Demyansk operation(01/07/42-05/20/42) troops of the North-Western Front (Len.-L. P. A. Kurochkin). The goal is to encircle and destroy the German group of troops in the Demyansk area. Advancing in forested and swampy terrain with deep snow cover, Soviet troops on 25.2 completed the encirclement of 6 divisions of 16A. Their liquidation was delayed due to lack of strength. The enemy managed to break through the encirclement front on April 23 and form the so-called. Ramushevsky corridor. Further attempts by Soviet troops to eliminate the Demyan group were unsuccessful. During the D. o. the enemy suffered significant losses. Soviet troops pinned down a large group of troops and thwarted the enemy's plans to attack Ostashkov towards another group that had the task of attacking from the Rzhev area. The long struggle in the Demyansk region was distinguished by exceptional tenacity and tension.

The breakthrough near the southeastern shore of Lake Ilmen was intercepted by the Germans in a westerly direction in the area of ​​Staraya Russa, but was a complete success in a southern direction. Large Russian forces, to which the 16th Army could hardly oppose anything, made their way south west of the Lovat River valley and, together with forces advancing from the area of ​​​​the city of Kholm to the north, encircled six divisions of the 2nd and 10th Army on February 8 buildings, forming the Demyansk cauldron. About 100 thousand people, whose minimum daily need for food, ammunition and fuel was approximately 200 tons, now found themselves surrounded, and for several months they had to be supplied only by air. The Russians acted here in the same way as before against the 9th Army: they stubbornly sought to compress the encirclement ring with continuous attacks with the introduction of large forces and destroy the troops located in it. Despite the reduction in food rations by half, extreme physical stress caused by low temperatures reaching 50° below zero, and continuous attacks by the enemy, who in several places managed to break through the battle formations of German troops stretched to the limit and fight already inside the cauldron, the encircled divisions withstood enemy onslaught. They retreated quite a bit. The Death's Head division was transferred to the western edge of the perimeter, where it plugged the breakthrough of the 34th Soviet Army. The Death's Head repulsed all Russian attacks and destroyed the elite 7th Guards Division.

In order to free the encircled divisions, German troops launched an offensive from the area southwest of Staraya Russa. Küchler formed five special shock divisions at Staraya Russa (5th, 122nd, 329th Infantry Divisions) under the command of Lieutenant General Walter von Seydlitz-Kurzbach and sent them into battle on March 21. Having made our way through five lines of defensive structures and during battles that lasted several weeks, we made our way to the western end of the cauldron through a 40-kilometer corridor stubbornly defended by the enemy. On April 20, contact with the encircled divisions was restored.

The city of Kholm, in which the 281st Division was captured on January 21, also surrounded and supplied by air, held out for several months, perhaps in an even more difficult position, being the only German stronghold between the Demyansk cauldron and Velikiye Luki. In Kholm, a garrison of five thousand was surrounded by troops of the 3rd Shock Russian Army. Only on May 5 did the 122nd Infantry Division break through to the city.

The Northwestern Front, headed by General P.A. Kurochkin, was faced with the task of defeating enemy troops in the Demyansk ledge. It was necessary to complete the encirclement of the enemy's Demyansk grouping with two strikes (from the north - by the 11th Army and from the south - by the 1st Shock Army), and then, with the rest of the front troops going on the offensive, to completely destroy it.

The offensive began on May 3. The front received 5 rifle divisions, 8 rifle and 2 tank brigades for reinforcement from the Headquarters reserve. However, despite the availability of sufficient forces and means, the offensive of the North-Western Front, which continued throughout May, ended in vain. The German command figured out the plan of the operation and transferred reinforcements from other sectors to the area of ​​the Ramushevsky corridor, through which the Demyansk group had contact with the main forces of the 16th German Army.

In the summer, troops of the Northwestern Front tried to destroy the Demyansk group by organizing offensive operations in the area of ​​the so-called Ramushevsky corridor, which connected this group with the main forces of the 16th German Army. Due to insufficient preparation of the operation and the stubborn resistance of the enemy, it was not possible to eliminate his group on the Demyansk bridgehead (the length of the front line inside it was 150 km). The German command transferred significant reinforcements from other sections of the Demyansk ledge to the corridor area, but left only about five divisions inside it. Nevertheless, the offensive actions of the Northwestern Front in the Demyansk area had a significant impact on the overall course of the struggle in the northwestern direction and weakened the enemy. The enemy command was unable to launch the planned attack on Ostashkov to meet its other group, which had the task of attacking from the Rzhev area.

As a result of the active actions of the Soviet troops on the Demyansk bridgehead, not only were large forces of the 16th German Army pinned down, but also serious losses were inflicted on many of its formations.

To repel the attacks of the Soviet troops, the enemy transferred part of the formations of the 18th Army to the Demyansk area, and also used a large number of transport aircraft to supply the 16th Army to the detriment of the interests of its main group, which was advancing in the south of the Eastern Front. Fighter aviation of the 6th Air Army, commanded by General D.F. Kondratyuk, took an active part in the fight against German transport aviation and shot down several dozen aircraft.

The actions of Soviet troops near Leningrad and in the Demyansk region in the spring of 1942 deprived the German command of the opportunity to transfer the forces of Army Group North from these areas to the south. Moreover, the enemy was forced to replenish his group on the Leningrad sector of the front in order to resume the assault on Leningrad, planned for the autumn of the same year.

Significant assistance to the enemy's ground forces was provided by his aviation, which during this time flew about 2 thousand sorties, while the aviation of the North-Western Front made a little more than 700 sorties. All this, together with shortcomings in the organization of the offensive, led to failure.

Recently I came across 5 leaflets issued in 1942.
The format is quite interesting: 122x116 mm.

The texts contain “letters” from Red Army defectors addressed to former colleagues.

The texts mention a number of settlements, units and formations of the Red Army.
I wanted to “tie” these defectors to a certain time period and combat operation.
It turned out that the leaflets were issued during the first Demyansk offensive operation, carried out at the beginning of 1942.

A few words about the operation.

The goal of the operation was to defeat a group of enemy troops (II AK troops) in the Demyansk area.
The Demyansk operation, like the Toropetsko-Kholmskaya and Rzhevsko-Vyazemskaya, was part of a large-scale offensive of the Western and Northwestern fronts.
The Northwestern Front had to go on the offensive in the Old Russian direction, defeat the troops of the 16th German Army, located south of Lake Ilmen, and go to the flank and rear of the Novgorod enemy group. At the same time, the front troops were supposed to advance on their left wing in the direction of Toropets, Velizh, Rudnya in order to assist the troops of the Kalinin and Western fronts in defeating the main forces of the German Army Group Center.
To solve the problems set by Headquarters, the commander of the North-Western Front created two strike groups. On the right wing of the front, he concentrated the 11th Army, consisting of five rifle divisions, ten ski and three tank battalions. The army was supposed to strike in the general direction of Staraya Russa, Soltsy, Dno and, together with the troops of the left wing of the Volkhov Front, defeat the Novgorod enemy group. The troops of the left wing of the front, as part of the 3rd and 4th shock armies, were given the task of striking from the Ostashkov area in the general direction of Toropets, Rudnya and, in cooperation with the troops of the right wing of the Kalinin Front, deeply enveloping the main forces of the enemy Army Group “Center” from the west. .
The front commander entrusted the troops of the 34th Army (five rifle divisions), operating in the center of the Northwestern Front, with the task of pinning down the enemy in the center of the army’s zone of action and simultaneously delivering two attacks with their flank divisions: on the right flank - in the direction of Beglovo, Svinora, on the left - on Vatolino with the aim of encircling the enemy group in the Demyansk area.
On January 7, 1942, the 11th Army went on the offensive.
January 9: 3rd and 4th Shock armies.
The latter, by the way, on January 19 were removed from the subordination of the NWF and transferred to the Kalinin Front, and in return, the Headquarters transferred the 1st Shock Army to the NWF, as well as the 1st and 2nd Guards Rifle Corps.
The offensive of the strike forces of the 34th Army did not begin simultaneously: the commander was forced to synchronize his actions with his neighbors. The offensive of the right flank of the 34th Army began simultaneously with the offensive of the 11th Army, on January 7. The left flank went on the offensive simultaneously with the 3rd and 4th UA: January 9.

In the sector of the 11th Army, the offensive quickly stopped, hitting Staraya Russa, which the Germans turned into a very powerful stronghold. By the way, Staraya Russa was liberated only on February 18, 1944, and before that its approaches were watered with Russian blood for a long time and unsuccessfully.
Here is the testimony of A.V. Rogachev, a fighter of the division advancing in this direction: “From February 23rd to 27th there were continuous attacks... 3-4 attacks during the day; at night, again. The losses were very large. I’m like this I saw very few bloody battles, like on the North-Western Front, during the war... there were so many killed there that it was difficult to just get through."

The left wing of the front, on the contrary, advanced quite successfully and soon found itself southwest of Demyansk.
On January 29, the 1st Guards Rifle Corps began its offensive. The offensive was carried out on a wide (40-kilometer) front in two groups. The main forces of the corps, consisting of the 7th Guards Rifle Division, the 14th and 15th Rifle Brigades, the 69th Tank Brigade and two ski battalions, struck along the Staraya Russa-Zaluchye highway through Ramushevo; the second blow was delivered by the 180th Infantry Division, 52nd and 74th Infantry Brigades on Pola. During February 1942, units of the 1st Guards Rifle Corps marched more than 40 km with continuous battles and by February 20 reached the Zaluchye area, where they linked up with the 42nd Rifle Brigade of the 34th Army, advancing from the south. The encirclement ring has closed. Units of the 290th, 123rd, 12th, 30th and 32nd Infantry Divisions, as well as the SS motorized division Totenkopf, fell into the “cauldron”. In total there are about 95,000 people.

The minimum daily requirement of the surrounded group was approximately 200 tons of food, fuel and ammunition.
On February 20, the Germans organized an air bridge connecting the group with the “mainland”. On the territory of the “cauldron” there were two operating airfields (in Demyansk for 20-30 aircraft and in the village of Peski for 3-10 aircraft). Every day, 100-150 aircraft arrived in the “cauldron”, delivering an average of about 265 tons of cargo.
You can read more about the organization of the air bridge and air battles in the Demyansk area here:
http://www.airwar.ru/history/av2ww/axis/demyansk/demyansk.html - this article was also published in the Aviamaster magazine No. 1 for 2004.

The battles to eliminate the encircled troops became fierce and protracted. Soviet troops sought to compress the encirclement ring and destroy the troops located in it. To this end, they carried out continuous attacks, throwing more and more forces into battle. Despite the reduction in food supply by half, extreme physical stress and continuous attacks by the enemy, who in several places managed to break through the battle formations of German troops stretched to the limit and fight inside the cauldron, the encircled divisions withstood the onslaught of the Soviet armies.

It should be noted that the formation of the pocket reduced the offensive potential of the NWF, since the task of containing six German divisions, like a large firebox requiring firewood, required reinforcements and a lot of ammunition, which were already in short supply at the beginning of 1942. Moreover, the NWF did not have the opportunity to simultaneously put pressure on the Demyansk and Kholm groups, as well as on Staraya Russa.

In order to disorganize the resistance of the encircled group and cut off its rear communications, the Soviet command carried out two successive landing operations: in February the 204th Airborne Brigade was dropped into the “cauldron”, and in March - the 1st and 2nd MVDBr.
You can read more about the fate of the paratroopers here:
http://desantura.ru/articles/34/
Also, a lot of interesting materials about the paratroopers of the 1st Maneuverable Airborne Brigade can be found in the journal of Alexey Ivakin ivakin_alexey

To free the encircled troops, a special strike group of three divisions (5th and 8th Jaeger Divisions, 329th Infantry Division) was formed under the command of Lieutenant General Walter von Seydlitz-Kurzbach, which launched an offensive on March 21 from the area southwest of Staraya Russa. Later, the blow was struck from inside the “cauldron”. The result of a month of fighting was the formation on April 21 of the so-called “Ramushevsky corridor” 6-8 kilometers wide, along which the Germans were again able to provide the “cauldron” divisions with everything they needed.

During May 1942, Soviet troops once again tried to eliminate the Demyansk ledge. The headquarters transferred 5 rifle divisions, 8 rifle and 2 tank brigades from its reserve to the NWF. However, despite the presence of sufficient forces and means, the offensive of the North-Western Front ended in vain. The German command, having figured out the plan of the operation, transferred significant reinforcements from other sections of the Demyansk ledge to the area of ​​the Ramushevsky corridor, leaving only about five divisions inside it, attracted part of the formations of the 18th Army and strengthened the defense of the corridor.
The Ramushevsky corridor was not liquidated and existed throughout 1942.

But let's get back to the leaflets.

1) The first leaflet (shown above) describes a Red Army soldier who crossed over (it is possible, of course, that this is a propaganda fiction, but the Germans could well have taken the real testimony of a defector, “creatively reworked” them and carried them to the masses) on April 12 - during the culmination of the battles for breakthrough of the encirclement ring around Demyansk. The ring was already close to a breakthrough; German units had already wedged themselves into our defenses quite strongly, reaching the line of the river. Redya. Although the advance of the Seydlitz-Kurzbach group practically stopped after reaching Redier on April 6 (it continued after regrouping and changing the direction of the main attack on April 20), the intensity of the fighting did not subside. The spring thaw also made its own adjustments to the actions of the parties, making the timely delivery of reinforcements, ammunition and food almost impossible. Naturally, not everyone survived such inhuman conditions. The described fighter was already an old man by that time - he had fought in the First World War. We must pay tribute: the older generation did not fight as evil and actively as the youth; probably, the prudence and caution acquired over the years still had an effect. Many had families and children behind them. Therefore, for these reasons, older fighters thought more about how to survive on their own than the “crazy” youth.

Here it is worth starting with the fact that there were mistakes in the name of the locality. Instead of "Strebitsa", the village that actually existed in the area of ​​the Demyansk cauldron was called Strelitsy. It can be easily found on the map above.
The rifle regiment indicated in leaflet 1234 belonged to the 370th Rifle Division - Siberian, formed in the Tomsk region in September 1941. By the beginning of 1942, the division was transferred to the NWF and became part of the 34th and then the 11th Army and occupied the defense line between the villages of Gorchitsy and Vyazovka in the Novgorod region. This was the north-west of the Demyansk cauldron. The division's regiments were tasked with destroying German strongholds in Novaya Derevnya, in the settlements of Nikolskoye, Kurlyandskoye, Strelitsy and breaking into the German defense system. This was part of a systematic effort to compress the encirclement cauldron.
By March 9, the Kurlyandskoye stronghold was taken.
On April 11, the village of Strelitsy was taken. Further advance was stopped by stubborn resistance from the enemy, who concentrated a large mass of troops in the western part of the pocket to break through the encirclement.

This example mentions the village of Vasilyevshchina - in 1942 - a powerful stronghold of the Germans, which was no less important than Ramushevo itself (Vasilyevshchina was located at the end of the corridor from the north - from the side of the encircled group; in fact, Vasilyevshchina, as well as Ramushevo, was part of the “skeleton” of the corridor) and passed from hand to hand more than once.
Our troops were repeatedly tasked with capturing Vasilyevshchina: first in January 1942 as part of the operation to encircle the Demyansk group, then - after the formation of the Ramushevsky corridor - as the first point in operations to eliminate it.
The plan for eliminating the corridor in all cases was approximately the same: the 11th Army was supposed to occupy Vasilyevshchina, the 1st Shock Army - Byakovo. After the connection in the Byakovo-Vasilievshchina area, it was planned, having created a defense along the Pola River, to attack Ramushevo with the goal of completely eliminating the corridor. The Germans knew this scenario, so they took measures in advance to strengthen the walls and mouth of the corridor (sometimes even to the detriment of the defense of the boiler itself).
In April 1942, troops of the 180th Infantry Division and the 74th Separate Marine Rifle Brigade held the defense in the Vasilyevshchina area. In March-April 1942, they were opposed by the SS division "Totenkopf" and the 290th Infantry Division of the Wehrmacht, who were trying to break through the encirclement.
In the April battles, the Germans almost completely destroyed the 180th SD (withdrawn for reorganization on May 3, 1942). The text gives the date: April 19, 1942. On April 25, the troops of the Seydlitz-Kurzbach group and the encircled group had already finally “formalized” the Ramushevsky corridor (although the battles for its expansion continued until May 5).
Maybe the defector described is just from the 180th SD?
Unfortunately, I was unable to find the village of Monakhovo (it is also mentioned in the leaflet). The village of Monakovo, consonant with its name, was located on the other side of the cauldron: from the south, near Lake Seliger. Could it be about her? I doubt it, of course, although...

This leaflet features the “neighbor on the left” of the 180th SD - 74th Omsbr. The brigade was formed in the Kazakh SSR, in the city of Aktyubinsk. It partly included sailors of the Caspian military flotilla, partly cadets of the Leningrad Higher Naval School.
The 74th Motorized Rifle Brigade was part of the 1st Guards Rifle Corps. The brigade's operational zone was located between the 26th SD (left) and the 180th SD (right).
In April, the brigade, along with neighboring units, defended itself in the area of ​​the Pola River, trying to prevent the encircled German group from connecting with the troops of Seydlitz-Kurzbach.
Unfortunately, I was unable to find any mention of the village of Lyudkino - nor, indeed, of settlements with a similar name in the corridor area.

The 7th Guards Division was part of the 1st GvSK. Despite the fact that the division was advancing from the north in February, during the April battles it found itself on the southern side of the Ramushevsky corridor, cut off from the main forces of the corps. The division's operating zone was in the Velikoye Selo area - the Znamya state farm.
On April 20, the Seydlitz-Kurzbach group resumed its offensive with the forces of the 5th, 8th Jaeger and 18th motorized divisions and the next day linked up with the encircled group near the village of Ramushevo.

The text of the leaflet looks funny at the surprise of our soldiers at the relationship between German officers and soldiers. In particular, the same rations.
You can read about German rations here: http://army.armor.kiev.ua/hist/paek-wermaxt.shtml
NGO order on food supplies for spacecraft fighters and commanders - here: http://militera.lib.ru/docs/da/nko_1941-1942/04.html
As you can see, paragraph 8 stipulates the ration supplement for middle and senior command personnel. In general, it is difficult to call it very significant. She only added some “pleasant little things” to the commander’s diet, which, by the way, throughout the war (and, indeed, to this day) were the target of enemy propaganda. The situation is approximately the same with the everyday uniforms of soldiers and commanders, which varied in materials and quality of tailoring (although on the front line commanders tried not to stand out from the mass of soldiers in their uniforms).

The defector described in this leaflet came to the Germans on May 3 - in the midst of oncoming battles for the Ramushevsky corridor (by May 5, the Germans further expanded the corridor and took up defensive positions).
The Wehrmacht introduced new formations into battle, trying to expand the boundaries of the corridor. Our troops, from May 3 to May 20, unsuccessfully attacked with the forces of the 1st UA and 11th A, trying to slam the corridor.

Here is what Alexey Isaev writes about these battles in the book “A Short Course in the History of the Second World War. The Offensive of Marshal Shaposhnikov”:
In May, troops of the North-Western Front launched an offensive to eliminate the “Ramushevsky corridor”. The offensive of the front troops began on May 3 and continued until May 20. However, due to poor organization of the operation, patterned actions of troops and weak command and control of troops on the part of the front command, these intense battles did not produce significant results. The shock groups of the 11th and 1st shock armies were unable to break through the enemy’s defenses and cut the “Ramushevsky corridor”. The German command, in order to maintain its positions in this corridor, regrouped the formations occupying the defense along the perimeter of the Demyansk ledge there. As a result, only 4.5 divisions were left on a 150-kilometer front inside the Demyansk bridgehead itself. However, the command of the Northwestern Front did not take advantage of this circumstance and stopped the offensive on May 20.

Numbers according to the register of propaganda publications: 399 Ub, 390 Ub, 402 Ub, 396 Ub, 397 Ub, respectively.
All leaflets have the same back side containing the pass form:

When preparing this post I used materials and links:
I would love to read a detailed study of the battles for Demyansk. The point here is not the talent of Hitler’s commanders and the mediocrity of ours. Both were on both sides of the front. It's a matter of the nature of the area. Yes, yes, exactly in it!
The German defense on these fronts was built from a network of strong points located on high, non-marsh areas (usually in the area of ​​populated areas). Around there were either dense forests (60% of the area of ​​the Novgorod region) or swamps, which reduced the possibility of large masses of troops bypassing these strongholds to almost zero.
As a result, no matter how cool tacticians and strategists the Soviet commanders were, they had no other choice but to storm the German defense centers.
There was simply no place to carry out dashing, daring maneuvers with masses of troops (as, for example, in the Stalingrad steppes).
This led to a World War I style carnage, where whoever had the most men, shells and equipment won.

PPS: it’s annoying when Demyansk is called Demyansk.

Battles of the Great Patriotic War unknown to the official history; at the cost of huge losses, ours kept the Germans surrounded for 14 months from February 1942 to May 1943.

The goal of the Demyansk operation was to encircle and destroy the German army near Demyansk. It was in the winter of 1942, on February 8, an encirclement ring closed around the 6 divisions of the 16th German Army, and the SS “Totenkopf” was among those surrounded. Forests, swamps, deep snow cover and lack of forces prevented the immediate liquidation of the enemy. The operation dragged on for 14 months - from February 1942 to May 1943.
Northwestern Front under the command of Lieutenant General P.A. Kurochkin, went on the offensive on January 7, 1942. The left wing of the 3rd and 4th shock armies and the right wing of the Kalinin Front advanced in the direction of Toropets, Velizh, Rudnya; The right wing of the 11th Army, consisting of 5 rifle divisions, 10 ski and 3 tank battalions, advanced on Staraya Russa, Soltsy, and Dno. The 34th Army (5 rifle divisions) was supposed to hold back the enemy and simultaneously launch two strikes with flank divisions: on the right flag in the direction of Beglovo, Svinoroy, on the left - Vatolino, in order to encircle the enemy in the Demyansk area.
It was not possible to take Staraya Russa, but there was complete success in the south. The 3rd and 4th shock armies reached west of the Lovat River valley and closed the encirclement on February 8, forming the Demyansk cauldron.
For three months the Germans were completely surrounded by land. Supplies came to them via an “air bridge” created by the Luftwaffe.
The Soviet army, with continuous attacks, sought to compress the encirclement and destroy the enemy within it. However, all Russian attacks were repulsed. The breakthrough of the 34th Army in the west was stopped by the Death's Head division.
During the fighting, the 55th Infantry Division defeated the SS Dead Head, but later two regiments of the 55th Division were cut off from the main forces, having pulled ahead, and nevertheless continued to pin down the enemy with a stubborn defense south of Borota Suchan.
In the autumn there was an offensive on the Demyansk bridgehead, the fighting became protracted and lasted for more than a month. To carry out this task, the 370th Siberian Division was brought in; battles were fought for many months in the area of ​​Topolevo, Gorchitsy, Kurlyandskaya, Strelitsy, Bolshaya Ivanovshchina, exhausting the enemy and causing him damage.
The 2nd Guards Rifle Corps, formed from units of the 8th Guards Division, was deployed in February 1942, and in 20 days of heroic battles, without tank or air support, they liberated dozens of settlements from Sokolovo to the city of Kholm.
The Germans, trying to help their own people get out of encirclement, began an offensive southwest of Staraya Russa. 5 special shock divisions were formed (5, 122, 329 infantry divisions) under the command of Sedlitz-Kurzbach. Having broken through 5 lines of defensive structures over the course of several weeks, we made our way to the western end of the “cauldron.” This is how the Ramushevsky corridor was formed, after the name of the nearest village of Ramushevo, which existed for the entire 42 year.
Despite the fact that the “corridor” was narrow, and the length of the front line was about 150 km, and the high risk of repeated encirclement, the German command did not want to leave Demyansk, and the possibility of using the Demyansk and Rzhev-Vyazma ledges to threaten the envelopment of Soviet troops from the north and south between Seliger and Velikiye Luki.
In 1942 alone, according to rough estimates, 4.7 million Soviet soldiers died in the Demyansk cauldron. Researchers note that although this operation was essentially a failure, the long-term retention of significant enemy forces in the Demyansk cauldron undoubtedly had a positive impact on the further outcome of the war.

During the Great Patriotic War, the troops of the North-Western Front fought fierce battles with the fascist invaders for two and a half years in the Novgorod direction - ancient Russian lands, where every city, every village is connected with the thousand-year history of Russia. Here, near Demyansk and Staraya Russa, Soviet troops pinned down a strong enemy group for a long time and inflicted heavy losses on it. However, in the Sovinformburo reports, those events were sparingly commented on with the words: “No change on the North-Western Front. There are local battles going on.”

Demyansk is an ancient Russian village in the Novgorod region, first mentioned in the chronicles of the 12th century, located on the Yavon River between lakes Ilmen and Seliger.

During the Great Patriotic War, fierce and bloody battles took place in this area: starting from the autumn of 1941, when Demyansk was abandoned by our troops during a counterattack near Staraya Russa, during 14 months of Nazi occupation until the winter of 1942 and ending in the spring of 1943. In military archives, the battles to liberate this territory are known as the 1st and 2nd Demyansk offensive operations.

In September 1941, fascist troops successfully advanced deep into our Motherland, advancing in three main directions: Army Group North towards Leningrad, Army Group Center towards Moscow and Army Group South towards Kyiv and Donbass. Hitler already in June determined the time of completion of the “victorious campaign to the East” and intended to capture Moscow immediately after the fall of Leningrad.

This front did not produce bright results, and the Demyansk cauldron was not included in the canonized list of victories of the Red Army. Nevertheless, the first encirclement of a large group of Nazi troops undoubtedly deserves more detailed study. Despite the fact that the battles did not end with the complete defeat of the 95,000-strong enemy group, they thwarted the Wehrmacht’s plans to strike Moscow from the Valdai heights, and also drew back part of the enemy forces from the Leningrad direction. And the Red Army soldiers here performed feats every hour, every day, demonstrating the incredible heights of the human spirit.

In the first days

Northwestern is one of those fronts that were created on the first day of the Great Patriotic War. Commanding Marshal of the USSR Kliment Efremovich Voroshiorv. It was formed on the basis of the Baltic Special Military District. It included troops of the 8th, 11th and 27th armies, the 3rd and 12th mechanized corps, as well as several separate divisions and brigades. In total, the front had 25 divisions (19 rifle, 4 tank and 2 motorized rifle) and 4 brigades (1 rifle and 3 airborne). They had 1,150 tanks, 6,400 guns and mortars, and 877 combat aircraft. This was no small force. But she was opposed by an even more powerful enemy armada: Army Group North, 3rd Tank Group and two left-flank army corps of the 9th Army of Army Group Center. This entire group consisted of 42 divisions, including 7 tank and 6 motorized. It consisted of about 725 thousand soldiers and officers, over 13 thousand guns and mortars of all calibers and at least 1.5 thousand tanks (more than 30 percent of all forces and means intended for the invasion of the Soviet Union). The offensive of the fascist group from the air was supported by the 1st Air Fleet, which had about 1.1 thousand aircraft. From a comparison of the composition of the groupings, it is clear that the enemy outnumbered our troops in divisions by 1.7 times, in tanks by 1.3 times, in guns and mortars by 2 times, and in aviation by 1.2 times.
Despite such an unfavorable balance of forces, the troops of the Northwestern Front fought heroically. From the very first day of the war, in cooperation with the Northern, Leningrad fronts and the Baltic fleet, they fought fierce defensive battles in the Baltic states and on the distant approaches to Leningrad. However, under the powerful onslaught of superior enemy forces, they were forced to retreat, desperately resisting and suffering huge losses.

During the first 18 days of the war, Soviet troops retreated to a depth of 450 kilometers. The irretrievable losses of the North-Western Front in 1941 (killed and died during the stages of sanitary evacuation, missing in action, captured, non-combat losses) amounted to 182,264 people.

Successful counterstrike

The first success of the North-Western Front was achieved already in mid-July 1941. To the troops of the 11th Army under the command of Lieutenant General Vasily Ivanovich Morozov With a decisive counterattack near the city of Soltsy, we managed to defeat and push back the enemy’s 8th Panzer Division, which was part of the 56th Motorized Corps of Lieutenant General Erich von Manstein, rushing towards Novgorod, inflicting great damage on the enemy, forcing him to increasingly disperse his forces.

This was one of the most effective counterattacks of the Soviet troops in the first days of the Great Patriotic War, which had enormous moral and political significance. The soldiers and commanders realized that they could not only retreat, but also advance and defeat the fascists. And in strategic terms, the Soviet command gained time to create a stronger defense on the approaches to Leningrad and concentrate additional forces in the North-Western direction.

Frightened by the high activity of the Soviet troops and a strong counterattack, the Nazi command on July 19 gave the order to stop the general offensive on Leningrad until the main forces of Army Group North reached the Luga line. The front here stabilized until August 10.

Defense of Novgorod

The defensive battles for Novgorod became a difficult test for the troops of the Northwestern Front. During the war years it was the regional center of the Leningrad region. The tasks of protecting it were assigned to the commander of the 12th mechanized corps, division commander Ivan Terentyevich Korovnikov.

On August 12, 1941, the southern enemy group broke through the front of Soviet troops near the village. Shimsk and rushed to Novgorod. The 28th Panzer Division, which had been tested many times in battle, but was greatly depleted, under the command of Colonel Ivan Danilovich Chernyakhovsky.

About one and a half thousand soldiers and commanders remained in it, armed with rifles, machine guns, pistols and machine guns removed from tanks.

On August 15, the Germans threw two infantry divisions into battle, supported by tanks, artillery and aircraft. And to help the tankers, the Soviet command transferred about a thousand more people from the 3rd tank and 128th rifle divisions.
For five days the fighting for the city did not subside. However, taking advantage of their large numerical superiority, the Nazis nevertheless captured Novgorod. On August 19, the ancient Russian city was occupied.

On August 21, units of the Novgorod Army Group received orders to recapture the city. On August 24, the Chernyakhovites broke through to the suburbs of Novgorod. The Nazis met the attackers with fierce fire. Political instructor Alexander Konstantinovich Pankratov rushed forward and covered the enemy’s firing point with his body, anticipating the feat of Alexander Matrosov. This was the first feat of self-sacrifice now known and captured in the history of the Great Patriotic War.

Unfortunately, the counteroffensive did not bring the desired result due to the unpreparedness and lack of strength of the Soviet troops. Novgorod was liberated from the enemy only on January 20, 1944.

With an eye on Leningrad

In August 1941, in order to cut off Leningrad from the country from the south, the German command set the task for the 16th Field Army to cut the Leningrad-Moscow road in the Bologoe region. At the end of August, the Germans launched an offensive in two wedges: one strike was delivered from the Kholm area to Molvotitsy and Demyansk, the other from the village of Pola to Valdai. Overcoming the fierce resistance of the Soviet troops, the Germans significantly pushed back units of the 23rd, 188th and 256th rifle divisions of the Northwestern Front. To further develop their operational success, in early September, in the rear of the 11th and 34th armies, the Nazis landed troops that cut the Lychkovo - Luzhno - Demyansk and Demyansk - Lyubnitsa roads. There was a direct threat of encirclement of Soviet troops, which is why they began to retreat. The newly formed Red Army units that arrived in time managed to stop the German troops, who never reached the Moscow-Leningrad highway and got stuck in the swamps south of Lake Ilmen. After a half-month of fierce fighting, by September 24, 1941, the front passed along the line of the lake. Ilmen - Lychkovo - lake. Velje - lake Seliger - lake Volvo. A vast and strategically important Demyansk bridgehead was formed.

Demyansk cauldron

At the beginning of January 1942, the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command, having assessed the results of the successful counter-offensive near Moscow, Tikhvin and Rostov, decided to launch a general offensive of the Red Army on a broad front from Leningrad to the Crimea.
The Supreme High Command set far-reaching tasks for the troops operating in the northwestern and western directions. The troops of the Leningrad, Volkhov and right wing of the North-Western Fronts were to defeat the Nazi Army Group North and release Leningrad. The Kalinin, Western and Bryansk fronts, with the support of the left wing of the Northwestern Front, were supposed to encircle and destroy the main forces of Army Group Center. Thus, the Northwestern Front had the task of participating simultaneously in two operations carried out in two strategic directions - northwestern and western, and had to act in divergent directions. At the same time, the North-Western Front had extremely few forces and means. It consisted of four armies (3rd, 4th shock, 11th and 34th), numbering 171 thousand people, 172 tanks, 2,037 guns and mortars, 69 aircraft. Artillery manning reached only 65 percent.
The situation was aggravated by climatic conditions. The winter of 1942 turned out to be extremely harsh and snowy. Frosts reached 50 degrees, and even 30 degrees almost every day. Blizzards covered the few paths so much that the troops had to make trenches in the snow layers with great difficulty. During the day they were cleared, and at night everything was covered again. On highways, cars moved at a speed no faster than 10-15 km per hour. Troops that found themselves in impassable conditions were forced to pave their own path and maintain it in a passable condition themselves, spending a lot of time and effort on this.

The situation with ammunition, food and especially fuel left much to be desired. All these factors made it difficult and slowed down the concentration of troops. The transfer of each division required five to six days instead of the planned one. Therefore, the start of the offensive was postponed several times.

And so on January 7, 1942, troops of the Northwestern Front attacked the enemy in the area of ​​​​the village of Demyansk.

During the fierce fighting in mid-February, six divisions of the German 16th Army - the 12th, 30th, 32nd, 223rd and 290th Infantry Divisions, as well as the SS motorized division "Totenkopf" with a total strength of about 95 thousands of soldiers and officers - found themselves surrounded there. Another 5.5 thousand Germans were locked in a second small pocket near the small town of Kholm (SS tank division SS-Obergruppenführer Theodor Eicke).

For the first time during the Second World War, a large group of Nazi troops was surrounded.

During the offensive, troops of the Northwestern Front under the command of Lieutenant General Pavel Alekseevich Kurochkin surrounded in the Demyansk area six German divisions of the 2nd Army Corps of the 16th German Army of Army Group North with a total number of up to 100 thousand people, namely parts of the 2nd Army Corps (12th, 30th, 32nd, 223rd and 290th Infantry Divisions, as well as the 3rd SS Motorized Division "Totenkopf") under the command of General Walter von Brockdorff-Ahlefeld.

Brockdorff-Alefeld was a famous German military leader who took part in the First World War (he was seriously wounded at Verdun). Thanks to his title of nobility, the soldiers of his corps who were surrounded preferred to call their position “County of Demyansk.”

To supply the encircled troops and hold the Demyansk “county,” all transport aviation of Army Group Center and half of the transport aviation of the Eastern Front were used. The Germans managed to organize an excellent defense of the outer front of the boiler, and inside it they built a system of reserve fortifications and ensured the protection of populated areas and roads.

This allowed them to hold out in the Demyansk cauldron from September 1941 until the spring of 1943, when, due to the incredible efforts of our army during the 2nd Demyansk offensive operation, the Germans were forced to leave the Demyansk bridgehead.

Hitler, in a rage, ordered to save those surrounded by any means. They were supplied by air. German aircraft (transport and bomber) made a total of more than 14 thousand sorties for this purpose.

Air bridge

The encircled Wehrmacht and SS units successfully defended themselves, being completely encircled for two months, and later they managed to break through the ring in the area of ​​the village of Ramushevo. This became possible thanks to air transport links: German planes made about 15 thousand sorties, delivering 265 tons of cargo to the boiler area every day. In total, during the entire existence of the Demyansk bridgehead, 32,427 flights with cargo and 659 with passengers on board were made.

The command of the air headquarters of German aviation was located at the Pskov-Yuzhny airfield. Lieutenant Colonel Tonne from the command of Army Group North and Colonel Fritz Morzik from the Air Force command were responsible for supplying the German “county”.

Every day, 100-150 aircraft delivered up to 265 tons of cargo to the “cauldron”. This saved those surrounded from serious difficulties.

For two months, all the enemy’s attempts to break out of the “cauldron” failed. But the troops of the Northwestern Front, lacking experience and sufficient strength, constrained by the terrain and climatic conditions, could not eliminate the surrounded German group.

In March, the command of the German Army Group North brought up additional forces to Demyansk and, with the support of the aviation of the 1st Air Front deployed to the Staraya Russa area, began an operation to relieve the blockade of troops.
Fierce fighting continued for a month. And only on April 21, a Nazi group of five divisions under the command of Lieutenant General Walter von Seydlitz-Kurzbach, Taking advantage of the weakening activity of the Soviet troops, a strike in the area of ​​​​the village of Ramushevo broke the encirclement.

The so-called “Ramushevsky corridor” was formed, which was held by the Nazis throughout 1942.

Confrontation

After the connection of the German Old Russian group with the Demyansk group, the front line resembled a 40 km long jug pressed down from the sides with a neck, the width of which ranged from 3 to 12 km. A new period of struggle began, the goal of which was to use counter strikes along the “Ramushevsky Corridor” from the north and south to again cut off the enemy’s Demyansk group from the main forces of the 16th German Army and subsequently destroy it.

Thus, with the formation of the “Ramushevsky Corridor”, the main task assigned to the troops of the North-Western Front in January 1942 - an offensive in the direction of Staraya Russa - Pskov - disappeared. Another was put forward as the main one - the destruction of the Demyansk enemy group. The Supreme High Command headquarters, whose main attention in the spring and summer of 1942 was focused on the southern wing of the Soviet-German front, believed that the North-Western Front, occupying an advantageous enveloping position in relation to the Demyansk group, was capable of encircling and destroying it with its own available forces and means. Overestimation of the capabilities of the troops of the North-Western Front and underestimation of the enemy’s forces led to the fact that the “Ramushevsky Corridor” determined the tasks and nature of the actions of the entire front for a whole year.

The struggle for the liquidation of the Demyan bridgehead on both sides was extremely fierce. The enemy tried to hold on to this bridgehead by any means necessary. He intended to use it to strike the troops of the Kalinin Front. The German command called the Demyansk group “a pistol aimed at the heart of Russia.” Hitler ordered the commander of the 16th Army to maintain the bridgehead at any cost and threw more and more forces there.

The Germans called Demyansk a “reduced Verdun” - the Battle of Verdun was one of the largest and bloodiest military operations in the First World War. It went down in history as the Verdun meat grinder and marked the depletion of the military potential of the German Empire.

The Germans attached great importance to their well-equipped citadel. To hold the Demyansk bridgehead, Field Marshal General Georg Karl Friedrich Wilhelm von Küchler recalled three divisions of the 18th Army from Ladoga, the ring around Oranienbaum and from Volkhov and sent them to the Demyansk cauldron.

The “Ramushevsky corridor” went down in the history of the Great Patriotic War as the “corridor of death”. The losses were enormous: the Germans had more than 90 thousand people, and the Northwestern Front had 120 thousand soldiers and commanders.

In the spring of 1942, the Northwestern Front exhausted its capabilities for conducting active offensive operations. Not receiving support and reserves from Headquarters, the front troops went on the defensive. During this period, the enemy significantly strengthened the Demyansk group and created a network of resistance nodes, saturated with firepower and engineering structures. Since the summer of 1942, stubborn local battles were fought in this direction, claiming thousands of lives.
At the beginning of February 1943, the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command developed a plan for the offensive operation “Polar Star”, during which the troops of the Northwestern Front were tasked with breaking through the enemy’s defenses south of Staraya Russa and destroying the Demyansk enemy group. The start of the operation was planned for February 15, but due to lack of preparation, the offensive began on February 23-26. The weather intervened again. The spring of 1943 was early. Due to the thaw, numerous rivers overflowed. Swamps, bogs and continuous forests made it difficult to pull up artillery to the highway leading from Demyansk to Staraya Russa. Bad weather also limited the operations of front-line aviation.
Frightened by the disaster at Stalingrad, the Nazi command began to withdraw the Demyansk group to Staraya Russa. Pursuing the retreating enemy, the 1st Shock, 11th, 27th, 34th, 53rd armies, with the support of the 6th Air Army, reached the Lovat River by the end of February. In eight days of fighting, 302 settlements were liberated and 3,000 German soldiers and officers were captured.

During the same time, the following trophies were taken: aircraft - 78, tanks - 97, guns - 289, machine guns - 711, as well as a large amount of ammunition and much other military property. The enemy left 8,000 dead on the battlefield.

The long and difficult struggle of Soviet troops near Demyansk ended.

In the spring of 1943, the Supreme Command Headquarters declared it inappropriate to continue the operation. A new difficult period of positional defense began. On November 20, 1943, the Northwestern Front was disbanded.

Behind Wehrmacht lines

In the northwestern regions occupied by the Nazi invaders, numerous partisan brigades and detachments were active. All their main operations were carried out under the leadership of the Military Council of the North-Western Front. For this purpose, in July 1941, a partisan department was created within the front. By October 15, 1941, there were 68 partisan detachments in the Northwestern Front. They transmitted intelligence information to military units, provided guides, and participated in jointly conducted combat operations.
The main force among these formations was the 2nd Leningrad Partisan Brigade under the command of Nikolai Grigorievich Vasiliev.

The partisans operated mainly in populated areas where the most important communications of the 16th German Army passed. And they hid in the Serbolovsky, Polistovsky and Rdeysky forests, where impenetrable swamps provided favorable conditions both for basing and for attacks on the enemy.

As a result of active hostilities, by the fall of 1941, the 2nd Leningrad Partisan Brigade liberated more than 400 settlements from the occupiers and created the first partisan region in the history of the Great Patriotic War.

It covered an area of ​​about 9,600 square kilometers.

From July 1941 to October 1942, the people's avengers destroyed more than 26 thousand enemy soldiers and officers, a large amount of military equipment and strategically important objects, defeated 28 enemy garrisons, 4 headquarters, freed 480 prisoners of war and removed over 6 thousand Soviet soldiers from encirclement.

Together with the front-line troops, the partisans took part in the Kholm, Tyurikov, and Dedovichi operations and helped provide units with food and fodder.
An action unprecedented in the history of the Great Patriotic War was carried out in the spring of 1942 by partisans and residents of the partisan region. On March 5, they sent a food convoy of 223 carts (about 50 tons of food) to besieged Leningrad.
Among those accompanying the convoy was a village boy Lenya Golikov. By the beginning of the war he was 15 years old. Seeing the atrocities the Nazis were committing in his native land, he joined a partisan detachment to take revenge on the enemy. Participated in 27 combat operations. On August 13, 1942, returning from reconnaissance, he used a grenade to blow up a car in which German Engineering Troops Major General Richard Wirtz was located. . Lenya found a briefcase from the killed Germans, which contained drawings and descriptions of new models of German mines, inspection reports to higher command and other important military documents. The brave scout has many more exploits to his name. January 24, 1943 in an unequal battle in the village of Ostraya Luka, Pskov region Leonid Aleksandrovich Golikov died.

Young and old rose to fight the enemy. The Nazis undertook four punitive expeditions in order to eliminate the partisan region. During these actions, in addition to the 20 thousand soldiers and officers who were used daily by the enemy in the North-Western Front to protect their facilities and communications, the Nazis additionally tore away entire divisions of field troops from the front, reinforced with aircraft and tanks.

They brought victory closer

Many exploits are written in golden letters in the heroic chronicle of the North-Western Front.
Natalya Venediktovna Kovshova and Maria Semyonovna Polivanova were the first among female snipers to be posthumously awarded the title of Hero of the Soviet Union. When the war began, they enlisted in the Moscow Communist Militia Division. Graduated from sniper school. In the battle for Novaya Russa, they went on the “hunt” for the first time and opened their battle account by destroying 11 fascists. By the summer of 1942, the number of Germans killed at Kovshova and Polivanova exceeded 300. Both were awarded the Order of the Red Star. On August 14, 1942, near the village of Sutoki, Parfinsky district, Novgorod region, the girls were ambushed. The battle with the Nazis was fought to the last bullet. They blew themselves up with the last grenades along with the soldiers surrounding them.

On January 29, 1942, in a battle near Novgorod, a platoon of the 299th Infantry Regiment fell into a bag of fire. The closest to the bunkers were Sergeant I.S. Gerasimenko, privates A.S. Krasilov and L.A. Cheremnov. They understood that it would only take the enemy a few minutes to destroy the platoon. Without saying a word, the heroes rushed to the embrasures of the bunkers. This was the first group act of self-sacrifice since the beginning of the war, testifying to the greatness of the moral spirit of Soviet soldiers. In total, during the Great Patriotic War, 470 soldiers covered the embrasures of Hitler’s pillboxes and bunkers with their bodies.

No one in the enemy camp was capable of such a feat.

The son of the Soviet commander Mikhail Vasilyevich Frunze fought on the North-Western Front - Timur. By January 1942, the pilot of the 161st Fighter Aviation Regiment of the 57th Mixed Air Division, Lieutenant Frunze, had 9 combat missions. He died covering troops in the Staraya Russa area.

But the pilot of the 580th Fighter Aviation Regiment, Lieutenant Alexey Petrovich Maresyev survived when his plane was shot down in an air battle over the Demyansk bridgehead. The further fate of the pilot, who fell into the forest behind enemy lines, and his 18-day desperate fight with death were revealed by Boris Polev in the book “The Tale of a Real Man,” which became a textbook of courage for many generations.

“Warriors of more than fifty nationalities fought in the troops of the North-Western Front,” Alexey Bolotskikh, a participant in the battles for the Ramushevsky Corridor, shared his memories with the Red Star correspondent. - I fought as part of the 364th Infantry Division, formed from graduates of the 1st Omsk Infantry School named after M.V. Frunze. I am grateful to the Novgorod writer Alexander Simakov for the excellent book “Demyansk Bridgehead: Confrontation 1941-1943,” which also tells about the role of the Siberian divisions that fought in the “Ramushevsky Corridor” area and made great sacrifices on the altar of Victory. We, soldiers of the North-Western Front, are offended that our merits are sometimes underestimated. Even at the Victory Parade there was no Battle Banner of our front.”

From generation to generation

As you know, the war is not over until the last soldier is buried. This is very important for the Novgorod land - many of its defenders have not yet found their final rest. During the Great Patriotic War, the North-Western and Volkhov fronts operated on the territory of the modern Novgorod region from 1941 to 1944. The total estimate of the losses of these fronts in killed and missing is about 800-850 thousand soldiers and officers. And according to the Novgorod Regional Military Commissariat, the military graves of the region contain the remains of only 415,543 fallen defenders of the Fatherland. This became the reason for the creation in February 1988 of the public organization “Search Expedition “Valley”. Today this is the largest association, which includes 46 search teams with a total number of about 800 people.

Over a quarter of a century, 98,454 Soviet soldiers were found and reburied on Novgorod soil, and about 17 thousand names were identified. In 2012 alone, 17 interregional search expeditions were carried out, the remains of 2,983 soldiers and commanders were discovered and buried, 103 names of the fallen, previously considered missing, were found, 2 medals “For Courage” and the Order of the Red Star were found.

The lessons of the Demyansk operations and conclusions from them are a topic for a separate discussion. One thing is clear: the heroic past cannot be forgotten. The soldiers of the Northwestern Front walked the difficult roads of war, not thinking about glory. Now it's time to give them what they deserve. This is our duty.