What is right-wing national Bolshevism? The phenomenon of the National Bolshevik movement: ideological, social and cultural aspects. Bolshevik belief in progress


NATIONAL-BOLSHEVISM
a type of communist ideology that tries to combine the cosmopolitan ideas of Marx and Lenin with the national, patriotic views of the Russian people.
Using pseudo-messianic motives of the “last and decisive battle”, speculating on the natural centuries-old desire of people for the “kingdom of universal brotherhood and justice”, the Bolsheviks managed to seduce the Russian people, muddy and distort their original Christian identity, cripple and corrupt the conciliar soul of Russia, habitually, easily and quickly responding to every messianic call. The people sinned by believing in crafty leaders and lying prophets; they succumbed to the devil’s temptation: through their own efforts, without God, to build “heaven on earth.”
Only such a great, universal, absolute goal could to some extent justify in the eyes of the Russian people those incredible sacrifices that the “proletarian” government demanded of him year after year. Only by believing that all of them are necessary to achieve final, eternal peace and “universal brotherhood” could Russian people reluctantly agree to the loss of their customary values. Many of those who smashed ancient shrines and mercilessly destroyed “class enemies” did this, sincerely believing that with one more, last effort, the shining gates would open to that very “bright future” that they were so confidently promised.
In fact, the doctrine of communism usurped, distorted and vulgarized those inexhaustible sources of powerful religious energy that for centuries nourished Russian life, ensuring the spiritual health of the people and the greatness of the state.
But such usurpation had its inevitable “costs.” The main one was that - for the most part - well-meaning and gullible Russian communists took seriously all the proclaimed slogans. They innocently and zealously strove for creative work, sincerely intending to build that fabulous kingdom of universal brotherhood, about which the “only true” teaching insisted. The destructive, destructive power of the diabolical “Sovdep” mechanism in this viscous, well-intentioned environment weakened year by year, despite any efforts of the “dedicated” mechanics, who seemed to have complete control over all its most important elements.
Almost immediately after the revolution, two factions, two different parties, irreconcilable in their attitude towards the country over which they ruled, emerged in the administrative class of the USSR. One part sincerely hated Russia and its people, seeing in it only a testing ground for new ideas or a fuse for the explosion of a “world revolution.” The second, to the extent of its distorted understanding, still cared about the interests of the country and the needs of its population. The struggle between these factions lasted - sometimes dying down, sometimes flaring up with renewed vigor, but not stopping for a moment - until the destruction of the USSR in 1991.
The Great Patriotic War became a turning point in this struggle. By the end of the 30s, the prerequisites had matured for the awakening of Russian patriotism and the national self-awareness of the people, who by that time had been ruled for two decades in a row, on whose behalf outright Russophobes shamelessly spoke - mostly foreigners, who had turned into a real privileged, “exploiting” class. When the war acutely raised the question of the physical survival of the Russian people and the existence of the state, a real revolution took place in the national policy of the Soviet leadership.
No, not a single dogma of the official communist worldview was rejected or even slightly revised. But the real content of “ideological work among the masses” changed dramatically and fundamentally, acquiring undoubted national-patriotic features. At the same time - we must give Stalin his due - the revision was carried out decisively and purposefully in all areas: from cultural-historical to religious.
Russian history and national culture, from being objects of mockery, dirty insults and attacks, suddenly turned into objects of veneration and returned to their rightful, honorable place. And, despite the fact that this was done very selectively and inconsistently, the results were not slow to be felt everywhere - at the front and in university classrooms, among party functionaries and ordinary peasants.
Scientists suddenly started talking about the fact that “denunciations of the Russian people” could be “to the taste” only of “those historians who failed to understand the deep talents, great mental, social and technical energy inherent in the Russian people”, that “ridicule... over the ignorance and barbarity of the Russian people” are unscientific, that such accusations are “a malicious myth that contains the judgments of most Europeans about Russia and Russian people.” Suddenly it turned out that Russia has a worthy answer to such an “indictment,” and “it is no longer science that is answering, but the entire diverse life of the Russian people.”
Equally serious were the changes in the field of church-state relations. On September 4, 1943, at a meeting held in one of Stalin’s country residences, it was decided to revise state policy in the field of religion. On the same day, in the Kremlin, Stalin received the most prominent Orthodox hierarchs, specially brought for this occasion from different parts of the country: the Patriarchal Locum Tenens Met. Sergius (Stragorodsky), Leningrad bishop metro. Alexy (Sinaisky) and Exarch of Ukraine Metropolitan. Nikolai (Yarushevich).
Stalin - pointedly - began the conversation by speaking highly of the patriotic activities of the Orthodox Church, noting that many letters were coming from the front approving this position of the clergy and believers. Then he inquired about the problems of the Church.
The results of this conversation exceeded all expectations. Every single question that was posed by the hierarchs, who spoke about the urgent needs of the clergy and flock, was resolved positively and so radically that they fundamentally changed the position of Orthodoxy in the USSR. A decision was made to convene a council of bishops and elect a patriarch, whose throne had been empty for 18 years due to obstacles from the authorities. We agreed to resume the activities of the Holy Synod. In order to train clergy personnel, they decided to reopen religious educational institutions - academies and seminaries. The Church received the opportunity to publish necessary religious literature, including periodicals.
In response to the topic raised by Metropolitan Sergius about the persecution of the clergy, about the need to increase the number of parishes, about the release of bishops and priests who were in exile, prisons, camps, and about providing the opportunity for unhindered performance of divine services, free movement around the country and registration in cities - Stalin is here he gave instructions to “study the issue.” He, in turn, invited Sergius to prepare a list of priests in captivity - and immediately received it, for such a list, compiled in advance, was prudently taken by the Metropolitan with him.
The results of the sudden “change of course” were truly stunning. In the next few years, on the territory of the USSR, where at the beginning of the war there were, according to various sources, from 150 to 400 active parishes, thousands of churches were opened, and the number of Orthodox communities was increased, according to some sources, to 22 thousand. A significant part of the repressed clergy was returned to freedom. The direct persecution of believers and the wild sabbaths of the “Union of Militant Atheists”, accompanied by a sacrilegious propaganda revelry, ceased.
Rus' came to life. The church survived. In a war with Orthodoxy unparalleled in its scope and ferocity, the atheists were forced to retreat.
The famous Stalinist toast at the victory banquet - “To the great Russian people” - seemed to draw the final line under the changed self-awareness of the authorities, making patriotism, along with communism, an officially recognized pillar of state ideology. The Orthodox reader will be interested to know that neither Hitler, starting the fatal war with Russia for him, nor Stalin, ending it with such a significant toast, probably had no idea about the prophecy pronounced in Moscow back in 1918 by the blessed elder, Schemamonk Aristocles. “By the command of God,” he said, “over time, the Germans will enter Russia and thereby save it (from godlessness. - Author’s note). But they will not stay in Russia and will go to their own country. Russia will then achieve greater power than before.”
The power of the USSR as the geopolitical successor of the Russian Empire after World War II certainly increased to unprecedented proportions. Within its ruling elite, there was still a deadly struggle between “nationalists” and “cosmopolitans.” By this time, the faction of internal party “Slavophiles” was headed by Zhdanov.
Since 1944, he worked as secretary of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party (Bolsheviks) on ideological issues; before that, for ten years he combined work in the Central Committee with the leadership of the Leningrad party organization, had extensive connections, a strong “rear” in the lower ranks of the party, and was one of the most influential Soviet nobles. In 1946, Zhdanov sharply condemned “rootless cosmopolitans,” which - applicable to the field of worldview and culture - meant recognition of the deep, centuries-old national roots of Russian self-awareness. In development of these new ideological guidelines, the Central Committee adopted a number of resolutions in the same year, thus “canonizing” the process of “exposing and completely overcoming all manifestations of cosmopolitanism and sycophancy before the reactionary culture of the bourgeois West.”
The triumph of the “nationalists,” however, turned out to be short-lived. Zhdanov’s main opponent in the internal party struggle was the almighty Beria. And if in a direct confrontation he lost, then in the area of ​​secret intrigues luck was on his side. Two years later, when Zhdanov died, Beria used the confusion of his opponents to “unwind” in Leningrad, the main stronghold of intra-party nationalism, a grandiose trial similar to the pre-war judicial mock-ups, under the cover of which he tried to cleanse the party apparatus of “degenerate nationalists.”
Metropolitan John (Snychev)

Source: Encyclopedia "Russian Civilization"


See what "NATIONAL-BOLSHEVISM" is in other dictionaries:

    National Bolshevism, National Bolshevism... Spelling dictionary-reference book

    - (NB) political and philosophical paradigm that arose among the Russian emigrant intelligentsia, the essence of which was an attempt to combine communism and Russian nationalism. It differs from “national communism”, which is understood as a combination... ... Wikipedia

    National Bolshevism- an ideological movement that arose among the White émigré intelligentsia in the beginning. 1920s, which recognized the Bolsheviks. revolution by the beginning of the necessary stage of national development and strengthening of growth. statehood. The term was first used by K. Radek in... ... Russian humanitarian encyclopedic dictionary

    M. 1. A direction in politics and ideology that combines the ideas of Bolshevism and nationalism [nationalism 1.]. 2. The transition from utopian dreams of world revolution to solving the problems of national construction, to the revival of the economy, industry, to... ... Modern explanatory dictionary of the Russian language by Efremova

    national bolshevism- national bolshev ism, and... Russian spelling dictionary

    national bolshevism- (2 m), R. nation/l Bolshevik/zma... Spelling dictionary of the Russian language

    Leader... Wikipedia

National Bolshevism

(Response to P.B. Struve)

Of all the extensive critical literature devoted to “national-bolshevism”, the article by P.B. Struve in the Berlin "Rul" seems to be the most remarkable. She immediately takes the problem at its root, puts forward the most significant, most serious objections, formulating them concisely, lapidally and elegantly. There is nothing superfluous in it, but the main thing that can be said against the contested position, based on its own starting point (“immanent criticism”), is said by it.

It is all the more gratifying to note its internal powerlessness to essentially refute National Bolshevism in its basic assertions. Even the most seemingly weighty, most convincing at first glance arguments are apparently unable to shake this point of view, which is now winning ever wider sympathy in the camp of Russian patriots.

Let's look at the article that interests us.

Decisive mistake by P.B. Struve's idea is that he confuses Bolshevism with communism. Based on this incredible and unsaid identification, he gets an easy opportunity to assert the “absolute and objective anti-nationality of Bolshevism.”

I am ready to agree with P.B. Struve, since the edge of his polemics is directed against orthodox communism. Hardly less often than my current political opponents, I myself had to emphasize the extreme economic harmfulness of the communist regime in modern Russia (this side of the conciliatory position has already been noted in critical literature: cf ... for example, the articles of Pasmanik in “Common Cause” and Prof. Yashchenko in No. 5 "Russian Book"). Struve is completely wrong in declaring that National Bolshevism, carried away by the state façade of Soviet Russia, is inclined to “idealize its entire system” (that is, obviously including socio-economic experimentation?) This has never happened and could not happen.

But the fact of the matter is that the Soviet system is not only not exhausted by the economic policy of immediate communism, but is not even organically and inextricably linked with it. Struve himself, a few lines below, speaks of Bolshevism as a “state system” that is “a pure political superstructure without an economic basis or foundation.” Thus, it is necessary to recognize that the quality of “absolute and objective anti-nationality” is not inherent in Bolshevism as such, but only in the economic policy that the Bolshevik government pursued during the civil war in the unjustified expectation of an imminent world revolution.

However, the general situation forced her to change her economic policy system. The time has come when the economic devastation of social experience can no longer be compensated by any political successes of the revolutionary government. The state is homesick. Before our eyes, that tactical “degeneration of Bolshevism” is taking place, which we have been persistently predicting for more than a year and a half (see, for example, my article “Prospects” in the collection “In the Struggle for Russia”), and the orientation towards which is one of the main elements of the national -Bolshevik ideology and tactics. Communism from the real program of the day gradually becomes a kind of “regulatory principle”, which is less and less reflected on the specific organism of the country. The Soviet government is capitulating in the sphere of its economic policy, no matter how orthodox words this capitulation is covered up by its official representatives.

An absolutely correct indication of the national harmfulness of communism thus misses the “conciliators”, since they assert (and life confirms) that Bolshevism will be evolutionarily forced in the name of preserving its “spectacular political superstructure”, which it needs for world purposes, to liquidate economically not the self-justified “basis” of violent, “Asian communism.” Thus, the facade will little by little lose its apparent “ghostliness” and deceptiveness.

At the same time, for us, the motives that guide the Soviet government in its “evolution” are of only secondary importance. P.B. Struve correctly emphasized our assertion in his first article: Bolshevism can achieve a certain national task regardless of its internationalist ideology.

Another question is whether the Soviet government will be able to transfer the country to “new economic tracks” in the difficult conditions of modern Russian life. But that she is forced to “sincerely” and strive for this with all her might, there can no longer be any doubt. It is equally clear that this aspiration is objectively in the interests of the country. Consequently, it must meet with active support from Russian patriots. The other path - a “return to capitalism” through a new political revolution - in this situation is incomparably more ephemeral, tortuous and destructive.

The state “superstructure” has an independent root and self-sufficient significance. State power is created by spirit to an even greater extent than by matter; Moreover, a healthy spirit ultimately inevitably complements itself with material power - it is clothed in gold and bristling with bayonets. Generally speaking, the terminology of Marxism, which for some reason is used by P.B. Struve in our dispute does not go to the point at all and only in vain obscures the problem. Neither for him, as a participant in Vekhi, nor for me, as their student, can there be any doubt about the enormous and creative value of the very beginning of the state organization, as such. In social life, the “superstructure” can sometimes play a creative and decisive role. It is not necessarily something secondary and derivative, fatally predetermined by the foundation. It can itself find a base, and there is no mathematically established relationship between this specific superstructure and a certain specific base. In a creative search for an economic basis, a state building can transform itself. There is no need to destroy it to the ground at any cost, so as not to find yourself in front of a continuous pile of ruins without any foundation and without any building at all. Salvation often comes through “politics”, through a “facade” - so to speak, from above, and not from below. How can we ignore the political organization that our revolution was able to forge, only on the grounds that until now this organization was combined with a utopian and harmful economic system?

I cannot help but admit that, from my point of view, the governments of Lvov and Kerensky, who in a year and a half brought (albeit unwittingly) the country to complete state collapse by the methods of their policies, are perhaps more deserving of the name “absolutely and objectively anti-national” than Bolshevism, who managed to revive state discipline out of nothing and create at least a “spectacular façade of statehood.” For starters, this is an infinite number. Through a powerful, intensely strong-willed government, and only through it alone, Russia can achieve economic and national recovery. What is the point of shaking the created revolutionary power in such torments, without having any other power in return - and even when the existing power is making heroic efforts to restore the state economy, at least through a gradual return to the “normal conditions of economic life”, which has so far been fundamental considerations destroyed?

I understand the “formal democrats” and radical intellectuals of the old type in their organic hatred of the “Moscow dictators”. These, in their own way, integral, although uninteresting people, will remain underground professionals and permanent inhabitants of Butyrok in Russia for a long time. But is there a place in their ranks or next to them for those who are so alienated from the “pre-revolutionary intelligentsia” and have fully comprehended the logic of the state idea?

Let the final goals of the Bolsheviks be internally alien to the ideas of state and national power. But isn’t this the “divine irony” of historical reason, that the forces that have wanted “evil” for centuries are often forced to “objectively” create “good”?..

Frankly speaking, I am directly struck by P.B.’s statement. Struve that “events have experimentally refuted National Bolshevism.” It seems to me that it’s just the opposite: events so far have only confirmed it with rare clarity, justifying all our main forecasts and systematically deceiving all the expectations of our “friends-enemies.” The ideology of conciliation is firmly established in the history of the Russian revolution. By the way, a simple chronological reference refutes Struve’s guess about the causal dependence of this ideology on the episodic Bolshevik successes on the Polish front: the defining provisions of National Bolshevism, which were already “in the air” and penetrating to us from the depths of Russia, were formulated by me in print in February 2020 , and verbally and presumably (to his closest political friends) - even earlier, in the last months of the life of the Omsk government. Being internally determined by the analysis of the Russian revolution as a well-known complex phenomenon of Russian and world history, the ideology of National Bolshevism was externally generated by the acceptance of the result of our civil war and was openly revealed abroad in connection with the liquidation of the white movement in its only serious and promising state form (Kolchak- Denikin). Struve is right in recognizing that this movement “was born from Russian non-emigrant soil and reflects some kind of internal struggles conceived and born in the revolution.” The days of the Polish war gave him only a bright external pathos, which naturally dimmed after its end, but did its job, widely spreading slogans and showing the face of the emerging movement. Its logical content was not at all shaken by the unsuccessful outcome of the Polish war. Further events - the collapse of Wrangel, who only managed to secure the Peace of Riga for Poland, the obvious shallowing and absolute spiritual impoverishment of further white attempts (cf. the disgrace of the current Vladivostok), and, most importantly, the beginning of the tactical evolution of Bolshevism - all this only strengthened our political position and determined its successes in wide circles of Russian nationalists, who were noticeably disillusioned with the emigrant “head”.

We never expected a miracle from our propaganda and did not embellish the bleak state of modern Russia. We had to choose the path of least resistance, the most viable and economical under the existing conditions. It was impossible not to foresee all its thorniness and duration, but there was no choice.

Let P.B. Struve will re-read the articles of his like-minded people over the past year and compare them with the literature of National Bolshevism: who showed greater sobriety, a greater sense of reality, and who revealed more political “confusion”? Who managed to establish a well-known historical perspective, and who fatally mistook all flies for elephants, without bothering to notice the real elephant?..

Finally, what is opposed to B.P. themselves? Struve’s political tactics that he rejected? - Dont clear. - “Chaotic.” A teasing “aporia” in the most interesting place, as in Plato’s early dialogues.

However, in “Reflections on the Russian Revolution” the following forecast-imperative is expressed: “The Russian counter-revolution, now crushed and flooded by revolutionary waves, apparently must enter into some kind of inextricable connection with certain elements and forces that grew out of the revolution, but alien and even opposite to it” (p. 32).

This vague phrase (in itself providing material for conclusions in the spirit of National Bolshevism) receives a certain explanation in the analyzed article from Rul. And this explanation makes it completely unacceptable in my eyes. “Some elements and forces” are obviously, first of all, the Red Army, which P.B. Struve recommends using it directly for the purposes of counter-revolution, that is, directing it against the Bolshevik regime in the revolutionary struggle that national forces should wage against it.

Given the current political situation, this recipe is clearly unsuccessful: at best it is utopian, and at worst it is anti-national and anti-state. If he means a painless and “in perfect order” act of action by the Red Army (with all its cadets) against the current Russian government, in the name of a certain idea or a certain person, then it is simply “devoid of any practical meaning,” and from it, as from a naive fantasy, “no directives for practical actions can be extracted,” even if it is recognized as “theoretically correct.” If he seeks to disintegrate the red army by the methods with which the Bolsheviks disintegrated the white army in their time, he is nationally criminal and insane, for he will destroy those “white principles” that, as Shulgin aptly noted, have crawled beyond the red front line as a result of our a terrible but instructive civil war. I am convinced that it was P.B. Struve must understand better than others the immeasurable danger of introducing a revolution into the Red Army, the entire inadmissibility of a new demagogic disorganization of the Russian military force. Why throw out unspoken slogans and ambiguous recipes? Why this relapse of the Red Bolshevik Spring?

The moment of conflict between the revolution and “certain elements and forces that grew on its soil, but are deeply alien to it,” is still far from coming and so far it is not even outlined ahead. On the contrary, at the moment there is rather a peculiar mutual rapprochement of these two factors of modern life in Russia. There is no point in artificially causing or forcing their conflict; it is much more expedient to achieve the greatest possible organic or even mechanical adaptation of the revolution to the national interests of the country, even if formally and outwardly victory remained with the internationalist revolution, even if its slogans were still outwardly opposed to the principles of nationalism and statehood. And that side of National Bolshevism, which Struve incorrectly calls the “ideology of national despair,” precisely takes into account the well-known usefulness of a revolutionary firm for “defensive” state purposes. The reference to the “monstrous hypocrisy and Machiavellianism” of such a point of view, which is not entirely clear to me, cannot serve as a convincing refutation of it. Moreover, the revolution itself “subjectively” acts here without any hypocrisy and Machiavellianism. Consequently, known and purely concrete results (even if they are very far from a real “world revolution”) can be achieved. For a patriot, all effective ways of preserving and restoring the homeland, conceivable under given conditions, must be fully used.

The tactics of National Bolshevism are as meaningful as its ideology is clear and internally integral.

From the book History of Russia in small polka dots author Eliseeva Olga Igorevna

FROM NATIONAL-NIHILISM TO NATIONAL-ROMANTICISM “How much of the Kremlin will you hang?” B. Pilnyak The secret of Catherine II's charm is largely determined by the charm of the power of the Russian Empire. Where did this charm come from in a society that just recently was literally sick of the word

From the book The Myth of the Eternal Empire and the Third Reich author Vasilchenko Andrey Vyacheslavovich

Eastern ideology and national Bolshevism Taught by the experience of the Seven Years' War, Frederick the Great at one time ordered his heirs to maintain friendly relations with Russia at all costs. For a century and a half, this order was at least fulfilled, and Prussia, and

From the book “Princess Tarakanova” from Radzinsky author Eliseeva Olga Igorevna

From the book Continent of Eurasia author Savitsky Petr Nikolaevich

“MORE ABOUT NATIONAL BOLSHEVISM” (Letter to P. Struve) Dear Sir, Pyotr Berngardovich! In your “Historical and Political Notes on Modernity” you devoted several pages to an analysis of the views of National Bolshevism. Belonging to the few among the Russian emigration

From the book 100 famous scientists author Sklyarenko Valentina Markovna

STUVE VASILY YAKOVLEVICH (1793 - 1864) “A teneris adsuescere multum est. We, Struve, cannot live satisfied without hard work, because from early youth we were convinced that it is the most useful and best pleasure of human life.” Jacob Struve Famous

From the book Between the Whites and the Reds. Russian intelligentsia of 1920-1930 in search of the Third Way author Kvakin Andrey Vladimirovich

National Bolshevism and the All-Union Communist Party (Bolsheviks) In practice, the ideas of Smenovekhism objectively contributed to the strengthening of the power of the Bolsheviks and the entry into Soviet service of significant sections of the Russian intelligentsia. The Bolshevik leaders used the ideas of the “Change of Milestones” purely pragmatically for

From the book National Bolshevism author Ustryalov Nikolay Vasilievich

Department One. National Bolshevism (articles

From the book Personalities in History. Russia [Collection of articles] author Biographies and memoirs Team of authors --

Vasily Struve. At the call of the stars Ruslan Davletshin He was not yet twenty when he was offered the position of senior teacher at the gymnasium - he could not have dreamed of anything better! But the stars called him... And after twenty years, people from Lisbon, Stockholm, and Zurich began to visit him.

From the book Book 1. Biblical Rus'. [The Great Empire of the XIV-XVII centuries on the pages of the Bible. Rus'-Horde and Ottomania-Atamania are two wings of a single Empire. Bible fuck author Nosovsky Gleb Vladimirovich

11.4. The answer of Tsar Ivan the Terrible to the traitor Andrei Kurbsky is the answer of the Assyrian Holofernes to the traitor Achior. In the Bible, after the speech-monologue of Achior, the Assyrian commander-in-chief Holofernes speaks with a reply message-speech. His speech takes up half of chapter 6 of the book of Judith

From the book Russian History in Persons author Fortunatov Vladimir Valentinovich

5.4.2. At the origins of Russian Marxism: Plekhanov and Struve On the right wing of the Kazan Cathedral in St. Petersburg, above a small elevation that seemed intended for speakers, relatively recently there was a tablet, a modest memorial plaque. From the text

From the book Secrets of the Russian Revolution and the Future of Russia author Kurganov G S

23. ABALDUY FROM RASTORGUYEVA STREET, HE IS PROFESSOR “SIVUKHA”, AND ACADEMICIAN P. B. STRUVE The authors ask you to note that none of them has anything against the venerable academician. This chapter says that not only our scientists, diplomats and politicians, but almost the entire Russian

author Lenin Vladimir Ilyich

The economic content of populism and its criticism in Mr. Struve’s book (reflection of Marxism in bourgeois literature) Regarding the book by P. Struve: “Critical notes on the question of the economic development of Russia.” St. Petersburg. 1894 (87) Written at the end of 1894 - beginning of 1895? Printed in

From the book Complete Works. Volume 1. 1893–1894 author Lenin Vladimir Ilyich

Chapter III. The formulation of economic questions by the Narodniks and G. Struve Having finished with sociology, the author moves on to more “concrete economic questions” (73). He considers it “natural and legal” to start with “general provisions and historical information”, with “indisputable,

From the book Complete Works. Volume 4. 1898 - April 1901 author Lenin Vladimir Ilyich

To the draft agreement with Struve (115) Representatives of the social democratic group “Zarya” - “Iskra” and the democratic opposition group “Svoboda” agreed among themselves on the following: 1) The group “Zarya” publishes a special supplement called

From the book Complete Works. Volume 7. September 1902 - September 1903 author Lenin Vladimir Ilyich

G. Struve, exposed by his employee No. 17 of Osvobozhdeniye, brought a lot of pleasant things for Iskra in general and for the writer of these lines in particular. For Iskra, because it was pleased to see some result of its efforts to move Mr. Struve to the left, it was pleasant to meet

From the book Complete Works. Volume 24. September 1913 - March 1914 author Lenin Vladimir Ilyich

Mr. Struve on the “Improvement of Power” Mr. Struve is one of the most outspoken counter-revolutionary liberals. Therefore, it is often very instructive to take a closer look at the political reasoning of a writer who especially clearly confirmed the Marxist

In our work, we almost did not touch upon issues of national politics in the Soviet republics, in particular because it was already the subject of research by many authors. The issues of the creation of the USSR in 1922, the problems of local nationalism and the fight against it - all this has been studied in much more detail than the Russian problem, which remains almost a blank spot on the historical map. All we would have to do here is to reconcile what is known about national politics with the development of National Bolshevism.
Already from the very beginning of the revolution, movements arose in a number of national regions that could be united under the general name of “national communism.” On the one hand, these movements were similar to National Bolshevism, but on the other, they were sharply different from it. These were left-wing radical nationalist movements that placed emphasis on communist ideology. As one of the leading researchers of these movements, Richard Pipes, notes, the national communists were people of radical views who joined the revolution out of the belief that the creation of a communist economy would automatically lead to the destruction of national oppression. If the National Bolsheviks saw in communism an annoying temporary addition to the revolutionary process, which would disappear over time, then the National Communists saw it as the main value of the revolutionary process.

Further, National Bolshevism defended the interests of the imperial nation, which found itself in a state of national crisis. He was her means of survival. National communism was the weapon of young nations, just getting on their feet, for whom the revolution was their midwife.
Both National Bolshevism and National Communism were different sides of the same process - pressure from the national environment on the new social system. But unlike the triumphant National Bolshevism, National Communism was defeated. One of the sharpest conflicts was generated by Turkic national communism. It is associated with the name of the Tatar communist Sultan-Galiyev. Already in 1919, he expressed doubt that the global class struggle launched by the Russian Bolsheviks would change the fate of the peoples of the colonial countries. In his opinion, the proletariat of developed countries is still interested in maintaining their advantages in relation to the colonial peoples.
The seizure of power by the proletariat in industrial countries will only mean a change of master for the colonial peoples. At first, Sultan-Galiyev attributed this only to the proletariat of Western countries, but later transferred his views to Russia.
If for many Russians the NEP instilled hopes for the national revival of Russia, then for Sultan-Galiyev it turned out to be the loss of all hopes for international communism and the loss of faith that the proletariat of developed countries could liberate the colonial peoples, because for him the NEP was, just like for many Russians, the beginning of a return to conditions that existed before 1917.

He could not help but be disgusted by the party’s flirtation with Russian nationalism, which meant for him the restoration of previous national relations in the country, as evidenced by his anonymous statement in “The Life of Nationalities” in 1921. Sultan-Galiyev proposes a program that should radically exclude the revival of Russian rule over the peoples of colonial countries, even in a communist guise. He proposes to establish a dictatorship of colonies and semi-colonies over industrialized countries, to create an International of colonial countries, opposed to the Third International, which is dominated by Western elements. In addition, he demands the creation of a Muslim Soviet republic and a Muslim communist party.
Sultan-Galiyev was arrested on the orders of Stalin in April or May 1923. Stalin pointed to him as a traitor. Sultan-Galiyev was the first responsible communist worker arrested after the revolution, and Stalin was the initiator of this arrest, as well as the initiator of the defeat of Turkic national communism.
He also led the defeat of Georgian national communism. In May 1921, Georgia signed an agreement with the RSFSR, recognizing it as a sovereign state, but this agreement remained on paper. As soon as the Georgian communist government adopted its own laws, Stalin, Ordzhonikidze and other Russified Georgians who were in Moscow launched a real campaign against Georgia. Under these laws, residence in Georgia for non-Georgians and marriages between Georgians and non-Georgians were limited by large taxes.
The Georgian question became one of the central ones at the end of 1922 - beginning of 1923 1 . Lenin came to the defense of the Georgian national communists and even raised the question of the advisability of dissolving the newly created USSR. But thanks to his retirement, Georgian “national deviationism” was completely defeated, and the entire former Georgian leadership was removed from Georgia and sent to different parts of the country.
The strongest and now only national communism remained - Ukrainian, with which Moscow constantly fought throughout the first years of the revolution.
In December 1920, the RSFSR and Ukraine entered into an agreement under which Ukraine was recognized as a sovereign state, but this agreement remained on paper. In May 1922, the Ukrainian government even filed a formal protest against the fact that the RSFSR acted in international relations on behalf of Ukraine.

After the creation of the USSR in December 1922, the status of Ukraine continued to steadily decline. A prominent representative of Ukrainian national communism, Skrypnik, even indirectly spoke out in defense of Sultan-Galiyev, saying at a meeting in the Central Committee that his case is an unhealthy symptom of the presence of national inequality, and in order to completely exclude the emergence of such cases, this inequality must be eliminated. In 1925-1926 There were new signs of an attack on national communism in Ukraine. This is manifested in criticism of the excesses of the so-called. Ukrainization, which was not previously questioned, as Mordechai Altshuler draws attention to.
The reason for this was the initiative shown by Shumsky, the People's Commissar of Education of the Ukrainian SSR, who, in a conversation with Stalin, demanded increased Ukrainization of state and cultural life in the republic and accused the existing leadership of this republic, especially Kaganovich, of deliberately preventing Ukrainization. Shumsky even proposed personal replacements in the Ukrainian leadership so that only Ukrainians would become the head of the republic. In response to this, Stalin sent a letter to Kaganovich and other members of the Central Committee of the Communist Party (Bolsheviks) of Ukraine (April 26, 1926). Having agreed with a number of Shumsky’s theses, Stalin accused him, in particular, of the fact that the adoption of most of Shumsky’s proposals would cause anti-Ukrainian chauvinism among Russian workers in Ukraine, and Ukrainization in relation to them would become a form of national oppression. Stalin accused the Ukrainian intelligentsia of anti-Russian sentiments. The main example for him was the Ukrainian communist writer Khvilevoy, who demanded “immediate de-Russification.” “While the Western European proletarians and their communist parties,” Stalin was indignant, “are full of sympathy for Moscow, for this citadel of the international revolutionary movement and Leninism, while the Western European proletarians look with admiration at the banner waving in Moscow, the Ukrainian communist Khvilevoy has nothing more to say in favor of Moscow other than to urge Ukrainian leaders to flee from Moscow “as soon as possible.” And this is called internationalism!”
On June 2-6, 1926, an expanded plenum of the Central Committee of the Communist Party (b)U was held on the issue of mistakes in Ukrainization, and to confirm that we are talking about a general change in policy on the national issue, on June 9 a similar plenum was held in Belarus, dedicated to the work among the intelligentsia. True, these changes are still of a limited and not decisive nature, so that in response to Stalin’s accusation, the same Khvilevoy in 1927 was still able to bring out in his new novel a heroine who exposes the slogan “socialism in one country.”

Speaking about one Russian intellectual, she accuses him of belonging to those “internationalists” who willingly talk about national self-determination, but see “Petlyurism” everywhere, not noticing their own “Ustryalism.”
Along with Turkic, Georgian, and Ukrainian national communism, Jewish national communism also deserves attention. Baruch Gurevich closes it within the framework of the Poalei Zion party, but, apparently, Jewish national-communist sentiments were more widespread. In this regard, it is curious to use the term “national-bolshevism” in application to the sentiments that existed among some of the Jewish party workers.
In parallel with national trends within the communist movement, a counter process is observed on the national outskirts: recognition of the national character of the newly emerged Soviet republics by part of the nationalists. If in Russian National Bolshevism, on the contrary, first a movement towards Bolshevism arises within national movements, and then a counter process occurs within the Communist Party, in the republics the order changes, and this is quite clear, because there the revolution occurs in the reverse order: first in the situation national revival comes national regimes that are destroyed by the Bolsheviks, while in Russia the revolution initially took place under the sign of a Russian national catastrophe.

These counter movements of non-Russian nationalists began to be called Smenovekhovism, although the similarity to Russian National Bolshevism completely obscured the directly opposite meaning of these movements. The Bolshevik leaders took advantage of this deliberately. Thus, S. Ordzhonikidze argued that Smenovekhovtvo was observed among the Georgian and Armenian intelligentsia."3 Since he was openly accused in Georgia of serving great-power Russian interests as a Russified Georgian, it was important for him to reduce the meaning of Smenovekhovtvo to the general idea of ​​cooperation with the Soviet government The statements of Soviet sources about the existence of “Ukrainian change of leadership”, based on the fact of the return of some national Ukrainian leaders, for example M. Grushevsky, or V. Vinnychenko’s attempts to enter the Ukrainian government in 1920, should be assessed in exactly the same way.
The fate of domestic Russian national communism was sealed. He was defeated by the strengthening of National Bolshevism, only to rise again after the death of Stalin.
The situation with national communism in foreign communist parties was much more complicated. It was possible to fight this, but it was impossible to destroy it like the Ukrainian or Georgian national communists.
The “National Bolshevism” of Laufenberg and Wolfheim, already known to us, took on an anti-Russian character.
For Ustryalov, this no longer mattered, because he was inspired by the very idea of ​​​​cooperation between nationalists and communists.
The Hamburg communists argued, for example, that the International was an instrument of Russian imperialist domination. In this regard, the Second Congress of the Comintern in August 1920 sent a letter to the German communists.
“In Germany itself,” it said, “the Wolfheims and Laufenbergs are doing everything to alienate you from communism. They slandered the mighty and heroic struggle of the Russian proletariat against world capitalism as a struggle for world domination of the Russian communist party authorities... They are trying to distract the German the proletariat from its revolutionary duties, declaring that they rejected "the transformation of Germany into a Russian marginal state."
In a report on the international situation at the Fourth Congress of the Comintern, Radek defended himself against attacks on the Comintern as an instrument of the state interests of Russia: “The interests of the Russian proletarian state are the interests of the Russian proletariat organized in the form of state power.”
German National Communism as an organized movement was nevertheless suppressed by the then all-powerful Comintern. But, like domestic Russian national communism, it re-emerged in the post-war period, especially since 1948, after the break between the USSR and Yugoslavia. Today, world communism is no longer a single bloc or camp of communist countries and parties that are not in power. At the slightest opportunity, they enter into hostility with each other, which can become global.
Communism has a tendency to become national communism as soon as it comes to power. This, apparently, is the historical fate of the communist movement. The relations between Russian National Bolshevism and the outlying national communisms in Soviet Russia in the twenties turned out to be a prototype of future relations between communist countries.

1 The Twelfth Congress... See also the speech at the congress by Makharadze, who connected the persecution of Georgian communists with the growth of change-of-government.

1. The roots of our failures

At first glance, the loss of the patriotic opposition in recent years is a matter of tactics, political implementation, and social specifics. There is an illusion that at the level of ideology everything is clear and understandable, and that only deceit, the dexterity of the internal enemy (the fifth column), powerful support from the West and the special idiocy of the people invariably provide the Russophobes with victory after victory.

I am convinced that this is not entirely true. Moreover, it is not at all like that. The defeat of the national and communist forces is not accidental. It has deep historical and ideological roots, and cannot be reduced to the simple mediocrity of leaders, the passivity of the masses and the power of the enemy. Everything is much more complicated.

2. Not red-brown, but pink-pale

The patriotic opposition was at one time called “red-brown,” emphasizing its combination of communist and nationalist elements. This name shocked, first of all, the patriots themselves, who saw in it only an insult. This is significant. Almost no one felt red-brown. There were red ones, there were white ones, there were even brown ones (but these are exotic). But the red-browns did not exist. Prokhanov at some point proposed the term “red-white” - it was more accurate, but also did not catch on.

Yes, the combination of socialist and patriotic sympathies of the opposition is obvious. But at the political level, this circumstance was expressed in a rather artificial and pragmatic alliance of forces, none of which even thought about the possibility of ideological synthesis. Right and left politicians united (for example, in the Federal Tax Service) solely for pragmatic purposes, without feeling the slightest ideological sympathy for their allies. The communists remained communists, and in the most recent late-Soviet, Brezhnev version (except for marginalized nostalgics, such as Nina Andreeva and exotic Stalinists). Right - monarchists, neo-Orthodox, nationalists, etc. - were a completely artificial formation, clumsily recreating pre-revolutionary structures, without having any direct historical connection with them. Moreover, the same politicians constantly gathered into the united opposition (their names stuck in their mouths), who were distinguished by almost outright indifference to ideology and only sought to take a place on the first flank of political life. Therefore, the “red” ones were more likely “pink”, and the “brown” ones were not “brown” at all, but slightly “white”, “pale”.

At the same time, there was one most important feature of the structure of the opposition. At the level of ordinary patriots, it was precisely about a vivid sense of the unity of social and national demands and ideals, and the leaders, on the contrary, constantly jumped from unprincipled pragmatism to ideological sectarianism. Simple patriots were, in fact, precisely “red-brown”, and the leaders represented much more vague shades, sometimes incomprehensible to themselves. For example, Sergei Baburin’s ideological priorities defy classification at all. But not due to their originality, but due to their complete inexpressiveness, evasiveness, caution... Instead of synthesis, patriotic ideology was a pragmatic and artificial alliance. Moreover, at the level of ideas, everything looked extremely poor.

3. Hopeless Brezhnevism

The pink ones (with varying degrees of frankness) were guided either by the familiar Brezhnev models (exactly reproduced in spirit and style in the Communist Party of the Russian Federation), or repeated the model of European social democracy, for which national sympathies are sometimes also not alien (the French socialist Chevenman). At the same time, the collapse of the USSR was explained solely by the “machinations of dark forces,” which meant the mondialists and the “fifth column” (often simply “Jews”). An ideal example of this position is Yegor Ligachev, who is still convinced that everything in the USSR was in order, and that if it were not for Yakovlev and Arbatov, the country would continue to prosper.

This logic is completely irresponsible. People who limit their analysis of the collapse of a great power to such a primitive explanation show that they are completely devoid of an elementary historical sense and understanding of the present stage of history. The late Soviet model and European social democracy have a very distant relationship with the “red”. Despite the obvious advantages of any (even the most disgusting) socialist system over a capitalist one, one must not lose sight of the main point - if the socialist system fell, then this was necessarily preceded by a long (albeit, perhaps hidden) illness, decay, degeneration. A return to Brezhnevism is as impossible as resurrecting a corpse through an operation (even a successful one) on the organ whose disease caused death. Today's communists, however, either do not understand this, if they are honest, or they cynically exploit the nostalgia of the masses, striving, in fact, to become just an ordinary parliamentary party of a social-democratic sense, which calmly lives with mondialism and liberalism.

Thus, the current “pink” do not have any serious positive model at all, or even a coherent ideological concept. Observing members of the Communist Party of the Russian Federation in the Duma leads to terrifying conclusions - these people are deeply indifferent to everything except their personal return to social positions lost during the reforms.

4. Hopeless monarchism

The situation is no less sad among the “right”, “white” (“pale”). Here is either a masquerade (Cossacks, lieutenants, banners), or archaic Black Hundreds, flavored with purely Soviet schizophrenics, irresponsible anti-Semitism (which, in fact, cannot really explain anything), or Orthodox-monarchist rhetoric, which also does not take into account the deep historical causes of the collapse Empires, like today's communists, do not take into account the underlying causes of the collapse of the USSR. There is also no positive program, slogans are presented as ideology, arguments are replaced by emotions. There is nothing to say about the fascists; most often they are just crazy cops or idiot teenagers. At the same time, our “fascists” most often understand themselves as extreme right-wing, i.e. They are distinguished by extreme anti-communism and chauvinism.

5. The bacillus of mediocrity has infected the leaders

The absence of a positive and coherent ideology in each of the two halves of the united opposition quite naturally leads to the absence of one at the level of unification. Two vague and irresponsible, mediocre and unfinished forms are combined into something even more monstrous and uglier. These are not red-browns, but a parody of them. Traces of the deep biological degeneration that marks the features of most patriotic leaders complete the picture.

With such a set, can one seriously count on victory over an intelligent, historically conscious and ideologically developed and united enemy?

Of course, at the individual level, Russian liberals are not far from being patriots. But the West thinks for them. And this is serious, these are hundreds of analytical centers, millions of dollars, structural support from the US government and NATO leadership. In such a situation, even a complete idiot can destroy the country, especially considering how incompetent, but greedy for power and glory, the contingent is located at the opposite political pole.

The failure of the patriots both at the present, and at the previous, and not in the future stage, had, has and will have, first of all, an ideological reason.

I have long noticed one asymmetrical phenomenon: at patriotic evenings and rallies it is impossible to escape the feeling that the simple patriots sitting in the hall are much smarter, deeper and more prepared than those on stage and acting as “shepherds”. It’s not that each individual viewer is smarter. No, that's not true. But all together, ordinary patriots feel and understand everything more healthily and purer than the leaders. Gradually, this anomaly, which I noticed back in 91-92, led to the complete alienation of the masses from the political leaders. A wall of misunderstanding arose. Gradually, the organic unity, solidarity, unity of thought and action that was outlined at the first heroic stage (the siege of Ostankino, May 1993, defense of the White House) gave way to apathy, fatigue and alienation. Many explain this by fatigue and depression from a series of defeats and a complete lack of real victories. In fact, an ideological vacuum, an inability to develop and formalize a synthetic worldview, is gradually taking its toll. In the future, these processes will only intensify. You shouldn't hope for a miracle here. Fatal mistakes, such as voting for Lebed, unfounded hopes for the Communist Party of the Russian Federation, enthusiasm for the farcical LDPR and other, even more disastrous projects, will not decrease, but multiply.

The ideological question is the main, central one. It is he who is key to the entire patriotic opposition. This can only be denied by a person who, deep down, is rather indifferent to the course of Russian history, and personal and group interests overshadow the fate of the nation, no matter how many altruistic and lofty words are uttered.

6. Where to look for an alternative?

The only adequate answer to the demands of the time should be sought in a direction where left and right tendencies, social and national, would be united in a real and deep synthesis.

At the same time, we should look for milestones of such a synthesis precisely in our own, and not in Central European history of the 30-40s. Turning, for example, to the situation of the mid-19th - early 20th centuries, to the pre-revolutionary era, we almost immediately encounter a whole spectrum of political and ideological trends, which largely meet the requirements of the desired synthesis. We are talking about the ideological environment in which the Revolution matured. It is significant that the Bolsheviks were not the main force here for the time being. The Russian Revolution drew its energies from a huge bloc of ideas and parties, circles and salons that shared two common attitudes - social utopianism and faith in the messianic destiny of Russia. In his book “The Ideology of National Bolshevism,” Mikhail Agursky brilliantly built a genealogy of this trend, going back simultaneously to the Decembrists, and to the Slavophiles, and to the Narodniks, and to the Social Democrats, and to the thinkers of the Silver Age, and to the Socialist Revolutionaries, and at the end finally to the Bolsheviks.

The name of this trend is National Bolshevism.

Its most famous representative, who willingly called himself and his like-minded people by this name, was Nikolai Ustryalov. Coming from the Kadet Party, a consistent nationalist who initially sided with the Whites and held a high position in the Kolchak government, Ustryalov quickly understood the national character of the Bolshevik government and the anti-national, Atlanticist mission of the White cause. While remaining in exile, in Harbin, where he worked as a simple librarian, Ustryalov propagated his views in Soviet Russia and among those who left it. He was the founder of the “Smenovekhovstvo” movement, which had a huge impact on the ideological situation in Russia itself. In relation to Ustryalov, positions were determined during the period of intra-party polemics, first between Trotsky and Zinoviev-Kamenev-Stalin, later between Zinoviev-Kamenev-Bukharin against Stalin.

A similar movement existed in the same 20s and 30s in Germany. In its broadest sense, it was called the Conservative Revolution and was represented by such brilliant thinkers as Oswald Spengler, Martin Heidegger, Ernst Jünger, Arthur Muller van der Bruck, Hermann Wirth. But its left wing was actually national-Bolshevik, the leader of which was the remarkable politician and publicist Ernst Nikisch. Nikisch wrote a prophetic book in 1932 - “Hitler is an evil fate for Germany”, in which he, with amazing insight, pointed out the cause of the impending catastrophe if the National Socialists came to power. He considered racism, anti-communism, Slavophobia and solidarity with the Anglo-Saxons and capitalist tendencies to be the worst mistakes. He turned out to be right a hundred times over. In 1937 he was captured by the Nazis and sentenced to life imprisonment.

But not only these historical National Bolsheviks personify this ideological and ideological trend. It is much wider and more diverse. Ustryalov and Nikisch only generalized and systematized, brought together the main lines of force that determined the national and social traditions of Russia and Germany. In this synthesis, Khomyakov and Chaadaev, Herzen and Aksakov, Leontiev and Bakunin, and Merezhkovsky and Lenin agreed. National Bolshevism was not just a political force, but a historical method, a philosophical school, a worldview platform that far exceeded political circles or literary publications.

7. Principles of National Bolshevism

National Bolshevism is a purely Russian ideology; it traditionally and initially combined revolutionary, rebellious, social (left) motives with deep nationalism, boundless love for the mystery of Russia, for its unique and paradoxical fate. Historically, this direction was distinguished by a highly critical attitude towards the liberal-bureaucratic monarchy of the Romanovs (by the way, the Slavophiles themselves hated Peter and sharply criticized the St. Petersburg period of Russian history). The post-schism synodal Church, subordinate to secular authorities, obedient, formal, and often hypocritical, also raised doubts.

But, at the same time, it was not Westernism, not “enlightened” Europe that was considered by the National Bolsheviks and their predecessors as a role model. On the contrary, the West and everything connected with it aroused deep hostility. Hence, by the way, the hatred of capitalism, which was and is considered a purely Western phenomenon (see the works of Max Weber and Werner Sombart). Capitalism was seen by National Bolshevism as the economic embodiment of the philosophy of individualism that developed in the Catholic and Protestant West. Socialism, the communal system, was considered a purely traditional Orthodox and, more broadly, Eurasian social system. The West-East opposition was seen both as religious (Catholicism + Protestantism + French Enlightenment - Byzantineism, Orthodoxy), and as economic (capitalism - socialism). But the socialism proposed by the National Bolsheviks was anti-dogmatic, flexible, tied to national-religious, ethical , and not abstract theoretical dogmas. The thesis of the dictatorship of the proletariat was not recognized. Instead, the dictatorship of labor, including the peasant labor, was established, the preservation of small private property, especially in the countryside, the cult of the family, the Spartan way of life, the ethic of self-sacrifice and the heroic morality of overcoming inertia were established. The right-wing version of this ideology is found in the theory of the New Middle Ages by Berdyaev, in the mystical-theocratic utopia of Merezhkovsky. The left option goes back to the doctrines of Lavrov, Mikhailovsky, and the left Socialist Revolutionaries (although there was no dogmatic orthodoxy on these issues. The ideology was open, flexible, insisting only on compliance with the main force directions. In particular, a wide variety of solutions were possible, which could lead the historical National Bolsheviks both to the recognition of Soviet power and to its radical rejection.) The revolution was understood nationally, patriotically. The new society, the new order had to be emphatically Russian - national and universal at the same time, which is what the Russian man, Dostoevsky's All-Man, is ideally. This is exactly how “internationalism” was understood for a long time by Russian revolutionaries - not as a cosmopolitan mixture, but as a triumph of Russian spiritual all-humanity.

National Bolshevism is a ready-made ideology that meets all the criteria of Russian destiny. Of course, it was not she who became dominant in the USSR. Narrow dogmatism, bureaucracy, eternal tenacious and stupid mediocrity, as always, have spoiled, distorted, and undermined everything from the inside. The best ideologists, the bright minds of National Bolshevism, the geniuses who prepared the triumph of the Revolution, sincere supporters of the Bolsheviks were brutally destroyed, humiliated, and trampled. This is precisely why the Brezhnevites and their predecessors (as well as their heirs) must be held accountable. That is why the smug bureaucracy of the later party members, who first betrayed the spiritual origins of their ideology, and then the great country, should receive a tasty slap in the face (and not our votes in the elections). Like the Nazis, who turned the bright ideas of the Conservative Revolution into a bloody and disgusting parody, Sovietism spat on its life-giving source, and therefore could not help but collapse.

But National Bolshevism is not responsible for this. On the contrary, it is he who is in an ideologically impeccable position - the shortcomings of the Council of Deputies are strictly equivalent to a deviation from National Bolshevik principles. Its virtues are a direct consequence of National Bolshevism.

At the current stage, National Bolshevism is extremely relevant. Here are its main principles:

1. Against the liberal capitalist system, against Atlanticism, the West, the USA and the instruments of its domination - NATO, the IMF, etc. This means against all representatives of this ideology in Russia.
2. But at the same time, against Romanov’s monarchism and pharisaical pseudo-religiosity, characteristic of the “whites”.
3. And also against the bureaucratized Soviet of Deputies (especially Brezhnev’s) and his today’s heirs, who are systematically surrendering the opposition for handouts to the Russophobic Westernizing authorities.

Symmetrical to the three global negations, there are three global affirmations. National Bolshevism:

1. For the original Russian Way, Russian socialism, loyalty to the national roots and eternal constants of Russian history - communalism, conciliarity, anti-utilitarianism, pan-humanity, imperialism.
2. For the ancient tradition, national culture, return to the ideals and values ​​of the ancient Russian doctrine “Moscow - Third Rome”.
3. For a society without rich and poor, for brotherhood and material equality, for solidarity and justice. For the social ideals of the populists, communists, socialist revolutionaries, Russian national anarchists.

This is a wide spectrum, open to both the past and the future, resonating with the sentiments of the Russian people in their historical constants, regardless of the era or historical moment. If you do not lead people into sectarianism, do not impose on them artificial and contradictory concepts that explain nothing and lead nowhere, they will naturally and organically choose exactly this. This is the ideological constant of the Russian soul. Without National Bolshevism and the sympathy of the broad Russian masses, the October Revolution would never have happened, and the empire would not have collapsed. If the Communists had not lost the living element of National Bolshevism, the USSR would never have collapsed, and socialism would have continued its triumphant march across the planet. (Someone, of course, would have to be disturbed, but these are details - you won’t be nice to everyone).

You don’t have to be a genius to foresee how the patriots’ bets will end on intermediate, rather random, pragmatically oriented leaders - on people who do not have any coherent worldview, parvenus and scribblers, unemployed officials or vain upstarts not rooted in Russian traditions that do not have sufficient intellectual horizons, are infected with late-Soviet mental laziness and do not know either the spirit or the letter of the deep Russian idea - National Bolshevism. The United Opposition, the Federal Tax Service, the Rutskoi movement, the Soglasie movement (or whatever it was exactly called) - all a complete failure, and as a result, votes are given to the outspoken Zionist Lebed (a puppet of Chubais and Radzikhovsky), powerless and stupid pensioners or a farcical lover of porn stars (a typical scammer with Odessa market). It's a shame.

We'll have to start from the beginning for the hundredth time. But from a new beginning. We must build on a solid foundation and not be afraid of Herculean labors, hard and unbearable work with a stupefied people and a shell-shocked intelligentsia. And IDEOLOGY must come first.

National Bolshevism.

Not too large-scale (10 thousand militants), but the active movement of the National Bolsheviks left a significant mark in Weimar Germany. The German National Bolsheviks saw as an ideal the union of the USSR and Germany, the dictatorship of the proletariat and the army, the Soviets - as opposed to “liberalism and the degeneration of the Anglo-Saxon world.”

The Interpreter's blog continues the story about left-wing nationalism - potentially one of the most promising political movements in Russia. Its origins lie in Germany. In the previous article we talked about the classic version of left-wing nationalism, in the same text - about its more exotic version, national Bolshevism.

In 1919, dozens of voluntary armed corps – “frikorps” – appeared in the country. They were led by Rehm, Himmler, Goering, G. Strasser, but also by future communist leaders: B. Remer, L. Renn, H. Plaas, Bodo Uze. In addition to the Freikorps, the traditional German “youth unions” and “völkisch” (people’s) organizations with nationalistic overtones multiplied. All of them became a breeding ground for the emergence of both Nazi and National Bolshevik associations.

The leaders of the National Bolsheviks came from the intellectual elite. Ernst Nikisch, Karl Otto Petel, Werner Lass were publicists; Paul Elzbacher, Hans von Henting, Friedrich Lenz - university professors; Bodo Uze, Beppo Remer, Hartmut Plaas - military; Karl Tröger and Krüpfgan represented officials and lawyers.

The source material for the emergence of National Bolshevism was a powerful movement of “conservative revolutionaries”: “young conservatives” (van den Broek, O. Spengler) and “neoconservatives” (Ernst Jünger, von Salomon, Friedrich Hielscher), as well as the “nationalist” associated with them. revolutionary movement." All these forces extended their hatred to the civilization of the West, which they associated with liberalism, humanism and democracy.


(Ernst Nikisch)

Spengler and later Goebbels described socialism as a Prussian legacy and Marxism as a “Jewish trap” to distract the proletariat from its duty to the nation. The national revolutionaries attributed this to Trotsky, but not to Lenin and Stalin (in the mid-20s they tried to organize an assassination attempt on Leon Trotsky in the USSR). These people valued the Soviet experience of the first five-year plans and the centralization of economic management. In 1931, E. Junger wrote in the essay “Total Mobilization”: “The Soviet five-year plans for the first time showed the world the opportunity to unite all the efforts of a great power, directing them in a single direction.” The idea of ​​economic autarky was popular, clearly outlined in the book “The End of Capital” by Ferdinand Fried, a member of the circle that formed around the national revolutionary magazine “Di Tat” (1931). The editor-in-chief of the magazine, A. Kuckhof, wrote: “The only means of changing the current social and political state of Germany is the violence of the masses – the path of Lenin, and not the path of the Socialist International.”

National revolutionaries put forward the idea of ​​“proletarian nationalism”, dividing peoples into oppressed and dominant - “young” and “old” in the Russian-Prussian tradition. The first included the Germans, Russians and other peoples of the “East” (!). They are “viable” and have the “will to fight.” National revolutionary groups welcomed the founding conference of the League against Imperialism, inspired by the Comintern, held in Berlin in 1927.

Nationalists and van den Broek, who wrote in 1923: “We are a people in bonds. The tight space in which we are squeezed is fraught with danger, the scale of which is unpredictable. This is the threat we pose, and shouldn't we translate this threat into our policies? Such views of “moderate” conservatives were quite consistent with Hitler’s military-political actions in Europe, which many of them later disowned.

It is no coincidence that many participants in the national revolutionary movement eventually joined the Nazis (A. Winnig, G.-G. Tekhov, F. Schaubecker). Others, having gone through a passion for National Socialism, stood in “aristocratic” opposition to it (E. Junger, von Salomon, G. Erhardt). A. Bronnen and A. Kuckhoff joined the communists. A quarter of the leaders and publicists of the “neoconservatives” (Ikish, V. Laas, Petel, H. Plaas, Hans Ebeling) went over to the National Bolsheviks - making up three quarters of the participants in the new movement. The rest of the National Bolsheviks came from the communist camp.


(The Soviet magazine "Peretz" on its cover shows the friendship between the Soviet and German proletariat)

Moving to the left, the national revolutionaries declared that national liberation could only be achieved by first achieving social liberation, and that this could only be achieved by the German working class. These people called liberalism a “moral disease of the people” and considered the USSR an ally in the fight against the Entente. Their heroes were Frederick II, Hegel, Clausewitz and Bismarck.

The views of the revolutionary nationalists largely coincided with the programs of the Russian emigrant movements - the “Smenovekhites” and especially the “Eurasians”. The National Bolsheviks, after separating from the National Revolutionaries, added Lenin, Stalin, and some Marx to the list of revered names. They condemned fascism and Nazism, which “regenerated” after 1930, and promoted class struggle, the dictatorship of the proletariat, the Soviet System and the “Red Army instead of the Reichswehr.”

The basic postulate of National Bolshevism was not inferior in sharp certainty to the favorite formulations of the Hitlerite party. He emphasized the world-historical role of the oppressed (revolutionary) nation in the struggle to build totalitarian nationalism for the sake of the future national greatness of Germany. The National Bolsheviks called for combining Bolshevism with Prussianism, establishing a “dictatorship of labor” (workers and military), and nationalizing the main means of production; relying on autarky, introduce a planned economy; create a strong militaristic state under the control of the Fuhrer and the party elite. Despite a number of similarities with the NSDAP program, all this was far from the central idea of ​​“Mein Kampf” - the eradication of Bolshevism and the subjugation of the eastern territories.

To understand National Bolshevism, it is necessary to note the presence in the Reichswehr of a strong group advocating Soviet-German cooperation. Its inspirer was the Commander-in-Chief of the Reichswehr, General Hans von Seeckt, and its active supporters were the Minister of War Otto Gessler and the de facto Chief of the General Staff Otto Hasse. During the Polish-Soviet War, Seeckt maintained contacts with the Chairman of the Revolutionary Military Council of the Soviet Republic, Trotsky, considering it possible to liquidate the Versailles system in alliance with the Red Army. A shock to the West was the signing of the Rappal Treaty in April 1922, which resumed diplomatic relations between Germany and Russia in full. This was a confirmation of the Russophile Prussian-German tradition. The Völkischer Beobachter, on the contrary, wrote about the “Rappal crime of Rathenau” as “a personal union of the international Jewish financial oligarchy with international Jewish Bolshevism.” After 1923, closed military contacts between the two countries began. One of the military leaders, General Blomberg, admired Voroshilov’s speech “For maintaining close military relations with the Reichswehr.”


(The head of the Reichswehr von Seeckt is a promoter of friendship between the USSR and Germany and the creation of a confederation out of them)

Von Seeckt outlined ideas for a rapprochement between Germany and the Soviet Union until 1933. Before the start of the war with the USSR, generals and theoreticians of the Reichswehr conducted pro-Soviet propaganda - Falkenheim, G. Wetzel, von Metsch, Kabisch, Baron von Freytag-Loringhofen.

The pioneer of National Bolshevism was Professor, Doctor of Law, Rector of the Berlin Higher School of Commerce Paul Elzbacher (1868-1928), Reichstag deputy from the German National People's Party (NNPP). His article in Der Tag on April 2, 1919 was the first presentation of the ideas of National Bolshevism: the combination of Bolshevism and Prussianism, the Soviet system in Germany, an alliance with Soviet Russia and Hungary to repel the Entente. According to Elzbacher, Russia and Germany had to defend China, India and the entire East from Western aggression and establish a new world order. He approved of Lenin's "merciless punishment of lazy and undisciplined workers." Elzbacher expected from such a turn of events the preservation of old cultures that were being destroyed by the “superficial civilization of England and America.” “Bolshevism does not mean the death of our culture, but its salvation,” the professor summarized.

The article received a wide response. One of the leaders of the NNNP, a prominent historian and specialist in the East, Otto Goetsch, also advocated close cooperation with Soviet Russia. A member of the Center Party, Minister of Posts I. Gisberts stated that in order to crush the Versailles system it is necessary to immediately invite Soviet troops to Germany. The article “National Bolshevism” appeared in the organ of the Farmers' Union "Deutsche Tageszeitung" (May 1919), which introduced this term into political circulation in Germany. In the same year, P. Elzbacher published the brochure “Bolshevism and the German Future” and left the NNPP after the party condemned his publication. Later he became close to the KKE, and in 1923 he joined the Comintern-inspired “International Workers' Aid”.

In 1919, a brochure by professor of criminology, World War I officer and anti-Versailles activist Hans von Henting (1887-1970) “Introduction to the German Revolution” was published. Two years later, Henting published the “German Manifesto” - the most vivid presentation of the ideas of National Bolshevism of that time. In 1922, von Henting established contact with the leader of the national wing of the Communists, Heinrich Brandler, and became a military adviser to the KPD apparatus. Through his brother-diplomat, Henting maintained contacts with the Reichswehr and prepared the “Red Hundreds” in Thuringia for future actions.


In organizational terms, the ideas of National Bolshevism were tried to be realized by a group of former radicals, and later communists, led by Heinrich Laufenberg and Fritz Wolfheim. During the First World War, the historian of the labor movement Laufenberg and his young assistant Wolfheim, who managed to visit the USA and go through the school of struggle in the anarcho-syndicalist organization “Industrial Workers of the World,” led the left wing of the Hamburg SPD organization. After the 1918 revolution, Laufenberg briefly led the Hamburg Council of Workers, Soldiers and Sailors. Together with Wolfheim, he participated in the organization of the KPD, and after its split he moved to the Communist Workers' Party of Germany (KAPD) along with 40% of the KPD members. They called on German workers to wage a people's war to create a Communist Soviet Republic. These individuals classified the nationalist layers of the bourgeoisie, including the most “reactionary” ones, as “patriotic forces.”

In April 1920, Laufenberg and Wolfsheim were expelled from the KAPD at the request of the Comintern. Three months later, together with the former editor of the KPD organ “Di Rote Fane” F. Wendel, they founded the “Union of Communists” (UC), which adopted an economic program in the spirit of the “socialized economy” of the famous left-wing economist Silvio Geisel, already carried out in the Bavarian Soviet Republic. Gradually, part of the left Nazis (R. Schapke) and National Bolsheviks (K.O. Petel) joined the work of the Investigative Committee.

At the same time (in 1920), both former communists in Hamburg initiated the creation of the “Free Association for the Study of German Communism” (SAS) from officers of the colonial units of General Lettow-Vorbeck, under the leadership of the famous publicists the Gunter brothers. Among the supporters of the SAS there were major figures - Müller van den Broek, government adviser Sevin, one of the leaders of the left-Nazi movement in the Weimar Republic, Ernst zu Reventlow. A number of people with academic training and many former officers, mostly of the younger generation, joined the SAS. In August 1920, member of the SAS, Councilor of Justice F. Krupfhans, published the brochure “Communism as a German National Necessity” that received wide resonance. Four years later, the Günther brothers and two publishers founded the Nationalist Club in Hamburg with the magazine German Front, and from the late 20s they published the magazine Young Team, close to National Bolshevism.


In 1920-21, National Bolshevik ideas spread among the Bavarian communists. There, under the influence of von Henting, they were propagated in the KPD newspaper by party cell secretary O. Thomas and Landtag deputy Otto Graf. They entered into collaboration with the extremely “reactionary” Oberland, led by Captain Remer, and for this they were expelled from the party as “opportunists”. But contacts between the communists and the Freikorps continued, for example, during the fighting in Silesia in 1921.

The first peak of the influence of National Bolshevik ideas appeared during the occupation of the Ruhr by Franco-Belgian troops in 1923, accompanied by unemployment, famine and anarchy. Communists then occupied the most important positions in factory committees and control committees, forming about 900 proletarian hundreds (up to 20 thousand in Saxony alone). They adopted a policy of cooperation with German nationalists, which was proclaimed by the leader of the KPD and the leading ideologist of the Comintern, Karl Radek, called the “Schlageter Course”.

At an extended meeting of the Comintern in 1923, in a speech dedicated to the memory of one of the cult Nazi heroes, Albert Leo Schlageter, killed by the French, Radek called on the fascists in alliance with the communists to fight against “Entente capital.” “We must not remain silent about the fate of this martyr of German nationalism,” Radek said. “His name says a lot to the German people. Schlageter, a courageous soldier of the counter-revolution, deserves that we, the soldiers of the revolution, courageously and honestly evaluate him. If the circles of German fascists who want to honestly serve the German people do not understand the meaning of Schlageter’s fate, then Schlageter died in vain. Who do the German nationalists want to fight against? Against Entente capital, or against the Russian people? Who do they want to team up with? With Russian workers and peasants to jointly overthrow the yoke of Entente capital, or with Entente capital to enslave the German and Russian peoples? If the patriotic groups in Germany do not dare to make the cause of the majority of the people their cause and thus create a front against Entente and German capital, then Schlageter’s path was a road to nowhere.” In conclusion, Radek criticized the deathly calm of the Social Democrats, arguing that the active force of the counter-revolution had now passed to the fascists.


(Karl Radek)

To German nationalists inexperienced in the cunning politics of the Comintern, this speech seemed like the revelation of a communist who had seen the light. The Jewish origin of Radek was forgotten, which at another time was for the left-wing Nazis a symbol of the eternal adaptation of these individuals. But M. Scheubner-Richter wrote in the Völkischer Beobachter about “the blindness of significant German men who do not want to notice the threatening Bolshevisation of Germany.” Even earlier, Hitler stated that 40% of the German people are on Marxist positions, and this is the most active part of it, and in September 1923 he said that the will of the communists sent from Moscow is stronger than that of flabby philistines like Stresemann.

At this time, the possibility of cooperation with the KKE was discussed by Tsu Reventlov and other national revolutionaries, and Di Rote Fahne published their speeches. The NSDAP and the KPD spoke at each other's meetings. One of the leaders of the NSDAP “period of struggle,” Oskar Körner, the second chairman of the party in 1921-22 (the first was Hitler), at a party meeting said that the National Socialists want to unite all Germans, and spoke about commonality with the communists to put an end to “ the predation of seasoned wolves of the stock exchange.” At the invitation of the Stuttgart organization of the NSDAP, KPD activist G. Remele spoke at its meeting. Radek’s speech was welcomed by Clara Zetkin, and the leader of the left faction in the KKE, Ruth Fischer, wrote: “Whoever calls for a fight against Jewish capital is already participating in the class struggle, even if he himself does not suspect it.” In turn, the Nazis and the Völkische called for a fight against the Jews in the KPD, promising their support in return.

In 1923, brochures appeared: “Swastika and Soviet star. The battle path of communists and fascists" and "Discussion between Karl Radek, Paul Freulich, E.-G. zu Reventlow and M. van den Broek" (the first two are leaders of the KPD). Communists and nationalists of all stripes fought hand in hand against the French in the Ruhr. In East Prussia, former officer and communist E. Wollenberg actively collaborated with the Freikorps Orgesch.


But already at the end of 1923, the line of curtailing the alliance with the nationalists began to prevail in the leadership of the KKE. They were declared “servants of big capital, and not petty bourgeois rebelling against capital,” as Fröhlich, Remele and other supporters of cooperation believed. Anti-Semitism, which was insurmountable for national revolutionaries and Nazis, played a role here. Despite five changes in the leadership of the KPD in Weimar Germany, in each of them Jews constituted a huge percentage, virtually dominating, but remaining in the background. The leading roles were played by the Jew Rosa Luxemburg under the German Karl Liebknecht, then the Jew Paul Levi, the Jew A. Thalheimer under the German Heinrich Brandler, the Jew Arkady Maslov under the German Ruth Fischer, the Jews H. Neumann, and then W. Hrisch under the German Ernst Thälmann. Instructors, representatives and employees of the Comintern in Germany were no exception: Radek, Jacob Reich - “Comrade Thomas”, August Guralsky - “Kleine”, Bella Kuhn, Mikhail Grolman, Boris Idelson and others. The vague line between right-wing liberals and conservatives could then be determined by whether they explained the features of the Russian Revolution by the predominant participation of Jews in its leadership, or found other explanations.

In the early 1920s, the number of nationalist organizations increased sharply due to the transformation of many Freikorps into civil “unions.” At the same time, some moved to the left, acquiring a pronounced national-Bolshevik character. One of the largest unions that has undergone a similar evolution, the Bund Oberland, arose from the Fighting League, founded in 1919 to fight against the left in Bavaria by members of the famous Thule Society, which included the founders and first functionaries of the NSDAP - Anton Drexler, Dietrich Eckart, Gottfried Feder, Karl Harrer, Rudolf Hess, Max Amann. The following year, several tens of thousands of Oberlanders fought against the “Red Army of the Ruhr”, and in March 1921 they fought with the Poles in Upper Silesia. They actively participated in the “Kapp Putsch”, joining together with Goering’s SA and Remov’s “Union of the Imperial War Flag” in the “Workers’ Commonwealth of Domestic Combat Unions”.


Oberland was founded by officers the Remer brothers. One of them, Joseph Remer (“Beppo”) became the military leader of the organization. The formal leader of the Oberland was a major government official, Knauf, but in August 1922, Roemer kicked him out for “collaborating with the bourgeoisie.” The new chairman was the future participant in the Beer Hall Putsch, later SS Gruppenführer Friedrich Weber (1892-1955), also soon removed by Beppo Remer. After the putsch, there were actually two “Oberlands” - Roemer and Weber. In the summer of 1926, J. Roemer was arrested during a meeting with Brown, one of the leaders of the illegal military-political apparatus of the KKE and a Soviet intelligence officer. There was a crisis in Oberland. Some of its members, led by Osterreicher, went over to the NSDAP, and after some time the Beppo group settled in the KKE.


Weber's Oberland that year adopted van den Broek's national revolutionary program and created a parallel union, the Third Reich Association, under the chairmanship of the National Bolshevik Ernst Niekisch, who has since personified this movement as a whole. Nikisch, in his newspaper Wiederstandt, attacked the National Socialists, seeing in them a hostile force of Romanization on German soil, dulling the severity of the struggle against Versailles. He condemned urbanization, bourgeois decadence and the capitalist money economy. Criticism of Bolshevism, according to Nikisch, meant the denial of the Russian-Asian way of life, which contained the only hope for its “evacuation from the feather bed of English prostitution.”

The ideas of National Bolshevism became widespread in the peasant movement of the Weimar Republic. Acts of violence and terror spread in this environment after many of its leaders (Bodo Uze, von Salomon, H. Plaas - former officers and Freikorps) joined the KKE, having passed through the nationalist unions and the NSDAP.

The beginning of the 30s again sharply revived the National Bolshevik movement, as the global economic crisis had the most severe impact on Germany. Small circles of activists become centers of National Bolshevism. If in the 20s they gathered around national revolutionary publications that were close in spirit (Di Tat, Komenden, Formarsh), now they have their own: Umstürz by Werner Lass, Gegner by H. Schulze -Boysen, “Socialistische Nation” by Karl-Otto Petel, “Vorkaempfer” by Hans Ebeling... In total, these circles consisted of up to 10 thousand people. For comparison: the number of military nationalist unions at the end of the 20s ranged from 6-15 thousand (Viking, Bund Tannenberg, Werwolf) to 70 thousand members (Young German Order). The “Steel Helmet” then numbered several hundred thousand people, and the paramilitary organization of the KKE “Union of Red Front Soldiers” - 76 thousand.

The comparative small number of National Bolshevik organizations of the early 1930s was compensated by their great activity and a significant number of associations with similar orientations. Among others, they were joined by Gotthard Schild's "German Socialist Fighting Movement", Jupp Hoven's "Young Prussian League", and Karl Baade's "German Socialist Workers' and Peasants' Union".


Each National Bolshevik organization had its own characteristics. “Widerstandt” E. Nikisch spoke mainly on foreign policy issues, advocating a German-Slavic bloc “from Vladivostok to Flessingen”; “Vorkaempfer” emphasized a planned economy, “Umstürz” promoted “aristocratic socialism” (Lenin’s work “What is to be done” was very popular here), “Socialistische Nation” combined nationalism with the ideas of class struggle, the dictatorship of the proletariat and the Soviets; “Gegner” instilled hatred of the West, calling on German youth to revolution in alliance with the proletariat. All the leaders of these groups, with the exception of Nikisch, came from the ultra-conservative camp.

Standing apart from these five National Bolshevik groups itself was the “Aufbruch” (“Breakthrough”) Workers’ Circle, which was similar in tactical actions. It was headed by former leaders of the Oberland - officers Beppo Remer, K. Diebitsch, G. Gieseke and E. Müller, writers Bodo Use and Ludwig Renn, former Strassers R. Korn and W. Rehm. This organization, operating in Berlin and fifteen German states, numbered 300 activists. It was completely controlled by the KKE and was engaged in poaching command personnel for its combat groups while creating a shock fist in the struggle for power.

The appearance of this group was associated with the next propaganda campaign of the Comintern - the so-called “Scheringer course” (a former Freikorps officer) to attract the middle strata, including “revolutionary proletarian” elements from the Nazi environment, to the KKE with anti-Versailles slogans. Lieutenant Richard Scheringer, sentenced to imprisonment in 1930 for the National Socialist disintegration of the Reichswehr troops, realized in prison that “a policy of force in relation to the Western powers is possible only with the preliminary destruction of liberalism, pacifism and Western decadence.” The Scheringer Course, conceived as a large-scale enterprise, was carried out from August 1930 to October 1932 and brought significant results. Under his influence, many National Bolsheviks, former Freikorps and Nazis, leaders of the national peasant (Landvolkbewegung) and youth movement (Eberhard Koebel, Herbert Bochow, Hans Kenz, etc.) joined the KPD. As a result, the KKE sharply increased its numbers and votes in the elections.


With the coming to power of Adolf Hitler, the National Bolshevik movement in Germany was quickly liquidated. Its participants emigrated (Ebeling, Petel), were subjected to repression (hundreds of Nikisch supporters in 1937) or were killed while working illegally, like D. Sher. Ernst Nikisch's Wiederstand magazine was closed in 1934, and five years later he was sentenced to a long prison term.

After 1933, a significant part of the National Bolsheviks showed themselves in the field of espionage in favor of the USSR. Here, H. Schulze-Boysen and Harnack, the leaders of the Red Chapel, who were executed after its exposure, distinguished themselves. Harnack headed the “Community for the Study of the Soviet Planned Economy,” inspired by the ideas of Professor F. Lenz, and Chief Lieutenant Schulze-Boysen published the national revolutionary magazine “Gegner” until 1933, criticizing the “inertia of the West” and “American alienation.” Worked for Soviet intelligence: former editor of Di Tat Adam Kuckhoff (1887-1943), Beppo Remer with his Oberlanders; G. Bokhov, G. Ebeling, Dr. Karl Heimsoth (pseudonym in Soviet intelligence - “Dr. Hitler”). The leading conspirators against Hitler, the Stauffenberg brothers (former “conservative revolutionaries”), were influenced by National Bolshevik ideas.


At the beginning of 1933, Nikisch, Petel and others tried to nominate a single electoral list for the Reichstag, headed by the leader of the terrorist peasants Klaus Heim. Petel published the National Bolshevik Manifesto. But it was already too late. Towards the end, E. Nikisch published the book “Hitler - Evil German Rock” (1932). The movement has completed the practical part of its history. According to researcher A. Sever, the National Bolsheviks lacked “originality, fearlessness and activity” to seize power. But these qualities, like many others, are inherent only in truly popular leaders, whose ideology completely coincides with the mood of the masses. History weeds out all those who hold intermediate positions, trying to put incompatible beliefs into practice.

Ctrl Enter

Noticed osh Y bku Select text and click Ctrl+Enter

Editor's Choice
The personality of the Patriarch of the Russian Orthodox Church Kirill is of interest to the residents of the country. The activities of the first clergyman of Russia cause...

Reading time 2 minutes Reading time 2 minutes Moscow protest rallies and fresh municipal elections have shown that young people are...

21-year-old Lyusya Stein, a candidate for municipal deputies in the Basmanny district of Moscow, received 1,153 votes. She's talking about this...

Salome Zurabishvili is 66 years old. She was born in Paris in 1952 into a family of Georgian political emigrants. Her paternal grandfather, Ivan Ivanovich...
NATIONAL BOLSHEVISM is a type of communist ideology that tries to combine the cosmopolitan ideas of Marx and Lenin with...
A meeting was held in Moscow between Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov and US Secretary of State John Kerry, who arrived the day before in...
Poland started a new anti-Russian scandal. The head of the Foreign Ministry of this country (I just don’t want to call this scoundrel by name), speaking at...
Europe in the 1920s and 1930s was simply a breeding ground for fascism. In a good half of European countries, the fascists came to power. In the remaining...
After registration, many new consultants ask the question: How to get a paper Oriflame catalogue? Of course, for the first...