Great Soviet encyclopedia - economic institutions. Institutions of the Soviet economy External and internal institutions

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Introduction

1. Characteristics of internal and external institutions in the Soviet economy

1.1 Definition of an economic institution

2. Institutions of the Soviet economy

3. External and internal institutions of the economy

4. Analysis of the enterprise in the Soviet economy according to the experiment of the state plan

Conclusion

Literature

ATineating

Economic institutes are scientific research institutions in the USSR that carry out research work in the field of economics. In Russia, the first special scientific institution dealing with economic problems was created in 1915? Commission for the study of natural productive forces. After the Great October Socialist Revolution, studies of the economic problems of building socialism and the world capitalist economy were conducted at the Socialist Academy of Social Sciences (1918), which in 1924 was transformed into a communist academy. It included: the Institute of World Economy and World Politics (1925), the Agrarian Institute (1928), the Institute of Economics (1930). Another Institute of Economics worked within the framework of the Russian Association of Research Institutes of Social Sciences. In 1936 the economic institutes of the Komacademy were transferred to the Academy of Sciences of the USSR.

The economic actions of an individual do not take place in an isolated space, but in a certain society. And therefore it is of great importance how society will react to them. Thus, transactions that are acceptable and profitable in one place may not necessarily be viable even under similar conditions in another. An example of this is the restrictions imposed on the economic behavior of a person by various religious cults.

In order to avoid coordinating many external factors that affect success and the very possibility of making a particular decision, within the framework of the economic and social orders, schemes or algorithms of behavior are developed that are most effective under given conditions. These schemes and algorithms, or matrices of individual behavior, are nothing but institutions.

The purpose of this paper is to consider internal and external Soviet economic institutions.

Define the term "institution";

Find out which institutions are called external, which are internal;

Consider Soviet economic institutions;

Consider modern economic institutions;

Draw conclusions on the research material.

In the course of the study, the works of domestic and foreign authors on economics, institutional economics, encyclopedic publications, as well as data posted on the Internet were used.

1. Characteristicinternal and external institutions in the Soviet economy

1.1 Definition of an economic institution

An institution is a set of roles and statuses designed to meet a specific need.

Definitions of institutions can also be found in works of political philosophy and social psychology. For example, the category of institution is one of the central ones in the work of John Rawls "The Theory of Justice". In economic theory, the concept of institution was first included in the analysis by Thorstein Veblen.

Institutions are a common way of thinking with regard to individual relations between society and the individual and the individual functions they perform, the system of social life, which is composed of a set of those acting at a certain time or at any moment in the development of any society, can be characterized from the psychological side in general terms, as a prevailing spiritual position or a common idea of ​​a way of life in society.

Institutions are the dominant and highly standardized social habits.

Institutions are the rules, the mechanisms that enforce them, and the norms of behavior that structure the repetitive interactions between people. It can also be said that institutions are formalized rules and non-formalized norms that structure the interactions between people within economic systems.

Institutions regulate access to the legitimate use of rare and valuable resources, as well as determine the principles of this access. They determine what these or other interests are and how they should be implemented, given the fact that the very scarcity of these resources, which makes it difficult to access them, forms the basis for rivalry and even conflicts in the struggle for their possession. Institutions regulate (structure and consolidate as socially recognized practices) such a struggle of various interests. They define the rules of the game, as well as the goals that can be achieved in this game, but not the moves that players must make during the game, remaining within the institutionally defined space of opportunities, choices and incentives. Institutions determine the ways in which conflict caused by lack of resources can be mitigated and resolved.

Economic institutions are understood as a set of rules and laws that structure social relationships in a special way, the knowledge of which must be shared by all members of society, because these rules have a direct impact on the organization and economic behavior of people.

The functioning of institutions is determined by the nature of their activities, cultural traditions and many other factors, among which efficiency is far from a determining parameter. Change often happens to them because the values ​​that condition their existence change, or they themselves become incompatible with other values ​​and institutions, but not for reasons of efficiency.

2. Institutes withSoviet economy

It is known that the Soviet economic system lacked those mechanisms and institutions that are the main subject of study of Western economic science: competitive (albeit imperfect) markets, currency exchanges, many financial instruments, etc. Russian economists had to develop separate blocks of economic theory, and they did it despite the ideological pressure. Let us consider several specific institutions of the Soviet economy and the problems associated with them. These institutions set the framework for the Soviet economy, and the country will feel its consequences for another 20-25 years. Up to 80% of the fixed assets used by today's enterprises were created under Soviet rule. In the same period, up to 70% of employees who work now and up to 50% of employees who will work in 10 years have grown. Their economic, legal, technological culture was formed in the conditions of the Soviet-type economy. Consider such institutions as: the party, the State plan and the enterprise.

In the literature, the Soviet people, members of the CPSU, and the Politburo were positioned as owners in the Soviet-type economy. Most likely, this is not the case. It is enough to recall how the elections to the party bodies were held to abandon the idea that the Soviet people were the owners. The political structure that existed in the USSR opened the way to the top of the bureaucratic pyramid only for people who were members of the party. It was an option out of 17 million party members. The Politburo could include 17 people, that is, one person in a million. But, at least, they did not choose from non-party people, only party members had a chance to enter. On the other hand, everything cannot be reduced to the Politburo, because the members of the Politburo could be re-elected if they lost the support of the secretaries of the regional committees, members of the Central Committee, or clearly did not fulfill the tasks assigned to them, etc. Thus, it was a totalitarian self-sustaining system, and since it was self-selective, interest always focused on the top. There are a number of serious works on this subject. Svetozar Pejović, a major institutionalist who wrote about the Soviet economy in the 1970s and 80s, considers the Politburo to be the ultimate owner because its members had some liabilities for their decisions. However, the fact that the Politburo was the ultimate decision-maker does not mean that its members were the real owners.

Members of the Politburo did not exist as real owners - they were very significantly limited in their decisions and could not go beyond fairly strict consumption norms. The limited opportunities to satisfy personal interests, material consumption for themselves and their families, which the members of the Politburo had, clearly demonstrate that they were not owners. They were the top executives, and they were squeezed just as tightly as their subordinates, the party bureaucrats, if not more. The owner is free in relation to the subject of his property, and the members of the Politburo were not free as much as possible. Mutual responsibility is a very accurate description of the system that existed in our country.

The hypothesis was widely discussed (and it is closest to the truth) that the collective owner in the USSR was the nomenklatura. This point of view was held, for example, by M. Voslensky and M. Djilas. The nomenklatura included all the leaders who were part of the administrative and party systems of subordination (that is, about 1 million people). Party organizations nominated and approved their candidacies. All personnel movements were carried out from the corresponding department or the Central Committee, or regional committees, or district committees of the CPSU. By controlling personnel appointments, the party thus controlled the replenishment of the "new class" itself.

The Soviet-style economy is often compared to the "Asian" mode of production, which was also characterized by a pyramid of officials (although at the top there was a tsar, but in many states he became a ritual victim after some time).

It can be assumed that the Soviet system is a unique system in which there was no supreme owner with a free choice in relation to objects of public property. There is a fundamental, from the point of view of economic theory, position: always and everywhere a complete unconditional private owner is needed; if the interests of the private owner are not protected, then with any distribution of property, the system will be economically inefficient.

The classics of Marxism believed that commodity relations in society are harmful, because they stimulate egoism, and considered them from a purely technological point of view, believing it possible to collect all resources and all information in the center, systematically calculate and distribute in an optimal way. institute soviet economy planning

The idea of ​​a "single factory" dominated our political economy. In the 1960s and 70s prominent mathematicians who worked at the Central Economics and Mathematics Institute (among whom, for example, was S. S. Shatalin), created the theory of the optimal functioning of the socialist economy - SOFE - which suggested the possibility of optimizing all flows at the level of the national economy, which they presented in the form " single factory. Naturally, this was only a theoretical model; in practice, it was not applicable. In reality, society is prevented from functioning as a single factory by three types of transaction costs - measurement costs; costs of acquiring and transferring information; agency costs. But still, public property, which acts as the property of the socialist state, had to find in itself certain mechanisms for implementation, and state planning became such a mechanism.

3. External and internal institutions of the economy

There are two types of institutions in the economic literature:

* External - establishing the basic rules in the economic system, ultimately determining its nature (for example, the institution of ownership);

ѕ Internal - which make transactions between entities possible, reduce the degree of uncertainty and risk, and reduce transaction costs (enterprises, types of contracts, payment and credit funds, means of accumulation).

Therefore, the study of institutions, as well as other complex economic phenomena, must begin with their classification. Let us consider in more detail the typology of institutions depending on their functional role in the economy. This classification includes two types of institutions:

* system (or external)

* local-organizational (internal).

Systemic institutions are those that determine the type of economic order, that is, the dominant type of economic system. These institutions establish the basic rules of economic activity, therefore they include not only purely economic rules and norms, but also political and ethical ones, without which the effective functioning of the entire economic system is impossible. An example of systemic institutions can be institutions that specify and protect property rights, determine the procedure for making and changing economic decisions, the norms of economic ethics, etc.

Local-organizational are the institutions that structure the interactions associated with the conclusion of transactions, both on the open market and within organizational structures. Such institutions as, for example, stock and commodity exchanges, banks, firms, not only make transactions between various economic entities possible, but also reduce the degree of uncertainty and risk, and help reduce transaction costs. The functioning of such institutions is associated with the activities of organizations associated with them, which creates a dichotomy.

The division of institutions into systemic and local-organizational ones makes it possible to deepen the analysis of institutional equilibrium. Institutional "markets" of the above two types of institutions are formed and function separately. This does not mean that the formation of systemic institutions does not affect the functioning and selection of local organizational institutions, and vice versa. By analogy, their interaction can be compared with the goods of higher and lower orders by K. Menger. Consequently, systemic institutions are goods of a higher order, and local organizational ones are of a lower order.

Very important, especially for the economy in transition, is the difference between external institutions as fundamental prerequisites for a market economy and internal institutions created by corporations in the course of their development. External institutions form a set of fundamental norms and rules on the basis of which the implementation of a market economy is possible. These are institutions that guarantee and protect property rights, ensure responsibility, freedom and obligation to fulfill contracts, form the basis of a market economy, and at the same time are derivative elements of a general legal democratic and free state order.

Within this given framework, numerous directly market (internal) institutions arise that make possible communications, transactions between subjects, reduce the degree of uncertainty and risk, that is, they represent forms of adaptation of management to external institutions. Their formation went from the bottom up and continued for a long time, being tested for strength, efficiency and compliance with the interests of economic entities. The functioning of internal institutions is constantly carried out under double control: legal - on the part of the state - and economic - on the part of the market.

All these institutions are united by common features:

* they are characteristic of the division of labor system;

- they operate on the basis of the principle of contractual relations.

Systemic institutions are understood as institutions that determine the type of economic order. An example of systemic institutions are institutions that determine the procedure for making and changing economic decisions, business ethics, etc. Local organizational institutions are institutions that structure interactions related to making transactions, both on the open market and within organizational structures. This category includes such institutions as, for example, commodity exchanges, financial and investment and other institutions.

4. Enterprise Analysisin the Soviet economy by expgovernment plan

The state plan was the center in which all information about the production capabilities of all enterprises was collected, and where forecasts were made, that is, several strategies for allocating resources were calculated in order to meet certain needs. Thus, a unique experiment was carried out in the USSR for 70 years. In fact, it began from the time of war communism, although the State Plan itself, as an institution that collects information and gives commands to the places, arose about five years later, in the early 1920s. This experiment was limited because there was no market in which resources could be valued.

All that the State Plan could do and honestly did, because many brilliant specialists worked there, was to collect information and plan the distribution of resources in the amount of 2000 items. In the State Plan itself, about 2,000 responsible workers were involved in this. In addition, the State Plan gave tasks to about 50 line ministries, which detailed them. The range of products, which were directly controlled by the ministries, amounted to 38,000 items. 2,000+38,000=40,000 items of products in physical terms, described with a certain standard - this is the maximum that the Soviet system was capable of at the apogee of its information and computing capabilities. The system of material balances for more than 2,000 positions - a huge table where it was shown in dynamics which industry went where - was a huge achievement of Soviet economic science. The successor of this scientific school is the Institute of National Economic Forecasting. However, despite this amazing system of planning, it should be noted and its very significant negative side.

With 40,000 planned (passed through 50,000 officials) nomenclature of products, its real nomenclature in the 1970s. was by no means 40 thousand, but somewhere between 1-1.5 million. That is, the State Plan captured and aggregated only 4% of the real range of products, even if it was 1 million items. Such coarsening of estimates, teams, strategies led, first of all, to our lagging behind in the system of technological tolerances for products.

It is the limited computing ability that explains the presence of 2 thousand in Gosplan and 40 thousand in total in the country of product names.

The planning system had its drawbacks and risks. The planning system for the enterprise itself very often failed. The enterprise received both the production plan and suppliers, and the suppliers of the enterprise were strictly defined, there were no alternatives. And if the supplier of this enterprise disrupted deliveries, that is, the system of in-kind planning, in-kind indication of production plans and suppliers for each enterprise was extremely fragile, which constantly led to some of its breakdown - to the disruption of plans.

The enterprise was a separate part of public property. The creation of a separate enterprise, in contrast to the idea of ​​a “single factory”, is a huge step towards realities, which was partially made under I.V. Stalin, and the enterprise received basic rights under A.N. Kosygin. Thus, two stages in the existence of Soviet enterprises can be distinguished. At first it was a Stalinist-type enterprise, to which all indicators were strictly planned, which did not have the right to sell its funds at all. And then this is an enterprise of the Kosygin type, which got the opportunity to form material incentive funds, independently set a labor plan, produce above-plan products and sell them on the free market (at the same time, prices remained fixed, but the supplier was not specified). But in any case, both the Stalin-type enterprise and the Kosygin-type enterprise represent a kind of separate part of public property.

The enterprise was managed by a director who acted as the main agent of the government. The company received from above:

1. The range, or rather, the range of products.

2. Financial plan.

3. Suppliers and consumers with fixed prices for products.

4. Capital resources.

The enterprise was controlled along three lines:

ѕ State plan and the ministry - according to the range of products;

ѕ by the Ministry of Finance, the Central Bank, the sectoral bank - on the execution of planned ratios, planned profitability;

* party structures.

Conclusion

Institutions are formalized rules and non-formalized norms that structure interactions between people within economic systems. Systemic, or external, are institutions that determine the type of economic order, that is, the dominant type of economic system. These institutions establish the basic rules of economic activity, therefore they include not only purely economic rules and norms, but also political and ethical ones, without which the effective functioning of the entire economic system is impossible.

Local-organizational are the institutions that structure the interactions associated with the conclusion of transactions, both on the open market and within organizational structures.

It was considered the main institutions of the Soviet economy and that for the Russian economy the problem of the "Soviet legacy" is of fundamental importance. The technological basis of the country, if it has undergone any significant changes, then, rather, for the worse - there were significantly more lost elements of the production system than appeared again.

Today, both domestic and foreign experts, regardless of belonging to one or another economic school, see the main reason for the current situation in the fact that despite the presence in the Russian economy of all the attributes of a market economy, their institutional direction is far from complete. Market institutions operate in a mode that does not meet modern requirements for the organization of the national economy. Therefore, the Russian economic system can be defined as institutionally imperfect and therefore requiring the continuation of its reform.

Literature

1. Alekseev A. V. The economic policy of the Russian government is a prisoner and generator of the “institutional trap” // Transformation of economic institutions in post-Soviet Russia. Moscow, MONF, 2000.

2. . Borisov E. F. Economic theory: Textbook. - M.: Jurist, 2002.

3. Zimenkova R. - M., Finance and statistics: Textbook, 2002.

Russia: integration into the world economy.

4. Kokorev V. E. Institutional transformations in modern Russia: analysis of the dynamics of transaction costs//Voprosy ekonomiki.1996. #12

5. North D. Institutions and economic growth: a historical introduction. Theory and history of economic and social systems, - M., 1993

6. North D. Institutional changes: a framework for analysis. - M., 1995.

7. Postnikov S. L., Popov S. A. World economy and the economic situation in Russia. Collection of statistical materials. - M., Finance and statistics, 2001.

8. Modern economy / under. ed. M. V. Nazarova M., 1998 C 152

9. Economy of Russia: Proc. allowance. - M.: Jurist, 2002.

10. Economic theory. Tasks, logical schemes, methodological materials / Ed. A. I. Dobrynin, L. S. Tarasevich. - St. Petersburg: Peter. 2001.

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It is known that the Soviet economic system lacked those mechanisms and institutions that are the main subject of study of Western economic science: competitive (albeit imperfect) markets, currency exchanges, many financial instruments, etc. Russian economists had to develop separate blocks of economic theory, and they did it despite the ideological pressure. Let us consider several specific institutions of the Soviet economy and the problems associated with them. These institutions set the framework for the Soviet economy, and the country will feel its consequences for another 20-25 years. Up to 80% of the fixed assets used by today's enterprises were created under Soviet rule. In the same period, up to 70% of employees who work now and up to 50% of employees who will work in 10 years have grown. Their economic, legal, technological culture was formed in the conditions of the Soviet-type economy. Consider such institutions as: the party, the State plan and the enterprise.

In the literature, the Soviet people, members of the CPSU, and the Politburo were positioned as owners in the Soviet-type economy. Most likely, this is not the case. It is enough to recall how the elections to the party bodies were held to abandon the idea that the Soviet people were the owners. The political structure that existed in the USSR opened the way to the top of the bureaucratic pyramid only for people who were members of the party. It was an option out of 17 million party members. The Politburo could include 17 people, that is, one person in a million. But, at least, they did not choose from non-party people, only party members had a chance to enter. On the other hand, everything cannot be reduced to the Politburo, because the members of the Politburo could be re-elected if they lost the support of the secretaries of the regional committees, members of the Central Committee, or clearly did not fulfill the tasks assigned to them, etc. Thus, it was a totalitarian self-sustaining system, and since it was self-selective, interest always focused on the top. There are a number of serious works on this subject. Svetozar Pejović, a major institutionalist who wrote about the Soviet economy in the 1970s and 80s, considers the Politburo to be the ultimate owner because its members had some liabilities for their decisions. However, the fact that the Politburo was the ultimate decision-maker does not mean that its members were the real owners.

Members of the Politburo did not exist as real owners - they were very significantly limited in their decisions and could not go beyond fairly strict consumption norms. The limited opportunities to satisfy personal interests, material consumption for themselves and their families, which the members of the Politburo had, clearly demonstrate that they were not owners. They were the top executives, and they were squeezed just as tightly as their subordinates, the party bureaucrats, if not more. The owner is free in relation to the subject of his property, and the members of the Politburo were not free as much as possible. Mutual responsibility is a very accurate description of the system that existed in our country.

The hypothesis was widely discussed (and it is closest to the truth) that the collective owner in the USSR was the nomenklatura. This point of view was held, for example, by M. Voslensky and M. Djilas. The nomenklatura included all the leaders who were part of the administrative and party systems of subordination (that is, about 1 million people). Party organizations nominated and approved their candidacies. All personnel movements were carried out from the corresponding department or the Central Committee, or regional committees, or district committees of the CPSU. By controlling personnel appointments, the party thus controlled the replenishment of the "new class" itself.

The Soviet-style economy is often compared to the "Asian" mode of production, which was also characterized by a pyramid of officials (although at the top there was a tsar, but in many states he became a ritual victim after some time).

It can be assumed that the Soviet system is a unique system in which there was no supreme owner with a free choice in relation to objects of public property. There is a fundamental, from the point of view of economic theory, position: always and everywhere a complete unconditional private owner is needed; if the interests of the private owner are not protected, then with any distribution of property, the system will be economically inefficient.

The classics of Marxism believed that commodity relations in society are harmful, because they stimulate egoism, and considered them from a purely technological point of view, believing it possible to collect all resources and all information in the center, systematically calculate and distribute in an optimal way. institute soviet economy planning

The idea of ​​a "single factory" dominated our political economy. In the 1960s and 70s prominent mathematicians who worked at the Central Economics and Mathematics Institute (among whom, for example, was S. S. Shatalin), created the theory of the optimal functioning of the socialist economy - SOFE - which suggested the possibility of optimizing all flows at the level of the national economy, which they presented in the form " single factory. Naturally, this was only a theoretical model; in practice, it was not applicable. In reality, society is prevented from functioning as a single factory by three types of transaction costs - measurement costs; costs of acquiring and transferring information; agency costs. But still, public property, which acts as the property of the socialist state, had to find in itself certain mechanisms for implementation, and state planning became such a mechanism.

There are two types of institutions in the economic literature:

* External - establishing the basic rules in the economic system, ultimately determining its nature (for example, the institution of ownership);

ѕ Internal - which make transactions between entities possible, reduce the degree of uncertainty and risk, and reduce transaction costs (enterprises, types of contracts, payment and credit funds, means of accumulation).

Therefore, the study of institutions, as well as other complex economic phenomena, must begin with their classification. Let us consider in more detail the typology of institutions depending on their functional role in the economy. This classification includes two types of institutions:

* system (or external)

* local-organizational (internal).

Systemic institutions are those that determine the type of economic order, that is, the dominant type of economic system. These institutions establish the basic rules of economic activity, therefore they include not only purely economic rules and norms, but also political and ethical ones, without which the effective functioning of the entire economic system is impossible. An example of systemic institutions can be institutions that specify and protect property rights, determine the procedure for making and changing economic decisions, the norms of economic ethics, etc.

Local-organizational are the institutions that structure the interactions associated with the conclusion of transactions, both on the open market and within organizational structures. Such institutions as, for example, stock and commodity exchanges, banks, firms, not only make transactions between various economic entities possible, but also reduce the degree of uncertainty and risk, and help reduce transaction costs. The functioning of such institutions is associated with the activities of organizations associated with them, which creates a dichotomy.

The division of institutions into systemic and local-organizational ones makes it possible to deepen the analysis of institutional equilibrium. Institutional "markets" of the above two types of institutions are formed and function separately. This does not mean that the formation of systemic institutions does not affect the functioning and selection of local organizational institutions, and vice versa. By analogy, their interaction can be compared with the goods of higher and lower orders by K. Menger. Consequently, systemic institutions are goods of a higher order, and local organizational ones are of a lower order.

Very important, especially for the economy in transition, is the difference between external institutions as fundamental prerequisites for a market economy and internal institutions created by corporations in the course of their development. External institutions form a set of fundamental norms and rules on the basis of which the implementation of a market economy is possible. These are institutions that guarantee and protect property rights, ensure responsibility, freedom and obligation to fulfill contracts, form the basis of a market economy, and at the same time are derivative elements of a general legal democratic and free state order.

Within this given framework, numerous directly market (internal) institutions arise that make possible communications, transactions between subjects, reduce the degree of uncertainty and risk, that is, they represent forms of adaptation of management to external institutions. Their formation went from the bottom up and continued for a long time, being tested for strength, efficiency and compliance with the interests of economic entities. The functioning of internal institutions is constantly carried out under double control: legal - on the part of the state - and economic - on the part of the market.

All these institutions are united by common features:

* they are characteristic of the division of labor system;

- they operate on the basis of the principle of contractual relations.

Systemic institutions are understood as institutions that determine the type of economic order. An example of systemic institutions are institutions that determine the procedure for making and changing economic decisions, business ethics, etc. Local organizational institutions are institutions that structure interactions related to making transactions, both on the open market and within organizational structures. This category includes such institutions as, for example, commodity exchanges, financial and investment and other institutions.

The variety of institutions needs to be structured according to different criteria to identify their role, nature and functions in the coordination of social life.

Institutions are divided into formal (for example, the Constitution, laws) and informal (for example, nationalism, interest organizations - rockers, hazing in the army, informal leaders in groups, religious communities whose activities are contrary to the laws of society, a circle of neighbors. In the first half of the 20th century, many informal organizations and movements appeared in many countries (including the "Greens") involved in environmental protection and environmental problems, an informal organization of television drama lovers).

Informal institutions are usually understood as generally accepted conventions and ethical codes of human behavior. These are customs, "laws", habits or normative rules, which are the result of the close coexistence of people. Thanks to them, people easily find out what others want from them, and understand each other well. These codes of conduct are shaped by culture.

Formal institutions are understood as rules created and maintained by specially authorized people (government officials).

The process of formalizing restrictions is associated with increasing their impact and reducing costs through the introduction of uniform standards. The costs of protecting the rules are, in turn, associated with establishing the fact of violation, measuring the degree of violation and punishing the violator, provided that the marginal benefits exceed the marginal costs, or at least not higher than them (MB ≥ MC). Property rights are realized through a system of incentives (anti-incentives) in a set of alternatives facing economic agents. The choice of a certain course of action ends with the conclusion of a contract.

Control over compliance with contracts can be both personalized and non-personalized. The first is based on family ties, personal loyalty, shared beliefs or ideological convictions. The second is on the provision of information, the application of sanctions, formal control carried out by a third party, and ultimately leads to the need for organizations

According to the way of formulating allocate:

At this stage of the study, we distinguish two criteria: the nature of the occurrence and the method of formulation. In accordance with the second criterion, the following are distinguished:

Prescriptive institutions that tell individuals what actions to take to achieve a specific outcome. Prescriptive institutions guide people positively, telling them what to do and establishing the course of action dictated by the leader.

Prohibitive institutions that exclude certain classes of unacceptable behavior (such as not speeding or stealing). Prohibitive rules leave actors much more freedom of action than do prescriptive ones, excluding certain harmful classes of actions (for example, "don't do..." institutions). An example of prohibitive institutions is the Ten Commandments, which exclude certain types of actions - "not." Another example is the well-known Hippocratic Oath (5th century BC), which teaches medical practitioners not to harm the patient. Such forbidding rules do not give targeted commands and leave enough room for individuals to exercise autonomous judgment and action.

As a result of both types of institutions, the behavior of people is coordinated: in the case of an order, by a visible hand and in accordance with the plan of a certain leader, in the case of prohibitive rules, voluntarily and spontaneously. Prescriptive rules are the most significant part of a planned, coercive order, while law-abiding behavior based on prohibitions is typical of spontaneous orders, such as a market economy, whose rules coordinate people through the mechanism of an "invisible hand".

There is an important difference between prescriptive and prohibitive institutions. In the case of the prescriptive nature of the establishment of rules, the subject of management - the leader who creates instructions and instructions - usually needs a much larger amount of specific knowledge than someone who only excludes certain types of actions. He who prescribes the conduct of others must be aware of the means and possibilities of the actors, as well as of the possible conditions and circumstances of the prescribed actions. In the case of the prohibition and exclusion of certain types of behavior, the subject of control only needs to know that certain actions are understood by individuals, and the specific details and assessment of the consequences are provided to the actors themselves. Thus, paradoxically, individuals get more freedom when they are guided by prohibitions.

By the nature of the formation institutions are divided into internal and external. Internal institutions are rules that develop within a group as a result of shared experience; external institutions - rules created from outside and imposed on society by political action from above. Many of the rules that influence our behavior are the result of the evolution of society and have always functioned on the basis of law-abiding behavior.

In the case of establishing institutions from above (by the state, parliament or bureaucracy), a fundamental problem arises: political agents, who are obliged to act in the interests of citizens, tend to exceed their powers and use rules and enforcement mechanisms for their own benefit, so the political process itself must be subject to certain clear rules. The effectiveness of external institutions largely depends on whether they complement internally developed institutions: for example, whether legislation supports the morality of society, its cultural foundations, customs and manners. Let us dwell in more detail on the features of these institutions.

Internal institutions evolve from people's experiences and incorporate solutions that have served their best in the past. Examples are customs, ethics, good manners, commercial conventions, common law in Anglo-Saxon society. Violations of internal institutions are usually punished by other members of society informally, although there may be formal sanctions for enforcing internal institutions. In its analysis of the emergence of internal institutions, institutional economics borrows much from moral philosophy, anthropology, psychology, and sociology. Each country has its own written law, reflected in various legal documents, and customary law, supported by public opinion. It is in the public interest to ensure that the difference between customary and written law is minimal. Law will be natural for society if the law becomes a continuation of the sanctions of public opinion.

Four rather broad, sometimes overlapping, categories of internal institutions can be distinguished, differing in the way they are observed and the sanctions for their violation.

1. Conventions are convenient rules that individuals voluntarily adhere to in their own interests. For example, in communication, it is an attraction to certain dictionary definitions and grammatical rules, since it is necessary to be understood. Other examples of conventions are the customs of denoting prices in money, denoting interest rates as percentages per year, etc. Individuals adhere to socially accepted conventions because this is rewarded by improved communication, and also due to exclusion from interaction when conventions are ignored.

2. Assimilated (internalized) rules - the second type of internal institutions, where the rules are usually obeyed spontaneously and without hesitation (like a conditioned reflex). Individuals, receiving education and experience, learn the rules of this type throughout their lives. Many rules turn into personal preferences of individuals and are consistently used by them. Such learned rules constitute, for example, morality. The fact that you can’t lie and you need to carefully pay off your debts are the rules of behavior that people learn from childhood and are observed as a conditioned reflex. Assimilated rules are both personal preferences and limiting frames, acting as constraints and protecting people from instinctive opportunism, saving them from unnecessary coordination costs and conflicts. Violations of internalized rules are usually punished with what is commonly called pangs of conscience (in other words, people bear mental costs). Sanctions can be introduced by reference to symbols. For example, the ethical rule “thou shalt not steal” in the Mosaic tradition became a commandment, the violation of which would grieve God. As A. Smith said: "Religion, even in its cruelest form, endowed the rules of morality with sanctions long before the era of artificial reasoning and philosophy." In the East Asian tradition, in particular in Confucianism, much attention is paid to moral education, which helps young people to adopt the rules of interpersonal communication. Members of society are brought up within the framework of strictly observed moral institutions, which voluntarily, or at least without formal coercion, limit them.

One benefit of internalized accepted rules that encourage conscious obedience and a high degree of adherence to the rules is that members of society save on coordinating costs. In communities where people are honest because they have adopted honesty as a rule, agents incur lower decision-making costs and less risk of “accidents” than their competitors in communities where deceit is common, and the agents wonder all the time whether they will get away with their deceit this time, and what possible punishment they risk in doing so. The adopted learned (internalized) rules that establish trust significantly reduce costs compared to a situation where trust depends on the conclusion of explicit, mutual contracts, the implementation of which must be monitored.

3. Customs and good manners are the third type of internal institutions, the violation of which does not automatically lead to organized sanctions, but the rest of the society tends to informally observe the observance of the rules. Violators get a bad reputation or are excluded from the community and ostracized. Being kicked out of a group can be a very powerful punishment. For example, an American Indian expelled from a tribe was effectively sentenced to certain death because he could hardly survive outside the group. Another example of the effectiveness of customs is the loss of a repeat business by a misbehaving party, which is a serious punishment, since trade is for the most part not a single act, but a process of bilateral relations. The costs of finding contract partners cost a lot of resources, it is better not to risk them. Only in the "final game" there is no such punishment, so due to the persistence of punishment, most exchange acts are organized as repeated games. Customs can also be used by partners who offer a "collateral" (for example, a down payment, which is confiscated in case of default). A pledge can be a reputation that suffers in the event of the sale of a low-quality product, etc.

4. Formalized internal rules are the fourth type of internal institutions. These rules arose empirically, on the basis of positive experience, but the observation of their observance takes place within the group formally: communities, groups of people create internal rules, which are then implemented in an organized way through a third party. The third party may be specialists who clarify the rules and announce possible sanctions, arbitrators who make appropriate decisions on the interpretation of laws and sanctions. An example is the practice of self-regulation in professional associations. Trade and finance in most communities are based on internal institutions set up by merchants and bankers to conduct business. Thus, Eastern bazaars and European markets have developed a complex system of trading rules that are interpreted and formally enforced by elected leaders or public arbitrators.

Another example of this type of internal rule is international trade based on trade-written laws (lex mercatoria) that are enforced by professional associations and arbitrators, but not by supranational bodies. These kinds of internal institutions are much more effective in facilitating business than externally enforced laws. self-control and formal coercion are carried out by people who have great knowledge of the specifics of the time, place and profession (whereas external arbitrators always have limited knowledge).

The first three categories of internal institutions are informal, since sanctions for violation of socially expected behavior are not applied in an organized manner, but are carried out spontaneously. The fourth category of domestic institutions is formal in that sanctions are "spoken" and violations are punished through organized mechanisms. The difference between formal and informal here refers to the way in which sanctions are applied: organized (formal) and unorganized (informal).

The first two categories of informal institutions tend to have a high degree of self-discipline: performed by individuals out of self-interest or out of conscience. A by-product of the behavior of individuals is a subconscious consideration of the interests of others. Where these mechanisms of institutional control are more practiced, the last two types of domestic institutions, as well as formal legal and regulatory control, are less necessary.

Spontaneous adherence to internal institutions has a positive effect on individual freedom, since, by being able to control themselves and refrain from opportunistic behavior, people gain greater freedom from formal, coercive sanctions. In a society where individuals can pursue their own goals, self-discipline and adherence to codes of conduct make effective interactions much easier. Internal institutions can be effective and sufficient to bring order even in very difficult situations.

The following types of external institutions can be distinguished in accordance with their content and goals:

1. External rules of conduct, designed to limit the actions of citizens in ways similar to internal rules; they consist of universal, prohibitive rules and are contained in the civil, commercial, and criminal codes of most countries. Private and commercial codes also contain numerous formal, prescriptive conditions that should facilitate human interactions and transactions.

2. The second type of external rules are target directives directing public and private agents to implement predetermined outcomes. Such institutions may be found in written laws, but in many countries they are found mainly in statutes based on more general legislation. Being prescriptive, target directives impose high demands on the necessary knowledge.

3. External institutions can be procedural or meta rules for various state agents, regulating their behavior (administrative law). Many of these institutions aim to maintain the internal coherence of the rule system. Procedural rules are critical to the effectiveness of external rules. For example, rules that protect citizens from arbitrariness by law enforcement, formulated in general terms, contain precise instructions on procedures, and reduce the costs of information gathering and decision-making.

Internal institutions order mainly the behavior of members of society. Despite the high efficiency of internal rules, almost all complex, large communities must also adopt external rules. The reason is that internal institutions in complex, mass societies cannot get rid of all acts of opportunism, since often interactions with strangers who will never meet again, so many informal sanctions (such as tit-for-tat, ostracism or loss of reputation) are ineffective in preventing opportunistic behavior. In such communities, the Prisoner's Dilemma 3 is highly likely to occur, so formal rules are useful in supporting cooperative behavior.

External institutions appeared relatively late in the history of mankind. It seems no coincidence that the invention of agriculture and pastoralism, which made it necessary to respect the rights of private property in land, animals, and the income from them, coincided with the emergence of legislators, judges, and the state. Although external institutions depend on political decisions and the government, this does not mean that the state owns external institutions; often government agencies only codify existing laws. External institutions are protected by power, although they serve all members of society.

External institutions may emerge formally through political processes, such as constitution-making or lawmaking; they may also come about through administrative action (when the authorities issue specific circulars on the basis of more general legislation). In some countries, external institutions are largely created by judges proposing new interpretations of existing laws, such as in Anglo-Saxon countries with a common law tradition, where "laws made by judges" - so-called case law - are often found. External institutions have the advantage of state power in setting and enforcing rules over relying on internal rules. There are a number of advantages to the collective political establishment and enforcement of rules. Let's dwell on them in more detail.

External institutions are easier to recognize and therefore reduce information costs. Existing customs and conventions may be ambiguous, vague and not well known. Officially codified internal institutions become more effective and sanctions are explicitly set, which strengthens the normative function of rules. Strengthening institutions by their formalization, combined with punishment for violations, has been an effective process in improving the conditions of human life. Such lawmaking made it difficult for inattentive, careless, dishonest and other actions of people. As early as the end of the 18th century, the American statesman J. Madison said: "If people were angels, there would be no need for government."

The spontaneous interpretation of internal rules by members of society can be unsystematic (random) and biased. The application of internal rules may be, for example, more lenient towards the rich, the popular, or the beautiful. To limit arbitrariness and prejudice, public leaders with a reputation for justice may be elected as judges. Fairness here means that everyone is equal before the law and the rules are objective in protecting people from coercion. Judges develop and promulgate the rules by which disputes are resolved, including the rules of procedure, which is known as "due process". The production of external rules meets the requirements not only for the implementation of justice, but also for the demonstration of the correction of justice in order to normatively influence behavior.

The implementation of the rules does not necessarily require government intervention, but funding the cost of independent judges often makes government funding preferable, as judges who appear informally and lack financial independence are prone to corruption. On the other hand, the material independence of tax-financed judges has proved to be a weak defense against corruption, so that external institutions that facilitate the administration of justice are of great advantage. One of the external institutional tools to achieve this is the existence of several levels of courts. Lower court judges are under the control of higher level judges because they do not want to see their decisions overturned by appeals to higher courts.

In the enforcement of sentences, informal sanctions, such as shame and spontaneous social influence, may not be satisfactory (overly emotional actions such as mob trial, lynching, or expulsion from the community). To prevent banditry, it is necessary to appoint "professionals of violence" (police, jailers, military, etc.), who are allowed to carry out legitimate punishments, perceived by society as fair retribution for a crime. The main argument here is that the state should have a monopoly on the legitimate use of force (except in rare situations of justified self-defence) and that this monopoly should be controlled by non-violent, institutional means of political power. Of course, there is always a certain danger that "professionals of violence" can use skills and tools for their own purposes (the problem of agent-principal), therefore agents of law enforcement must be deterred from voluntaristic actions. Most communities have come to the conclusion that control is best done by turning violent professionals into government agents and looking for non-violent methods to monitor them. The commitment of the state to the protection of individuals does not necessarily mean that all aspects of the protection of citizens have always been under the control of the state. Thus, in medieval Iceland (930-1260), the parliament made most of the rules externally, and the external jurisdiction interpreted the laws and decided particular cases. Both were funded by society, however, the enforcement of laws and court decisions remained in private hands: people who received a sentence in their favor could legally hire private police to enforce the sentence.

An important aspect of institutions is that they allow individuals to make reliable commitments. In certain circumstances, a third party is needed to make contractual obligations reliable, and government agencies may use tools of formal enforcement when they become such a third party.

Another advantage of collective action over private action stems from the “prisoner's dilemma”, when cooperation that is beneficial to society, in order to be sufficiently reliable, needs to be implemented through state-supported institutions. Rival clans suffer by being "imprisoned" in constant conflict. It would be better for everyone to cooperate under the control of an external authority - the state. By withdrawing from the conflict, in the words of J. Buchanan, the parties could receive additional "disarmament rent". Commitment to cooperation makes a deal that resolves the "prisoner's dilemma" more reliable, moreover, peace is better preserved if the deal is curated by a third party in the person of the state.

The problem of "ticketless travel" is closely related to the need for government agencies to comply with the rules. "Free travel" refers to a situation where the costs of information and exclusion are such that it is impossible to exclude others from benefiting from a public good or service. Some assets have indivisible costs or benefits where other users cannot be easily excluded, i.e. we are dealing with a public good. Thus, it is too expensive to exclude outsiders from access to private broadcasting. However, technology changes over time and in the future will allow this kind of exception, so that the free rider problem will disappear and private production will become achievable. In situations where not enough public goods are produced by privateers, the argument is to nationalize private production and ensure its financing through forced taxation. In this case, nationalization - as a cost-sharing through external organization by the state and control through external institutions - prevents "free travel" and leads to a better provision of the population with public goods.

Another reason for the involvement of the state in the creation and planting of institutions is the "tragedy of the common." The tragedy of the common is a situation in which members of society, acting in isolation, find themselves facing a special "prisoner's dilemma": common resources are used by a large number of people who exploit them mercilessly in their own private interests. If everyone acts like this, then a tragic situation arises when resources are destroyed. The protective, protective state is concerned with the creation, planting, supervision and execution of external institutions; it usually supports the internal institutions of civil society and makes the establishment of the use of resources a central concern of public policy. The members of the group operate a common asset, and as long as there are many resources in relation to demand, there is no problem. But as the number of users increases, resource consumption must be rationed. Internal, informal constraints tend to allocate resources efficiently within small communities where people know each other and where spontaneous performance can work informally on a personal level. It has been found that informal restraints can work satisfactorily in groups of 50 to 70 people. If the group expands, information about individual behavior and informal restrictions on individuals (such as loss of reputation) are not sufficient to control the overexploitation of the common. As a result, there is an overspending and depletion of common resources. In such a situation, external rules have an advantage: the state can set limits on the use of resources. Another solution may be to divide the common into private property.

External institutions and collective action may be preferable in certain circumstances due to the fact that internal institutions often function through discrimination and exclusivity, singling out outsiders, since the sanction of exclusion is only enforceable in this way. Associations of merchants or financiers are built on the basis of complex systems of internal rules, limiting the benefits to members of the association. Examples are the famous fairs in Champagne; Arab merchants engaged in caravan trade; modern Chinese family clans in the Far East. Many people participate in associations based on internal institutions that allow huge amounts of risky business to be carried out at low cost. However, these associations can only function if the number of participants is limited and offenders are excluded. Exclusivity and small size are thus essential for the functioning of internal institutions within such networks. Under certain circumstances, this can have a negative impact, paving the way for monopolies and destroying profitable competition from outsiders. Experience shows that trade and finance, built on informal internal institutions of personal ties, can develop economically to a certain level, beyond which external institutions and the protective state demonstrate economies of scale and guarantee fair, open market access to all. The infrastructures of modern, open, expanded markets require sanctions other than private markets, so certain established, formal laws and a formal legal system are more effective in creating an open order and obtaining a broader, more dynamic division of labor.

These circumstances give rise to the imposition from above and the execution of institutions by the state, what James Buchanan called the "protective function of the state" to promote efficient and just conduct. Of course, this is not the only function of the modern state. Another function of the state relates to the production of public goods and services by state agencies (providing the legal system, national security, etc.), as well as the non-market redistribution of property rights, the introduction and management of taxes and other fees to finance agency and other costs of the state.

Most of the institutions usually created by the state can, in principle, be developed and executed through internal non-state institutions. For example, cheating, doping or violence in sports can be effectively controlled by formal sports bodies that investigate incidents and punish those responsible. However, external institutions are often more effective. State action to protect the rules of conduct is not without alternatives, it only shows that in certain circumstances collective action tends to be comparatively advantageous and allows societies to benefit from economies of scale over purely private action.

External institutions usually serve as essential, coercive support for internal institutions, although they can also replace them. However, if external institutions replace all the internal rules of society, difficulties arise. This was the case with various totalitarian regimes in the 20th century, which imposed more and more external rules at the expense of the inner workings of civil society. The costs of surveillance and coercion increased sharply, the spontaneous motivation of people decreased, and the state machine was overloaded, external coordination led to administrative failures. These problems are not new, and this is confirmed by the fact that even Confucius and the Confucians defended spontaneous coordination and were extremely skeptical about “made” orders, based on external institutions and commands from above: “He who ... wants to restore order in the country and does not rely on customs, resembles a person who wants to plow without a plow, ”said Confucius in the Book of Ceremonies. As you know, the Chinese authorities, trying to replace the traditional civil society with "scientifically constructed" new institutions, banned Confucius after 1949, but ultimately failed and were forced to rely again on internal institutions.

There are two directions in the European tradition of the formation of external institutions: the Anglo-Saxon, which is more based on common law (ie, specific judicial decisions, the development and formatting of external rules); and Roman - the legal tradition reflected in the created legislative systems (such as the French Napoleonic Code, or the German civil and commercial codes of the 19th and 20th centuries). In practice, no legal system exists in its pure form. The application of the common law has been gradually supplemented and replaced by formal, parliamentary legislation, and even carefully drafted formal laws need further judicial refinement based on jurisprudence to work effectively.

The prevailing case law in the Anglo-Saxon tradition, as a result of judicial practice, tends to be open and adaptable, i.e. open to more flexible interpretation, learning and feedback between lawyers and the public, thus embracing the wisdom of a larger number of participants. However, on the other hand, he lacks the consistency, clarity, and transparency of the created codes of the Roman tradition. Jurisprudence-created laws tend to undermine the separation of executive, legislative and judicial powers, and thus the control of power in society. In addition, the costs of applying a common legal system are high, since daily practice requires the services of professional lawyers and frequent court opinions, while potential conflicts often simply do not arise if transparent and comprehensive civil and commercial codes are in place. However, in practice, formal codes also have their drawbacks, since they have long lost their simplicity and logical consistency. Experience shows that parliament's reliance on formal legislation often brings rigidity in times of change. Politicians are responding to the growing complexity of social interactions by issuing complex codes and regulations, often for the benefit of special groups. This undermines the coordinating function of external institutions and provides new evidence that a complex world needs simple rules.

It must be concluded that establishing and enforcing external rules is a difficult task. Relying exclusively on codified law or common law alone will not result in the external rules functioning satisfactorily, so a flexible and carefully calibrated combination of both is the best approach to solving this problem.

institutions that regulate the activities of economic entities and relations between them and implement economic policy at the sectoral, regional, national, interstate and supranational levels. The subject of the world economy can be both an individual and a legal entity. In the first case, we mean an individual entrepreneur, in the second - commercial organizations.

9.5. Innovative business in Russia
institutions that created the foundations of scientific knowledge for the industry found themselves in a difficult position associated with the general crisis of state scientific organizations. Underfunding of fundamental and applied research, aging of scientific equipment, loss of many scientific schools - these are the common and still unresolved problems of many state institutes of metallurgy. Large traditional companies

Some moments of the history of the development of the credit system of Russia
institutions (banks and insurance companies), the National Bank was created on the basis of the State Bank of Russia. Started in 1918 the civil war essentially eliminated the credit system, since in the absence of commodity-money relations, credit lost its significance. This confirms the fact that in those years the People's Bank merged with Narkomfin (Ministry of Finance). The only source of income in the country

*(№)
institute of jurisdiction: Chudinovskikh K. A. Jurisdiction in the system of civil and arbitration procedural law: author. dis. ... cand. legal Sciences. Yekaterinburg, 2002, pp. 13-14. * (14) See: Yakovlev V.F. Civil law method of regulation of public legal relations. Sverdlovsk, 1972, pp. 151-152. * (15) More about this, see: Osipov Yu.K. Legal regulations governing

h 2. FORMS OF THE STATE: FORM OF GOVERNMENT, FORM OF GOVERNMENT, FORM OF STATE REGIME
institutions of democracy. The People's Assembly, and later the People's Tribunate, did everything possible to protect citizens from the abuse of power. Despite the dominant position of the Senate, the public life of the republic mainly ensured the urgency of the powers of officials, their accountability to the people's assembly, and the collegial structure of state institutions. merit of the Roman

3. Social partnership in Russia
institutions of civil society and the formation of a system of regulation of social and labor relations on the basis of social partnership are interrelated and complementary processes. The real weakness of the trade union movement in Russia gave rise to a very curious and interesting variety of social partnership - "the situation of the special role of the state in the system of social partnership." calling

3. Transformation of the Russian economic system
institutions. The same institutions, forms of economic management and management can be very effective in some conditions and completely useless and even harmful in other conditions. Therefore, when implementing economic reforms, one should in no way be guided by direct copying of the models that have developed in other countries. The goals of economic transformation should not contain performance components

1.3. Public administration and state regulation
institutions and tools of public administration can be partly attributed to the state regulation of the economy, while in the other part they are instruments not of regulation, but of direct management. For example, the levying of taxes and tax payments by the state from taxpayers is direct, direct state administration in the form of coercion. In the same time

2.4.3. State planning
institutions and planning tools that are applicable in the conditions of a market economic system that do not contradict the market principles of economic management. According to the above considerations, there is reason to assert that the system of state planning of a market economy is based on the following principles: 1) central planning on the scale of the entire economy of the country is reduced primarily

3.1. State management of the production sector and sectoral structure of production 3.1.1. The role of the state in production management
institutions that allow regulation in the interests of the development of production that is beneficial for all participants and the state itself. Let us single out the main directions of state influence on the production sector of the economy in the conditions of market relations. The general line of action of the state is to pursue a structural policy that, in relation to the branches of the material