Pasha's journal from Odessa. Events in Czechoslovakia (1968) Czechoslovak uprising 1968

On August 21, 1968, Soviet airborne troops carried out a successful operation to capture key points in the capital of Czechoslovakia.

No matter how much you feed the wolf, he looks into the forest. No matter how much you feed a Czech, Pole, Hungarian or Lithuanian, he will still look to the West. From the very moment of the formation of the socialist camp, concerns about its well-being were entrusted to the country that liberated these countries from fascism. The Russian peasant ate gray bread so that the East German could spread his favorite type of marmalade on a bun. The Russian man drank Solntsedar so that the Hungarian could drink his favorite Tokaji wines. A Russian man rushed to work on a crowded tram so that a Czech could ride in his beloved Skoda or Tatra.

But neither the Germans, nor the Hungarians, nor the Czechs appreciated any of this. The first staged the Berlin crisis in 1953, the second staged the notorious events in Hungary in 1956, and the third staged the so-called Prague Spring in 1968.

It was to eliminate this turmoil that Operation Danube was carried out.

At 2 a.m. on August 21, 1968, advanced units of the 7th Airborne Division landed at the Ruzyne airfield in Prague. They blocked the main facilities of the airfield, where Soviet An-12s with troops and military equipment began to land. The seizure of the airfield was carried out using a deceptive maneuver: a Soviet passenger plane approaching the airfield requested an emergency landing due to alleged damage on board. After permission and landing, the paratroopers from the aircraft captured the control tower and ensured the landing of the landing aircraft.

At 5 o'clock. 10 min. A reconnaissance company of the 350th Parachute Regiment and a separate reconnaissance company of the 103rd Airborne Division landed. Within 10 minutes they captured the airfields of Turany and Namešti, after which a hasty landing of the main forces began. According to eyewitnesses, transport planes landed at the airfields one after another. The landing party jumped off without waiting for a complete stop. By the end of the runway, the plane was already empty and immediately picked up speed for a new takeoff. With minimal intervals, other planes with troops and military equipment began to arrive here.

Using military equipment and captured civilian vehicles, the paratroopers went deep into the territory, and by 9.00 they blocked all roads, bridges, exits from the city, radio and television buildings, telegraph, main post office, administrative buildings of the city and region, printing house, train stations in Brno , as well as the headquarters of military units and military industry enterprises. CHNA commanders were asked to remain calm and maintain order.

Four hours after the landing of the first groups of paratroopers, the most important objects of Prague and Brno were under the control of the Allied forces. The main efforts of the paratroopers were aimed at capturing the buildings of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China, the government, the Ministry of Defense and the General Staff, as well as the radio and television building. According to a pre-developed plan, columns of troops were sent to the main administrative and industrial centers of Czechoslovakia. Formations and units of the allied forces were stationed in all major cities. Particular attention was paid to protecting the western borders of Czechoslovakia.

The 200,000-strong Czechoslovak army, as 30 years earlier during the capture of the country by the Germans, offered virtually no resistance. However, among the population, mainly in Prague, Bratislava and other large cities, there was dissatisfaction with what was happening. Public protest was expressed in the construction of barricades on the path of the advance of tank columns, the operation of underground radio stations, the distribution of leaflets and appeals to the Czechoslovak population and military personnel of the allied countries. In some cases, there were armed attacks on military personnel of the contingent of troops introduced into the Czechoslovak Socialist Republic, the throwing of petrol bombs at tanks and other armored vehicles, attempts to disable communications and transport, and the destruction of monuments to Soviet soldiers in the cities and villages of Czechoslovakia.

On August 21, a group of countries (USA, England, France, Canada, Denmark and Paraguay) spoke at the UN Security Council demanding that the “Czechoslovak issue” be brought to a meeting of the UN General Assembly, seeking a decision on the immediate withdrawal of troops from the Warsaw Pact countries. Representatives of Hungary and the USSR voted against. The governments of socialist-oriented countries - Yugoslavia, Albania, Romania and China - condemned the military intervention of five states.

On October 16, 1968, an agreement was signed between the governments of the USSR and Czechoslovakia on the conditions for the temporary presence of Soviet troops on the territory of Czechoslovakia, according to which part of the Soviet troops remained on the territory of Czechoslovakia “in order to ensure the security of the socialist commonwealth.” The treaty contained provisions on respect for the sovereignty of Czechoslovakia and non-interference in its internal affairs. The signing of the agreement became one of the main military-political results of the entry of troops of five states, which satisfied the leadership of the USSR and the Warsaw Department.

On October 17, 1968, the phased withdrawal of allied troops from the territory of Czechoslovakia began, which was completed by mid-November.

Despite the fact that there were no military operations during the deployment of troops from the Warsaw Pact countries, there were losses. Thus, during the redeployment and deployment of Soviet troops (from August 20 to November 12), 11 military personnel, including one officer, were killed as a result of the actions of hostile persons; 87 Soviet military personnel were wounded and injured, including 19 officers.

Many are now asking the question: why was it necessary to keep all these Czechs, Poles, Germans and Hungarians in the socialist camp? But if we allowed all of them to fall under the West, American military bases would immediately appear on our borders. And therefore, in Poland we were forced to maintain the Northern Group of Forces, in the GDR - the Western, in Hungary - the Southern, and in Czechoslovakia - the Central.

MEMORIES OF OPERATION PARTICIPANTS

Lev Gorelov(in 1968 - commander of the 7th Guards Airborne Division):

There is no such thing in the Airborne Forces regulations; it is not intended to fight in cities. In the combined arms regulations, where the infantry are, there is also nothing there - “peculiarities of combat operations”...

What to do? The guys from the villages, some of them have never even been in the houses, don’t know what a multi-storey building is.

I gathered retired veterans who once took settlements during the war. We are writing temporary instructions for taking over the house. Houses are like houses, not on a global scale, but like taking a large house. We are withdrawing the division and regiments, but the regiments stood separately, and in each city there are microdistricts. So here we are at dawn, until people come home from work, we were training there - we were practicing the capture of a populated area. And this is a different tactic: an assault detachment, a support detachment, fire support, cover squads - this is a whole new tactic for paratroopers, and for everyone. Taking a populated area means creating assault groups. I’ve been training for a month, they say: “The division commander has gone crazy, what’s wrong, they took everyone out, from morning to night, until the working class arrived, they stormed…”

What saved us from bloodshed? Why did we lose 15 thousand of our young guys in Grozny, but not in Prague? Here's why: there were detachments ready there, ready in advance, Smarkovsky was in charge, an ideologist. They formed detachments, but they did not issue weapons, weapons on alert - come, take the weapon. So we knew, our intelligence knew where these warehouses were. We captured the warehouses first, and then we took the Central Committee, the General Staff, and so on, the government. We devoted the first part of our efforts to warehouses, then everything else.

In short, at 2 hours 15 minutes I landed, and at 6 hours Prague was in the hands of the paratroopers. The Czechs woke up in the morning - to arms, and our guards were standing there. All.

— So, there was no resistance?

- Only in the Central Committee. This means that 9 Czechs in the Central Committee were killed by ours. The fact is that they went through the basements and came out on the opposite side, the corridor is long, you know, these are service rooms. And our guard stood in Dubchik’s office, and the machine gunner was sitting 50 meters before this office and saw them coming, running with machine guns. He took aim and fired. He then unloaded the entire belt with a machine gun, killed them, and then the Czechs were taken away by helicopter. I don’t know where they buried him.

NIKOLAY MESHKOV(senior sergeant of motorized rifle regiment PP 50560):

The regiment commander, Colonel Klevtsov, a combat commander, a participant in the Great Patriotic War, as well as a participant in the Hungarian events, said: “I learned from the bitter experience of the Hungarian events; many soldiers were killed because of the orders “not to shoot.” And we were given the order to defend the socialist gains in Czechoslovakia and we will defend them with weapons in our hands, and for every shot from their side, we will respond in kind.”

The first 50 kilometers passed without incident. Passing at about 2 o'clock in the morning some settlement where one of the military units of the Czechoslovak Socialist Republic was located, we saw that soldiers were withdrawing tanks and vehicles on combat alert. We heard the first machine gun bursts about 40 kilometers short of Prague. Each of us immediately found his helmet, half of the soldiers went down inside the armored personnel carrier. All the soldiers attached the horn to their machine gun and cocked it. The soldier's jokes were put aside.

The city greeted us warily. There are no signs around, the streets are narrow. There are 10-15 storey buildings everywhere. The tank in such a place looked like a matchbox. Almost a kilometer later, the first obstacle stood in the way of the cars - a barricade of cars and buses, all of Soviet production. Our column stopped. From some building, from above, automatic weapons fire began. The bullets clicked against the armor of the armored personnel carrier, and we were blown inside the vehicle as if by the wind. In response, we also opened fire from machine guns. No harm done. The lead tank was ordered to fire a blank charge to clear the road. The shot rang out suddenly, breaking the silence of the early morning. The barricade of cars shattered, some cars overturned and caught fire. The column moved on.

... The road ran along the river, and on the left there were high-rise buildings. The road was very narrow; two tanks on it would not have been able to pass each other. A kilometer and a half later, at a turn, a crowd of armed people appeared, hiding behind small children. They opened fire on us. The front tank began to move to the right, so as not to run over the children, broke the parapet and fell into the river. None of the crew made it out, everyone died, but at the cost of their lives they saved the children. Then people began to run home, and we pushed back the armed militants with fire. Three of them died, and we had two wounded and a dead crew...

On the way to Prague there were two barricades of cars and buses, and also all the equipment was Soviet, where did they get so much of it? A BAT moved ahead of the column with a cleaner and cleared the barricades like a pile of garbage. We were fired at three more times from the houses... An armored personnel carrier caught fire behind us, 40 meters later another one, soldiers jumped out of the cars. A mixture in cellophane was dropped from the windows of the armored personnel carrier, when upon impact the cellophane burst, the mixture immediately ignited like gasoline, the commanders said that this fire could not be extinguished... Having reached the government residence with losses at about 7 a.m. and surrounded it from all sides, we did not We saw not a single paratrooper, there were none. As it turned out later, for some reason they were delayed for almost three hours, and got to their destination using whatever they could. In total, the convoy of motorcycles they arrived on amounted to 100 units. But they were immediately taken to other lines, their task was completed by our unit.

On the northern side there was a regiment of Germans, next to them were Hungarians, and a little further on were the Poles.

By 8 a.m. the city woke up as if on cue, deafened by explosions and machine gun fire. All Allied troops entered the city 6 hours earlier than expected.

The city began to live a military life, military patrols appeared. The shooting in the city did not stop, but increased every hour. We could already clearly distinguish where our machine gun was firing and where someone else’s, the shots of our guns and the explosions of alien shells. Only the fan of bullets could not be distinguished; it was the same in flight. The first pickets, students, appeared. They went on strike, then launched an assault; we could barely hold back the onslaught. The howitzer was captured, and our platoon repelled the gunners.

... An incident remains in my memory: Czechs who spoke Russian well came out of the crowd and suggested that we get out of their land in an amicable way. A crowd of 500-600 people became a wall, as if on command, we were separated by 20 meters. From the back rows, they lifted four people in their arms, who looked around. The crowd fell silent. They showed something to each other with their hands, and then instantly pulled out short-barreled machine guns, and 4 long bursts thundered. We did not expect such a trick. 9 people fell dead. Six were wounded, the shooting Czechs instantly disappeared, the crowd was dumbfounded. The soldier in front, whose friend had been killed, emptied his clip into the crowd. Everyone dispersed, carrying away their dead and wounded. This is how the first death came to our “gunners”. Later we became smarter, we rounded up all the strikers and checked everyone for weapons. There was not a single case where we did not confiscate it, 6-10 units each time. We transferred people with weapons to headquarters, where they were dealt with.

The week of fighting and shooting left its mark. One day, when I woke up in the morning, I looked in the mirror and saw that I had gray temples. The experiences and death of our comrades made themselves felt... Somewhere on the fifth day in the morning, a kilometer away from us, a machine gun hit with heavy fire. Bullets clattered along the walls, showering streams of sand. Everyone fell to the ground and covered their heads with their hands and began to crawl. The order was received to suppress the firing point. The machine gun hit, not allowing anyone to raise their heads; the bullets, ricocheting on the paving stones, made a buzzing sound that made the heart skip a beat. I felt something hot in my right leg, crawled around the corner, and took off my boot. It was torn, there was blood all over the footcloth. The bullet tore through the boot and cut the skin on the leg, essentially a scratch. I wrapped it in a bag and gave an injection. There was no pain as such, I was lucky. Received baptism of fire. The guys from the second company, and they were grenade launchers, suppressed the firing point. With one salvo of a grenade launcher, the 4-story building from which the fire was fired became 3-story, one floor collapsed completely. After such a shot, we are filled with pride in the power of our weapons.

... Somewhere on the twentieth day of hostilities, the fighting began to subside, only minor skirmishes occurred, although there were some killed and wounded.

I will describe one more case. One day in September 1968, our company was sent to unload food for the army. 4 railway refrigerators arrived, loaded with pork and beef carcasses, 2 wagons of butter, sausages, stewed meats and cereals. Before unloading, our doctors checked the food for suitability; it turned out that all the meat and other food was poisoned, although all the seals and documents were accompanied by yatsel. The train was moved further from the city, into a field. The military dug trenches. We, wearing chemical protection, unloaded food into the pits, poured diesel fuel on them and set them on fire. Everything was razed to the ground... There was a real war going on...

Alexander Zasetsky (in 1968 - radio platoon commander, lieutenant):

The Czech people greeted us differently: the adult population was calm, but wary, but the youth were aggressive, hostile and defiant. She was heavily “processed” by hostile propaganda. Prague was full of Westerners at that time; they were later caught and expelled. There were mainly attacks, shootings, and burning of cars and tanks from young people. On our tanks, two barrels of fuel were attached above the engine compartment, so they jumped on the tank, pierced the barrels and set them on fire. The tank was on fire. Then there was an order to remove the barrels. There were, of course, human losses. Radio operator Lenya Pestov worked with me on the helicopter, sorry I don’t know from which unit. A few days later, when he was not visible, he asked - where is Lenya? They say he died. The helicopters we were flying on were fired at multiple times. Some were shot down. People were dying. I remember a helicopter carrying journalists was shot down. Two journalists and the pilot were killed.

Although I remember other moments of my combat life back then with pleasure. Near our location there was an estate with a large luxurious garden. Autumn. Everything is ripe, there are a lot of fruits. To avoid the temptation to eat from the garden, the commander organized security for this estate. When everything has calmed down a little, an elderly Czech man arrives in a three-wheeled car and asks permission to harvest the garden. “If there is anything left,” as he put it. Imagine his surprise when he saw that everything was intact, everything was in perfect order, and a squad of soldiers was assigned to help him clean up. The moved elderly Czech burst into tears and thanked him for a long time.

Alexander Dubcek - first secretary of the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia (January-August 1968)

In 1968, for almost eight months, the Czechoslovak Socialist Republic (CSSR) experienced a period of profound changes unprecedented in the history of the communist movement. These transformations were a natural result of the growing crisis in this relatively prosperous and developed country, in whose political culture predominantly democratic traditions are deeply rooted. The process of democratization in Czechoslovakia, prepared by reformist-minded forces within the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia, went almost unnoticed for a number of years by most analysts and political figures in the West and East, including Soviet leaders. They misinterpreted the nature of the political conflict within the CPC at the end of 1967, which led to the removal in January 1968 of the first secretary of the Presidium of the CPC Central Committee A. Novotny. A. Dubcek, a graduate of the Higher Party School under the CPSU Central Committee, who spoke excellent Russian, was elected instead.

At the end of March, A. Novotny resigned from the post of President of the Czechoslovak Socialist Republic. Instead, on the recommendation of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia, the hero of the Second World War, General Ludwik Svoboda, was elected to this post, to whom the Soviet leaders also had no objections.

The fall of Novotny was not just the result of a struggle for power within the Czechoslovak leadership, but occurred for a number of reasons, including: the economic crisis of 1962 - 1963, which awakened the desire for economic reforms, the slow progress of the process of political rehabilitation of the repressed, the open dissent of writers and students, the awakening reformist-minded intellectual layers in the party, who began the struggle for freedom of thought and expression.

The protracted nature of the political crisis, the stubborn opposition of Novotny and his supporters to Dubcek, a number of scandalous incidents in 1968 (for example, the sensational escape to the United States of General Ian Cheyna, accompanied by rumors of a failed attempt at a military coup in favor of Novotny’s restoration), the weakening of censorship - all this contributed to the mobilization public support for the new leadership. Interested in reform, the leaders of the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia included their pluralistic concept of socialism “with a human face” in the “Program of Action” adopted in April 1968 as the “Magna Carta” of the new Dubcek leadership. In addition, Dubcek allowed the creation of a number of new political clubs, and also abolished censorship; in the field of foreign policy, it was decided to pursue a more independent course, which would, however, meet the interests of the Warsaw Pact in general and the policy of the USSR in particular.

The amazing speed of events in Czechoslovakia in January - April 1968 created a dilemma for the Soviet leadership. The resignation of Novotny's Moscow-oriented supporters, and especially the reformist programs of the Dubcek leadership and the revival of press freedom, led, from the Soviet point of view, to a dangerous situation in one of the key countries of Eastern Europe. In addition, the leadership of a number of countries participating in the Warsaw Pact thought about the increased, in their opinion, vulnerability of the borders and territory of Czechoslovakia, the prospect of its withdrawal from the Warsaw Pact, which would result in the inevitable undermining of the Eastern European military security system.

Potentially, the situation in Czechoslovakia could affect neighboring Eastern European countries, and even the Soviet Union itself. The Czechoslovak slogan “socialism with a human face” questioned the humanity of Soviet socialism. The "Magna Carta" meant a much greater degree of internal party democracy, the granting of greater autonomy to the state apparatus, other political parties and parliament, the restoration of civil rights (freedom of assembly and association) and a more decisive continuation of political rehabilitation, the restoration of national rights of ethnic minorities within the federation, the implementation of economic reform, etc.

Prague. August 1968

The possibility of a “chain reaction” in neighboring socialist countries, where the social upheavals of the recent past were still fresh in memory (GDR in 1953, Hungary in 1956), led to hostility towards the Czechoslovak “experiment” not only of the Soviet, but also of East Germany (W. Ulbricht ), Polish (V. Gomulka) and Bulgarian (T. Zhivkov) leadership. J. Kadar (Hungary) took a more restrained position.

However, the Prague Spring represented a different kind of protest than that which Soviet leaders faced in Hungary in 1956. Dubcek's leadership did not challenge the fundamentals of ensuring the national security interests of the USSR; it did not come up with a proposal to revise the foreign policy orientation of Czechoslovakia. The preservation of membership in the OVD and CMEA was not questioned. Limited pluralism also did not mean a loss of overall control on the part of the Communist Party: power, although somewhat dispersed, would remain in the hands of the reformist party leadership.

From the point of view of the Soviet leadership, events in Czechoslovakia created problems and were potentially dangerous. Having been burned by Hungary, Soviet leaders for a long time could not determine their course in relation to what was happening in Czechoslovakia. Should the changes that have taken place there since January be eliminated or simply limited? What means should be used to influence Czechoslovakia? Should we limit ourselves to political and economic actions or resort to armed intervention?

Despite the fact that the Kremlin was united in its negative attitude towards Czechoslovak reformism, for a long time they were not inclined towards a military invasion. Some members of the Soviet leadership began an intensive search for a peaceful solution to the problem. This became evident after March 1968, when the Soviet government began to use a range of political and psychological pressure to convince Dubcek and his colleagues of the need to slow down the impending changes.

The Soviet side exerted political pressure on Dubcek's leadership during various meetings and negotiations: at a multilateral meeting in Dresden in March, during a bilateral meeting of the leaders of the CPSU and the Communist Party of the Communist Party in Moscow in May, at unprecedented high-level negotiations between the Politburo of the CPSU Central Committee and the Presidium of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China in Cierna nad Tisou in July, in Bratislava in August 1968. The Czechoslovak delegation refused to attend the meeting of the leaders of Bulgaria, Hungary, the GDR, Poland and the USSR in Warsaw (July 1968).

The aggravation of the situation was also facilitated by the initially restrained reaction and then the categorical refusal of the Czechoslovak leadership to accept repeated proposals to station Soviet military contingents on the territory of Czechoslovakia.

Political pressure was accompanied by psychological pressure: large-scale exercises of the Internal Affairs Troops with the participation of the USSR, the GDR and Poland were held near the borders of Czechoslovakia. Later, such a type of psychological influence was used as the presence of troops of the Warsaw Pact countries on the territory of Czechoslovakia during and after military exercises in June and July 1968.

In addition, the Soviet leadership did not exclude the possibility of using economic sanctions against Czechoslovakia as a form of pressure. However, despite reports that appeared at the end of April 1968 about the cessation of Soviet grain supplies, there was no real evidence of the use of economic leverage.

1896
Faina Georgievna Ranevskaya (nee Faina Girshevna Feldman)
Soviet actress. Born in Taganrog. Father - merchant of the 2nd guild Girsh Feldman. Mother, Milka Rafailovna (Zagovailova) is a fan of literature and art, a passionate admirer of A.P. Chekhov. From her, apparently, Faina inherited sensitivity, artistry, and a love of poetry, music, and theater. At the age of 14, Faina's passion for theater began. The first visits to the city theater left indelible impressions in the soul of the teenage girl, but she experienced a real shock in 1913, when she attended the play “The Cherry Orchard” by A.P. Chekhov on the stage of the Moscow Art Theater, where the stars of those years played. Under the influence of this play, the pseudonym “Ranevskaya” appeared. Faina Grigorievna studied at a private theater school. She considered Pavel Wulf, who would accept the largest enterprises - the “provincial Komissarzhevskaya”, as her teacher. She began her stage activities in 1915 at the Malakhovsky Dacha Theater (near Moscow). Then she played in Kerch, Rostov-on-Don, in the traveling “First Soviet Theater” in Crimea, Baku, Smolensk and other cities. She settled in Moscow in 1931, having already played dozens of roles. Ranevskaya’s first stage successes were associated with her performances in sharp-character roles: Charlotte (“The Cherry Orchard” by A. Chekhov), Zmeyukina and Merchutkina (“Wedding”, “Anniversary” by A. Chekhov), Gulyachkina (“Mandate” by N. Erdman), Dunka ( “Yarovaya Love” by K. Trenev). Since 1931, F. Ranevskaya has been an actress at the Moscow Chamber Theater, and since 1933 at the Central Theater of the Red Army. In 1934 she began acting in films, and she immediately became widely known. Ranevskaya was equally successful in satirical, everyday, grotesque and dramatic images. Natural talent, incredible work ethic and dedication to art helped her become one of the most beloved actresses by viewers. Ranevskaya's talent was most fully revealed in the role of Vassa Zheleznova (1936) in the play based on the play of the same name by M. Gorky. The image of Vassa acquired both a tragic and satirical sound in her performance, and was distinguished by the depth and completeness of its psychological and social characteristics. In 1943-1949, Faina Ranevskaya worked at the Drama Theater (now the Mayakovsky Theater), where she played the role of Birdie in Lillian Helman's play “Little Chanterelles” (1945) with great success. In 1949-1955, Ranevskaya worked at the Mossovet Theater, and since 1955 she has been an actress at the Moscow Pushkin Theater. In 1963, Ranevskaya returned to the Mossovet Theater, where in 1966 she played the title role in the play by J. Patrick's The Strange Mrs. Savage. For thirteen years, Ranevskaya played the role of Lucy Cooper in the play “Next - Silence” (based on the play by V. Delmar) with great success. In the same performance, Faina Ranevskaya last appeared on stage on October 24, 1982. Ranevskaya's acting talent combined the fullness of realistic character development with a sharp, sometimes grotesque manner. The actress was fluent in all genres - from tragedy to farce. Faina Grigorievna Ranevskaya is more familiar to the general public from the films “Pyshka”, “Wedding”, “Man in a Case”, “Dream”, “Spring”, “Cinderella”, “Elephant and String”, “Foundling” (starred in her 20s films). Faina Ranevskaya was awarded the USSR State Prize three times. The editorial board of the English encyclopedia "Who is who" ("Who is who") included in the ten most outstanding actresses of the twentieth century (1992).
Faina Georgievna was distinguished in life by her sharp, merciless tongue. “You have to live in such a way that even the bastards remember you,” these are her words.
* * *
Ranevskaya was constantly late for rehearsals, Yu.A. Zavadsky was tired of this, and he asked the actors that if Ranevskaya was late again, then simply not notice her.
Faina Georgievna runs out of breath into the rehearsal:
- Hello!
Everyone is silent.
- Hello!
Nobody pays attention. Then she for the third time:
- Hello!
Same reaction again.
- Oh, there’s no one?! Then I'll go piss.
* * *
Oleg Dahl's favorite story about Ranevskaya:
It is filmed on location. In an open field. But Ranevskaya’s stomach is not good. She retires to a green house somewhere on the horizon. No and no, no and no. They send the dead man several times: has something happened? Ranevskaya responds, reassures, says that she is alive, and again she is not there and not. Finally he appears and majestically says: Lord! Who would have thought that there is so much shit in a person!
* * *
When the film "Foundling" was released, Ranevskaya's popularity, especially among children, reached its apogee. When Faina Georgievna walked down the street, a gang of boys ran after her and shouted: “Mulya! Mulya! Mulya!” Somehow she got very tired of this, she turned around, adjusted her pince-nez and said, grazing:
- Pioneers, go to hell!
* * *
When Ranevskaya was asked why she changed so many theaters in her life, she answered:
- When I was young, I experienced all types of love, except bestiality.
* * *
About her last theater in her life - the Mossovet Theater - she said:
“I have lived with many theaters, but have never experienced pleasure with any of them. Zavadsky’s rehearsals are a mass in chaos.”
* * *
"Starting in a bad movie is like spitting into eternity."
* * *
Faina Grigorievna said about her life: “I, by virtue of the talent given to me, squeaked like a mosquito.” “I spent my entire life swimming in the toilet butterfly style.”
* * *
Already at an advanced age, Faina Georgievna was walking along the street, slipped and fell. Ranevskaya lies on the sidewalk and shouts in her unique voice:
- People! Lift me up! After all, folk artists don’t lie on the road!
* * *
The images created by Ranevskaya are characterized by a combination of high drama and lyricism with comedy, realistic depth with satire and grotesqueness. The actress is fluent in the art of tragicomedy. Winner of the Stalin Prize (1949, 1951). She was awarded 2 orders and medals. Faina Grigorievna Ranevskaya gained legendary popularity, was awarded high titles and awards, and was friends with many outstanding people. She had everything except family and personal happiness: she never became either a wife or a mother. While I had strength, everything was occupied by the theater. Faina Grigorievna appeared on stage for the last time at the age of 86. In 1983, she left the theater, explaining that she was "tired of feigning health." no one knew then that she had the last year of her life left. F.G. Ranevskaya died on July 19, 1984, she was buried in the cemetery of the Donskoy Monastery in Moscow along with her sister Isabella. A memorial plaque was installed on the house in Taganrog where the actress was born in August 1986.
“Character actress? - Osip Naumovich Abdulov was perplexed. - Nonsense! She's a whole troupe. Yes Yes! In the old days, the entrepreneur selected actors based on their roles. So, Faina is a “heroine”, and a “travesty”, and a “grand coquette”, and a “noble father”, and a “hero-lover”, and a “fat”, and a “simpleton”, and a “soubrette”, and “dramatic crone” and “villain.” All roles are in her alone.” Now it’s clear: Ranevskaya is a one-man show. More precisely, a theater man. And the greatest injustice lies in the fact that such a person, in essence, never had “his own theater”, where he could replay to his heart’s content everything his heart desired. Faina Georgievna once sadly told the widow of Bertolt Brecht about this, who, being completely delighted with Manka the Speculator from the play “Storm,” “insistently asked” the actress to play Mother Courage. Y. Zavadsky then assured the playwright that he would certainly stage his play, but he did not keep his promise. Moreover, the ill-fated Manka, this tiny episodic role, entirely improvised by Faina Georgievna and, without exaggeration, became the highlight of the entire performance (“What are you digging?”), the theater management finally decided to “remove” from the historical-revolutionary “Storm” - from out of harm's way. And that’s the real problem with this Ranevskaya: as soon as she left the stage, most of the audience left the auditorium. At times she really made a role out of nothing. “One day a director called me and asked me to film with him,” said the actress. - When asked what the role was, he replied: “Actually, there is no role for you. But I really want to see you in my film. There is a pop in the script, and if you agree to act, I can make him a pop.”<…> This director was a talented, sweet man, Igor Savchenko. I remember how he put a cage of birds in front of me and said: “Well, talk to them, say whatever comes to your mind, improvise.” And I began to address the birds with the words: “My dear fish, you keep jumping and jumping, giving yourself no rest.” Then he led me to the nook where the pigs stood: “Well, now talk to the pigs.” And I say: “Well, my dear children, eat to your health.” Sometimes Ranevskaya’s irrepressible talent felt a little cramped even within the framework of a completely finished image. They wrote about her “Strange Mrs. Savage”: “Ranevskaya was immeasurably taller than her heroine. The whole, enormous personality of a brilliant actress hovers like “God’s spirit” over the play, over the role...” What a blessing that Faina Georgievna, in different years of her life, also plucked from her enormous “tart talent” (A.N. Tolstoy) for the children a little piece! This is how the funny and touching Lelya appeared from the comedy “Foundling” (“Mulya, don’t make me nervous”), the kind Grandmother from the film “The Elephant and the Rope”, the mischievous and charming Stepmother from Shvartsev’s “Cinderella”... It’s amazing, but also in “Cinderella” the great the actress managed to “get into co-authorship”, adding a number of witty, memorable lines of her own. Needless to say, any seemingly meaningless remark in Ranevskaya’s mouth turned almost into an aphorism. Miss Bok, voiced by her, from the cartoons about Carlson, was completely dispersed into quotes. According to rumors, the actress herself even grumbled in surprise about this: just think, she said a few words in front of the microphone, but the noise, the noise... But it’s really surprising. In the play “Storm” by V. Bill-Belotserkovsky at the State Academic Theater named after Mossovet, F. Ranevskaya played the small role of a speculator in such a way that this image became one of the brightest images of the play (from the collection of the radio fund, recording 1952). And the role of Lucy Cooper performed by F. Ranevskaya on the stage of the same theater in the play “Next - Silence ...” (directed by A. Efros) caused a real emotional shock among spectators and listeners - the performance was recorded in 1976 and is stored in the collection of the radio fund. The Radio Foundation also has a recording of scenes from the play “The Last Victim” by A. Ostrovsky. F. Ranevskaya - in the role of Glafira Firsovna. In search of “her own theater,” F. Ranevskaya more than once moved from one Moscow group to another. In the collection of the radio fund there is a recording of the play “The Law of Honor” by A. Stein of the Moscow Drama Theater (now the Moscow Academic Theater named after Vl. Mayakovsky). F. Ranevskaya - in the role of Nina Ivanovna, and scenes from the performance of the Moscow Drama Theater named after A.S. Pushkin “Trees Die While Standing” by A. Kason. F. Ranevskaya - in the role of Grandmother. The first radio play with the participation of F. Ranevskaya was recorded on the radio in 1946 - “David Copperfield” by Charles Dickens, in the role of Miss Trotwood. Cast: V. Sperantova, M. Yanshin, E. Fadeeva, O. Wiklandt and other artists of Moscow theaters. And in the radio play (one-act comedy) “According to Audit” she played a bright, characteristic role of Ryndychka. Other roles: M. Yanshin, N. Gritsenko, O. Wiklandt, A. Kubatsky. The “pearls” of the radio fund’s collection are the radio play “Granny” by F. Dostoevsky (based on the novel “The Player”), in the role of Granny, and the staged story by A. Chekhov “A Defenseless Creature”. Cast: F. Ranevskaya, O. Abdulov, N. Yakushenko. Over the years, F. Ranevskaya recorded on the radio the literary works of N. Leskov, A. Chekhov, V. Ardov. And in the recording of the program based on the works and with the participation of A. Barto, she sang two children's songs based on the poems of A. Barto: “At the corner, at the crossroads, they were green, like in a garden” and “I ask you, pioneers, protect the trees.” A recording of F. Ranevskaya’s speech about the beginning of her stage activity in 1915 at the Malakhovsky Dacha Theater near Moscow has been preserved. About the meeting with the wonderful actor Illarion Pevtsov and his influence on the future creative life of the actress. The collection of the radio fund also contains documentary recordings of speeches about F. Ranevskaya - Yu. Zavadsky, D. Zhuravlev, A. Adoskin, G. Bortnikov, A. Batalov, G. Volchek. They remember F. Ranevskaya’s spiritual generosity and charm, her high demands on herself, the roles she played in the theater, on the radio and in the cinema.

Operation Danube. This is exactly what the documents called the strategic exercise of the troops of the five member countries of the Warsaw Pact, the purpose of which was “to protect the socialist gains in Czechoslovakia.” Under Gorbachev, the entry of troops into Czechoslovakia on August 21, 1968 was written as “the suppression of the construction of socialism with a human face,” and after the collapse of the USSR, these events are described only in a sharply condemning and rude form, the foreign policy of the USSR is considered aggressive, Soviet soldiers are called “occupiers” and so on…

Today's publicists do not want to take into account the fact that all events in the world took place, and are still taking place, in a specific international or domestic situation in a given period of time, and judge the past by the standards of today. Question: could the leadership of the countries of the socialist camp and, first of all, the Soviet Union at that time make a different decision?

International situation

At that time, there were two worlds in Europe, opposite in ideologies - socialist and capitalist. Two economic organizations - the so-called Common Market in the West and the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance in the East.

There were two opposing military blocs - NATO and the Warsaw Pact. Now they only remember that in 1968 in the GDR there was a Group of Soviet Forces in Germany, in Poland there was a Northern Group of Soviet Forces and in Hungary there was a Southern Group of Forces.

But for some reason they don’t remember that troops from the United States, Great Britain, and Belgium were stationed on the territory of Germany and that the army corps of the Netherlands and France were ready to move out if necessary. Both military groups were in a state of full combat readiness.

Each side defended its interests and, observing external decency, tried by any means to weaken the other.

Social and political situation in Czechoslovakia

At the January 1968 Plenum of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China, the mistakes and shortcomings of the country's leadership were fairly criticized, and a decision was made on the need for changes in the way the state's economy is managed.

Alexander Dubcek was elected General Secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China, who led the implementation of reforms, later called “the construction of socialism with a human face.” The country's top leadership changed (except for President L. Svoboda), and with it, domestic and foreign policy began to change.

Using the criticism of the leadership voiced at the Plenum, opposition political forces, speculating on demands for the “expansion” of democracy, began to discredit the Communist Party, government structures, state security agencies and socialism in general. Hidden preparations for a change in the political system began.

In the media, on behalf of the people, they demanded: the abolition of the party's leadership of economic and political life, the declaration of the Communist Party of Human Rights as a criminal organization, a ban on its activities, the dissolution of state security agencies and the People's Militia. (People's Militia is the name of the armed party workers' detachments, preserved since 1948, reporting directly to the General Secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia.)

Various “clubs” arose throughout the country (“Club 231”, “Club of Active Non-Party People”) and other organizations, the main goal and task of which was to denigrate the history of the country after 1945, rally the opposition, and conduct anti-constitutional propaganda.

By mid-1968, the Ministry of Internal Affairs received about 70 applications for registration of new organizations and associations. Thus, “Club 231” (Based on Article 231 of the Law on the Protection of the Constitution, anti-state and anti-constitutional activities were punishable) was established in Prague on March 31, 1968, although it did not have permission from the Ministry of Internal Affairs.

The club united over 40 thousand people, among whom were former criminals and state criminals. As the newspaper Rude Pravo noted, the club’s members included former Nazis, SS men, Henleinites, ministers of the puppet “Slovak State,” and representatives of the reactionary clergy.

At one of the meetings, the general secretary of the club, Yaroslav Brodsky, stated: “The best communist is a dead communist, and if he is still alive, then his legs should be pulled out.” Branches of the club were created at enterprises and in various organizations, which were called “Societies for the Defense of Word and Press.”

One of the most striking anti-constitutional materials can be considered the appeal of the underground organization “Revolutionary Committee of the Democratic Party of Slovakia,” distributed in June in organizations and enterprises in the city of Svit.

It put forward demands: to dissolve collective farms and cooperatives, distribute land to peasants, hold elections under the control of England, the USA, Italy and France, stop criticism of Western states in the press, and focus it on the USSR, allow the legal activities of political parties that existed in bourgeois Czechoslovakia, to annex “Transcarpathian Rus” to Czechoslovakia in 1968. The appeal ended with the call: “Death of the Communist Party!”

On May 6, the French weekly Express quoted Antonin Lim, editor of the foreign department of the newspaper Literary Listy, as saying: “Today in Czechoslovakia there is a question of taking power.” The Social Democratic Party and the Labor Party revived their activities underground.

In order to create some kind of counterbalance to the Warsaw Pact, the idea of ​​​​creating the Little Entente was revived as a regional bloc of socialist and capitalist states and a buffer between the great powers.

Publications on this topic were picked up by the Western press. Notable was the remark of an analyst for the French newspaper Le Figaro: “The geographical position of Czechoslovakia can turn it both into a bolt of the Warsaw Pact, a pact, and into a gap that opens up the entire military system of the Eastern bloc.”

In May, a group of employees of the Prague Military-Political Academy published "Remarks on the development of the Action Program of the Czechoslovak People's Army." The authors proposed “the withdrawal of Czechoslovakia from the Warsaw Pact or, possibly, joint actions of Czechoslovakia with other socialist countries to eliminate the Warsaw Pact as a whole and replace it with a system of bilateral relations.” As an option, there was a proposal to take a position of “consistent neutrality” in foreign policy.

Serious attacks from the standpoint of “sound economic calculation” were also made against the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance.

On June 14, the Czechoslovak opposition invited the famous “Sovietologist” Zbigniew Brzezinski to give lectures in Prague, in which he outlined his “liberalization” strategy, called for the destruction of the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia, as well as the abolition of the police and state security. According to him, he fully “supported the interesting Czechoslovak experiment.”

Calls for “rapprochement” with Germany, heard not only in the media, but also in the speeches of some of the country’s leaders, directly undermined the national interests of Czechoslovakia.

It wasn't just about words.

The western borders of Czechoslovakia were opened, and border barriers and fortifications began to be eliminated. According to the instructions of the Minister of State Security Pavel, the spies of Western countries identified by counterintelligence were not detained, but were given the opportunity to leave. (In 1969, Pavel was put on trial and shot by the Czechoslovak authorities.)

Activities of foreign authorities, military and media

During this period, consultative meetings of representatives of NATO countries were held, at which possible measures were studied to bring Czechoslovakia out of the socialist camp. The United States expressed its readiness to influence Czechoslovakia on the issue of obtaining a loan from capitalist countries, using Czechoslovakia's interest in returning its gold reserves.

In 1968, the Vatican intensified its activities in Czechoslovakia. Its leadership recommended directing the Catholic Church's activities to merge with the "independence" and "liberalization" movements, and to take on the role of "support and freedom in the countries of Eastern Europe", focusing on Czechoslovakia, Poland and the German Democratic Republic.

The population of Czechoslovakia was persistently instilled with the idea that there was no danger of revanchism from the Federal Republic of Germany, and that one could think about returning the Sudeten Germans to the country. The newspaper “General Anzeiger” (Germany) wrote: “The Sudeten Germans will expect from Czechoslovakia, liberated from communism, a return to the Munich Agreement, according to which in the fall of 1938 the Sudetenland ceded to Germany.”

In the program of the National Democratic Party of Germany, one of the points read: “The Sudetenland must again become German, because they were acquired by Nazi Germany within the framework of the Munich Treaty, which is an effective international agreement.” This program was actively supported by the Sudeten German Community and the neo-fascist organization Witikobund.

And the editor of the Czech trade union newspaper Prace, Jirczek, told German television: “About 150 thousand Germans live in our country. One can hope that the remaining 100-200 thousand could return to their homeland a little later.” Of course, no one anywhere recalled the persecution of the Czechs by the Sudeten Germans.

Correspondence from the ADN agency reported that Bundeswehr officers were repeatedly sent to Czechoslovakia for reconnaissance purposes. This applied, first of all, to the officers of the 2nd Army Corps, whose units were stationed near the border of Czechoslovakia.

Later it became known that in preparation for the “Black Lion” exercise of the German troops planned for the fall, the entire command staff of the 2nd Corps, up to and including the battalion commander, visited Czechoslovakia as tourists and traveled along the likely routes of movement of their units.

With the start of the “exercise,” it was planned to take a short push to occupy the territories seized by Germany in 1938 and present the international community with a fait accompli. The calculation was based on the fact that if the USSR and the USA did not fight over the Arab territories captured by Israel in 1967, then they will not now.

In order to create a situation in Czechoslovakia that would facilitate Czechoslovakia's withdrawal from the Warsaw Pact, the NATO Council developed the Zephyr program.

An article in the Finnish newspaper Päivän Sanomat dated September 6, 1968 reported that in the region of Regensburg (Germany) “an organ has worked and continues to function to monitor Czechoslovak events. In July, a special Monitoring and Control Center began operating, which American officers call “Strike Group Headquarters.” It has more than 300 employees, including intelligence officers and political advisers.

The center reported information about the situation in Czechoslovakia to NATO headquarters three times a day.” An interesting remark by a representative of NATO headquarters: “Although due to the entry of Warsaw Pact troops into Czechoslovakia and the conclusion of the Moscow Agreement, the special center did not solve the tasks assigned to it, its activities were and continue to be valuable experience for the future.”

Choice

Thus, by the spring of 1968, the countries of the socialist camp were faced with a choice:
- allow opposition forces to push Czechoslovakia off the socialist path;
- open the way to the East for a potential enemy, jeopardizing not only the Warsaw Pact troop groups, but also the results of the Second World War;

OR
- by the efforts of the commonwealth countries to defend the socialist system in Czechoslovakia and provide assistance to the development of its economy;
- put an end to Munich politics once and for all, rejecting all claims of Hitler’s revanchist heirs;
- put a barrier in front of the new “Drang nach Osten”, showing the whole world that no one will be able to redraw the post-war borders established as a result of the struggle of many peoples against fascism.

Based on the current situation, at the end of July 1968, the second was chosen. However, if the leadership of the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia had not shown such weakness and tolerance towards the enemies of the ruling party and the existing political system, nothing like this would have happened.

The military-political leadership of the USSR and other Warsaw Pact countries closely followed the events in Czechoslovakia and tried to convey their assessment to the authorities of Czechoslovakia. Meetings of the top leadership of the Warsaw Pact countries took place in Prague, Dresden, Warsaw, Cierna nad Tisou. During the meetings, the current situation was discussed, recommendations were given to the Czech leadership, but to no avail.

In the last days of July, at a meeting in Cierna nad Tisou, A. Dubcek was told that if the recommended measures were refused, the troops of the socialist countries would enter Czechoslovakia. Dubcek not only did not take any measures, but also did not convey this warning to the members of the Central Committee and the government of the country.

From a military point of view, there could be no other solution. The separation of the Sudetenland from the Czechoslovak Socialist Republic, and even more so of the entire country from the Warsaw Pact, and its alliance with NATO put the grouping of Commonwealth troops in the GDR, Poland and Hungary under flank attack. The potential enemy received direct access to the border of the Soviet Union.

From the memoirs of the commander of the Alpha group of the KGB of the USSR, Hero of the Soviet Union, retired Major General Gennady Nikolaevich Zaitsev (in 1968 - group leader of the 7th Directorate of the KGB of the USSR during Operation Danube):

« At that time, the situation in Czechoslovakia looked like this.

... It was no longer even the “progressives” from the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia that began to come to the fore, but non-party forces - members of various “social” and “political” clubs, which were distinguished by their orientation towards the West and hatred of Russians. June marked the beginning of a new phase of aggravation of the situation in Czechoslovakia and the leadership of the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia, and in mid-August the Dub-chek team completely lost control over the situation in the country.

It is also noteworthy that some leaders of the Prague Spring believed that the sympathies of the West would certainly materialize in the form of a tough anti-Soviet position of the United States in the event of forceful actions by the Soviet Union».

The task was set: the group led by G.N. Zaitsev to enter the Ministry of Internal Affairs of the Czechoslovak Socialist Republic and take control of it. The Minister of the Ministry of Internal Affairs I. Pavel managed to escape the day before. According to numerous testimonies, I. Pavel, as the Prague Spring developed, gradually liquidated state security agencies, getting rid of communist cadres and supporters of Moscow.

He threatened his employees who tried to work to neutralize the so-called “progressives” (the Club of Non-Party Activists and the K-231 organization) with reprisals. Before the government's decision, they were given an order: to immediately stop jamming foreign broadcasts and begin dismantling the equipment.

... The documents contained information that the Minister of Internal Affairs I. Pavel and the head of the department of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia, General Prhlik, “prepared a project for the creation of a leading Center, which should take all state power into its own hands during times of political tension in the country.” It also spoke of the implementation of “preventive security measures aimed against protests by conservative forces, including the creation of labor camps.”

In other words, the country was carrying out hidden, but very real preparations for the creation of concentration camps, where all forces opposing the regime “with a human face” were to be hidden... And if we add to this the titanic efforts of some foreign intelligence services and agents of Western influence, who intended to tear off the Czechoslovakia from the Eastern Bloc, then the overall picture of events did not look as clear as they are trying to convince us of it.

... How did you manage to capture a by no means small European country in the shortest possible time and with minimal losses? The neutral position of the Czechoslovak army (which was about 200 thousand people armed with modern military equipment at that time) played a significant role in this course of events. I want to emphasize that General Martin Dzur played a key role in that very difficult situation. But the main reason for the low number of casualties was the behavior of Soviet soldiers, who showed amazing restraint in Czechoslovakia.

... According to Czech historians, about a hundred people died during the entry of troops, about a thousand were wounded and injured.

... I am convinced that at that time there was simply no other way out of the crisis. In my opinion, the results of the Prague Spring are very instructive. If it were not for the harsh actions of the USSR and its allies, the Czech leadership, having instantly passed the stage of “socialism with a human face”, would have found itself in the arms of the West. The Warsaw bloc would have lost a strategically important state in the center of Europe, NATO would have found itself at the borders of the USSR.

Let's be completely honest: the operation in Czechoslovakia gave peace to two generations of Soviet children. Or is it not? After all, by “letting go” of Czechoslovakia, the Soviet Union would inevitably face a house of cards effect. Unrest would break out in Poland and Hungary. Then it would be the turn of the Baltic states, and after that the Transcaucasus.”

Start

On the night of August 21, troops of five Warsaw Pact countries entered the territory of Czechoslovakia, and troops landed at the Prague airfield. The troops were ordered not to open fire until they were fired upon. The columns walked at high speeds; stopped cars were pushed off the roadway so as not to interfere with traffic.

By morning, all the advanced military units of the Commonwealth countries reached the designated areas. Czechoslovak troops were ordered not to leave the barracks. Their military camps were blocked, batteries were removed from armored vehicles, fuel was drained from tractors.

It is interesting that in early August, representatives of the People’s Militia units met with their commander A. Dubcek and presented an ultimatum: either he changes the leadership’s policy, or on August 22, the People’s Militia will put all important objects under its control, take power into their own hands, and remove him from his post Secretary General and will demand the convening of a party congress. Dubcek listened to them, but did not answer anything concrete.

The main thing is that he did not tell the commanders of the armed party units subordinate to him personally about the ultimatum he received in Cierna nad Tisou from the leaders of the GDR, Bulgaria, Hungary, Poland and the USSR. Apparently he was counting on something. And when the Warsaw Pact troops entered Czechoslovakia on August 21, the leadership of the detachments and ordinary communists considered this an insult.

They believed that they could cope with the situation in the country themselves, without bringing in foreign troops. Life showed that then they overestimated their strength. Only after the defeat of the opposition in August 1969 did opponents of the regime go underground for a long time.

Attitude of the local population

At first, the attitude of the local population towards the military personnel of the Commonwealth countries was bad. Intoxicated by hostile propaganda, the duplicitous behavior of the top officials of the state, the lack of information about the true reasons for the deployment of troops, and sometimes intimidated by local oppositionists, people not only looked askance at the foreign soldiers.

Stones were thrown at cars, and at night the troops' locations were fired upon from small arms. Signs and markers on the roads were demolished, and the walls of houses were painted with slogans such as “Occupiers, go home!”, “Shoot the occupier!” and so on.

Sometimes local residents secretly came to military units and asked why Soviet troops came. And it would be okay if only Russians came, otherwise they also brought “Caucasians” with “narrow-eyed” people with them. In the center of Europe (!) people were surprised that the Soviet army was multinational.

Actions of the opposition forces

The entry of Allied troops showed the Czech opposition forces and their foreign inspirers that hopes of seizing power were dashed. However, they decided not to give up, but called for armed resistance. In addition to shelling of cars, helicopters and locations of allied troops, terrorist attacks began against Czech party workers and intelligence officers.

The evening edition of the English newspaper The Sunday Times on August 27 published an interview with one of the leaders of the underground. He reported that by August “the underground numbered about 40 thousand people armed with automatic weapons.” A significant part of the weapons was secretly supplied from the West, primarily from Germany. However, it was not possible to use it.

In the very first days after the entry of the Allied troops, in cooperation with the Czech security authorities, several thousand machine guns, hundreds of machine guns and grenade launchers were seized from many hiding places and basements. Even mortars were found.

Thus, even in the Prague house of journalists, which was led by extreme opposition figures, 13 machine guns, 81 machine guns and 150 boxes of ammunition were discovered. At the beginning of 1969, a ready-made concentration camp was discovered in the Tatra Mountains. Who built it and for whom was unknown at that time.

Information and psychological warfare

Another evidence of the existence of organized anti-constitutional forces in Czechoslovakia is the fact that by 8 o’clock on August 21, underground radio stations began operating in all regions of the country, on some days up to 30-35 units.

Not only radio stations that were pre-installed on cars, trains and in secret shelters were used, but also equipment seized from MPVO agencies, from branches of the Union for Cooperation with the Army (such as DOSAAF in the USSR), and from large rural farms.

Underground radio transmitters were combined into a system that determined the time and duration of operation. Capture teams discovered working radio stations deployed in apartments, hidden in the safes of leaders of various organizations. There were also radio stations in special suitcases along with tables of wave transmission at different times of the day. Install the antenna supplied with the station and work.

Radio stations, as well as four underground television channels, disseminated false information, rumors, and calls for the destruction of Allied troops, sabotage, and sabotage. They also transmitted encrypted information and code signals to the underground forces.

The radio transmitters of the West German 701st Psychological Warfare Battalion fit well into this “choir”.

At first, Soviet radio intelligence officers were surprised that a number of anti-government stations were taking direction in the west, but their guesses were confirmed on September 8 by the Stern magazine (Germany).

The magazine reported that on August 23, the newspaper Literary Listy, followed by underground radio, reported that “allied troops fired at the children’s hospital on Charles Square. Windows, ceilings, expensive medical equipment were broken...” A German television reporter rushed to the area, but the hospital building was undamaged.

According to Stern magazine, “this false information was transmitted not from Czech, but from West German territory.” The magazine noted that the events of these days "provided an ideal opportunity for practical training for the 701st Battalion."

If the first leaflets announcing the entry of Allied troops were issued by official government or party bodies and printing houses, then the subsequent ones did not contain any output data. In many cases, the texts and appeals were the same in different parts of the country.

A change of scenery

Slowly, but the situation changed.

The Central Group of Forces was formed, Soviet military units began to settle in the Czech military towns liberated for them, where the chimneys were filled with bricks, the sewers were clogged, and the windows were broken. In April 1969, A. Dubcek was replaced by G. Husak, and the country's leadership changed.

Emergency laws were adopted, according to which, in particular, showing a fist to a Russian “cost” up to three months of imprisonment, and a provoked fight with Russians - six. At the end of 1969, military personnel were allowed to bring their families to the garrisons where construction battalions had built housing. Construction of housing for families continued until 1972.

So, what kind of “occupiers” are these who sacrificed their lives so that civilians would not die, did not respond with a shot to the most blatant provocations, and saved people unknown to them from reprisals? Who lived in hangars and warehouses, and the beds, even in the officers' and women's (for medical staff, typists, waitresses) dormitories, were in two tiers? Who preferred to act not as soldiers, but as agitators, explaining the situation and their tasks to the population?

Conclusion

The deployment of troops from the Warsaw Pact countries into Czechoslovakia was a forced measure aimed at preserving the unity of the countries of the socialist camp, as well as preventing the entry of NATO troops onto the borders of the USSR.

Soviet soldiers were not occupiers and did not behave like invaders. No matter how pretentious it may sound, in August 1968 they defended their country at the forefront of the socialist camp. The tasks assigned to the army were completed with minimal losses.

No matter what modern political scientists say, in that situation the government of the USSR and other countries of the socialist camp made a decision that was adequate to the current situation. Even the current generation of Czechs should be grateful to the Soviet army for the fact that the Sudetenland remained part of the Czechoslovak Socialist Republic and their state exists within modern borders.

"Notes in the Margins"

But here’s what’s interesting and raises questions.

The soldiers who were the first(!) to be called “Internationalist Warriors” are not even recognized as such in Russia, although by Order of the Minister of Defense, Marshal of the Soviet Union A. Grechko No. 242 dated October 17, 1968, they were thanked for fulfilling their international duty.

By order of the USSR Minister of Defense No. 220 dated July 5, 1990, “The list of states, cities, territories and periods of combat operations with the participation of citizens of the Russian Federation” was supplemented by the Republic of Cuba.

For unknown reasons, Czechoslovakia (the only one!) was not included in the list, and, as a result, the relevant documents were not handed over to former military personnel who performed international duty in this country.

The issues of whether or not to recognize the participants in the operation as internationalist soldiers and combat veterans were repeatedly discussed at various levels.

A group of scientists, having analyzed the materials available for study and after meetings with direct participants in the Czechoslovak events, stated that “in 1968, a superbly planned and flawlessly executed military operation was carried out in Czechoslovakia, during which combat operations were carried out. Both from the point of view of military science and the real situation in the use of forces and means.”

And the soldiers and officers who fulfilled their duty during Operation Danube have every right to be called internationalist warriors and fall under the category of “combatants.”

However, the Russian Ministry of Defense does not recognize them as such, and in response to questions and requests from regional organizations of participants in Operation Danube, it replies that there were “only military clashes,” and they were thanked for “fulfilling an international duty,” and not for participating in hostilities.

Today, the youngest participants in Operation Danube are already 64 years old, and every year their ranks become thinner. The last, according to the author of the article, appeal only from the Rostov organization of participants in Operation Danube was sent to the Minister of Defense of the Russian Federation in January of this year. Let's wait to see what the new minister will answer.

On the night of August 21, 1968, troops from five Warsaw Pact countries (USSR, Bulgaria, Hungary, East Germany and Poland) were brought into Czechoslovakia. The operation, codenamed "Danube", was aimed at stopping the process of reforms taking place in Czechoslovakia, initiated by the first secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia, Alexander Dubcek - the "Prague Spring".

From a geopolitical point of view, a dangerous situation arose for the USSR in one of the key countries of Eastern Europe. The prospect of Czechoslovakia withdrawing from the Warsaw Pact, which would result in an inevitable undermining of the Eastern European military security system, was unacceptable for the USSR.

Within 36 hours, the armies of the Warsaw Pact countries established complete control over Czechoslovak territory. On August 23-26, 1968, negotiations took place in Moscow between the Soviet and Czechoslovak leadership. Their result was a joint communique, in which the timing of the withdrawal of Soviet troops was made dependent on the normalization of the situation in Czechoslovakia.

On October 16, 1968, an agreement was signed between the governments of the USSR and Czechoslovakia on the conditions for the temporary presence of Soviet troops on the territory of Czechoslovakia, according to which part of the Soviet troops remained on the territory of Czechoslovakia “in order to ensure the security of the socialist commonwealth.” In accordance with the agreement, the Central Group of Forces (CGV) was created. The headquarters of the Central Military Command was located in the town of Milovice near Prague. The treaty contained provisions on respect for the sovereignty of Czechoslovakia and non-interference in its internal affairs. The signing of the agreement became one of the main military-political results of the entry of troops of five states, which satisfied the leadership of the USSR and the Warsaw Department.

On October 17, 1968, the phased withdrawal of allied troops from the territory of Czechoslovakia began, which was completed by mid-November.

As a result of the entry of troops into Czechoslovakia, a radical change in the course of the Czechoslovak leadership occurred. The process of political and economic reforms in the country was interrupted. In 1969, at the April plenum of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia, Gustav Husak was elected first secretary. In December 1970, the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia adopted the document “Lessons of the crisis development in the party and society after the XIII Congress of the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia,” which generally condemned the political course of Alexander Dubcek and his circle.

In the second half of the 1980s, the process of rethinking the Czechoslovak events of 1968 began. In the “Statement of the leaders of Bulgaria, Hungary, the GDR, Poland and the Soviet Union” dated December 4, 1989 and in the “Statement of the Soviet Government” dated December 5, 1989, the decision to introduce Allied troops to Czechoslovakia was considered erroneous as unjustified interference in the internal affairs of a sovereign state.

On December 10, 1989, after the victory of the Velvet Revolution (the bloodless overthrow of the communist regime as a result of street protests in November-December 1989), Czechoslovak President Gustav Husak resigned and a new coalition government of national accord was formed, in which the communists and the opposition received the same number of places. A “reconstruction” of the parliament was carried out, where the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia lost its majority. On December 28-29, 1989, the reorganized parliament elected Alexander Dubcek as its chairman.