Hero of the Civil War, commander of the Tunguska partisan detachment. The first chairman of the Tunguska volost. The battles in the Bikin positions were the last attempt of the “White Rebel Army” to provide serious resistance to the troops of the People's Revolutionary Army. Pos

While playing on the bank of the Tunguska River channel, he found a matchbox filled with stearin, inside of which was a piece of paper, darkened with time. There was a pencil note on it that had turned into a solid blue blur. Only the date has been preserved: “1921.”

Local historians have restored the text from more than forty years ago. This is what was in the note: “...We, five people, are making our way to the detachment. We're already there. Three are wounded, two are fighting. The two of us are fighting against an entire squad and we might die. Farewell. 1921."

After reading this text, the correspondent of the Trud newspaper V. Korenyuk decided to find out: who was part of the heroic five who fought with the detachment of the White Guards? Are they alive or did they die the death of the brave?

And he managed to unearth many interesting facts. It was established that one of the heroes who wrote the note, Savva Evdokimovich Bozhko, lives in Blagoveshchensk. To be precise, that's what the article says.

In 1918, as a nineteen-year-old boy, Bozhko joined the first Tunguska partisan detachment under the command of I.P. Shevchuk, who three years later joined the fifth special Amur regiment. On December 18, 1921, the fifth special Amur and sixth Khabarovsk regiments left Khabarovsk and retreated to the left bank of the Amur. The city was occupied by the Kappelites. On the night of December 20, they launched an offensive against the fifth and sixth regiments located in the village of Pokrovka.

The fifth and sixth regiments reached Volochaevka and stopped to rest. A squad of five people, which included Bozhko, Pripuga, Shcherbakov - Buryats from Transbaikalia, Pyotr Dolich - a peasant from the Akmola region, Arnutsky Martyn Mikhailovich - a Hungarian, an Austrian subject from a prisoner of war (real name Mart Michel Arnuts), remained to monitor the advance of the enemy.

Five brave warriors entered into an unequal battle with a squadron of enemy cavalry. Pursued by a handful of brave men, the White Guards retreated. Taking cover in a ditch, they began a shootout. Shcherbakov and Dolich were wounded. The other three captured the railway bridge, under which they hid the wounded.
It was late afternoon. The group's attempts to break through to their own were unsuccessful. Pripuga was wounded by enemy fire. There are two left: Bozhko and Arnutsky.

Night has come. Ammunition was running low. They decided to write a note, put it in a matchbox, fill it with stearin from the candle to protect it from moisture, and put it on the bridge piles.

That night, the enemy retreated under the blows of the Red Army. Five brave men, who heroically fought against a large enemy detachment, united with their squad. The wounded recovered and continued their combat journey in units of the Red Army. Friends and fellow soldiers separated during demobilization.

Bozhko returned to his native village of Novo-Pokrovka. Arnutsky and Dolic came here. They decided to stay in the village of their front-line friend. In 1924, Dolich left for the Akmola region, Arnutsky joined the collective farm. In 1932 he fell ill and died. Savva Evdokimovich worked in the Amur region, during the Great Patriotic War he defended his homeland from the Nazi invaders. At the time of writing, he was a pensioner. Bozhko was awarded for his military services.

Later, in 1968, in the Birobidzhaner Stern newspaper, Konstantin Lipin published an article “On the Search Path,” which talked about the historical finds of Efim Iosifovich Kudish, a famous regional local historian. In 1961, he initiated the creation of the Smidovichi Regional Museum of Local Lore, the first of its kind in the Khabarovsk Territory. Later he organized three more museums in Birobidzhan.

And this material again mentions the same matchbox that was once found near the village of Danilovka. Kudisch wrote about this find to several Far Eastern newspapers at once in the hope of learning at least something about one of the five brave men. And then a parcel arrived from Blagoveshchensk to the Smidovichi Museum. Personal pensioner Savva Evdokimovich Bozhko, the leader of that same five, sent a detailed story about how and why this letter was written, and named the names of his comrades.

The Trud newspaper, so to speak, following in the footsteps of what was written, decided to find out how the further fate of the heroes of that night turned out and whether they had descendants. But, unfortunately, all attempts by our editorial staff to contact their relatives were unsuccessful. And the question of the heirs of the “matchbox” still remains open.

The so-called “active intelligence” (or “active”), which was so energetically and purposefully carried out by the Intelligence Directorate of the Red Army Headquarters in the 1920s on the western borders against Poland and Romania (see “NVO” ## 34 and 44, 2005), in Due to a number of international reasons, it was curtailed by the early 1930s. But in the Far East during the same period, it truly found a second wind, since there were very favorable factors for this.

Secret War Front

First of all, it should be noted a huge border stretching thousands of kilometers with convenient places for crossing the Amur and Ussuri and the local partisan movement on the territory of the “independent” state of Manchukuo, which the USSR never recognized. Chinese partisan detachments, pressed by Japanese troops to the border, were transported to the Soviet side, rested there, here they were provided with medical care, supplied with weapons and ammunition, radio communications, and money. And what was equally important was that the partisan commanders received instructions on further combat activities.

Such support for the Chinese insurgents became especially widespread immediately after the occupation of Manchuria by Japanese troops. Moreover, the command of the Soviet Separate Red Banner Far Eastern Army tried to coordinate the actions of the partisan detachments, giving instructions not only on the methods of everyday combat work, but also on the deployment of a mass insurgency on Manchurian territory in the event of a war between Japan and the Soviet Union, considering the Chinese partisans as their saboteurs and scouts deployed behind enemy lines.

Of course, all this could be considered as interference in the internal affairs of a neighboring country. But in those years when any means were good to strengthen the defensive power of the Far Eastern borders, neither Khabarovsk nor Moscow thought about it. In addition, Tokyo formally could not make any claims against the Soviet Union, since the partisan movement did not take place on the Japanese Islands. And the opinion of an unrecognized “independent” state could not be taken into account.

Meanwhile, in the spring of 1939, the situation in the Far East became more and more alarming, intelligence warned of the possibility of serious actions by the Japanese Kwantung Army. On April 16, the heads of the NKVD departments of the Khabarovsk and Primorsky territories, the Chita region, as well as the chiefs of the border troops of the Khabarovsk, Primorsky and Chita districts received encrypted telegram # 7770 from Moscow. It said the following: “In order to more fully use the Chinese partisan movement in Manchuria and its further organizational strengthening The Military Councils of the 1st and 2nd OKA are allowed, in cases of request from the leadership of the Chinese partisan detachments, to provide assistance to the partisans with weapons, ammunition, food and medicine of foreign origin or in an impersonal form, as well as to direct their work. Verified people from among the interned partisans are small groups to be transferred back to Manchuria for reconnaissance purposes and to assist the partisan movement. Work with partisans should be carried out only by military councils"

The Chekist leadership had to provide the command of the 1st and 2nd Separate Red Banner Armies (OKA) with full assistance, in particular, to ensure both the transfer of partisan groups and messengers to the territory of Manchuria, and their return. In addition, a group of 350 Chinese partisans was transferred to the military council of the 1st OKA, who were checked by the NKVD authorities and found reliable (how many of the same Chinese were considered unreliable and went to Soviet concentration camps is still unknown). The previously interned leaders of the partisan detachments Zhao-Shangzhi and Dai-Hongbin were sent to the military council of the 2nd OKA, who were then supposed to be transferred to Manchuria.

It is impossible not to pay attention to the fact that under the Moscow encryption were the signatures of two people's commissars - Kliment Voroshilov and Lavrentiy Beria. But they were unlikely to make independent decisions on such a serious matter, and therefore there is no doubt: the entire range of issues related to the Chinese partisan movement was agreed upon with Stalin.

It seems that the Kremlin was not even embarrassed by the possibility of a serious diplomatic conflict with the Japanese if the latter discovered that several hundred militants had been sent to the region under their control. And here it is worth saying this. Japanese intelligence also illegally sent saboteurs (the same partisans) recruited from among the White emigrants to the USSR. When they were discovered, captured or destroyed, Soviet newspapers certainly wrote about it, branding the aggressive Japanese military with shame. Diplomats also got involved: summonses to the People's Commissariat of Foreign Affairs of the Ambassador of the Land of the Rising Sun, notes of protest, etc. When “our people” came across and the Japanese made a fuss, the citizens of the USSR, naturally, knew nothing and did not know anything about it.

Just one document

Naturally, the contacts of the Soviet command with the leaders of the partisan movement in Manchuria were surrounded by a veil of impenetrable secrecy. Such meetings, which took place on Soviet territory, were documented very rarely. And if anything did end up on paper, then, as a rule, it was marked “Soviet secret. Of special importance. Only one copy.” It is supplied, for example, with a recording of a conversation between the commander of the 2nd Army, Army Commander of the 2nd Rank Ivan Konev (the future Marshal of the Soviet Union) and a member of the military council of the 2nd OKA, Corps Commissar Biryukov, with the leader of the partisan detachments in Northern Manchuria Zhao-Shangzhi and the commanders of the 6th th and 11th detachments by Dai-Hongbin and Qi-Jijun, held in Khabarovsk on May 30, 1939. The head of the army intelligence department, Major Aleshin, took part in the conversation (judging by the transcript, it was conducted correctly and politely).

The purpose of the meeting was to analyze the considerations presented by Zhao-Shangzhi: resolving issues of transfer, further work and connections with the USSR. First of all, the leader of the partisan movement was asked to contact the subordinate detachments operating in the Sungari River basin, unite their control, create a strong headquarters, clear the ranks of the insurgents from unstable, corrupt elements and Japanese agents, and also create a department to combat Japanese espionage among the partisans (apparently, the partisans got a hard time from Japanese intelligence).

As a further task, the demand was put forward to strengthen and expand the partisan movement in Manchuria. For which, for example, it was considered useful to organize several large raids on Japanese garrisons in order to raise the morale of the rebels. It was also proposed to organize secret partisan bases in hard-to-reach areas of Lesser Khingan to accumulate weapons, ammunition and equipment. All this was recommended to be obtained during attacks on Japanese warehouses. Chinese commanders were advised to contact the local communist organization to launch political agitation among the population and carry out measures to disintegrate units of the Manchurian army and supply the partisans with everything they needed through propagandized military personnel.

Soviet comrades emphasized Zhao-Shangzhi's extensive experience in partisan warfare and talked about his preparation before moving to Manchuria. Reliable communications and comprehensive assistance were promised in the future on all problems discussed at the meeting.

As for the actions of Chinese insurgents during a possible war between Japan and the USSR, during this period it was proposed to carry out destructive work in the rear of the Kwantung Army, to attack the most important objects there on instructions from the Soviet command (the partisans were supposed to receive specific tasks at the beginning of the war). Konev and Biryukov also argued that “the Manchukuo army is not strong, the Japanese do not trust it. The partisans must take advantage of this circumstance and take measures to disintegrate the Manchukuo army.”

Until the war began, it was planned to organize a detachment of about 100 fighters from the Chinese partisans located on Soviet territory and transport it across the Amur to Manchuria in one go at the end of June. This size of this formation was dictated by the available number of combat-ready partisans who were at that time on the territory of the USSR. The rest of the partisans who remained in the Soviet Far East should have been trained as machine gunners, grenade launchers, propagandists, and orderlies, and then crossed the Amur in small groups. The Soviet command assured Zhao-Shangzhi that weapons, ammunition, food, medicine, and money would be allocated in accordance with his requests.

The success of the operations of the rebel units largely depended on reliable communications both between them and with the headquarters of the partisan movement, and the latter with Soviet territory. To do this, it was proposed to select 10 competent fighters, carefully tested and dedicated to the cause of the revolution, and send them for radio training in the USSR. After which they, equipped with walkie-talkies, codes, and money, will be transported to China. During the conversation, the Soviet military leaders also expressed their wishes: “It is desirable for us to receive from you maps of Manchuria, which you will obtain from the Japanese-Manchurian troops (maps made in Japan), Japanese and other documents - orders, reports, reports, codes. It is desirable that you supplied us with samples of new Japanese weapons." The basic principle that one must pay for all services was observed here too. By supporting and developing the partisan movement, Soviet military intelligence received in return an extensive network of agents in the neighboring country.

An interesting question is how and when Zhao-Shangzhi came to the USSR and where he was until the spring of 1939.

Since the transcript of the conversation is so far the only document on this case that has been found in the archive, only a few assumptions can be made. It is possible that the Chinese partisan leader was summoned to the USSR shortly after the repressions that befell the intelligence department of the OKDVA headquarters in the fall of 1937, when the NKVD authorities arrested the head of the RO, Colonel Pokladok, his two deputies and several lower-ranking employees (they were shot on standard charges as " Japanese spies"). All contacts and lines of communication with the Chinese partisans were cut off. As soon as Zhao-Shangzhi crossed into Soviet territory at this time, he was apparently immediately arrested and spent a year and a half in prison or in a camp. Only in the spring of 1939, the surviving Chinese partisan leader was released after verification. This version looks quite plausible.

Of course, Konev and Biryukov could not say all this during the conversation and had to dodge, declaring that they were unaware of the presence of one of the leaders of the Chinese rebels in the Soviet Union. Or maybe, as new people in Khabarovsk, only recently appointed, they really did not know about who was in the camps and prisons. This is also not excluded.

Zhao-Shangzhi wanted to include more fighters in his troops: after all, at one time they moved to the Soviet Union in considerable numbers. The partisan leader was assured that most of the partisans who had previously found themselves in the USSR had already been sent to China (in the late 1930s, many Chinese partisans were transported from the Far East to Central Asia and from there along the Z-Alma-Ata-Lanzhou highway to China), and all those remaining will be given to him for selection. Zhao-Shangzhi received everything he asked for - there were no refusals. At the end of the conversation, he was once again informed: “We consider you the main leader of the partisan movement in Manchuria and through you we will give instructions on all issues. At the same time, we will maintain contact with detachments operating geographically close to the Soviet border.”

The last issue discussed at this meeting was the emergence of a conflict between the USSR and Japan as a result of the transfer of a partisan detachment from the Soviet Union to Manchuria. Apparently, this option was not ruled out at army headquarters. However, in connection with the outbreak of fighting at Khalkhin Gol, Soviet-Japanese relations had already deteriorated to the limit, and another possible incident meant little. Or maybe the army authorities received carte blanche to conduct guerrilla operations. The Chinese partisan was told: “You are going to carry out the will of the party and do not bear any responsibility for possible conflicts. During the transition, take all possible precautions. None of the partisans should under any circumstances say that he was in the USSR. Disclosure of the secret of the transition will complicate further contacts with the partisans, complicate the possibility of transferring weapons, ammunition, medicines, etc.”

The final phrase clearly indicates that the partisan movement in Northern Manchuria was never independent and existed under complete control because of the Amur. Of course, a similar situation arose in Primorye, where the 1st OKA was stationed. Although other partisan detachments operated across the border along Ussuri, which were also led by the intelligence department of the headquarters of this army.

Exchange of militants and saboteurs

Several months have passed. Zhao-Shangzhi, together with his detachment, safely crossed the Amur River and established contact with other partisan detachments. Joint operations against the Japanese-Manchurian troops began. The fighting went on with varying degrees of success. There were victories, but there were also defeats. We managed to capture some documents that were of great interest in Khabarovsk. The messengers left for Soviet territory, carrying samples of new military equipment and reports on the progress of hostilities. In the intelligence department of the 2nd OKA, after a thorough study of all materials received from across the Amur River and an analysis of the situation in Northern Manchuria, they drafted a new directive for the partisans.

Zhao-Shangzhi’s letter was approved by army commander Konev and the new member of the military council, divisional commissar Fominykh. On the first page there is a date: August 25, 1939 and a resolution with the same signatures: “The entire directive will be transmitted as separate orders.”

This document indicated that the main task before winter was to strengthen and increase detachments, obtain weapons, ammunition and food. It was recommended, on the eve of winter, to create secret bases in inaccessible places, equip them with housing, and accumulate supplies of food and clothing. Bases must be prepared for defense. The partisans were advised to refrain from destroying mines, railways and bridges for the time being, since they still had little strength and means to carry out these tasks.

The rebels were asked to carry out smaller operations to attack railway trains, gold mines, warehouses, mines, and police stations. The main purpose of such strikes is to obtain weapons, ammunition, food and equipment. It was also pointed out that these actions must be carefully prepared: reconnaissance of the target of the attack, drawing up a plan and discussing it with the detachment commanders. Otherwise, losses and failures are inevitable. This directive also contained recommendations for Zhao-Shangzhi: “You yourself should not lead the attacks. Do not forget that you are the leader of the partisan movement, and not the commander of a detachment. You must organize the destruction of the entire system, and not individual detachments and groups. take risks on any occasion. You must teach commanders"

The rebels were promised to send dynamite and experienced instructors who knew how to use it, as well as food, propaganda literature and topographic maps. Soviet intelligence officers thanked their Chinese comrades for materials captured during raids on Japanese and Manchu garrisons, topographic maps, for the report of the Japanese topographic detachment, as well as new sights and rangefinders.

Judging by this directive, things were going well for the Chinese insurgents. They carried out, in general, successful operations, conducted reconnaissance and campaigning, and stocked up on everything they needed for the winter (and the winters in those parts are harsh). And in the spring of 1940, the partisan movement in Manchuria, with active support from across the Amur, developed on an even greater scale...

Japanese intelligence, of course, knew that the leadership of partisan detachments in Northern China was carried out from the USSR. It was impossible to hide this during the massive transfer of fighters, weapons and ammunition across the border. The methods of the Japanese fight against the rebels were analyzed in the certificate of the NKVD Directorate for the Khabarovsk Territory, compiled in September 1940. Punitive operations against the Manchu partisans, the document says, were carried out from the very beginning of the partisan movement, i.e. since the early 1930s. But recently, more sophisticated methods have been used. For this purpose, false revolutionary organizations and false partisan groups are being created on the territory of Manchuria. The main task is to pour them into existing insurgent detachments to decompose them from within. False rebel supply bases are also set up. The Japanese are trying to introduce their agents into the partisan detachments and, with their help, win a decisive victory over the rebels.

At the same time, Japanese intelligence tried to use partisan detachments as a channel to send their agents into the Soviet Union. Thus, at the end of 1939, the NKVD managed to uncover a large Korean “revolutionary” organization created by the intelligence department of the Kwantung Army headquarters. Members of this organization were supposed to be transported through connections of Chinese rebels to the territory of the USSR to conduct espionage and carry out sabotage.

In order to find the channels of the Soviet leadership of the partisan movement in Manchuria, the Japanese made several attempts to send their spies to the USSR under the guise of underground communists. They had the task of receiving a military-political education in the Soviet Union, and then returning back to Manchuria and taking leadership positions in partisan detachments. Naturally, Soviet counterintelligence did everything possible to clear the Manchurian partisan formations of Japanese agents.

When you get acquainted with documents about the activities of Soviet and Japanese intelligence services, you involuntarily get a feeling of a mirror image. Everything is the same on both sides. Soviet military intelligence uses the local Chinese and Korean population to organize partisan detachments on the territory of Manchuria, arms them, supplies them with ammunition and food, and sends reinforcements across the Amur and Ussuri. Japanese military intelligence, in turn, relies on white emigrants who went to Manchuria, also equips them, provides them and transports them across the Amur and Ussuri to Soviet territory.

Leaders of Chinese and Korean partisan detachments are trained in Soviet intelligence training centers. The leaders of emigrant sabotage groups are in special schools of Japanese intelligence. The commander of the Kwantung Army gives instructions to former subjects of the fallen Russian Empire. Command of the 1st and 2nd OKA - to the Chinese communist rebels. Chinese partisans conducted reconnaissance in Manchuria on instructions from the Soviet intelligence services. White emigrant sabotage detachments were engaged in espionage on Soviet territory on instructions from Japanese intelligence.

True, it can be said that the Chinese partisans fought for the liberation of their homeland from the Japanese occupiers and therefore used help from abroad. But the White emigrants also believed that they were fighting for the liberation of Russia from the Bolsheviks... In general, there was no difference in the actions of both sides. On both banks of the border rivers sat two seasoned predators who growled at each other, bared their fangs and tried to grab each other’s throats at the right opportunity.

To be remembered

On the basis of our small Volochaevsky school museum, search and research work was carried out dedicated to the 80th anniversary of the Smidovichi district and the Jewish Autonomous Region

This work was called “To Remember” and was dedicated to one of the first residents of the village of Volochaevka, the first chairman of the Tunguska volost, Alexander Vasilyevich Protsenko. Unbeknownst to us, a simple search and research work has grown into a large-scale project with a large geography and a serious claim for results.

The basis for the work was the materials of the school museum, collected in the 1950s - 1970s. Rearranging the museum's exhibitions after its expansion and renovation, the children paid attention to exhibits related to the history of one of the first families of Volochaevka - the Protsenko family. Small notes on old yellowed photographs, letters from Alexander Protsenko’s brothers Ilya and Antonin suggested the idea of ​​conducting a search and research.

Having familiarized ourselves with information about the history of our area during the Civil War, with the biographies of P.P. Postysheva, I.P. Shevchuk, we found almost no information about Alexander Protsenko. Similar to the fate of Protsenko was the fate of another fairly well-known resident of the Smidovichi district, the first commissar of public education of the Far Eastern Republic, teacher and director of the Nikolaev school Sergei Prokofievich Shchepetnov, who was also brutally tortured and killed during the Civil War.

About Alexander Protsenko, if there were any mentions in the literature about the Civil War in the Far East, then only a few lines - such a person was and was the first chairman of the Tunguska volost, one of the associates of Shevchuk and Postyshev. Then the question arose: why were the names of Shevchuk, Postyshev, Shchepetnov immortalized, but the name of Protsenko, who was tortured to death by Kalmyk punitive forces, was simply forgotten?

School students and museum activists, its guides, immersed themselves in the topic. During the search and research, a few letters, photographs, documents from the search work of past years, memories of the Protsenko brothers, the first inhabitants of Volochaevka and participants in the Civil War, stored in the school museum, were studied. Sources of information were books, collections, directories of administrative-territorial divisions, Internet resources, etc.

The geography of the search work included the territories of the Arkhangelsk and Belgorod regions, the Krasnodar region (search for the Ust-Labinsk gymnasium, where A. Protsenko studied), Ukraine, the Leningrad region, the Khabarovsk region, the city of Khabarovsk and, of course, the Jewish Autonomous Region.

The result of a lot of work was the biography of the first chairman of the Tunguska volost, and small biographies of his family members. The project made it possible to learn about the origin of the names of many geographical objects in the vicinity of Volochaevka, which appeared thanks to the extraordinary personality of A.V. Protsenko.

The school staff appealed to the district Assembly of Deputies with a request to perpetuate the memory of this man. A working group was formed to consider the school's appeal.

In addition, in the course of the work, a list of the names of Volochaevites who participated in the First World War was compiled. In memory of them in our village in 2015-2016. It is planned to install a memorial plaque.

First inhabitants

Alexander Vasilyevich Protsenko was born in 1892 in the Ekaterinodar province (now Krasnodar region). After graduating from Ust-Labinsk teacher's gymnasium, received the title of Zemsky (rural) teacher. As a student, he was arrested in 1905 for participating in a student revolutionary rally and disseminating the ideas of the revolution and revolutionary literature. A few months after his arrest, Alexander was allowed to graduate from high school, but Stolypin’s persecution of the first revolutionaries did not stop. In 1906, the father, Vasily Trofimovich, was ordered to leave Yekaterinodar within a week for his son’s revolutionary actions. And the family moves to the village of Ivanovka to the relatives of the mother, Alexandra Antonovna. In 1907, after endless persecution, my father was asked to leave Ivanovka and generally leave the Cossack Kuban province. My father signed up for a group of migrants to the Amur.

So, in the spring of 1908, after three months of traveling by rail, the Protsenko family, along with thirty-five families of landless Cossacks, arrived at the foot of the June-Koran hill.

In the summer of 1909, Alexander came to his family in the village of Volochaevka with a diploma as a folk teacher and violinist. But he never managed to work in his specialty, since there was no school in Volochaevka at that time. Alexander was actively involved in hunting and fishing, and helped his family settle in a new place.

Alexander learned to hunt animals and fish in summer and winter from the Golds, who lived 8 kilometers from Volochaevka. They, in turn, he taught literacy and writing. Love for nature and passion for everything unknown forced the young man to explore the surroundings of the village far and wide, as a result of which the first names of lakes, rivers, channels, etc. appeared. The names were invented by Alexander himself, and then they were naturally legitimized by the population.

Among the geographical objects named by Alexander are lakes Utinoye, Prohodnoye, Krivoye, Velikoye, Komarinoe, Khaty-Talga, Komariny Stream, the Poperechka River, the Dashkevich Channel, Bondarenkino Lake, Koshelevy Yama, Drozdovy Mowing, Andreeva Channel and others. At 10–15 versts, the area surrounding Volochaevka became more clear.

In 1909, Alexander got a job as a coachman-scribe at the Poperechensky postal stop, 9 km from Volochaevka along a temporary road - the “prisoner’s wheel”.

In the summer of 1910, the guy went to work at the Tunguska brick factory, located three miles from Nikolaevka. After the liquidation of the unprofitable enterprise, Alexander returned to the stop and returned to his previous job.

In the spring of 1911, research began on the construction of the Amur Railway. Before the First World War, Alexander worked on the construction of the railway. He supervised the construction of the first wooden railway bridges across rivers from the future Amur Bridge to Olgokhta station. His job as a government inspector was to monitor how contractors were driving piles into the ground with a pile driver to capacity. Due to improper construction, Alexander had a constant feud with the contractors, which further served to subsequently lead to the quick capture and reprisal of Alexander in 1919.

By the will of the people

In 1914 he was drafted into the tsarist army and in the same year he was sent to the front of the First World War. In the spring of 1918 he returned home to Volochaevka. In the same year he joined the party. In October in Pokrovka, at the volost Congress of Soviets, Alexander was elected by the poor part of the population as chairman of the Tunguska volost (later renamed the Volost Zemstvo Council) of the Khabarovsk district of the Primorsky region. The volost was then located in a significant part along the left tributary of the Amur - the Tunguska. The center of the Tunguska volost at that time was the village of Nikolaevka. In total, there were more than 60 settlements in the volost, including 24 villages, 7 settlements, 27 settlements with a total population of more than 3,800 people. The volost included such settlements as Vladimirovka, Pokrovka, Dezhnevka, Arkhangelskoye, Verkhne-Spasskoye, Volochaevka, Vostorgovka (Novokurovka), Golubichnoye, Danilovka, Nikolaevka, Nizhne-Spasskoye, Samarka, Ulika, Kalinovka, Ivankovtsy, Preobrazhenskoye, Kamenka ( Novokamenka) and others.

At village meetings, the chairman explained the meaning of the revolution and, in order to get out of the difficult post-war situation, called for the creation of their own cooperatives. Alexander was respected among the population of the volost. In the territory captured in 1918 by interventionists and white bandits, the Soviets were defeated or eliminated. The Council of the Tunguska volost also withdrew, but Alexander submitted to the will of the people who elected him and continued to do his work in the villages of the volost, realizing that he was going to certain death, declaring: “There is no revolution without victims.”

The primary task for Alexander under the conditions of intervention was to hide and adapt to work former party leaders and various workers of the Soviet government who were hiding in the taiga.

Having learned through the Nanais that P.P. Postyshev is hiding in the upper reaches of the Tunguska, Alexander went up the river. Using the power of the chairman of the volost zemstvo council, he hired Postyshev’s wife as a teacher in the small semi-Russian village of Shamanka, and Postyshev himself as a guard at the same school.

In 1918, having met Ivan Pavlovich Shevchuk, he began, together with him and Postyshev, to organize the first partisan detachment in the area of ​​​​the village of Arkhangelovka, in the homeland of I.P. Shevchuk. The preparation of the population of the volost in organizing a partisan detachment was entrusted to Alexander. With his participation, the second Tunguska partisan detachment was organized in the village of Golubichnoye under the command of Alexei Nikolaevich Kochnev, consisting mainly of workers of the Amur flotilla and partly of the local population.

The main role in the organization of partisan detachments I.P. Shevchuk and A.N. Kochneva Alexander Protsenko played in 1919, when Ataman Kalmykov announced the mobilization of people, horses and other property into the white Kolchak army, intended to suppress the partisan movement and the people's revolutionary army. Protsenko, Postyshev and Shevchuk at this time wrote a protest appeal against mobilization. Alexander volunteered to bring the appeal to every village of the volost, being its chairman and having great authority among the population.

Protsenko traveled to many villages of the Tunguska volost, where he convened peasant gatherings (gatherings), at which he spoke, calling on the peasants to fight against the American-Japanese interventionists, the White Guard gangs of Semyonovites and not to give the Kolchakites a single person or a single horse. He called to take up arms and go to the taiga to join the organizing partisan detachments of Shevchuk and Kochnev. The population of the volost responded patriotically to the calls, and the partisan detachments were actively replenished with people. Meetings of residents were held by Alexander in Vostorgovka (Novokurovka), Arkhangelovka, Danilovka, Volochaevka, Dezhnevka, Samara-Orlovka, Nizhnespassky, Novokamenka, Golubichny and other settlements.

Tragic death

On August 19, 1919, after a gathering was held in Nikolaevka and Kamenka (Novokamenka) and the next replenishment of the partisan detachment, Alexander’s advance was reported to Khabarovsk, to the headquarters of Ataman Kalmykov. The punitive forces under the command of Captain Piskunov, who was rampaging through the villages of Tunguska, sent a cavalry detachment along Protsenko’s route. After holding the next peasant gathering in the village of Kalinovka at dawn on August 20, 1919, A. Protsenko was captured by the punitive expedition of Ataman Kalmykov. Alexander was subjected to brutal torture, after which the white bandits tied his bloody body with a rope around his neck, and the other end to the pommel of a horse’s saddle and dragged him at a gallop through the entire village. Then, tying the body to a larch tree not far from Kalinovka, they shot him and chopped him up with blades. Thus ended the short life of one of the organizers of the first partisan detachments, the first chairman of the Tunguska volost.

The punitive forces forbade the peasants of Kalinovka to bury Protsenko under penalty of death. After their departure, on the 5th-7th day, Kochnev’s partisan detachment arrived in the village and, together with the peasants of the village of Kalinovka, buried the tortured body in the taiga behind the village, at the site of his execution. The place of chairman of the Tunguska volost at the end of 1919 was taken by Pavel Petrovich Postyshev.

History of the memorial

After the defeat of the White Guards in the Far East in 1923, the Volost Executive Committee (VEC) was organized in Nikolaevka. On his initiative, a workers’ club was built in Nikolaevka named after A. Protsenko and S. Shchepetnov, who were tortured to death by punitive forces. Large portraits of A.V. were installed in the club. Protsenko - the first chairman of the Tunguska volost and S.P. Shchepetnov - the first commissar of public education of the Far Eastern Republic.

In the late 1920s - early 1930s, the club in Nikolaevka, along with portraits and documents, burned down. Protsenko’s portrait was restored in the Khabarovsk Regional Museum, but before the Great Patriotic War the portrait was no longer in the museum either. In the 1960s, Protsenko’s portrait was in the Volochaevsky Museum on the June-Koran hill, but was not exhibited.

Since 1954, Ilya Vasilyevich Protsenko, Alexander’s brother, conducted active correspondence with the Khabarovsk regional partisan section with a request to collect evidence from still living eyewitnesses of those events who lived in the villages of Nikolaevka, Kalinovka, Kamenka (today Novokamenka) and to transfer his brother’s ashes from the taiga to Volochaevka or Nikolaevka. In November 1954, at a meeting of the partisan section at the Khabarovsk Museum of Local Lore, Ilya Protsenko’s application was considered. The section decided to ask the Khabarovsk Regional Executive Committee to transfer the remains of A.V. Protsenko to Volochaevka station.

But in the same 1954, another brother, Antonin Vasilyevich Protsenko, turned to the Supreme Soviet of the USSR with a request to erect a monument to the hero of the Civil War. A letter signed by K.E. was received from the Supreme Soviet of the USSR to the Khabarovsk Department of Culture. Voroshilov, who supported this request.

In 1958, based on documents sent by the Protsenko brothers and collected by the partisan section of the Khabarovsk Museum of Local Lore, the Khabarovsk Regional Executive Committee erected a monument to Alexander Protsenko near Kalinovka (at the place of execution). A memorial plaque was installed on the monument with the inscription: “The first chairman of the Tunguska Volost Council, Alexander Vasilyevich Protsenko, who was tortured by the gangs of Ataman Kalmykov, is buried here.”

The following year, the residents of Kalinovka were resettled to the Volochaevsky state farm. In fact, the village, not far from which the monument was erected, ceased to exist. In 1963, the Kur-Urmi region also disappeared from the map. The territory where the monument was erected belonged either to the Amursky or to the Khabarovsk districts of the Khabarovsk Territory.

As it became known quite recently, in 1960, a protection certificate was filled out for the monument, and it was even included in the list of historical and revolutionary monuments in the Khabarovsk Territory.

In August 1960, at a meeting of the partisan section at the Khabarovsk Museum of Local Lore, a proposal was again put forward to the department of culture of the Khabarovsk Territory to transfer the remains of A.V. Protsenko to the village of Volochaevka, where it was proposed to erect an individual monument. In response to this appeal, the district authorities pointed out that it was inappropriate to move the remains, since 10,000 rubles were spent on the installation of the monument at that time.

In 1968, Kalinovka-Russian was excluded from the registration data by the decision of the Khabarovsk Regional Executive Committee and disappeared from the map completely.

The Protsenko brothers repeatedly petitioned the department of culture of the Khabarovsk Territory and the Volochaevka school to move the remains and monument to A.V. Protsenko to Volochaevka and about naming the school after him. In 1966, they asked school No. 11 to take patronage of the monument and put the burial site in order, but due to the inaccessibility of the monument and grave, it was not possible to care for it, since it can only be reached by a winter road.

Today there is deep taiga there. There is no maintenance of the burial site. The monument is not listed in the register of historical objects of the Khabarovsk Territory.

Tribute to a hero

The history of the Protsenko family deserves special attention. They are one of the first settlers of Volochaevka. Father, mother, six brothers and a sister, together with the Volochaevs, founded the village. Since 1911, the whole family worked on the construction of the Amur Railway. Three brothers fought on the fronts of the First World War. Four brothers Ilya, Antonin, Anatoly and Vladimir are partisans of the detachment I.P. Shevchuk, participants in the Volochaev battle and military events before the end of the Civil War in the Far East. In Volochaevka, the Protsenko family was considered a family of progressive views, in which Russian classics and revolutionary literature were read. Protsenko are the first in many ways. Among them are the first secretary of the Volochaevsky Village Council, and the first chairman of the village, the first pioneer leader, the first party organizer, the first organizer and secretary of the Komsomol cell, a writer, three brothers - participants in the Great Patriotic War. The biographies of family members, like the biography of Alexander Protsenko, are eventful and deserve to be remembered by us about these people.

Today, the memory of Alexander Protsenko and his family is preserved in the museum of the Volochaev School, in letters from his brothers, in photographs and documents sent to us more than half a century ago. The materials from our search operation will also remain in the school museum. The installation of a memorial sign to Protsenko in the village will be another tribute to the memory not only of a hero of the Civil War, but also of a participant in the First World War and a historical figure - the first chairman of the Tunguska volost.

Alexey ZAYTSEV, head of the school museum, teacher of secondary school No. 11, village. Volochaevka

As a result of the measures taken and individual successes achieved in military clashes in January 1922, the position of the Eastern Front of the People's Revolutionary Army improved significantly. On January 31, the front in the area of ​​Art. Vira, st. The Chita Rifle Brigade arrived. With the arrival of the Chita brigade, the cavalry group operating in the Amur direction was disbanded. The 4th Cavalry Regiment was transferred to the Combined Brigade, and from the Chita Brigade and the Troitskosavsky Cavalry Regiment attached to it, the Transbaikal Group was created under the command of N.D. Tomin, the commander of the Chita Brigade. By February 4, 1922, a grouping of units of the Eastern Front of the People's Revolutionary Army was next.

The Troitskosavsky Cavalry Regiment was still in the Amur direction in the area of ​​​​the villages of Zabelovo and Lugovskoy; The 2nd Regiment of the Chita Brigade, replacing units of the Combined Brigade, which withdrew to the station. Ying for additional staffing, moved to the area of ​​the 3rd half-barracks; The 1st regiment of the Chita brigade was located in the area of ​​the village and the station. In; 3rd Regiment of the Chita Brigade - at the Aur junction; Combined brigade (5th, 6th, Special Amur regiments and 4th cavalry regiment) - in the area of ​​the village and station. In.

In addition, the Eastern Front included the Tunguska partisan detachment of Shevchuk, grouped in the area of ​​the village of Vostorgovka, and the Plastun partisan detachment of Petrov-Teterin, located in the area of ​​​​the village of In. The last two detachments were attached to the Combined Brigade, whose commander at the end of January was appointed J. Z. Pokus. In total, the troops of the Eastern Front of the People's Revolutionary Army before the counter-offensive had about 6,300 bayonets, 1,300 sabers, 300 machine guns, 30 guns, 3 armored trains and 2 tanks.

In terms of the number of bayonets, the People's Revolutionary Army outnumbered the enemy by almost 2 times, in sabers the superiority was insignificant, in machine guns - almost five times, in guns - 2.5 times.

The front's supply of ammunition and food thanks to those created at the station. There were sufficient reserves. Forage supplies were scarce. The units were not sufficiently provided with warm clothing. Supply agencies and logistics services clearly failed to cope with their tasks. For example, during the assault on Volochaev’s positions, fighters were forced to make passes through the enemy’s wire barriers with grenades and rifle butts, while the scissors for cutting the wire lay in warehouses in Blagoveshchensk. The units were not provided with a sledge train. There were also no skis in the units.

Politically, the upcoming operation was well secured. This was evidenced by the high political and moral state of the units and the offensive impulse of the troops, despite the harsh conditions of the cold Far Eastern winter and the lack of sufficient warm clothing among the soldiers. Political bodies under the leadership of P.P. Postyshev, a member of the Military Council of the Eastern Front, used every military encounter with the Whites to make his experience available to the entire command staff and the people’s army. Using specific examples of combat situations, they raised the fighters' confidence in their abilities, instilled a consciousness of superiority over the enemy and rallied them around the communists.

Grouping and combat composition of enemy forces.

Having failed in the battles under Art. In and having lost the initiative of the offensive in the January clashes, the enemy decided to gain a foothold in the area of ​​Art. Volochaevka. Having created strong defensive positions here, the White Guard command intended to bleed the troops of the People's Revolutionary Army, and then, choosing an opportune moment, go on the offensive again. The White Guards did not choose the Volochaevka area for this purpose by chance. The presence of the hills and hills of the June-Korani Mountain to the northeast of Volochaevka, as well as a small forest to the south of it, created natural conditions for the creation of defensive positions that blocked the path to Khabarovsk.

To the west of Volochaevka stretched a hummocky plain, covered in places with skinny bushes and perfectly visible from Mount June-Korani. With a small clearing of the firing sectors, all approaches to Volochaevka could be kept under artillery and rifle-machine-gun fire. Loose, waist-length snow made it impossible for the attacker to move in large forces across the plain. In view of this, the fighting of the parties was inevitably drawn to the railway track. Armored trains were to play an exceptional role.

During January 1922, the Whites created and equipped positions that began at the Tunguska River, passed through Mount June-Korani, the western outskirts of the village of Volochaevka and, capturing the edges of the forest south of Volochaevka, went south, ending with fortifications in the Verkhne-Spasskaya area on the left bank of the Amur. The total length of positions between the Tunguska and Amur rivers reached 18 km.

The area of ​​the station was especially strongly fortified. Volochaevka. Many trenches with ice parapets were created here; Blockhouses for observation posts and machine guns were equipped from icy snow. Two strips of wire fences were erected in front of Volochaevka. The northern slopes of Mount June-Korani and the western and southwestern edges of the forest south of Volochaevka were also entangled with wire. In general, Volochaevka was a heavily fortified field-type area at that time. General Molchanov, who toured the front of the “White Rebel Army” at the end of January, assessed the railway direction as completely safe and believed that in order to capture Volochaevka, the People’s Revolutionary Army should have much more significant forces than those it actually had. Even reactionary US newspapers wrote about Volochaevka: “The Bolsheviks will not advance to the east. The Far Eastern Verdun was created on the approaches to the Amur".

But, representing a truly serious, almost insurmountable obstacle in the railway line, Volochaev’s positions had one drawback. They did not reach Verkhne-Spasskaya in a continuous line. In this regard, the troops of the People's Revolutionary Army could, although with great difficulty due to the lack of roads, bypass Volochaevka from the south. In addition, the attacker could use the direction along the Amur. Moving along the ice of the river, it was possible through the channel connecting the Amur and Ussuri to reach the Kazakevicheva area and further to the station. Korfovskaya, i.e. to the rear of the entire Volochaev-Khabarovsk group of whites. But the White Guard command believed that the distance of this direction from the base of the People's Revolutionary Army, located at the station. In the absence of sleds and skis, there was no possibility of active operations by large infantry units. Molchanov believed that only cavalry action could be expected in the Amur direction, and therefore placed a strong infantry barrier in the Verkhne-Spasskaya area.

The advantage of well-equipped defensive positions in the Volochaevka area was also that the White Guard troops were located in populated areas (the villages of Volochaevka, Danilovka, Arkhangelovka, Dezhnevka and others). This circumstance, in cold winter conditions, was of no small importance for maintaining the combat effectiveness of the troops. The Whites also had well-rolled winter roads running along the railroad tracks and the left bank of the Amur towards Khabarovsk. The presence of these roads allowed the enemy not only to ensure uninterrupted supply to the front, but also to use them to maneuver reserves. The troops of the People's Revolutionary Army were deprived of these advantages.

On January 1, 1922, the “White Rebel Army” had about 4,550 bayonets and sabers, 63 machine guns, 12 guns, 3 armored trains at the front; in the immediate and deep rear - about 3,460 bayonets and sabers, 22 machine guns, 3 guns.

According to intelligence data from the headquarters of the People's Revolutionary Army, the forces of the "White Rebel Army" were exaggerated. The White Guard command, which pinned its hopes on the support of the Amur Cossacks, failed to attract any significant number of Cossacks to its side. Thanks to the widespread work of party organizations, the Amur Cossacks took a hostile position towards the “white rebel army”, responding to Molchanov’s appeals that their path was not with the whites, but with the working peasantry, and did not give the whites any reinforcements. Thus, the forces of the “White Rebel Army” not only did not increase with its advance to the Amur region, but even decreased due to losses.

Considering the main direction to be the railway, and the right flank of the Volochaev positions to be the most threatened due to the actions of the partisans, the White Guard command concentrated its main forces in the Volochaevka area and to the northeast. North of the railway and station. Volochaevka, in the area of ​​Mount June-Korani, the 3rd detachment was located. To secure the right flank, a group of General Vishnevsky consisting of 500 bayonets and sabers was advanced to the area of ​​​​the village of Arkhangelovka. In the village of Danilovka there was a cavalry regiment and the Iman hundred of Colonel Shiryaev. In the area of ​​Volochaevka itself, along the saddle railway, the 1st detachment was concentrated. The vast majority of artillery and machine guns were located here. South of the railway and along the edge of the forest behind wire fences, the 2nd detachment occupied a position. The 4th detachment was located in the Amur direction in the area of ​​Verkhne-Spasskaya and Nizhne-Spasskaya. The 5th detachment was located in reserve in the Dezhnevka area, which, if necessary, could be sent to the flanks or to the center of Volochaev’s positions.

Plans of the command of the People's Revolutionary Army.

In December 1921, when, under the pressure of superior enemy forces, parts of the People's Revolutionary Army were forced to retreat to the west and the command of the People's Revolutionary Army had no confidence in the rapid concentration of troops of the Trans-Baikal Military District west of Khabarovsk, it was planned to actively defend the Ina bridgehead with available forces. In the event of a forced retreat to the west from the station. The In troops of the People's Revolutionary Army, destroying the railway track and bridges, had to retreat to the Arkhara positions (about 250 km west of the station In) in order to gain time, exhaust the enemy forces and put their extended communications under attack by the partisans. Having concentrated the Chita brigade under the cover of the retreating units, the command of the People's Revolutionary Army intended to inflict a crushing blow on the Whites here and organize a parallel pursuit of them, first along the Amur River and then along the Ussuri River with the aim of finally eliminating the enemy. This was the original plan of action.

However, the turning point at the front, which occurred as a result of the defeat of General Sakharov’s group near Art. On December 28, and the concentration of units from the Transbaikal Military District that began in early January radically changed the original plan. Already at the beginning of January 1922, the troops of the People's Revolutionary Army made their first attempt to launch a counteroffensive, capture Volochaevka and completely seize the initiative of military operations into their own hands.

Despite the fact that this offensive was unsuccessful, the commander of the Eastern Front, S. M. Seryshev, gave a new order for the offensive on January 8, 1922. Front units were given the task of encircling the enemy in the Khabarovsk area, Art. Verino and destroy his manpower. To accomplish this task, the Troitskosavsky and 4th Separate Cavalry Regiments had to occupy Verkhne-Spasskaya, Kazakevicheva on January 10-11, and on January 12 go to the Krasnaya Rechka crossing area, Art. Verino, where to contact the partisan detachment of Boyko-Pavlov and cut off the enemy’s retreat to the south. The Insk group was divided into two columns. The first column, consisting of the Special Amur Regiment, the 5th and 6th Rifle Regiments, with the support of armored trains No. 2 and No. 9, was tasked with taking Volochaevka on January 9 and, having sent the 5th Regiment to occupy Pokrovka, Khabarovsk, on January 10 go to the Nizhne region -Spasskaya, Samarka and further advance on Nikolo-Aleksandrovskoye. The second column, consisting of Shevchuk’s partisan detachment, two squadrons of cavalry with two guns, was supposed to strike the rear of the Volochaev white group on the morning of January 9, occupy the Amur crossing in the evening on January 10, and then, bypassing Khabarovsk from the northeast, destroy the enemy retreating along road to Knyaz-Volkonskoe.

The Commander-in-Chief of the People's Revolutionary Army, V.K. Blucher, believed that a decisive offensive should not be undertaken without preliminary preparations, and therefore canceled the order. At the same time, he pointed out that the dispersion of forces and the lack of opportunity to launch a concentric strike could lead to the failure of this offensive. On January 10, 1922, V. K. Blucher, in a direct conversation with the commander of the Eastern Front, outlined the plan of the main command of the People's Revolutionary Army.

At the first stage of hostilities, it was proposed to firmly hold the positions occupied and defeat the enemy if he went on the offensive, in order to ensure the concentration of the cavalry division of the Chita brigade in the area of ​​st. In. At the second stage, the 5th, 6th and Special Amur regiments, forming the Consolidated Infantry Brigade, were to move along the railway line to attack Volochaevka, and the 4th, Troitskosavsky cavalry regiments and the cavalry division of the Chita brigade, united into the Consolidated Cavalry The brigade, supporting the infantry advance, was supposed to strike the nearest rear of the enemy Volochaev group. Shevchuk’s detachment was to attack Dezhnevka for the same purpose. At this stage, the main task of the troops was to capture the Volochaevka region.

At the third stage, which began after the capture of Volochaevka, it was planned to occupy Khabarovsk and destroy the enemy in this area. The fighting at this time should have taken place in this sequence. The Special Amur and 6th Rifle Regiments, as well as the Combined Cavalry Brigade, forming a strike group, advance through Novgorodskaya, Novo-Troitskoye, and capture Kazakevicheva, Art. Korfovskaya, Krasnaya Rechka crossing and thereby cutting off the enemy’s retreat to the south. Shevchuk's detachment and the 5th Infantry Regiment, united in a group, are attacking Khabarovsk by rail. That was the plan.

From the stated plan it is clear that before the capture of Volochaevka the main blow was planned to be delivered on the railway direction. After the capture of Volochaevka, decisive importance was assigned to the Amur direction, because only by acting in this direction could the troops of the People's Revolutionary Army cut off the enemy's escape route to Primorye and destroy his manpower. The plan did not yet talk about the use of the Chita brigade, which was already heading to the front. Only the cavalry division of this brigade was mentioned. Meanwhile, the arrival of the Chita brigade had a significant impact on changing this plan.

On January 15, the commander of the Eastern Front proposed new considerations that arose in connection with the transfer of the Chita brigade: 1) until the arrival of this brigade, the draft order for the capture of Volochaevka should not be implemented; 2) with the end of the concentration of the Chita brigade, carry out both tasks with a simultaneous strike: a) capturing Volochaevka and b) attacking Kazakevicheva. The task of capturing Kazakevicheva was assigned to the Trans-Baikal group, and the capture of Volochaevka - to the Combined Infantry Brigade, giving it the 4th cavalry regiment and Shevchuk's partisan detachment. The front commander believed that in this way it would be possible to prevent the Whites from retreating to the south and to get closer to the task of destroying enemy manpower.

At this time, the commander-in-chief had already left Chita for the front, so no response was received to the considerations presented. Subsequently, the front commander came up with another plan - to deeply bypass the enemy from the north along the Tunguska River valley.

On January 28, 1922, the commander-in-chief of the NRA, V.K. Blucher, arrived at the front to directly lead the counteroffensive. With his arrival, the final plan of the operation was adopted, which boiled down to the following: 1. Seize Art. Olgokhta, using its area as a springboard for the deployment of forces for the purpose of a subsequent attack on Volochaevka. 2. After the regrouping and deployment of forces in the area of ​​st. Olgokhta With a combined brigade, advance along the railway and, with the assistance of partisan detachments, strike at the right flank of Volochaev’s positions; further pursue the enemy in the direction of Khabarovsk. At the same time, the Transbaikal group, sent from the station. Olgokht in the Amur direction, strike on the left flank in the direction of Verkhne-Spasskaya, Nizhne-Spasskaya and, building on the success along the channel connecting the Amur with Ussuri, to Kazakevicheva, cut off the enemy’s retreat to Southern Primorye. The ultimate goal of the operation was to encircle and destroy the “White rebel army” in the Khabarovsk region. It was decided to launch a general offensive on February 7-8, having previously captured the area of ​​the station. Olgokhta.

Plan of the White Guard command.

As already mentioned above, the White Guard command, after unsuccessful battles near Art. In and loss of offensive initiative in the January clashes, he decided to temporarily gain a foothold in the Volochaevka area. Molchanov intended to defeat the troops of the People's Revolutionary Army in Volochaev's fortified positions, and then, choosing an opportune moment, launch a decisive offensive. The goal of the offensive was to occupy the passes over the Vanda ridge (a spur of the Lesser Khingan) in the shortest possible time. By capturing the passes across the Vanda ridge, the Whites hoped to strengthen their position in the Amur region and secure the Khabarovsk region and all of Primorye. These goals completely followed from the plans of the Japanese interventionists, who prepared the entire “White Rebel” adventure.

Progress of the counteroffensive.

The counteroffensive of the People's Revolutionary Army developed in the following stages: First (February 5-7) - the battle of units of the People's Revolutionary Army for the capture and retention of Art. Olgokhta. The second (February 8-9) - regrouping of units of the People's Revolutionary Army and reaching the starting position to attack Volochaev's positions. The third (February 10-12) - the assault on Volochaevka by the Combined Brigade and the battles of the Transbaikal group for Verkhne-Spasskaya and Nizhne-Spasskaya. Fourth (February 13-26) - pursuit of the enemy.

First stage (February 5-7). On February 4, the Chita brigade of the Eastern Front was ordered to capture the station the next day. Olgokhta. At the same time, the partisan detachments came under the command of the commander of the Combined Brigade, who was supposed to advance the Plastun partisan detachment to the area of ​​the village of Vostorgovki, occupied by the Tunguska partisan detachment, and unite these detachments under the general command of Petrov-Teterin.

To advance to the station. Olgokht was assigned the 2nd Infantry Regiment of the Chita Brigade, a squadron of the 4th Separate Cavalry Regiment, the 3rd Battery of the Artillery Division of the Combined Brigade, separate railway and engineer companies, armored trains No. 2, 8, 9 and one tank.

On the morning of February 5, the 2nd regiment of the Chita brigade, with the support of the 3rd battery, went on the offensive at the station. Olgokhta and, having knocked out the enemy, occupied it. With selfless work in 30° frost, sappers and a railway company by the end of the day on February 5 restored all the railway bridges west of the station. Olgokhty thereby gave armored train No. 8 the opportunity to move to the station.

At dawn on February 7, a strong group of whites numbering up to 700 bayonets, 85 sabers with 8 machine guns and 4 guns launched a counterattack. Advancing with the forces of the “Volunteer” regiment, supported by the “Volzhanin” armored train, along the railway, the Whites simultaneously advanced the Kama and Jaeger regiments consisting of 225 bayonets and sabers with two guns to bypass the station. Olgokhty from the north, and the Omsk and Ufa regiments numbering up to 375 bayonets and sabers with four machine guns and two guns - to bypass from the south and reach the rear of the People's Revolutionary Army units.

Having received a report of an enemy advance along the railway, the commander of the 2nd regiment moved the 1st battalion to the east. With the support of the approaching armored train No. 8, this battalion not only delayed the White advance, but, acting decisively and boldly, drove them back and occupied the bridge at the 3rd verst east of the station. Olgokhty. At this time, the enemy's encircling column, approaching the station from the north, opened fire. Almost simultaneously, the second enemy column went on the offensive from the south. The 2nd and 3rd battalions located at the station deployed on both sides of the railway track and prepared to repel the enemy attack. At this time, the white cavalry, having reached the railway between the station. In and Art. Olgokhta, set fire to the bridge and opened fire from the west. Communication with Art. The battle was interrupted, and the 2nd Regiment was surrounded. The team of armored train No. 8, seeing a bridge burning in the rear, stopped the firefight with the enemy armored train and rushed to the west. Using cannon and machine gun fire, she dispersed the white cavalry. The fire was extinguished. At the same time, the 3rd Battery moved its guns to exposed positions and opened fire with grapeshot. The White attack was repulsed by fire from the armored train and battery.

Encouraged by the bold actions of the artillerymen and the armored train crew, the infantry launched a counterattack. After a three-hour battle, the enemy, having suffered heavy losses, retreated to the east. The 2nd regiment began pursuit and occupied the 1st half-barracks, located 6 km east of the station. Olgokhta. Thus, the task was completed. A springboard for the deployment of units for the purpose of launching a general counteroffensive was secured.

Second stage (February 8-9). On February 7, the Combined Brigade was supposed to replace the 2nd Regiment of the Chita Brigade in the area of ​​the station. Olgokhta and the 1st half-barracks, and on February 8 occupy Mount Lumku-Korani (north of the railway) as the starting line for the attack on Volochaevka. The Transbaikal group was supposed to follow the Combined Brigade to the station. Olgokht, meaning that when the latter goes on the offensive, go south to occupy Nizhne-Spasskaya, and subsequently capture Kazakevicheva. One regiment of the Chita brigade remained in the front reserve in the Olgokhta area.

On February 8, the Combined Brigade, replacing the 2nd Regiment of the Chita Brigade, began an offensive. Its vanguard - the Special Amur Regiment - having on the right flank a combined cavalry squadron (consisting of teams of mounted reconnaissance regiments of the Combined Brigade) and one battalion of the 5th Infantry Regiment in reserve, maneuvered around the enemy's flanks in two columns and forced him to retreat. By the evening of February 8, the Special Amur Regiment occupied Mount Lumku-Korani. However, it turned out that the area of ​​Mount Lumku-Korani was too far from the enemy’s main defensive line and could not serve as a starting point for an attack. As a result, units of the Combined Brigade, having reached Mount Lumku-Korani, continued to fight their way east during February 9.

Carried away by the battle for Mount Lumku-Korani, the commander of the Combined Brigade did not pay due attention to the railway direction. Taking advantage of this, the enemy, with the help of an armored train, held this direction in his hands until midday on February 9 and fired flanking fire at units of the Combined Brigade, thereby delaying their advance. Only after a battalion of the Amur Regiment with an artillery platoon was sent here were the Whites forced to clear the railway. The advance became faster and by the end of the day on February 9, the Combined Brigade reached the Poperechnaya River.

The Transbaikal group was less successful. Having been late due to poor performance of the military communications service of the front, focusing on the station. Olgokhta, she set out on Verkhne-Spasskaya only at 12 o’clock on February 9. She was supposed to reach Verkhne-Spasskaya on the same day in order to capture this point with a blow from the east and north-east and a simultaneous attack of the Troitskosavsky cavalry regiment from the west. But due to the lack of a road and a rising snowstorm, which made it difficult to navigate, parts of the Transbaikal group (1st and 2nd regiments of the Chita brigade, Chita cavalry division and horse-mountain battery) covered only 10 km in 6 hours and were forced to make a big halt in the village of Ulanovka. The group did not achieve their intended goal that day.

Third stage (February 10-12). Another February 9th at 12 noon. 10 min. The commander of the Eastern Front gave the order to launch a general attack on the enemy. According to this order, the Combined Brigade, having occupied Arkhangelovka, the railway water pumping station near the Poperechnaya River and the Poperechnaya postal station as its starting position by the end of February 9, was to launch an offensive on Volochaevka at dawn on February 10. The Transbaikal group was ordered, leaving one regiment in the front reserve in the Olgokhta area, to occupy Verkhne-Spasskaya and Nizhne-Spasskaya by the end of February 9. At dawn on February 10, the Trans-Baikal group was supposed to begin demonstrating an offensive on Samarka, Orlovka, and at 12 o’clock move to Kazakevicheva with the goal of cutting off enemy units leaving the Volochaevka, Khabarovsk area and destroying them.

On February 9, units of the Combined Brigade were unable to capture the line of the Poperechnaya River. They completed this task only by dawn on February 10, occupying the 3rd half-barracks on the right bank of the Poperechnaya River (7 km west of Volochaevka).

The Transbaikal group, which spent a lot of time on the march, was only approaching Verkhne-Spasskaya at dawn on February 10th. Since the vanguard of the group lost its orientation due to a snowstorm, the main forces left on the morning of February 10 not eastern Verkhne-Spasskaya - to the enemy’s rear, as planned, but to the west.

On February 10, the Combined Brigade, having taken its initial position in the area of ​​the 3rd half-barracks, launched a decisive offensive. She launched her main attack on the white right flank, with a secondary attack in the center and south of the railroad.

To deliver the main attack, a bypass column consisting of the 5th Infantry Regiment, the 4th Separate Cavalry Regiment, partisan detachments of Petrov-Teterin and Shevchuk with four mountain guns was allocated. For operations south of the railway, the 6th Infantry Regiment with two guns was assigned. One battalion of the Special Amur Regiment with a platoon of tanks (two tanks) was supposed to advance in the center. Two battalions of the Special Amur Regiment were left in reserve on the railway line. The artillery was grouped in the center under the overall command of the chief of artillery of the Combined Brigade. Since the railway track and bridges between the 3rd semi-barracks and the station. Volochaevka were destroyed, armored trains could not take part in the offensive.

February 10 at 11 a.m. 30 min. units of the Combined Brigade launched an attack on Volochaevka. Before others, two companies of the 6th Infantry Regiment, operating on the right flank, approached the enemy fortifications. The enemy opened strong cross-machine gun fire. Under enemy fire, the companies began to overcome obstacles, but became entangled in the wire and almost completely died. The advance of other units of the 6th Regiment was stopped.

In the central sector, one tank, supporting the advance of the battalion of the Amur Regiment, broke through two rows of wire barriers, but was hit by fire from an enemy armored train. The second tank was out of action due to a malfunction even before the attack.

The units of the encircling column advancing on the left flank (5th Infantry and 4th Cavalry Regiments) had to walk through deep snowdrifts that reached their waists. They were so tired that when they reached the enemy wire, they were completely exhausted. The partisan detachments advancing to the left of the Combined Brigade did not reach their starting position by the appointed time, and contact with them was lost. Therefore, the 4th Cavalry Regiment, intended to attack the enemy's rear, was forced to dismount and cover the left flank of the 5th Infantry Regiment. The artillery assigned to the encircling column fell behind and could not conduct effective fire at enemy firing points. By 5 p.m. the advance of the Combined Brigade was stopped by the enemy. The soldiers lay in the snow near the wire fences under heavy enemy fire and could not get up either to rush forward or to retreat back. Only with the onset of darkness was it possible to take them 600 m back.

The partisan detachments of Petrov-Teterin and Shevchuk, who had orders to advance from Vostorgovka to Arkhangelovka and further to the southeast, broke into Arkhangelovka at dawn on February 10 and attacked the White headquarters, but counterattacked by the enemy, they were forced to retreat to Vostorgovka, having lost contact with Svodnaya brigade. A positive result of the partisan raid was that they captured an important operational order from the commander of the White Guard troops, General Molchanov. Thus, the first attack on Volochaevka failed. South of Volochaevka, in the offensive sector of the Transbaikal group, events developed as follows.

At the time when the Combined Brigade began attacking the Volochaev positions, the Transbaikal group, having joined the Troitskosavsky cavalry regiment, at 11 o'clock on February 10 launched an offensive on Verkhne-Spasskaya. At first, only one 2nd regiment was brought into the battle, so the offensive developed slowly. The enemy, having fortified himself on the western outskirts of the village, held back the advance of the 2nd regiment with artillery and machine-gun fire. By the evening of February 10, another battalion of the 1st regiment was brought into battle. At the same time, the horse-mountain battery, having moved to an open position, shot down the White observation post with direct fire. Taking advantage of the temporary weakening of enemy fire, the infantry broke into Verkhne-Spasskaya and captured the western and northern outskirts. The enemy nevertheless held the eastern part of the settlement and made forays into the location of the Transbaikal group all night.

Only by dawn on February 11, when the Chita cavalry division put forward to bypass created a threat to the Whites reaching the rear, they left Verkhne-Spasskaya and began to hastily retreat to the east. On the same day in the afternoon, the Transbaikal group reached Nizhne-Spasskaya and, with a simultaneous attack from the west, north and northeast, captured this village. The enemy was thrown back towards Samarka. However, with the active actions of horse patrols, the Whites interrupted the connection between the Combined Brigade and the Transbaikal Group.

Throughout the entire day of February 11, the commander of the Transbaikal group had no information about the situation in the area of ​​the Combined Brigade. Only late in the evening did two mounted scouts manage to deliver to the commander of the Trans-Baikal group an order to assist the Combined Brigade in capturing Volochaevka. To do this, it was proposed to allocate the Troitskosavsky cavalry regiment, reinforcing it with artillery, with the task of delivering a blow to the rear of the Volochaev white group in the direction of Dezhnevka. The Troitskosavsky Cavalry Regiment began to prepare for a new mission on the morning of February 12. The remaining parts of the Transbaikal group settled down for the day in Nizhne-Spasskaya.

Thus, as a result of the battles that took place on February 10 and 11, success was achieved only in the Amur direction. In two-day battles, the Transbaikal group defeated the 4th White detachment and captured Verkhne-Spasskaya and Nizhne-Spasskaya. But this task was completed two days behind schedule.

The slow and insufficiently decisive offensive of the Transbaikal group allowed the enemy to retain freedom of action. Having covered himself with insignificant forces in the Amur direction, he concentrated his main efforts in the Volochaevka area and repelled the attacks of the Combined Brigade here. In the current situation, when the main White group was not only not defeated, but also continued to firmly hold its positions, the further advance of the Transbaikal group to Kazakevicheva and further to the northeast could lead to its complete isolation and did not promise success.

Meanwhile, the White Guard command, having received information about the defeat of the 4th detachment in the Verkhne-Spasskaya area, decided that the People's Revolutionary Army had transferred the main blow of its forces to the Amur direction. Therefore, on the night of February 12, Molchanov sent his reserve here - the Volga brigade (5th detachment), giving it the task of recapturing Nizhne-Spasskaya at any cost.

The unsuccessful actions of the Combined Brigade in the Volochaev direction are explained by the following reasons. Due to poor reconnaissance, the brigade command was unable to determine in advance the enemy grouping and the nature of its fortifications. Therefore, the main blow was delivered on the right flank of the Volochaev junction, where the positions were the strongest and where the main enemy forces were grouped. The starting position was chosen too far from the target of attack. As a result, the strike group approached the enemy’s main defensive line exhausted.

In addition, in the conditions of the struggle for Volochaevka, armored trains became extremely important, since off-road conditions and deep snow cover almost completely excluded the maneuver of field artillery. However, the destroyed bridges and railway tracks were not restored. As a result of this, the armored trains could not support the infantry and suppress enemy firing points, and the artillery assigned to the infantry lagged behind and could not provide effective assistance to the attacking units. The lack of interaction between the created groupings also had an effect, as a result of which the units reached the front edge of the enemy’s defensive position separately. Taking advantage of this, the Whites were able to consistently concentrate their fire on threatened areas and repel attacks.

Yet, despite the failure, the attacks launched by the Combined Brigade on February 10 also had a positive impact. As a result of the battle, as well as from the operational order of the commander of the “White Rebel Army” captured by the partisans, the command of the Combined Brigade became aware of the enemy group and its intentions. It was discovered that the main forces of the Whites were in the most fortified, northern section of the Volochaev positions; the central section is covered mainly by machine guns, artillery and armored trains; in the southern section the fortifications are not completed and do not reach Verkhne-Spasskaya.

Based on the data obtained, a new action plan was adopted. It was decided to deliver the main attack south of the railway with the right flank of the Combined Brigade, while at the same time selecting a bypass column consisting of one battalion, one cavalry squadron and two guns under the overall command of the commander of the 2nd battalion of the 6th rifle regiment, Gulzhof, to bypass from the south.

The right flank was strengthened by the 3rd regiment of the Chita brigade transferred from the front reserve. Under the general command of the commander of the 6th regiment A. Zakharov, a strike group was created here. The special Amur regiment with attached armored trains was still supposed to advance in the center. The 5th Infantry and 4th Cavalry Regiments were to conduct demonstrative offensive actions on the left flank. The general attack was scheduled for the morning of February 12.

During February 11, units of the Combined Brigade regrouped according to the new plan. Despite enemy fire, the railway track and bridges were restored. Armored trains No. 8 and 9 were put on alert and pulled closer to the front line.

Assault on Volochaevka on February 12. By 7 o'clock on February 12, units of the Combined Brigade occupied a new starting position. The 3rd regiment of the Chita brigade was located on the northern edge of the forest, 2.5 km southwest of Volochaevka; 6th Infantry Regiment - to the left of the 3rd Regiment, on the edge of the grove, 1.5 km from Volochaevka; 1st battalion of the Special Amur Regiment - along the edge of the grove, 1.5 km west of Volochaevka, with the 2nd and 3rd battalions in a ledge behind; 5th Infantry Regiment - to the left of the Special Amur Regiment, along the edge of the grove northwest and north of Volochaevka, 2 km from the central hill of Mount June-Korani; The 4th Cavalry Regiment, attached to the 5th Infantry Regiment, covered the left flank. The main artillery group of 11 guns was concentrated in the center behind the Special Amur Regiment. Armored train No. 8 approached the bend of the railway 4 km west of Volochaevka; Behind him stood armored train No. 9.

The outflanking column of the 6th Infantry Regiment set out to complete the assigned task at 3 o'clock on February 12th. The signal for the start of the offensive was three gun shots from armored train No. 9.

At 8 o'clock on February 12, following a signal, units of the Combined Brigade began an attack on Volochaevka. Tearing apart the wire fences with rifle butts, sapper shovels, hand grenades, or crushing them under themselves, the companies of the right-flank 3rd and 6th regiments approached the enemy trenches and, after a short battle, occupied some of them. However, further advance was delayed by strong flanking fire from enemy armored trains, which advanced along the railway level with the battle formations of their infantry. Having come under devastating fire, the companies of the 3rd and 6th regiments were forced to leave the trenches they had captured.

In the central sector, the artillery group, having dispersed fire on individual targets, did not provide effective support to the infantry. At the same time, armored train No. 8, due to one section of rails destroyed by enemy artillery, could not move closer to the battle formations in order to conduct targeted fire. In view of this, the attack of the Special Amur Regiment foundered.

The advance of the 5th Infantry and 4th Cavalry Regiments was also stopped by heavy enemy fire. By 9 o'clock the advance of the Combined Brigade resulted in a protracted firefight. The main obstacle to the advance of our troops were enemy armored trains. With their fire they did not allow the infantry to rise to rush forward.

Having assessed the situation, the commander of the Combined Brigade ordered the fire of all artillery to be concentrated on the white armored trains and, under the cover of this fire, to restore the railway track. At the same time, the commander of the 5th Infantry Regiment, Kondratyev, ordered the battalion gun to be moved directly into the chain and fired at point-blank range on the enemy armored train, which was cruising in the area of ​​Mount June-Korani. Artillery fire diverted the attention of enemy armored trains. They entered into a firefight with the artillerymen. The sappers took advantage of this and quickly restored the path, and armored train No. 8 moved forward at full speed. Despite the oncoming hurricane fire, he forced the enemy's lead armored train to retreat and, breaking into the Whites' position, opened flanking machine-gun fire on the trenches. Encouraged by the bold onslaught of their armored train, the infantry of the Combined Brigade rose and launched an assault, trying to knock the enemy out of the trenches with a bayonet strike and grenades. A fierce battle broke out, often turning into hand-to-hand combat in some areas.

While these events were unfolding in the Volochaevka area, the following happened in the Amur direction and south of Volochaevka. The Volga region white brigade, sent by Molchanov on the night of February 12 to help the 4th detachment, moved towards Nizhne-Spasskaya. Due to the darkness of the night and a rising snowstorm, its vanguard broke away from the main forces. By the morning of February 12, he reached Nizhne-Spasskaya and was defeated by the Transbaikal group. Having been defeated, the vanguard began to quickly retreat to the northeast to the main forces. He was pursued by the Troitskosavsky cavalry regiment, which received the task of going to the rear of the Volochaev white group. Almost at the same time, the main forces of the Volga brigade, still only halfway between Dezhnevka and Nizhne-Spasskaya, unexpectedly came across a bypass column of the 6th Infantry Regiment. Taking advantage of the enemy's confusion, the commander of the encircling column quickly deployed his units and opened fire with direct fire from two guns. The enemy began to retreat, but finding that the numerical superiority was on his side, he stopped and decided to take the fight. The Whites barely had time to deploy their forces when cavalry appeared on their flank. It was the Troitskosavsky cavalry regiment, pursuing the vanguard of the Volga brigade. The unexpected appearance of cavalry on the flank caused confusion among the whites. Having only lost up to 300 people killed, they began to hastily retreat to the northeast.

The outflanking column of the 6th Infantry Regiment and the Troitskosavsky Cavalry Regiment, dividing into two detachments, began pursuit. The first detachment quickly reached the railway east of Volochaevka and set fire to a bridge 6 km east of the station. This forced the white armored trains to leave their positions and move east, thereby weakening the defense of the Volochaevka area. The exit of the encircling column to the rear of Volochaev’s group, combined with a powerful blow from the front by the Combined Brigade, decided the fate of Volochaev’s positions. The infantry of the Combined Brigade intensified the onslaught and broke into the enemy fortifications.

The Whites, suffering huge losses, began to retreat to the east. Already at 11 o'clock. 30 min. On February 12, the Special Amur Regiment entered Volochaevka, and the 5th Infantry Regiment occupied Mount June-Korani. A battalion of the 5th Infantry Regiment, the 6th Infantry Regiment and the Troitskosavsky Cavalry Regiment were sent to pursue the enemy. However, due to severe overwork in previous battles, the regiments pursued that day only to the experimental field, located 12 km east of Volochaevka.

The White Guards lost up to 400 people killed and 700 wounded in the battles for Volochaevka. The losses of the People's Revolutionary Army were also significant. The heroism and courage shown by the soldiers and commanders during the assault on Volochaev’s positions aroused admiration even among their enemies. The commander of the Volochaev group of whites, Colonel Argunov, later said: “I would give each of the red soldiers who stormed Volochaevka a St. George’s Cross”.

For the heroism of the soldiers and commanders shown during the capture of Volochaevka, the 6th Infantry Regiment was awarded the Order of the Red Banner and was subsequently renamed the “4th Order of the Red Banner Volochaevsky Regiment.” Armored train No. 8 and 67 soldiers and commanders of the Combined Brigade were also awarded the Order of the Red Banner.

Fourth stage (February 13-26) - pursuit. After the defeat at Volochaevka, the White Guards had no choice but to quickly flee to the south under the cover of Japanese troops. They wanted to preserve the remaining manpower for the subsequent struggle. To do this, they first of all needed to get out from under the blow that was threatening in the Amur direction.

On the night of February 12-13, hiding behind strong rearguards and blowing up bridges after themselves, the “White Rebels”, without entering Khabarovsk, immediately began to retreat from Dezhnevka to the southeast. To protect themselves from a flank attack from Kazakevicheva and to prevent the Transbaikal group from capturing the latter, the White Guard command organized a withdrawal in two columns. The main forces, forming the left column, were sent from Dezhnevka to Vladimirovka, Nikolo-Aleksandrovskoye and further south along the Ussuriysk railway. The right column as part of the Izhevsk-Votkinsk brigade received the task of moving from Dezhnevka to Novgorodskaya and Kazakevicheva in order to secure the flank and subsequent withdrawal along the Ussuri River.

The pursuit of the enemy with all the forces of the People's Revolutionary Army began on February 13. On this day, the Combined Brigade occupied Dezhnevka, but the enemy had already left there. From Dezhnevka the 5th Regiment was sent along the Amur Railway to Pokrovka and further to Khabarovsk; Having occupied Khabarovsk on February 14, the 5th Regiment remained there as a garrison. The 6th regiment and the partisan detachment of Petrov-Teterin moved through Vladimirovka to Nikolo-Alexandrovskoye. On the night of February 14-15, they reached Nikolo-Alexandrovsky and after a short battle with the White rearguard, they occupied it. The Special Amur Regiment and the 4th Cavalry Regiment were sent to Novo-Troitskoye (the Special Amur Regiment immediately from Dezhnevka, and the 4th Cavalry Regiment after occupying Pokrovka) with the task of assisting the Transbaikal group in capturing Kazakevicheva with a blow from the north. The regiments reached Novo-Troitsky on February 14. In general, the Combined Brigade had clashes only with the enemy rearguard in the area of ​​​​Vladimirovka and Nikolo-Alexandrovsky. The main forces of the left column of the whites managed to go south.

The Transbaikal group, according to the previously set task, was to vigorously attack Kazakevicheva and further to the station. Verino cut off the enemy's escape route to the south and destroy his manpower. However, due to the fatigue of the people and lack of forage, she set out from Nizhne-Spasskaya only at noon on February 13, thus losing a whole day. Having set out from Nizhne-Spasskaya, the vanguard of the Transbaikal group, due to the lack of preliminary reconnaissance of the route and poor orientation, lost its way. Instead of going along the channel leading to Kazakevicheva, the vanguard went along the Amur branch, going in a northeast direction, and only after a three-hour march discovered its mistake. By the morning of February 14, the Transbaikal group passed the channel, but, mistaking the Chinese village of Goldy, located at the confluence of the channel on the left bank of the Ussuri, for Kazakevichev, they began to deploy against it. While this second mistake was corrected, the enemy managed to hide behind the Consolidated Regiment stationed in Kazakevicheva and slipped to the south along the Ussuri River. In the battle for Kazakevicheva, the Whites suffered minor losses: 45 people captured, 25 carts, 1 gun. The Transbaikal group finally occupied Kazakevicheva only in the evening of February 14th. The Special Amur and 4th Cavalry Regiments, sent to help her, also arrived there. On February 15-16, the Trans-Baikal group, having made a 35-kilometer march over rough roads, made another attempt to cut off the enemy’s retreat route in the area of ​​st. Dormidontovka, but only overtook the rearguards here.

The People's Revolutionary Army continued to pursue the whites in two columns: the Transbaikal group along the Ussuri River and the Combined Brigade along the Ussuri Railway. On February 26, its vanguards reached the Bikin River, where the enemy offered the first serious resistance during the entire retreat from Volochaevka.

Fights for Bikin positions. On February 27-28, the White Guards tried to gain a foothold in previously prepared positions along the right bank of the Bikin River.

The narrow front and the presence of heights commanding over the surrounding terrain gave the enemy the opportunity to organize defense at this line. By the time the People's Revolutionary Army arrived, the Whites, with the help of the Cossacks of the Bikinsky stanitsa district they had mobilized, managed to erect field-type defensive structures here, using the remains of old fortifications. The tactical key of the entire position was the village of Vasilyevskaya, located on a hill along the right bank of the Ussuri River. Having prepared for active defense in the Bikin positions, the enemy positioned himself as follows.

The main group under the command of General Yastrebov, consisting of 1,500 bayonets and sabers with six guns, occupied the left sector in the Vasilyevskaya area. On the railway line near the station. Bikin was left with three armored trains with infantry landings and cavalry.

On February 26, the advanced units of the People's Revolutionary Army occupied the village of Kozlovskaya (north of the village of Vasilievskaya). The plan of the command of the Eastern Front was to eliminate the main enemy group with a strike in the direction of Vasilyevskaya. For this purpose, the Special Amur and 4th Cavalry Regiments were temporarily transferred to the Transbaikal Group from the Combined Brigade. The commander of the Trans-Baikal group, which was entrusted with the task of defeating the main enemy forces, decided to achieve this goal through a roundabout maneuver. To do this, the 3rd Infantry Regiment, the Special Amur Regiment and the Chita Cavalry Division had to attack Vasilievskaya from the north in order to pin down the enemy from the front; at the same time, a detachment consisting of the 1st, 2nd rifle regiments and the Troitskosavsky cavalry regiment under the overall command of the commander of the 1st regiment Kuzmin received the task of bypassing Vasilyevskaya along the Lesnichenkova River from the east and capturing the main enemy resistance center with a blow from the rear; The 4th Cavalry Regiment was sent for a deep bypass of the village. Vasilievskaya through Chinese territory from the west with the task of reaching the village of Pokrovsky Novy and cutting off the Whites’ retreat routes.

For actions along the railway in the direction of Art. Bikin left two regiments (5th and 6th). For the sake of surprise, the offensive was launched immediately with a march from the village. Kozlovskaya. By 6 o'clock on February 27, a detachment sent to bypass enemy fortifications approached them along the valleys of the Lesnichenkova and Bikin rivers from the east and turned around to attack. But the enemy was not taken by surprise. He met the advancing units of the 1st Infantry and Troitskosavsky Cavalry Regiments with strong artillery and rifle-machine-gun fire, and then launched a counterattack.

The pinning group, advancing from the north, approached the White positions on February 27 and made several passes through the wire entanglements, but also encountered stubborn enemy resistance. Fierce fighting in the eastern and northern sections of the Transbaikal group continued throughout the day on February 27. The enemy suffered heavy losses, but with the help of redeployed reserves, he still held his positions.

On the night of February 27–28, the 3rd Infantry Regiment was replaced in the pinning group by the Special Amur Regiment; In the outflanking group, the 2nd Infantry Regiment was assigned to the offensive.

On February 28, the outflanking group, leaving the 1st Regiment as a barrier towards the station. Bikin and placing the Troitskosavsky cavalry regiment on the left bank of the Bikin River to secure the left flank, led the 2nd regiment to advance along the road along the right bank of the river. Bypassing the first line of fortifications under the cover of the vanguard, the 2nd regiment threw the enemy back to the second line of trenches, but, met by shrapnel fire, was unable to advance and was forced to lie down in front of the wire. At the same time, the Whites launched an attack against the Troitskosavsky cavalry regiment, bypassing its left flank.

The cavalrymen retreated to the right bank of the Bikin River, and then, regrouping their forces, launched a counterattack. Knotted on the eastern face of the fortifications near the village. Vasilievskaya battle became protracted. The enemy was forced to pull all reserves here.

Meanwhile, the Special Amur Regiment, having correctly organized the interaction of artillery, machine guns and infantry, broke through the wire barriers and with a swift attack occupied an important White stronghold on the northern approaches to the village. Vasilievskaya. The successful attack of the Special Amur Regiment predetermined the fate of the enemy's defense. Further developing their success together with the 2nd Infantry Regiment, the Amurians completely occupied the village by the end of day 28. Vasilievskaya. Having lost the main support of the entire defensive position, the White Guards began to hastily retreat to the south.

The battles in the Bikin positions were the last attempt of the “White Rebel Army” to provide serious resistance to the troops of the People's Revolutionary Army. After these battles, the Whites continuously retreated to Southern Primorye to the “neutral zone.”

September 7th, 2018

In the fall of 1957, on the eve of the fortieth anniversary of the October Revolution, the Khabarovsk section of veterans of the revolutionary underground and civil war was looking for candidates to be “immortalized” on the occasion of the anniversary.

On October 2, the chairman of the section, Ivan Semikorovkin (former commander of mounted reconnaissance in the partisan detachment of Alexei Kochnev), proposed filing a petition to erect a monument to the Kochnev brothers in Khabarovsk.

Both in the hall and among the members of the bureau there were many former Kochnevites; apparently, a unanimous “for” was expected, but a member of the bureau, Comrade Malyshev, asked to speak:

– Although I was in the neighboring partisan detachment of Shevchuk, I know the Kochnev brothers well, especially the younger brothers - Nikolai, Alexander and Grigory, who in 1920, after the partisan detachments entered the city of Khabarovsk, were engaged in unworthy things, namely: they were in a gang Shmatko Alexandra, were engaged in robbing the population, for which they were beaten by the partisans of Izotov’s detachment. Therefore, I think there is no reason to erect a monument.

Heroes of the post

The Kochnevtsy, of course, reared up. Comrade Timkin expressed himself most eloquently:

– Slander, policy of revenge of the class enemy(sic!).

Former partisan Klishko said with a blue eye:

– Indeed, the bandits Shmatok, Yevtushenko and others penetrated our detachment. But they were all quickly exposed and, by order of Comrade Kochnev, shot.

Bureau member Ponomarev responded to his speech in a peculiar way: