

Efficient labor markets are needed to facilitate transfer of an employee to another place of work where his work is most productive.

For the effective functioning of labor markets in conditions of free enterprise, the characteristics of a developed market economy are required. economic infrastructure, providing for private property, competition, capital markets and labor mobility. And until such an infrastructure is created, the state retains the most important functions in regulating the labor market.

State policy in the social and labor sphere during the transition period is aimed at keeping unemployment at the lowest possible, cost-effective and politically acceptable level.

Leading strategic direction development of the labor market in Belarus remains its transfer to effective market (including exchange) mechanisms with maintaining the key role of the state in creating system-wide conditions for the formation of market institutions, legal protection of workers, establishing social standards and the level of minimum wage, regulating the tax burden on labor, developing social partnership (state, business, trade unions) in the field of employment.

Capital as a factor of production- these are human-created resources used to produce goods and services, or means of production, investment goods that are not directly involved in meeting human needs (equipment, buildings and structures). From these positions capital market is a market for financial capital(primarily the credit market), i.e. financial resources intended for the purchase of equipment, buildings and structures.

Capital flows, including international ones, are classified according to forms. According to their functional purpose, movements are distinguished loan capital (in the form of a loan) and entrepreneurial capital (in the form of investments); distinguished by affiliation private and public capital for the intended purpose - private and public, direct and portfolio investments; according to the timing of movement - short, medium and long term capital.

Short-term loan capital market, or money market, is a market for transactions in short-term securities with a low level of risk. Main money market securities are treasury bills, commercial paper, bankers' acceptances, and negotiable certificates of deposit.

As the development of the world economy shows, dominant place occupy in the financial market system capital markets. The capital market itself is functionally divided into the market valuable papers and market loan capital.

Loan capital market is a market for medium-term (from 1 to 5 years) and long-term (over 5 years) loans, mediating the connection between the supply of cash savings of the non-financial sector and the demand for loans necessary for financing (investments). It is often called the capital market. He covers the bank loan market and the debt securities market(bonds, bills, etc.).

Stocks and bods market- part of the capital market where the issue, purchase and sale of securities and rights to them are carried out. Securities- payment documents (checks, bills, letters of credit, etc.) and stock values ​​(stocks, bonds, etc.) in national and foreign currencies.

The securities market (stock market) performs two functions. The first is to provide flexible intersectoral redistribution of capital and mobilization of money from the population. The second assumes mobilization of temporarily available funds to meet the needs of the state and other organizations.

The securities market, in turn, is divided into primary and secondary, exchange and over-the-counter, futures and spot.

Thus, capital market is a long-term segment of the loan capital market, including primarily the issue of bonds and shares and their secondary markets. It accumulates and circulates long-term capital and debt obligations. In a market economy, it is the main type of financial market through which companies seek sources of financing for their activities.

It is the presence and development of capital markets that distinguish industrialized countries from developing and transition countries, where the possibilities for mobilizing industrial and commercial capital are either absent or very limited.

State and development trends of the capital market in Belarus. The formation of the capital market in the country began in 1990 with the adoption of the Law “On the National Bank of the Republic of Belarus” and proceeded in such directions as the formation of a national financial and credit system, interbank, foreign exchange and stock markets. In 1994, the Interbank Currency Exchange (ICE) was established, and in 1999, the Belarusian Currency and Stock Exchange (BCSE).

The capital market in the form of trade in industrial and technical products has been developing in the country since the late 80s. XX century and now operates in the system of financial and commodity markets of the country.

The most important problem of the current stage of development of the capital market is the lag of its potential, volume and dynamics from the growth rate of the Belarusian economy, from the need for the formation of domestic investment resources and their redistribution to the real sector. This hinders the creation of an effective investment and innovation development model in Belarus.

Currency market is a system of economic and organizational relations that arise between households, firms, commercial banks and other financial institutions in transactions of purchase and sale of foreign currencies and payment documents in foreign currencies.

Institutional participants in the foreign exchange market are commercial and central banks, currency exchanges, brokerage agencies, international corporations (subjects are both exporters and importers).

The Republic began forming a foreign exchange market in 1992. The main foreign exchange market is the Interbank Currency Exchange (since 1999 - Belarusian Currency and Stock Exchange OJSC). Members of the International Bank are banks or other financial institutions licensed to conduct foreign exchange transactions. The direct conduct of trading and determination of the current exchange rate is entrusted to a special employee of the exchange - the exchange rate broker.

In conditions of limited foreign investment, the situation in the country's foreign exchange market mainly depends on trends in foreign trade and mechanisms for financing export-import flows.

Stock market is part of the capital market where transactions are carried out issue and purchase and sale of securities.Its main purpose is to ensure accumulation of temporarily free funds for investment into promising sectors of the economy. In addition, the stock market, or securities market, solves problems such as servicing public debt, redistribution of property rights, and speculative transactions.

General structure stock market presented investors(strategic and institutional), issuers(organizations interested in raising funds for production development), infrastructure- a link between investors, issuers and regulatory authorities his activities.

The functioning of the stock market (primary and secondary) is ensured by professional participants: operators (brokers, dealers); organizers of exchanges(trading platforms); clearing organizations, banks and depositories; registrar

In a modern market economy, an efficient stock market is seen as a major national asset. The securities market is one of the main sources of financing investments in the real sector of the economy.

From the totality functions of the stock market especially important:

investment, those. education and distribution of investment resources necessary for the development of production;

redistribution of property through the use of packages of securities, primarily shares.

Belarus began to form a national stock market in 1992, when the Law “On Securities and Stock Exchanges” was adopted.

Transparency and control of the stock market by the state is ensured by the Securities Department under the Ministry of Finance of the Republic of Belarus

Currently, the role of the stock market in the development of the country's economy is insufficient. There are also problems in the development of the stock market itself. One of them is the absence of significant amounts of foreign investment in its instruments. The other is the low level of capitalization of the national stock market, which is explained by low market demand and supply on it.

Thus, currently in the republic there is a situation where, on the one hand, an infrastructure, a regulatory framework for the stock market, systems of state regulation and regulation of interstate circulation of securities have been created that meet the requirements of international standards, and on the other hand - dimensions foreign portfolio investments and national stock market capitalization do not correspond to the level and dynamics of macroeconomic indicators of the Belarusian economy and lag behind other countries with economies in transition.

The formation and development of market institutions in the transition economy of Belarus occurs unevenly.

So, commodity market(market of consumer goods and industrial products) and services market during the transition period differed slightly from similar markets in economically developed Western countries in terms of saturation of goods and services, assortment, organizational and legal forms and other parameters.

State of the art markets of labor, capital, land and others significantly lower due to the weakness of their institutional and organizational basis, including the exchange mechanism. While it remains low mobility of labor resources due to the excessive number of employees in most enterprises and the difficulties associated with moving to a new place of residence when changing jobs. Minor role in mobilizing financial resources plays and sale of corporate securities.

The uneven development of various market segments gives rise to a huge number of very difficult problems, or “difficulties of growth,” in the transformation activities of the state, society, and business entities, which is the subject of further reforms.

It is impossible to imagine a real society and a real market where people would be guided solely by profit maximization. This is only possible if we assume the possibility of single interactions between personalized counterparties, i.e. if the exchange of goods and products of economic activity were not repeated, much less regular. The spread of market exchanges and the formation of networks of interactions based on long-distance, non-personal connections and repeated, regular interactions gives rise to problems of reliability, confidence, and trust of participants, based not on personal connections, but on compliance with common universal norms. Regular exchange relations with predictable results for their participants presuppose the existence of a fairly stable, transparent and shared regulatory mechanism, a system of rules that will minimize arbitrariness and randomness.

If the network approach is focused on identifying the influence of the nature of structural connections between market participants on their activities, then the institutional approach reveals the regulatory framework for the implementation of private interests, i.e. is based on the idea that the individual desire for profit is always limited by the rules that are established for a given area of ​​the market. Accepted norms limit the number of options for choosing a behavioral strategy and course of action to those that are considered legitimate, and also offer social actors ideas about especially desirable, socially approved ones.

our methods of action. These rules and regulations that guide the agents operating in the market constitute market institutions.

According to D. North's definition, “institutions are rules, mechanisms that ensure their implementation, and norms of behavior that structure repeated interactions between people.”

In order for market exchange relations to be sustainably reproduced, institutions must regulate:

Access to market interactions, e.g. participation of counterparties in acts of exchange;

Property rights, i.e. the procedure for appropriating benefits in the form of transfer of ownership rights and the right to appropriate profits by both sellers and buyers;

Characteristics of exchange objects as valid, i.e.:

The possibility of goods participating in market exchange, the presence or absence of restrictions on their free purchase and sale;

Proper quality of goods involved in the exchange (certification, trademarks);

Mutual obligations of the parties related to various circumstances of the exchange (procedure and form of payment, terms, frequency of deliveries, transportation costs, storage, etc.);

Forms and methods of interaction (contracts, business ethics);

Enforcement of rules and sanctions systems:

Sanctions for violating the rules;

Compliance systems;

Monitoring order in markets.

D. North emphasizes that since individual market participants do not always have complete information about all the circumstances of the transaction and limited ability to monitor compliance with contracts, there is a need for an exchange participant who specializes in approving, legitimizing and enforcing all these rules, which is the state . At the same time, no formal rules are capable of taking into account and regulating all possible circumstances of market activity in real life, therefore they are supplemented by informal rules of conduct based on ethical norms and values, traditions and the sociocultural environment. Thus, institutions regulating the market can be divided into formal and informal.

Formal rules are systems of norms for the implementation of market exchanges, fixed in laws and various acts and regulations that have the status of laws, i.e. legitimized by the state and based on its authority and power. Their compliance is mandatory for all market participants, and violations are followed by sanctions, also prescribed by law and implemented by authorized government bodies (arbitration courts, etc.). If it is mandatory to comply with formal rules on the territory of a given state, we can distinguish rules that apply:

For all market participants (laws regulating economic activities);

On participants in specific transactions (officially executed contracts, agreements, non-compliance with which may result in sanctions carried out on the basis of court decisions).

The subordination of market participants to formal rules is the result of both the belief in the need for order, responsibility for the legitimate conduct of business arising as a result of the internalization of rules and norms, and coercion from the state, fear of sanctions and too high a price for violating norms (penalties, fines, etc. .).

Informal rules are formed in the process of historical development of economic activity, including market exchanges, in the context of specific sociocultural systems. They can be based on ethical standards, customs and traditions, rooted in the picture of the world

of a given society, its mentality. Informal rules, not having unambiguous formulations, sources and authorities on which they could rely, allow broader interpretations than formal ones. They are not supported by clearly stated and inevitable sanctions for violation, and therefore may be perceived by some market participants as optional. However, the effect of informal rules is longer-term, they cannot be adopted or canceled at the request of any actors, and they are less related to the interests of specific social groups.

The universality of informal norms is determined by their rootedness in the culture and social relations of a given society and internalization in the process of socialization of economic actors, transforming them into general stereotypes of consciousness, implemented in specific practices. Thus, in Western societies it is customary to trust exclusively written contracts, which are drawn up in such a way as to stipulate as accurately as possible all the small nuances of the transaction. In Japan, it is believed that a written contract should record only the general intentions of the parties, while details that cannot be foreseen are left to the discretion of the participants, depending on their interpretation of specific situations. This is generally explained by the phenomenological and situational orientation of the thinking of the Japanese, as opposed to the orientation toward rigid formal and logical frameworks inherent in Western consciousness.

As historians testify, in pre-revolutionary Russia, entrepreneurs relied more on the “merchant's word” than on formal contracts. Studies of the rules operating in modern Russian markets, conducted within the framework of the institutional approach, indicate both a low culture of written contracts and mutual distrust of participants due to negative experience of contract violations.

The formal and informal rules in place in markets deal with complex dynamics. They not only complement each other, but are in a fluid state of institutional transformation. These transformations assume:

Formalization of informal rules that have become widespread and entrenched in everyday experience;

Deformalization of rules if they are ineffective, opaque, unprofitable, difficult to comply with, etc.;

Mutual complementarity as the embedding of informal rules into formal systems.

It is generally accepted that the main problem is the lack of clearly fixed, formalized rules of action, as well as the imperfect execution of existing market participants, which introduces uncertainty and unpredictability into their activities and forces them to develop their own informal rules. This is only partly true.

In addition to the problem of formalizing rules, opposite processes are of no less, if not greater, social significance.

Formal institutions are the result of the legislative activity of the state, and therefore are focused on establishing a procedure for carrying out economic activities that is appropriate to its nature. They reflect the uneven distribution of power resources

in society in the interests of those social groups that are in power. D. North emphasizes: “Those laws that meet the interests of those in power begin to be adopted and observed, and not those that reduce total transaction costs... even if rulers want to pass laws, guided by considerations of efficiency, the interests of self-preservation will dictate a different course of action, since effective norms can infringe on the interests of powerful political groups”1. The adopted formal rules reflect not so much the need of society for the effective regulation of market relations, but rather the desire of the groups in power to control economic activities, and they exercise this control not only in the interests of the state and society, but also in their own interests - political and economic. Often, formal rules become a tool of pressure from officials on market participants; studies note a high degree of dependence of entrepreneurs on officials, which encourages them to look for informal ways to solve problems.

The deformalization of rules is caused by the complexity and redundancy of formal regulation, imperfection of laws and practices of their application, which causes high transaction costs. Deformalization takes the form, firstly, of direct challenging of rules and active activity to change them, and secondly, of actions bypassing formal rules.

Deformalization, however, does not mean an increase in chaos, but an increase in informal regulation through the establishment of tacit agreements; replacing formal payments with informal ones, including bribes, optimizing transaction costs; simplifying the conduct of business in the form of personal agreements, as well as the formation of complex networks of personal relationships with officials and representatives of regulatory authorities. Such networks involve subtle systems of hierarchies and their own norms for organizing connections, based on mutually beneficial agreements, mutual concessions and services. Based on materials from the formation of Russian markets in the 90s. last century, these relationships were studied by V.V. Radaev. At the same time, formal rules are not completely replaced by informal ones, but mutual growth and addition occurs, which generally increases the opacity of the market.